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II. Abstract 
 
Free markets encourage a highly-productive/low-cost coffee culture that denies farmers their 
expected income; communities their required healthy environment, indigenous population their 
vital cultural heritage, roasters their envisioned reputation; consumers their desired aromatic 
profile; NGO’s their claimed fairness; authorities their needed social cohesion, etc. All of these 
deprivations are services demanded from the Resource Coffee, which interested actors have 
tried to obtain by activating institutions, such as voluntary sustainable standards based on private 
law, or organic labeling defined by public law, among others. These institutions (dis)incentivize 
farmers, traders, roasters, and consumers to behave differently than mandated by market forces.  
 
Scholars have used the “lens of contract” to analyze the effectiveness of these institutions to 
provide a normatively defined combination of economic, social and environmental services, 
namely the three dimensions of sustainable development. However, the provision of such a 
combination can diminish the provision of other services like the exceptional aromatic profile 
demanded by high-end roasters or the cultural heritage demanded by the indigenous population. 
Expectedly, these deprived actors had activated institutions to fight for their demanded services 
that could cancel the effect of the previously activated institutions. The absence of a wide-
accepted consensus of these institutional effects is not surprising.  
 
We propose a different approach that evaluates the provision of services demanded by actors 
from the Resource Coffee in a given time and space using the “lens of negotiation”.  How do 
actors enhance the sustainable management of coffee, defined as the provision of this whole set 
of demanded services, by reaching local regulatory agreements (LRA)? To answer this question, 
first, we evaluate which type of LRAs optimize the level of services provision depending on the 
combined presence/absence of three conditions: extent or the regulation of uses of the 
Resource; coherence or the governance mechanism; and closure or the market power. Then, we 
explain the emergence of LRAs by actors’ games conceptualized as a sequence of three analytical 
dimensions: actors’ coalition or the joint action agreed by actors to tackle a shared threat for the 
provision of their demanded services; mobilization of action resources or the observable 
engagement of actors in the political arena to activate institutions using a closed-list of ten action 
resources; and institutional creativity or actors’ capability to shape the final output in order to 
incentivize the uses of the Resource needed to profile the demanded services. We selected 
Riosucio and Buesaco, two Colombian municipalities where coffee sparked the highest quantity 
of services for the highest quantity of actors in the most antagonistic way: whereas the LRAs in 
Riosucio are characterized by labels, those in Buesaco are featured by shorter chains.  
 
 Our results suggest that the key to enhancing the sustainable management of Coffee is the 
dialogue at the appropriate resource-perimeter level, in which interested individuals are 
aggregated in collective or corporate actors that represent the whole set of profilers and 
stakeholders in production and consumption. If they solve the first negotiation dilemma 
privileging a power-balanced initial stage, they could solve the second one by agreeing on both 
the combination of services and the distribution of cost/benefits through a minimum of regulated 
uses. Hence, they would trigger the kinds of LRAs that optimize the level of services provision.   
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“Porque para que haya política del café, necesario es que el café haga política”  
 
Mariano Ospina´s words in the fourth Congreso 
Cafetero Colombiano on December 1930, which 
elected him as the first Gerente General de la 
Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia.  
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IV. Introduction   
 
When I started this uncharted journey sponsored by the Colombian Government1 and generously 
welcomed at the IDHEAP’s Public Policy and Sustainability research unit2, I had a goal to “design” 
the appropriate institutions to enhance the sustainability of the Colombian Coffee Cultural 
Landscape (CCCL), an UNESCO’s world heritage site. These institutions would have produced the 
proper incentives to make actors behave “sustainable” because markets were rewarding a 
higher-yield lower-cost coffee culture that put this heritage site at peril.  
 
But what was at peril? Since the International Coffee Agreement in 2001, the sustainability of 
coffee landscapes was defined from the “triple bottom line”: a sustainable development that 
sparks economic prosperity while protecting social cohesion and environmental integrity. This 
objective guided public authorities’ intervention in the CCLC to encourage the sustainable 
intensification of coffee farming. Namely, producing more coffee per unit of area while 
conserving natural Resources3.  
 
However, when I started the exploratory research in this UNESCO’s heritage site in the 
municipality of Riosucio, I faced an unexpected definition of the problem. The local indigenous 
organization perceived that it was the coffee culture itself that had triggered an unsustainable 
relation between their community and Mother Nature. The coffee culture changed the 
cosmovision of the indigenous farmers from a spiritual relationship in which the community 
humbly accepts the privilege and responsibility for using Resources in the quest for their 
collective wellbeing, to a capitalist one in which the land is a productive factor that has to be 
efficiently exploited to produce individual prosperity4.  
 
Hence, well-designed institutions to encourage the sustainability of the CCCL according to the 
public authorities would forcefully diminish the sustainability for the indigenous organization, 
and the other way around.  
 
For me, the different perspectives of the problem according to the various actors was not 
surprising. However, it was shocking to realize that there was no objective definition of the 
sustainability problem. Indeed, my previous academic experience was framed by the evidence-
based policy, a positivist approach that predicts future outcomes through the past data analysis, 
usually through impact evaluation of public interventions. This approach is highly sophisticated 
in its statistic methods, but it is rather simplistic when discussing the desired outcome, privileging 
a literature review to define the problem and operationalize the look-for outcome.  
 
                                                     
1 Convocatoria Colciencias “Doctorado Exterior” No 646 de 2014. 
2 The Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration of the University of Lausanne.  
3 We will distinguish the ¨Resource’` with capital letter from all other “resources”.   
4 This personal reflection is sustained on the contextual chapter of Riosucio in Annex 2.2, which shows how coffee 
culture had affected social cohesion (when the prosperity triggered by the attractive prices of coffee encouraged 
land grabbing and caused dispossession) and endangered the environmental integrity (when synthetic fertilization 
needed for the high-density coffee crop to increase the yield, polluted the soils and water). 
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My first challenge in this journey was to separate the reality I perceived from this positivist 
epistemology because I considered that problems could be always objectively defined and, the 
different perspectives of actors were a symptom that the problem definition was still a work in 
progress by the researcher. Fortunately, I was shaken by the empirical unfolding, which showed 
that it cannot exist one solely definition of the problem because the sustainability of anything 
forcefully has two dimensions: the objective one that is linked to the physical existence of the 
¨thing¨ and the subjective one linked to the actors’ expectations derived from its utilization. 
Indeed, following de Buren (2015), a thing become a Resource5 only when human use it to 
produce goods and services. Furthermore, according to Merton (1995), humans behave 
according to their socially-constructed reality. Hence, the Resource is defined by both, the thing 
and the socially-constructed perception of its goods and services.  
 
In this order of ideas, the Coffee Cultural Landscape of Colombia looked more like a socially 
constructed service from various Resources than a Resource itself. In fact, it is an extremely 
complex social construction because it is produced by the interaction among various Resources 
around the salient one, the Coffee Resource. For example, people from the urban area of Riosucio 
are so familiarized with the steep slopes embellished with the scattered family coffee farms and 
the guadua bamboo clusters alongside its creeks, that when the unprofitable coffee crops had to 
be chopped down for pastures, they feel losing a part of their own identity. On the other hand, 
for indigenous leaders in rural areas of Riosucio, the invasion of this African tree since the end of 
the eighteenth century6 had extinguished the indigenous identity of the local community (annex 
2.2). In both cases, the socially constructed service “the identity” was endangered by either the 
absence or the existence of the coffee crop.  
 
Consequently, as it would be further developed, the urban Riosuceños tried to protect their 
access to the “coffee identity” service by inscribing the CCLC in UNESCO’s world heritage list. 
They expected that farmers in Riosucio would be encouraged to maintain their coffee crops 
because consumers would pay a higher price for their coffee due to the inscription. The 
indigenous-rural Riosuceños tried to protect their access to the “indigenous identity” by 
developing their schools' curriculum around the “seed stewardship”. They expected that the 
same farmers would prioritize staple crops like maize and beans over cash crops like coffee. This 
example demonstrates the salience of the subjective dimension to explain actors’ engagement 
in the political arena to influence the uses of the Resource through the activation of institutions, 
namely the cultural public policy by the former and the education public policy by the latter.  
  
Hence, sustainability has to be defined in terms of both dimensions. If the objective dimension 
can be assessed through a positive approach, which observes the uses of the Resource that 
eventually could lead to practices that protect the reproductive capabilities of the Resource, the 
                                                     
5 We will identify the Resource with capital letters to distinguish it from all other kinds of resources.   
6 According to Topik (2004), at the end of the first millennium, Arabians planted coffee trees in Yemen coming from 
Abissinia (coffee’s center of origin) and created the coffee culture, that afterwards was disseminated throughout the 
Turkish Empire and its commercial partners. Arabians lost the monopoly of coffee production when the Dutch 
planted coffee in Batavia (Indonesia) and then in Surinam in 1714, from where it was disseminated to Venezuela and 
Brazil (Palacios, 2009, p. 48) and to Riosucio in 1890 (Appelbaum, 2007, p. 181). 
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subjective one forcefully needs a constructivist approach, which takes into account the different 
socially-constructed demand for services by actors. Furthermore, the approach has to take into 
account the process through which actors decide which services are going to be obtained from 
the Resource. In this regard, it has to scale up the observations to the agreements among actors 
on the uses of the Resource to profile services.  
 
The international consensus on the sustainability of the coffee crop privileges the objective 
dimension. It takes the triple bottom line definition and frames the problematic through the 
market failure lenses, inviting scholars to find well-designed institutions that correct the 
imperfection. As a result, a non-negligible amount of literature, which we will develop in chapter 
1.3, had focused on this institution-effect relationship focusing on two main types of institutions: 
Voluntary Sustainable Standards (VSS) and Geographical Indications (GI). 
 
Without undermining the explanatory power of economic tools for testing positive hypotheses 
and recommending better practices, we decided to scale up our research changing our “lens of 
contract” that focus on the institution by the “lens of negotiation” to focus on the agreement. 
Thus, we took the political sciences toolbox which fits much better with our constructivist 
approach. 
 
Consequently, following Muradian and Cardenas (2015) recommendations, instead of asking 
which were the “well-designed” institutions that would increase the economic, social and 
environmental sustainability of the Coffee Cultural Landscape (which in the end, would have 
implied to take a position in favor of some actors at the expense of others), we ask which are the 
conditions of an agreement that explains the sustainable management of the Resource Coffee? 
Thereupon, how can we explain the emergence of these conditions?  
 
In this sense, we moved apart from the normative perspective, which would have focused on the 
“objective” sustainability of the Coffee Cultural Landscape and moved towards an explanatory 
perspective which focuses on the “constructivist” sustainable management of the Resource 
Coffee.  
 
The present four-part manuscript is the result of this epistemological change. The first part 
presents the analytical framework and the relevance of our object of study to answer these 
questions. The second and third parts are devoted to the empirical results and the last one ends 
with the conclusions and recommendations.        
  
The first part is divided into four chapters. Chapter one (problematic and state of the art) presents 
the problem of the sustainable management of coffee that gives us a base from which we unroll 
insights from existing literature. We start developing the concept of sustainability to define the 
sustainable management of the Resource system in a given Resource perimeter, as an ideal-type 
state in which all demanded services are guaranteed in their expected life span. We conclude 
that the IRR framework is perfectly equipped for answering our questions thanks to its robustness 
to systematically analyze actors’ games to activate institutions steaming from the public policies 
and the regulatory system. This is lacking in other analytical frameworks for studying the 
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sustainable management of Resources like the well-known Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework (Elinor. Ostrom, Gardner, Walker, & Walker, 1994) and its further 
“politicization” (Clement, 2010, 2013; Whaley & Weatherhead, 2014).  
 
The IRR principal hypothesis is that an integrated regime that coherently regulates the whole set 
of services derived from the Resource increases sustainability. However, empirical studies have 
questioned it. First, there is an implementation gap between the integrated regime and the 
actors’ behavior because actors act strategically to activate or not certain institutions known as 
the Local Regulatory Arrangement (De Buren, 2014; Schweizer, 2015). Second, there is an 
institutional complexity trap that impedes the consolidation of integrated regimes because 
transaction costs produce incoherencies when new regulations are introduced (Bolognesi, 
Nahrath, & Metz, 2018). At the state of the art of the IRR literature, the question regarding the 
sustainable management of Resources has to be redefined in terms of how do actors overtake 
transaction costs to produce LRAs that coherently regulates the whole set of services, before 
failing into the institutional complexity trap?  
 
If we define sustainability through the provision of the demanded services by actors, an 
agreement on both the combination of services provided by the Resource and the distribution of 
the costs and benefits, known as the “negotiator’s dilemma” (Lax & Sebenius, 1987) becomes 
salient. “Parties to a negotiation have to deal with problems of production and problems of 
distribution at the same time… if they succeed, this mode of interaction is being described here 
as positive coordination” (Scharpf, 1997, p. 132).  
 
As the higher the participation, the higher the transaction costs to reach an agreement, actor-
centered institutionalism concept of positive coordination could solve this dilemma when 
individuals are aggregated in a few collective actors and there is a “recognition of the 
simultaneous existence and legitimacy of problems of distribution as well as of production 
problems and the willingness to deal with both of them explicitly” (Scharpf, 1997, p. 133). 
 
We are interested in looking at the mechanisms that could explain the emergence of this positive 
coordination among actors, so they can agree on an LRA that coherently regulates the whole set 
of services enhancing the sustainable management of Resources, without failing in the 
complexity trap.  
 
Chapter two (conceptual framework) adapts the IRR to assess the sustainable management of 
the Coffee as a Resource according to the configuration of the LRA, namely the combined 
presence of three conditions, the first two adapted from the IRR literature (Boisseaux, Knoepfel, 
Laesslé, & Tippenhauer, 2012; J. D. Gerber, Knoepfel, Nahrath, & Varone, 2009) and a last one 
proposed by the author: 
 
1- Extent defined as the regulation of uses of the Resource.  
 
2- Coherence defined as governance mechanisms that allow two-way actors’ alignment 
around the commonly agreed profile.  
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3- Closure defined as the strategies carried on by actors to erect barriers of entry and win a 
market position. 
 
Thereupon, to assess the emergence of these conditions (extent, coherence, and closure) by the 
actors’ games, we conceptualized them as a sequence composed of three analytical dimensions: 
 
1- Actors’ coalitions: a collective actor (as defined by Scharpf (1997)) in which members 
agree on joint action to use their own individual resources to tackle a shared threat for 
the provision of their demanded services. This dimension allows us to identify the closed 
set of actors interested in the Resource in a given time and space (including farmers, 
traders, roasters, consumers and stakeholders in consumption and production), giving us 
the ideal composition of an actors’ coalition against which we can assess the observed 
one. 
 
2- Mobilization of action resources: the observable engagement of actors in the political 
arena to activate institutions using a closed-list of ten action resources identified by Peter 
Knoepfel (2017). This dimension allows us to categorize the mobilizations depending on 
the intention. 
a. Selfish when intends to impose a demanded service at the expense of other actors. 
As an example, from chapter 6.3.2. In Riosucio, the Indigenous movement selfishly 
mobilized their law (one of the ten action resources) to innovatively activate both 
the education and the cultural public policies to influence the behavior of the 
indigenous farmers and discourage the over-cultivation of coffee, clearly at the 
expense of the monetary services demanded by other actors like the Cooperative 
(a trader owned by the coffee farmers in Riosucio) and the FNC (authority in the 
coffee public policy).   
b. Strategic when it moves forward demanded services neither at the expense nor in 
favor of other actors. As an example, from chapter 6.3.3. In Riosucio, an alliance 
between the Cooperative and Nespresso strategically mobilized their personal and 
money to concretize the specialty coffee program of the coffee public policy to 
incentivize farmers to produce both the “winy” taste related service and 
“monetary” services.  
c. Cooperative when empowers the other actors so they could move forward their 
demanded services. As an example, from chapter 6.1.2. In Riosucio, an alliance 
between Max Havelaar, the Cooperative, and the FNC cooperatively mobilized 
their organization, law, and property to endow the indigenous movement with 
the money so they could consolidate an organization capable of exercising their 
constitutional right to cultural diversity. It balanced the power game so the 
indigenous movement could move forward their demand for services alongside 
the MH, the FNC and the Cooperative. Thus, they innovatively activated the coffee 
public policy to incentivize indigenous (coffee farmers) traders and roasters to 
profile both the “Fairtrade” and “indigenous coffee” symbolic services in order to 
produce “monetary services”.  
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3- Institutional creativity: the actors’ capability to shape the final output in order to 
incentivize the uses of the Resource needed to profile the demanded services, adapted 
from Laesslé (2016). This dimension allows us to systematize the presence of the 
institutional creativity through both the procedural element (the existence of a 
deliberative scenario) and, the substantive element derived from the negotiation 
dilemma that is observed in the final output composed of both the distribution (uses of 
the Resource) and the production (the combination of services).  
 
The main contribution of this IRR adapted framework is that the constructivist definition of the 
sustainable management of the Resource is conceptualized as a collective action problem in 
which the greatest benefit is only possible if everyone cooperates even if participants can benefit 
individually if they deceive (Olson, 1965), so positive coordination is possible. Therefore, it can be 
analyzed. Contrary to the situation when sustainability is “objectively” defined because rivalries 
between “good” and “bad” uses of the Resource would direct the analysis towards pure conflict 
constellations, usually known  as a zero-sum games, “in which one side must lose what the other 
side gains” (Scharpf, 1997, p. 73) . 
  
In chapter three (empirical adaptation), we move into the empirical stage with a promising logic 
of generalization: if the theoretical mechanisms explain a complex Resource in which different 
actors demand different services, it would explain another less complex with fewer 
actors/services involved. But also, from a heuristical perspective, this complexity has to trigger 
LRAs that could be evaluated at a small-enough coffee harvest (a geographical space in a given 
time period) to make the research feasible, meaning we can observe LRA’s effects on the uses of 
the Resource and explain LRA’s emergence due to actors' games.   
 
In this quest, the Coffee Resource happens to be a perfect candidate. Its international trade 
triggers a global and local demand for services (e.g. the fair distribution of value demanded by 
the International Fairtrade Organization; the organic production demanded by the US and EU 
public policies; the protection of biodiversity demanded by local environmental organizations; 
the economic development demanded by authorities; alongside many others services) that fulfill 
the “high complexity” requirement. Its cultivation in a clearly defined territory allows us to 
observe the effects of the LRA on the use of the Resource to produce the services (e.g. to cultivate 
avoiding synthetic fertilizers to produce the “organic” demanded service), and to explain its 
development by interviewing and analyzing data from participants in the actors’ game, fulfilling 
the “feasibility” requirement.   
  
If complexity works for generalizing among Resources, we use antagonism as our logic for 
generalizing among the LRA. Thus, we selected the two most antagonistic coffee harvests, 
according to the types of governance of global value chains (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 
2005), in which the global complexity is found at the local level: The municipalities of Riosucio 
and Buesaco in Colombia. 
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Chapter four (contextualization) contextualizes our empirical field describing the evolution of the 
coffee public policy in Colombia in two salient periods: before the breakdown of the international 
coffee agreement on quotas in 1989 that consolidated the commercial coffee farming and the 
posterior free coffee market that sparked the peasant coffee farming. We focus on the main 
policy instruments to (des) incentivize uses of the Resource in each period. Additionally, this 
chapter is complemented with annex II, which contains a similar exercise to describe the 
evolution of the IR on other productive factors (land and labor) at the national and local level (in 
Riosucio and Buesaco), which are needed to understand the socially constructed services 
demanded by actors.  
 
The second part (Riosucio) and the third part (Buesaco) are composed of two chapters that 
develop sequentially the two questions; chapter five/seven (LRAs that explain the sustainable 
management of coffee) assess the sustainable management of the Resource coffee by identifying 
the closed list of services demanded through the identification of the LRAs that shaped the coffee 
harvest 2015/2016, then it puts on evidence the services provided because of the observed uses 
by each LRA, finally it compares LRAs depending on this provision. Thereafter, the presence of 
each condition is evaluated separately by each LRA so we can categorize all of them, and we can 
assess the services provided by the LRA’s configuration. Chapter six/eight (actors’ games that 
explain LRA’s configuration) assess the LRAs’ configurations according to four consecutive actors’ 
games.  
 
And finally, our fourth part is composed of two chapters: our conclusions and recommendations. 
Our results suggest that the key to enhancing the sustainable management of Coffee is the 
dialogue at the appropriate resource-perimeter level, in which interested individuals are 
aggregated in collective or corporate actors that represent the whole set of profilers and 
stakeholders in production and consumption. If they solve the first negotiation dilemma 
privileging a power-balanced initial stage, they could solve the second one by agreeing on both 
the combination of services and the distribution of cost/benefits through a minimum of regulated 
uses. Hence, they would trigger the kinds of LRAs that optimize the level of services provision. 
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First Part: Conceptualization    
Chapter 1. Problematic and state of the art 
 
The International Coffee Agreement (ICA) signed in 2001 and renovated in 20077, problematized 
the free coffee market as responsible8 for threatening the sustainability of coffee production9 
and raised the need for a new governance model that would guarantee a sustainable production 
that would reduce consumers’ anxiety10. For the signatories, both farmers were responsible for 
maintaining practices that limited their income while affecting the ecosystem and local 
communities11 and, the consumer whose preferences fostered low-cost coffee12. Consequently, 
a logic of intervention targeted both actors, incentivizing farmers to adopt agricultural practices 
considered sustainable, and encouraging consumers to pay higher for coffee produced following 
these practices13.  
 
In spite of the disagreement regarding the precise definition of which these practices were (Ponte 
& Gibbon, 2005, p. 289), the actors not only accepted the triad of sustainability (economic, social 
and environmental14) but also the approach of market environmentalism15 to frame the problem: 
the coffee farmer does not internalize the socio-environmental costs of his economic activity and 
                                                     
7 Agreement signed between 50 producing countries and 34 coffee consuming countries that represent almost all 
coffee production and four-fifths of consumption (ICO, 2001). 
8 The free-market model prevailing since the breakdown of the negotiations on coffee quotas in 1989 (through which 
the coffee world market had been regulated since 1962 to align coffee-dependent tropical countries to the Western 
bloc in a cold war context, four successive International Coffee Agreements were signed in 1962, 1968, 1976, and 
1983) motivated a downturn spiral (coffee overproduction, lower prices, more production diminishing costs to 
compensate, lower quality, less attractive for consumers, lower prices) that plunged the international coffee price 
to its historical minimum in the year 2000 of USD 0.425. 
9  Free markets has rewarded mega-productive agricultural companies that use fertilizers and pesticides for 
increasing agricultural yield. However, it prioritization on productivity withdraws soil nutrients at rates much higher 
than their reincorporation, leaving sterile lands, polluted rivers and threatening biodiversity on a planetary scale 
(Sachs, 2014, pp. 338-347). 
10 Decreasing prices had penalized the low productive coffee farmers and concerned consumers: on the one hand, 
it made impossible to implement good environmental and labor practices in entrepreneurial coffee farms and it 
impoverished family coffee farms at levels of malnutrition and emigration (Gresser & Tickell, 2002; Ramírez et al., 
2002a); On the other hand, consumers felt anxious when consuming a coffee that was suspected of having negative 
effects both on his health and on the environment (Biltekoff, 2010; Fonte, 2002). 
11 “Encouraging members to develop and implement strategies to enhance the capacity of local communities and 
small-scale farmers to benefit from coffee production, which can contribute to poverty alleviation”. Objective 12, 
art. 1 of the ICA 2007 (ICO, 2007, p. 2). 
12 “Promoting the development of consumption and markets for all types and forms of coffee, including in coffee 
producing countries” Objective 7, art. 1 of the ICA 2007 (ICO, 2007, p. 2). 
13 “The objective of this Agreement is to strengthen the global coffee sector and promote its sustainable expansion 
in a market-based environment for the betterment of all participants in the sector”. Article 1, ICA 2007 (ICO, 2007, 
p. 2). 
14 “Encouraging Members to develop a sustainable coffee sector in economic, social and environmental terms” 
Objective 3, art. 1 of the ICA 2007 (ICO, 2007, p. 2). 
15  As defined by (Muradian & Cardenas, 2015) 
23 
 
the asymmetric information prevents the consumer from correctly assessing his purchase16. As a 
result, these international coffee agreements prioritized the market-based instruments to solve 
information failures creating higher value markets for coffee growers, which had internalized the 
externalities of their activity17, supported on a project-based and public-private governance18. 
 
Nevertheless, these ICAs overestimated consumers and underestimated other actors in shaping 
the “sustainable” behavior of profilers along the coffee value chain: On the one hand, according 
to  Panhuysen and Pierrot (2014), 40% of the world coffee harvest was cultivated under 
sustainable practices moved forward by the main market-based mechanism, known as the big 
seven voluntary sustainable standards: Organic, Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance, UTZ, 4C, 
Starbucks' CAFE Practices, and Nespresso AAA. However, only 15% percent of this production 
was actually paid as sustainable coffee. On the other, some of these sustainable practices were 
seen invasive by different actors: Indigenous communities prioritized ancient knowledge over 
scientific evidence to decide how to crop, and the self-named specialty coffee traders favored an 
extraordinary aromatic profile over a higher yield19. Hence, prices paid by consumers are hardly 
the only incentive that influences coffee farmers’ behavior. Both the indigenous organization and 
the specialty traders activated other institutions like the education public policy to avoid cropping 
coffee in the first case (chapter 6.3), or the competitiveness public policy to increase the chances 
of high-scored coffee in the second one (chapter 8.3) to make coffee farmers explicitly resist the 
“sustainable” practices encouraged by the locally implemented policies derived from the ICA 
compromises.    
 
More than the ICA, the approach to frame the problem is the one to be blamed. The market 
environmentalism framework overestimates the ability of consumers to influence the behavior 
of the coffee farmer while underestimates the ability of other actors to influence it: not only 
those connected vertically by the material interest of money but also those connected 
horizontally by other more or less material interests linked to the production or consumption of 
coffee.  
 
                                                     
16 Inspired in the seminal paper on asymmetrical information by Akerlof (1970). 
17 ICA 2007 prioritized market-based tools by “(8) developing, evaluating and seeking finance for projects that benefit 
members and the world coffee economy… (13) facilitating the availability of information on financial tools and 
services that can assist coffee producers, including access to credit and approaches to managing risk” (ICO, 2007, pp. 
2,3). An example of this consensus on market-based mechanism can be read in the message written by the Chef de 
la Promotion commercial of the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO. “Une première analyse comparative 
montre que l’application de critères labellisés contribue, grâce aux progrès effectués dans les processus de 
production, à réduire les incidences négatives sur l’environnement, à améliorer les conditions sociales, à élever les 
revenus nets et, enfin, à accroître la sécurité alimentaire des producteurs” (Egler, 2010). 
18 A good synthesis of the agreement can be found in the message from the Federal Council (Swiss Government) to 
the Federal Assembly (Swiss Parliament). « En général, le nouvel accord renforce le principe d’un développement 
durable du secteur du café en mettant explicitement l’accent sur les trois piliers fondamentaux de la durabilité, à 
savoir les dimensions économiques, sociales et environnementales. L’accord prévoit également la possibilité de 
renforcer la coopération avec le secteur privé et les organisations non gouvernementales appropriées. Ces 
développements répondent aux demandes clés de la délégation suisse» (SECO, 2009, p. 210). 
19 Rivalries identified in the field by the author.  
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Indeed, this analytical framework assumes the institutions itself will change actors’ behavior, and 
if it fails, it is because the institutions were either poorly designed or implemented. That is why 
the only response to motivate coffee farmers to adopt sustainable practices, given that only 15% 
of consumers value certified/verified coffee, is encouraging more demand20. Furthermore, these 
lenses do not allow us to understand why certified/verified unpaid coffee almost double the 
actually paid, in other words, why farmers maintain “sustainable” practices if they are not paid 
for doing it.  
 
Even if other institutions besides the price could also influence the decision of the coffee farmer, 
the market environmentalism framework cannot see them because it has an inherent flaw: the 
institution is the gateway for researchers to understand the effects on the territory, making local 
dynamics invisible through random samples of certified/verified farms in different regions to 
"control" by those territorial particularities. Scholars would assume an objectively defined 
problem that could be solved through the “right” institution. So, to produce robust evidence, 
scholars conduct quasi-experiments to isolate the influence of other relevant factors to assess 
the effect of the treatment (the institution). As a result, this heuristic manipulation explicitly 
omits the horizontal actors, who are perceived unimportant, because they do not vertically 
participate in the input-output relation throughout the coffee value chain. In other words, the 
fact that some actors opposed the institution because their considered “legitimate” claims are 
simply out of the reach of this framework. 
 
From our perspective, more than a technical issue to design the “right” institution supported by 
robust evidence, there is a substantial issue at the epistemological level: there is not one “right” 
institution that could be revealed because if others than the vertically-linked actors are 
incorporated into the analysis, there is highly improbable that it could exist one objective 
definition of the coffee sustainability. 
 
Indeed, if we conceptualize coffee as a commodity that is solely used by actors in an input-output 
relation for adding value until its consumption, consumers could use their payments to reward 
or punish practices implemented by actors along the value chain. As it is known that it could be 
information asymmetries, there could be better institutions to correct these failures. However, 
as it would be demonstrated, coffee is a commodity for a set of actors (so the previous logic still 
is valid) but coffee also is a transmitter of identity for a group of people; it is a socio-cultural tissue 
to enhance social cohesion for the Colombian authorities21; it is an invasive foreign species that 
had negatively affected indigenous cosmovision and wellbeing for the indigenous organization; 
it is an irresponsible traded merchandise that pollutes and endangered biodiversity for the 
environmental NGO’s, and so on and so forth. If we want to explain the sustainability of coffee, 
the concept of the commodity is unfit to the task.  
 
                                                     
20 See for example the discussions on the first panel “towards a diverse and sustainable coffee culture” of the fourth 
World Coffee Conference, on March 2016 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, organized by the International Coffee 
Organization. 
21 “El café más que un producto agrícola de exportación es ante todo un tejido social, cultural, institucional y político 
que ha servido de base para la estabilidad democrática y la integración nacional” (Ramírez et al., 2002b, p. 16). 
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We propose to conceptualize coffee as a Resource, so it is used by humans to produce services 
(de Buren, 2015) not only for consumers nor actors along the coffee value chain but also for other 
actors: citizens use coffee as an identity vector; authorities to enhance social cohesion; 
indigenous leaders to protect their cultural heritage and; the NGO’s to trigger environmentally 
responsible coffee culture. In this sense, we have to acknowledge that the demand for services 
is a real consequence of a situation defined by actors as real, whether this situation is an objective 
statement or not (Merton, 1995). So, services are a social construction of a group of persons in a 
given time and space.  
 
In this line of arguments, the sustainability of coffee must be assessed through two dimensions: 
the objective one linked to the physical existence of the Resource, and the subjective one linked 
to the actors’ expectations derived from its utilization. If the objective dimension can be assessed 
through a positive approach that observes the uses of the Resource, which eventually could lead 
to practices to protect the reproductive capabilities of the Resource’s system, the subjective one 
forcefully needs a constructivist approach that scales up the observation to the agreements 
among actors on the uses of the Resource. 
 
Without undermining the explanatory power of economic tools for testing a positive hypothesis 
and recommending better practices, we decided to scale up the research from institutions to the 
agreements among actors. So, we took a constructivist approach to which political sciences are 
much better equipped. As proposed by Muradian and Cardenas (2015), we would change the 
analytical framework to understand the threat to the sustainability of coffee growing, not as a 
product of market failures that demand the “right” institutions, but as a problem of collective 
action that demands the “right” agreement among interested actors.  
 
In this order of ideas, this chapter presents the main elements that we have identified in the 
literature to frame our work in four sections. Firstly, we recover the discussion on the definition 
of sustainable management of Resources to claim that it should be constructed on both the 
objective and the subjective dimensions.  
 
In the second section, we bring about some literature that had unrolled the sustainable 
management of Resource through the collective action problem, an empirically observable 
phenomenon, in which the collectively preferred existence of the Resource is threatened 
because actors benefit individually. So, the "lens of contract" was needed to focus on the 
property rights transaction, and how these transactions were governed by institutions to craft 
order, mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains.   
 
In the third section, we present literature on how these “lens of contract” have been used to 
study the sustainable management of coffee. Unsurprisingly, coffee has been conceptualized as 
a commodity governed by a global value chain in which its sustainability heavily depends on 
consumers expectations and in a lower degree on other actors along the value chain like 
producers. So, there has been an objective definition of the problem that could be tackled down 
through well-designed institutions. Voluntary Sustainable Standards (VSS) and Geographical 
Indications (GI) are the two main institutions evaluated to assess the sustainable management of 
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coffee. This literature demonstrates that well-designed institution could incentivize a transaction 
of property rights that could solve the problem in the “objectively defined” terms.  
 
However, different actors have their own “objective definition of the problem”. The last section 
shed light on literature that seriously incorporates the subjective dimension, broadening the 
research to the horizontal actors previously omitted, in addition to the clearly relevant actors 
vertically linked throughout the coffee value chain. As money is not the unit of transaction for 
these horizontal actors, this literature focuses on the power game and how power is used to 
activate institutions that are expected to change actors’ behavior.  
 
This last section briefly presents the Institutional Resource Regime framework literature and the 
two open issues that the IRR is facing around its main explanatory variable: The Local Regulatory 
Arrangement (LRA). Then, we discuss the pertinence of the IRR to answer our questions by 
discussing both open issues: one is the need to focus on the integrality of the “Local Regulatory 
Arrangement” rather than on the integrality of the “Institutional Regime”. And the other is the 
need to understand the mechanisms through which this integral LRA can be achieved, before 
reaching prohibiting transaction costs that would conduce towards an institutional complexity 
trap. In this order of ideas, we place our contribution through the “lens of the negotiation”: to 
assess the integrality of the LRA and the mechanisms for triggering it avoiding the institutional 
complexity trap.  
 
1.1. A two-face definition of sustainable management of Resources.  
 
As long as we know, Nature in the broadest sense is by definition sustainable22. Galaxies could 
collide crashing its planets, but new galaxies will emerge23 and from the debris left over, new 
planets would be formed24. Life itself is sustainable: it could be at the edge of disappearance but 
evidence shows that the extinction of some species is followed by the thriving of new ones25. 
Homo sapiens behavior could trigger a mass extinction but it is highly possible that, even though 
this species and many others could disappear, after some thousands of years, new species would 
conquer the space left behind. Henceforth, if we talk about sustainability it does not make sense 
to think on protecting Nature by itself but to protect Nature so the Homo sapiens as a species 
could continue living on this planet before an unstoppable force (like the predicted galactic 
collision) would make it impossible. 
  
The last example shed light on two salient dimensions: the system and the time frame. Costanza 
and Patten (1995) relate both concepts through the scales: the higher the scale of the system 
                                                     
22 According to the Oxford Dictionary, sustainability is defined as the ability to continue or be continued for a long 
time.   
23 Like the milkdromeda Galaxi predicted to emerge after a collision between the Milky Way and the Andromeda 
Galaxy in 4 billion years (Dubinski, 2006). 
24 E.g. the giant-impact hypothesis to explain the moon genesis from a collision between the earth and another 
astronomical body known as the Thea impact (Halliday, 2000). 
25 Five mass extinctions events had been documented with losses from 70% to 96% of total species on Earth (Raup 
& Sepkoski, 1982). 
27 
 
(e.g. the Milky Way Galaxy), the higher the live span (e.g. 4 billion remaining years for this Galaxy). 
Then, planet Earth within the Galaxy, ecosystems within planet Earth, populations within 
ecosystems, organisms within populations, and so on. “A sustainable system in this context is 
thus one that attains its full expected life span within the nested hierarchy of system within which 
it is embedded” (p. 195).  
 
Costanza and Patten (1995) define unsustainability from the unconvincing argument of an 
external accident “the key is differentiating between changes due to normal life span limits and 
changes that cut short the life span of the system” (p. 195). So they use this argument to sustain 
their claim that “Humans' interventions in ecosystems frequently have deleterious consequences 
(…) interrupt normal function and both truncate natural longevity and hasten senescent decline” 
(p. 195). It is a weak argument because external accidents are part of the natural life span of any 
Resource, even if they are triggered by human behavior. Any accident that is naturally possible is 
normal, only impossible accidents, like shutting down gravity, are not normal. Species had existed 
for millions of years before became extinct due to the quaternary glaciation or to human 
behavior. In both cases, categorizing one as an external accident and the other not implies a 
subjective position.  
 
However, this argument stands when we transparently accept that they are not accidents in Nature 
and we simply assume that humans categorize as an accident a natural phenomenon that they would 
prefer to avoid because they are attached somehow, like the extinction of species. Henceforth, the 
time frame of systems and subsystems, that the Homo sapiens is attached to, is determined by the 
socially defined “accidents” that could cut short their natural life span. Clearly, as we cannot interfere 
with the trajectories of the Galaxies, at least we hope to control the “accidents” caused by human 
behavior. 
 
From this anthropocentric point of view, sustainability only makes sense for systems that 
produce something useful for humans. From the oxygen produced by forest to disease control 
produced by bacteria. A systemic definition of sustainability to capture this enormous complexity 
“as prerequisite for humanity in the universe” had been tried by Pater and Cristea (2016), but 
from our research objective we limit the scope to a particular system in which there is a clearly 
defined thing that is used by humans to produce services in a given time and space, namely a 
Resource. Under this broad conceptualization, we can identify two branches of the literature on 
sustainability. The first focuses on the uses to guarantee the sustainability of the Resource 
because otherwise, services could not exist. The second focuses on the services, so the 
sustainability of the Resource is important to the extent it contributes to services provision. We 
will propose a third ideal type definition that empathizes on the salience of both, the 
sustainability of the Resource and of its services.  
 
On the first branch, scholars agree that services can be obtained to the extent that their uses do 
not affect the reproductive capability of the Resource. Kuhlman and Farrington (2010) argue that 
the concern about preserving systems for the future human use could have been present since 
the Paleolithic, but the concept of sustainability was originally coined in forestry in 1713 as “never 
harvesting more than what the forest yields in new growth” (p. 3437). This idea was eventually 
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operationalized as the maximum sustained yield: "(the) management of a resource for maximum 
continuing production, consistent with the maintenance of a constantly renewable stock" (Tivy 
& O'hare, 1981). Peter Knoepfel and Nahrath (2005), look at this resource-based approach, i.e. 
the management of the stocks and reproductive capacities of resource systems, from a political 
perspective. They observe the process that ends in this management of the Resource as a multi-
actor game in which diverse actors seek for various goods and services. There are actors 
interested in the wood of Forests, some in the ecosystem services like water purification and 
landslide protection, and others in the fertile soils for harvesting. Hence, they argue that 
sustainability "can only be guaranteed if all of the users jointly ensure that the quantities they 
extract or withdraw from a resource do not reach the limit of the reproductive capacity of the 
resource system” (p. 14). 
   
The Brundtland Report, following this renewal logic, incorporated a more generous 
intergenerational life span that values both “needs” demanded from the living generation and 
the ones potentially demanded by unborn generations. It focused on the “needs” or services as 
the cornerstone of sustainability26.  
 
This service perspective is much harder to asses. From a quite ambitious definition of 
sustainability like "one that to all intents and purposes can be sustained indefinitely while giving 
optimum satisfaction to its members," (Goldsmith, 1974) to other more general "ecologically 
sound development, a process of positive management of the environment for human benefit" 
(Holdgate and others 1982). The international consensus has gathered around the widespread 
“triple bottom line” definition of sustainable development. It comes from the business 
management literature (Elkington, 1994) that incorporate in addition to the basic bottom, the 
economic success, the well-being of societies (that is assumed that is not reached only by the 
former) and the protection of the environment.  
 
On the one hand, there is an assessment defy of the triple bottom definition that leaves vaguely 
defined socio-economic dimensions that could be used to justify the depletion of the natural 
resources27. On the other, it is inherently flawed. Kuhlman and Farrington (2010) discussed the 
inherent incoherencies of this triple bottom definition with the material renewal of the Resource. 
Indeed, by giving equal weight to each dimension, Resource management is sustainable even if 
it scores positively in both the economic and social dimension and negative in the environmental 
one. Peter Knoepfel and Nahrath (2005), in their analysis of environmental policies in Europe 
reach a similar conclusion that “the pursuit of social, economic and even ecological sustainability 
                                                     
26 In 1968 the United Nations Economic and Social Council, for the first time, called for a global conference that 
would focus on human interactions with the environment, ECOSOC resolution 1346 of 1968. It took place in 
Stockholm in 1972 and laid down the basis for the World Commission on Environmental and Development created 
by the United Nation in 1983. This Commission defined sustainable development as the one which “ensure that it 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs” 
(WCE&D, 1987, p. 16).  
27 The triple bottom line definition is so general that it gave an ample leeway to actors to operationalize each bottom 
line as it suit them best. In some cases leading to “greenwashing” or misinforming for shaping a good reputation and 
image even though any substantial change had been made (Laufer, 2003).  
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at the level of selected goods and services will ultimately lead to the non-sustainable 
management of the resource” (p. 13) when the management is based on the logic of pollution 
limitation independently of the reproductive capacities of the resource systems.  
 
According to Hickel (2018), this balance between socioeconomic and environmental services was 
somehow solved through a model sustained in technological change provided by the economic 
growth, and allowed 178 governments to adopt a non-binding action plan to achieving global 
sustainable development on the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992. This model was built on the basic mechanisms through which economic growth, 
at the expense of today’s sustainable management of Resources, would produce the 
technological change that eventually would inverse the situation. 
 
Indeed, the world economic system drives on an assumption that the economic success would 
compensate the environmental depletion through the exchange between natural and 
manufactured capital. Assumption developed by Solow (1991) and his claim that, if the exchange 
is an “investment” in improving the future capacity to create well-being (and not a mere 
consumption of Resource), this exchange would trigger sustainability. That is why the emission 
of CO2 to the atmosphere at the expense of global warming is justified because there could be “ 
an effective strategy that maximizes overall net economic welfare (call it 'green GNP') (…) and 
includes all externalities from economic activity” (Nordhaus, 1991, p. 923). The mechanism is the 
endogenous technological change bring about by Romer (1990): If the economy grows, market-
encouraged actors could trigger a technological change that could diminish the negative impacts 
of Resource depletion. In this order of ideas, the “investment” of Resources would enhance the 
future capacity to create well-being28.  
 
It is not surprising the contradictory evidence that this exchange, even as an investment, does 
not always produce the predicted well-being29. That is why scholars like Kuhlman and Farrington 
(2010) propose to divide this discussion between well-being which accounts for both the 
economic and social dimension and sustainability for dealing with the environmental one, and 
specifically “to recognizing the primacy of the ecological pole over the economic and social poles 
of the sustainability triangle” (Peter Knoepfel & Nahrath, 2005, p. 14).  
 
However, this hierarchical focus on the Resource system’s reproductive capacities is in itself so 
complex that the socio-economic dimensions are under-evaluated because either there are 
                                                     
28 For example, that if forests had not been overexploited in the previous centuries sparking economic growth, we 
would not have the actual technologies that allow us to benefit from similar heating services without using wood. 
So, if previously having forests and heating services were rivals, thanks to the economic growth and the technological 
change, today humans can simultaneously enjoy both 
29 Even though there is evidence on the contrary “In 1900 one of the world's richest phosphate deposits was 
discovered on Nauru and today, as a result of just over ninety years of phosphate mining, about 80 percent of the 
island is totally devastated (…) Income from phosphate mining enabled the Nauruans to establish a trust fund 
estimated to be as large as $1 billion (…) the Asian financial crisis (…) has wiped out most of the trust fund (...) Their 
island is biologically impoverished and the money Nauruans traded for their island home has vanished (Ayres, Van 
Den Bergh, & Gowdy, 1998, p. 3) 
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classified as “good/bad” due to the position of the researcher, or because of the unconvincingly 
heuristic techniques. We are interested in bringing back the socio-economic dimensions to the 
forefront by facing both the inherent subjective actors’ expectations and the heuristic technique 
defy, without changing the hierarchical salience of the environmental dimensions. 
 
Bringing back the previous anthropocentric discussion, the very definition of a Resource is built 
on the idea of a mean to produce an end. A Resource exists because humans used it to produce 
services (we incorporate into this single word everything that people sought for from Resources 
like goods, fruits, values, etc.) otherwise it would be a “thing”. In this sense, the sustainability of 
Resources forcefully has two dimensions the objective and the subjective one. From the objective 
one, the appropriated level of the stock and reproductive capacities of the Resource can be 
objectively measured through a positive approach that observes the uses that eventually could 
lead to the “sustainable” practices. From the subjective one, the appropriated quantities and 
qualities of services during their expected life span depend on the actor’s social construction in 
the sense of the Thomas’ theorem “if men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences” (Merton, 1995, p. 380). Thus, whether men think quantities and qualities of 
services are appropriated, or not, and whether the expected life span is long enough or not, 
depends on the actor’ definition of a “real situation”. So, it demands a constructivist approach 
that assesses the actors’ expectations derived from the Resource’s utilization. In this order of 
ideas, the Resource is defined by both, the thing and the socially-constructed services.  
 
In this sense, we propose a Weberian ideal-type conception: a Resource is sustainable when all 
services demanded from the Resource are guaranteed in their expected life span. So, two 
conditions must be fulfilled sequentially: Following the hierarchical salience of the environmental 
sustainability, the stock and reproductively capacity of the Resource must be guaranteed in the 
expected life span so the second condition, the provision of the whole set of services demanded, 
can also be guaranteed.  
 
In this logic of life span within a nested hierarchy of systems, the services are a subsystem of the 
Resource system. So, a particular citric-acid aroma (a taste related service from the Resource 
coffee) has a life span featured by consumers’ preferences. If the demand for this service 
disappears, roasters would look for other aromatic profiles encouraging traders and farmers to 
profile other aromas, ending this service life span in a sustainable way. On the other hand, a 
phenomenon caused by human behavior that “accidentally” cut the life span of this citric-acid 
aroma service, like blending coffee from different regions before export, would be considered 
unsustainable. In the end, the services’ life span as well as the “accidents” that could reduce it 
depends on an actor’s perception grounded in the physical reality. So, it is susceptible to varying 
due to both changes in the perception itself or in the physical reality. 
 
Thus, this conception of sustainability can only be measured in a given time and space when the 
actors and the socially-constructed demanded services are identifiable. When new actors arrived, 
or when the incumbent changed their perceptions, the previous measurement is useless and a 
Resource that was “sustainable” in time 𝑡𝑡0 could be “unsustainable” in time 𝑡𝑡1. 
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1.2. The sustainable management of Resources: a problem of collective action.  
 
If the Resource system is sustainable when its subsystems (including the demanded services 
subsystems) are guaranteed in their expected life span, and the expected life span of these 
(sub)systems is at risk because of “accidents” caused by human behavior, then, we must shift our 
focus to human behavior to understand the sustainable management of Resources. 
 
We start with an assumption: Human beings act collectively when they fail to control individually 
the “accidents” that would reduce the life span of a Resource system or one of its services 
subsystems. From the game theory perspective, “one individual pays a cost for another to receive 
a benefit”(Rand & Nowak, 2013, p. 413). We can say the cost refers to measures taken to control 
the “accident”, and the benefit refers to the continued enjoyment of services demanded from 
the Resource. Individuals either cooperate to obtain the collective benefit or they deceive, 
obstructing the emergence of it.  
 
We can observe that individuals cooperate in some occasions and deceive in others. Scharpf 
(1997) explains both results through a conceptual tool, the actors’ constellations built on the 
expected benefit for the actors involved. He distinguishes among several actors’ constellation 
between two extremes: the pure coordination in which all actors optimize their benefit by 
cooperating and, the pure conflict in which one actor must lose the benefit that the other would 
gain. There is one constellation in particular where the greatest benefit is only possible if 
everyone cooperates but the participants can benefit individually if they deceive, so the expected 
outcome is that all actors would deceive and there would be no collective benefit. This 
consequent social dilemma was defined as the collective action problem by Olson (1965). 
 
The collective action problem is the core of the sustainable management of Resources: deceivers 
that in pursuit of individual benefit diminish the life span of the Resource at the expense of the 
collective benefit. Two generations of scholars had tried to understand the mechanisms that 
trigger this problem in order to propose recommendations to solve it. A first generation used the 
“lens of choice”30 to frame the problem as a market failure that demanded public intervention, 
and a second generation used the “lens of contract”31 to frame the problem as an institutional 
defy.  
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, scholars considered that the authority was required 
to impede deceptive action. Pigou (1932) studied the collective action problem using the 
neoclassical “lens of choice”, meaning that markets would encourage agents to maximize profit 
at their marginal private interest. He demonstrated that when the marginal social interest was 
higher than the private one, agents do not have incentives to internalize this social cost. He 
                                                     
30 According to Williamson (2002, p. 172)  the lens of choice follow the assumption of utility maximization that 
leads to an efficient allocation of resources by markets.   
31 According to Williamson (2002)  the lens of contract focus on the voluntary exchange. “This latter is what I refer 
to as private ordering, which entails efforts by the immediate parties to a transaction to align incentives and to 
craft governance structures that are better attuned to their exchange needs” (p. 172). 
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conceptualized this market failure as a negative externality that justified the governmental action 
to internalize the social cost in the private decision.  
 
Using the same “lens of choice”, Coase (1960) demonstrated that this governmental action was 
unnecessary because under zero transaction cost (assumption of the “lens of choice”) 
negotiation would maximize wellbeing no matter the initial assignment of rights. The literal 
reading implied that by defining property rights in a free market environment deceptive action 
would be avoided because utility maximization in a costless negotiation would lead to an efficient 
internalization of social costs.   
 
But this later conclusion was inadvisable by the same Coase (1991) who recommended the study 
of positive transaction cost because costless ones were hardly present in real-life situations. In 
this quest, the second generation of scholars used the “lens of the contract” to zoom into the 
transaction itself. Through this lens, the transaction was not automatically linked to the price 
mechanism but was also affected by several institutions, among them, agreements between 
actors to refine the transaction, in the words of Williamson (2002, p. 172), the contracts “to 
realize better the mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange”.  
 
These scholars that could be considered affiliated to the New Institutional Economics, recognize 
the positive transaction cost and focus on the institutions through which actors manage their 
interaction. According to (Williamson, 2000) individuals agree on how to govern their property 
rights transactions: “governance is an effort to craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize 
mutual gains” (Williamson, 2000, p. 599). Governance could range from markets at one side and 
hierarchies at the other depending on the complexity of the transaction. This complexity could 
generate mutual dependency because of asset specificity, meaning property rights on an asset 
that is valuable in that transaction but has no value in others. Low complexity transaction can be 
easily procured in markets, once complexity increases, procurement can be guaranteed through 
contracts until security costs to avoid opportunism are so high that unified ownership, or 
hierarchy, is preferred (Williamson, 2010). 
 
Elinor Ostrom (1990) used the “lens of the contract” to study the collective action problem in the 
management of some Resources. Namely the Resources that “share the attribute of 
subtractability with private goods and difficulty of exclusion with public goods” (Elionor Ostrom, 
2010, p. 645), in practice Resources that could maintain its reproduction capability if actors 
cooperate, however, there are strong incentives for them to benefit individually. For doing so, 
she developed the Institutional Analysis and Development  Framework (IAD onwards) to explain 
how the actor situation (the problem of collective action) is affected by three independent 
variables: the rules in use, the attributes of the community and the biophysical conditions (Elinor. 
Ostrom et al., 1994). She demonstrated that communities can overtake the individual deception 
to bring about the collective benefit if the institution to manage the commons follows eight 
design principles to craft order to mitigate conflict and produce mutual gains32.   
                                                     
32 An updated version of these design principles is provided by Elionor Ostrom (2010, p. 653). 
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1.3. The “lens of contract” to study the problem of collective action of the Coffee 
Resource.  
 
Having conceptualized sustainability as a problem of collective action and presenting the two “lenses” 
to frame this problem, we turn our attention to an interesting literature that makes use of both 
the “lens of choice” to frame the problematic as a market failure and, the “lens of contract” to 
focus on the institutions that govern actors’ transactions, to study the sustainable management 
of the Resource coffee. This literature privileges the triple bottom line definition of sustainable 
coffee brought about by the ICA 2001 and 2007. It frames the problematic as a problem of 
information asymmetry, inviting scholars to find a well-designed institution that corrects this 
imperfection. As a result, a non-negligible amount of literature had focused on this institution-
effect relationship focusing on two main types of institutions: Voluntary Sustainable Standards 
(VSS) and Geographical Indications (GI). 
 
A worldwide consensus is that the main challenge of the coffee global value chains is to achieve 
socially-inclusive and environmentally-sustainable economic growth (FAO, 2015; ICO, 2001, 
2007). Using the “lens of the contract” proposed by  Williamson (2010), these socio-
environmental concerns increase complexity. It implies non-market information and different 
capabilities on supply partners to meet customers’ expectations for a “sustainable” bean. The 
coffee bean has to “encapsulate” 33  specific agronomic practices from the planting to the 
harvesting, post-harvesting and so on, that implies a “sustainable” use of property rights. E.g. a 
                                                     
“1A. User Boundaries: Clear and locally understood boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers are 
present. 
1B. Resource Boundaries: Clear boundaries that separate a specific common-pool resource from a larger social-
ecological system are present. 
2A. Congruence with Local Conditions: Appropriation and provision rules are congruent with local social and 
environmental conditions. 
2B. Appropriation and Provision: Appropriation rules are congruent with provision rules; the distribution of costs is 
proportional to the distribution of benefits. 
3. Collective Choice Arrangements: Most individuals affected by a resource regime are authorized to participate in 
making and modifying its rules. 
4A. Monitoring Users: Individuals who are accountable to or are the users monitor the appropriation and provision 
levels of the users. 
4B. Monitoring the Resource: Individuals who are accountable to or are the users monitor the condition of the 
resource. 
5. Graduated Sanctions: Sanctions for rule violations start very low but become stronger if a user repeatedly 
violates a rule. 
6. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Rapid, low cost, local arenas exist for resolving conflicts among users or with 
officials. 
7. Minimal Recognition of Rights: The rights of local users to make their own rules are recognized by the 
government. 
8. Nested Enterprises: When a common-pool resource is closely connected to a larger social-ecological system, 
governance activities are organized in multiple nested layers”. 
33 Using the term coined by Acampora and Fonte (2009) 
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farmer renounces a higher yield by cultivating fewer coffee trees per hectare and more canopy 
trees in order to protect biodiversity. This complexity can go up to a point in which the investment 
(that commercial partners have done) is so valuable to that exclusive transaction, that it spurs 
vertical integration. E.g. an experimental roaster that seeks for extremely uncommon coffee 
aromatic profiles encourages farmers to invest in uncommon post-harvesting methods, which 
make their coffee unmarketable through other buyers. So, to avoid farmers’ opportunism 
(farmers could take advantage and unilaterally increase the price of the coffee) the experimental 
roaster would take over their supplier34. Even though “complexity” in the coffee industry is 
increasing according to Rhinehart (2009), the high complexity that could motivate vertical 
integration hardly would reach the 1% that today is sold as specialty coffee. However, the socio-
environmental concerns had increased complexity for the 40% of the coffee world harvest that 
is harvested and traded following "sustainable practices" (Panhuysen & Pierrot, 2014), whereas 
the 59% remaining is harvested and traded as a commodity using market information like 
quantities and qualities evaluated through standardized methods.  
 
The Global Value Chain (GVC) analysis provides a conceptual framework to understand how these 
chains are organized by examining the structure and dynamics of the actors involved from two 
contrasting vantage points: Governance35, as a top-down control process exerted by leading 
firms, and Upgrading36, as a bottom-up improving process, in which firms, regions, and countries 
try to advance and capture more benefits within the GVC (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011). This 
framework categorized the governance of mutually dependent value chains depending on three 
variables: 1- the complexity of knowledge required by product specification; 2- the degree in 
which this complexity can be mitigated through codification (and then low-cost replication in 
other firms); 3- the capability of suppliers to meet buyer’s requirements (Gereffi et al., 2005). In 
between the two extremes of market and hierarchies, high complexity, high codification, and low 
capabilities led to a captive value chain, in which suppliers are completely dependent on their 
leading firm like maquilas which manufacture goods according to detail instruction from the 
buyer; when complexity, codification, and capability are high a modular value chain is expected 
in which the complex information can be exchanged with little coordination like the car-
parts industry. When complexity and capabilities are high but codification is low because the 
product specification cannot be codified, mutual dependency is reinforced and a relational value 
chain can arise and “may be regulated through reputation, social and spatial proximity, family 
and ethnic ties, and the like” (Gereffi et al., 2005, p. 86). 
 
The complexity associated with the socio-environmental concerns as drivers of change within the 
GVC analysis encouraged Ponte and Gibbon (2005) to take a step forward by merging GVC 
analysis with the Convention Theory. They claim that socio/environmental expectations are 
                                                     
34 An example is Café Libertario in the business district in Bogotá, an experimental roaster integrated with La Palma 
y El Tucán a coffee farm in Zipacón that is well-known for their post-harvesting methods. 
35 Gereffi (1994) seminal paper on the governance of the GVC focused on how purchase power shaped production 
networks: Sometimes driven by producers in capital/technology-intensive industries or by buyers in labor-intensive 
sectors. 
36  Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) identified four types of upgrading (process upgrading, product upgrading, 
functional upgrading, and inter-sectorial upgrading).   
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absorbed by “quality standards” which details the whole set of uses of property rights, and 
through them, leading firms will govern the GVC. Muradian and Pelupessy (2005), in their work 
on the governance of the coffee chain, show how Voluntary Sustainable Standards (VSS), by 
codifying information and exchanging “extra standards” information, create stronger 
coordination than was expected using Gereffi’s framework in which higher codification means 
lower coordination. Bitzer, Francken, and Glasbergen (2008) in the same line highlighted the 
influence of actors outside the value chain (meaning outside the input-output relation), namely 
NGOs and activists among others that integrate socio/environmental issues into the governance 
of the coffee value chain through partnerships that increase complexity.  
 
Barrientos, Gereffi, and Rossi (2010) developed the Global Production Network analysis, which 
emphasized on the institutional and social context of the GVC by understanding people both as 
an input (labor as a productive factor) and as actors (workers as social agents) that influence 
global production. So, participants in the coffee value chain can be understood as both an input-
output factor and actors that use strategically their resources (of action) to shape the GVC in their 
advantage, particularly through conventions/institutions.  
 
González and Nigh (2005) merged this conceptualization of actors as an input-output factor with 
the normative goal of the sustainable management of the coffee value chain, to redefine the 
latter as a common pool resource that could be managed by a well-designed institution according 
to Elinor Ostrom (1990).  
 
In this order of ideas, the socio-economic-environmental effects of coffee are considered as a 
common-good resource resultant of a complex interaction within participants in the global coffee 
value chain that is governed by an institution. A non-negligible amount of literature had focused 
on this institution-effect relationship. We will focus on the two main types of institutions: 
Voluntary Sustainable Standards (VSS) and Geographical Indications (GI).  
 
1.3.1. Voluntary Sustainable Standards 
 
From the GVS analysis framework, the VSS are detailed product specifications that should be 
followed by actors throughout the coffee value chain, to produce the economic-socio-
environmental attributes demanded by consumers, characteristic of a modular value chain. From 
the IAD framework, it can be conceptualized as governance mechanisms to solve the problem of 
collective action in the way that coordinate actors to produce the common: the triple bottom 
sustainability of the coffee value chain. Both perspectives use the "lens of contract" to observe 
the influence of VSS on the uses actors made of their property rights. And in both cases, scholars 
have assessed VSS' effects on the economic social and environmental dimensions with mainly 
positive outcomes but unequally distributed.    
 
On the one hand, Dragusanu, Giovannucci, and Nunn (2014, pp. 222-223) presented a summary 
of several studies that had found an increased utility in consumers who bought products 
overpriced due to the manner in which is produced rather than its physical features. If their utility 
is higher then there is an increase in the aggregate welfare and the market is efficient. They 
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performed a meta-analysis to assess Fairtrade certifications in producers´ wellbeing and 
concluded that “the existing empirical evidence, based primarily on conditional correlations (...) 
Fair Trade farmers do on average receive higher prices, have greater access to credit, perceive 
their economic environment as being more stable, and are more likely to engage in 
environmentally friendly farming practices”(Dragusanu et al., 2014, p. 234). Max Havelaar argues 
that the price received by the Fairtrade producer is between 19% and 26% of the retail price (F. 
International, 2006) and consumer not only recognizes the label but they are confident in it37.  
 
In the same line, El Centro de Estudios Regionales Cafeteros y Empresariales - CRECE evaluated 
the impact of sustainable programs in Colombia. Using data for 3,372 coffee farmers participating 
in seven voluntary sustainability standards 38  for 3 years. Researchers showed an average 
improvement of participant farmers in those schemes in a social index (4.3 points), an 
environmental index (8.1 points) and an economic index (5.4 points) compared with non-
participant farmers (Garcia, Ochoa, Garcia, Mora, & Castellanos, 2014).  Additional empirical 
evidence on positive effects of VSS in the three dimensions of sustainability (social, 
environmental and economic) in Colombian coffee zones were provided by Rueda and Lambin 
(2013). They assessed the effects of one VSS (Rainforest Alliance) in Santander (Colombia) and 
showed that comparing to non-participant farmers, participants “had adopted significantly more 
environmentally friendly practices, such as tree diversity, watershed protection through fencing 
and reforestation, and infrastructure for water-use efficiency and wastewater management (…) 
children had significantly higher educational levels (…) the median educational achievement of 
children was two years higher (…) and farmers also joined associations and informal groups 
significantly more frequently” (Rueda & Lambin, 2013, pp. 5-7). S. Arango et al. (2014) evaluated 
the effects of one VSS (Nespresso AAA) in five departments of Colombia, they showed a 
continuous increase during a three-year period in the three economic, social and environmental 
index of participant farmers which constantly remained 25% superior to non-participant ones.   
 
On the other hand, VSS are seen as arrangements that impede market efficiency through both 
overpricing for consumers and resource allocation traps for producers. For Paul Collier quoted by 
Dragusanu et al. (2014, p. 217) producers involved in fair trade certifications “get charity as long 
as they stay producing the crops that have locked them into poverty”. Essentially, critics come 
from concerns about distributive issues in access, governance, and benefits. According to Lozano, 
Samper, and García (2011), VSS impose expensive practices that erect a barrier of entry for 
unsupported small coffee farmers. Indeed, exclusivity to access to the VSS market is at the core 
of labeling. If there is free entry, VSS premiums would attract producers and, if consumption did 
not increase at the same rate, the premium would decrease to a level in which producers would 
not be interested in continuing with the regulated practices. A similar situation was identified in 
                                                     
37 “D’après une étude réalisée auprès des consommateurs suisses par GlobeScan en 2015, 88 % des personnes 
interrogées connaissent Fairtrade Max Havelaar, 84 % lui font confiance, ce qui se traduit par 82 % d’acheteurs 
fidèles" (Havelaar, 2014). Also at the global level “nearly 6 in 10 consumers have seen the Fairtrade mark of those, 9 
in 10 trust it”(F. T. International, 2014, p. 18). 
38  Four certifications (Fairtrade, Organic, Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified) and three codes of conduct 
(Nespresso AAA, 4C and Starbuck’s C.A.F.E. Practices). 
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Mexico in which the expensive practices demanded by the organic certification allow larger 
producers to take over the niche market at the expense of small ones (González & Nigh, 2005).  
 
Dragusanu et al. (2014, pp. 229-231) summarized some studies in which contradictory evidence 
is presented about Fair-Trade effects on local governance. On the one hand, farmers who identify 
strongly with their cooperative and on the other, farmers which are distrustful and dissatisfied 
with the cooperative management. Giovannucci and Ponte (2005) draw attention to large 
commercial roaster that entered the VSS realm to achieve recognition while minimizing cost. Silla 
(2014) argue that intermediaries, including the labeling initiatives, are the real financial 
beneficiaries of those services. In the case of Fairtrade “to take the case of the United States, for 
each dollar paid by “ethical consumers” to buy a fairtrade coffee product, only 0.03 dollars are 
actually transferred to producer organizations” (Silla, 2014, p. 5). Bitzer et al. (2008) show the 
uneven distribution of benefits among partnership members (including producers, traders, 
roasters, and NGO’s). Hiscox (2007, p. 59) argue that just one-quarter of the extra price is 
received by producers because tradable costs are higher 39 . The situation clearly increases 
suspicions for the business model and reduces its capacity to solve the misalignment between 
private and social incentives 40 . Part of the answer for the latter finding is explained by a 
certification boom of coffee farms that rapidly overtook demand for certified coffee, creating an 
oversupply that reduced prices and re-commoditized the coffee market in the roasters’ benefit 
by “greening” their activity (Benoit.  Daviron & Vagneron, 2011).  
 
In response to this distributive issue cause, Lozano et al. (2011) proposed an alternative 
institution, so farmers could upgrade within the coffee value chain in order to redistribute the 
value created on their favor: the Geographical Indications.  
 
1.3.2. Geographical indications 
 
A Geographical indication (GI onward) is an indication for consumers that links a certain good 
with its geographical origin, and the quality and reputations that come alongside41. It tries to 
both encourage consumers to identify the geographical origin of the product and to associate its 
consumption to an offer-driven bundle of sensations mainly associated with the reputation of 
the geographical origin42 and, coordinate producers to follow the practices that maintain or 
enhance their product reputation.  
                                                     
39 According to Hiscox (2007), incomplete information about the tradable product  restricted consumers to purchase 
coffee with other appreciated features (e.g. shade-grown coffee) in addition to just sensorial characteristics: they 
are willing to pay more, but they decide not because nothing guarantees that the extra price reaches its social goal. 
Consequently, roasters who want to offer coffee with those features struggle to distinguish their product. If high 
investment in publicity is so they are going to receive the same lower price for a costly product, in the end, they 
either lose margin/market share or abandon the enterprise. 
40 See for example (Harford, 2008; Rodrik, 2007) 
41 "indications which identify a good as originating in the territory (…), where a given quality, reputation or other 
characteristics of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin". Article 22 of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
42 Indeed, cultural identity and the more appreciated cultural heritage, is the result of a social construction in which 
the past comes to the present to inspire local communities and give meaning to indigenous products in order to 
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From the GVS analysis framework, when this coordination to encapsulate the territorial features 
(especially the aromatic profile) in a coffee43 is so complex that it cannot be codified, a relational 
value chain is expected in which coffee growers individually “work closely with roasters, buyers 
and importers to establish a direct, long-term trading partnership for coffees that have high-
quality cup profiles” (Hernandez-Aguilera et al., 2015, p. 4).  
 
This close relationship could be referred to as coordination. D Barjolle and Sylvander (2002) 
analyzed 21 supply chain featured by GIs in seven countries and concluded that upgrading 
success depends primarily on the effective coordination of objectives in three main areas: 
product quality and control, research & development, image promotion. As the complexity and 
incomplete information make optimum solutions unattainable, collectively setting objectives on 
the basis of their individual competencies is a crucial step to find acceptable solutions to be 
coordinated. Hence,  “many firms jointly managing the same product in the way one large firm 
might do”(D Barjolle & Sylvander, 2002, p. 6)  
 
From the IAD framework, the GI can be conceptualized itself as a common pool Resource that 
helps producers to upgrade their commoditized coffee to a differentiated one. So, scholars 
analyze the sustainability of the GI according to the fulfillment of GI's objectives. Interesting 
enough, the monetary dimension overshadows the socio-environmental ones. Scholars might 
have assumed that the latter was automatically protected by a successful GI because it is feasible 
that the code of conduct developed by the interested community of producers would internalize 
the social cost of production. 
 
 Xiomara F.  Quiñones-Ruiz, Penker, Vogl, and Samper-Gartner (2015) analyzed the management 
of the GI of Café de Colombia in the light of Ostrom’s eight design principles for the governance 
of the commons to illustrate the coordinate effort to govern this GI. They argue, as D Barjolle and 
Sylvander (2002) empathized, that it is not enough to effectively coordinate the collective effort: 
intrinsically features of the market play an important role. The “Café de Colombia” for example, 
cannot fully attain its objectives because it is mainly traded in the green coffee market. Therefore, 
roasters “are not obliged to add the GI-symbol on the package of third-country GI-products. Thus, 
it will be up to the consumer demand and the willingness of international roasters and brand 
owners to communicate origin coffee” (Xiomara F.  Quiñones-Ruiz et al., 2015, p. 434). Similarly 
in the case of countries like Kenya, where sui generis GI’s legislation contributed to the quality 
management (actors used trademarks law to protect the reputation because the absence of a 
proper GI Law) but it did not produce the expected outcomes because they had no control over 
the transformation and marketing stages (Dominique Barjolle, Quiñones-Ruiz, Bagal, & Comoé, 
2017, p. 116).  
 
                                                     
differentiate them in the market according to (Boisseaux et al., 2012). In contrast with marks owned by roasters, 
which encourage consumers to identify the origin of the product at the company level and to associate its 
consumption to a demand-driven bundle of sensations designed through sophisticated marketing campaigns. 
43 “la encapsulación del territorio en un producto” in terms of Ray quoted by Acampora and Fonte (2009, p. 16).  
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In fact, the very recent use of GI for coffee in the developing world has restricted the number of 
empirical studies on its effects44. Teuber (2010) demonstrates that country and region of origin 
are an important price determinant. Using data that she describes as “informal GI” (it means 
coffee sold because of its origin but without legal protection) analyzed through a hedonic price 
model, she shows that single-origin coffee receives significantly higher retail prices (from 3 to 13 
times more than all roasted coffee). Chabrol, Mariani, and Sautier (2015) analyzed a project 
implemented by the Organisation Africaine de la Propriéte Intellectuelle, and show that after the 
Ziama-Macenta coffee GI was granted in 2014, the international market was opened increasing 
purchase prices in 10%.  
 
To conclude, the "lens of contract" literature on the sustainable management of the coffee 
through the GVC analysis and the IAD framework has focused on the institution itself and its 
effects. In this sense, there is an objective definition of the problem that could be solved if clear 
goals are set out, and institutions could produce the incentives needed to accomplish them. In 
the case of the VSS, it emphasized on the institutions' characteristics and mainly its socio-
economic and environmental positive effects however unequally distributed. In the case of GI, 
this institution might internalize the socio-environmental costs so scholars have mainly focused 
on the economic dimension. They claim success depends on coordination among actors which is 
particularly tricky in the highly complex coffee value chain. 
 
This message is highly relevant to our research. Whenever there is an objective definition of the 
problem of sustainability in the coffee culture, a well-designed institution could incentivize a 
transaction of property rights that could solve the problem in the defined terms. We highlight 
the conditional because of the asymmetry of consequences (Favre, 2005): if an institution is 
implemented, its objectives could or could not be attained, if the institution is not implemented 
its objectives are not going to be attained. Hence, institutions are a key component of our 
research. 
 
1.4.  Should we use the “lens of negotiation” to study sustainable management of 
Resources?   
 
However, as we discussed previously, there is never an objective definition of the problem 
because different actors demand different services from the Resource, and each one could 
probably have their own "objective definition of the problem". So, we should look on the other 
way around: How do actors, who had a different definition of the problem, play the game to 
produce the institutions that are going to play a major role to govern their transactions?  
 
1.4.1. Actors’ negotiation matters.  
 
                                                     
44 According to Dominique Barjolle et al. (2017, p. 116), in addition to Colombia in 2007, only both Guinea in 2014 
and Thailand in 2016 successfully obtained the GI for coffee. Jamaica started their process in 2014 and Kenya and 
Ethiopia used the Trademarks legislation to protect the reputation.  
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Xiomara F Quiñones-Ruiz et al. (2016) used the IAD Framework to understand the process that 
ended with a particular GI protected under the European Legislation. They compared five cases 
according to time and resources to create and maintain property rights, two independent 
variables steaming from the empirical transaction cost analysis. They showed that “the most 
critical and demanding phases were the conception of a consensus on the GI-strategy (phase I), 
followed by the definition of an agreement on the Product Specification (phase II)” (Xiomara F 
Quiñones-Ruiz et al., 2016, p. 113). This process perspective draws attention to a seminal piece 
of the puzzle: the actors’ negotiations as an explanatory factor of the final shape of the 
institution.   
 
Boisseaux et al. (2012) disentangle this process using the lens of political sciences. They produced 
a framework to observe the actor’s negotiations in order to develop a GI sustained on the cultural 
identity to increase revenue in markets, which had an inherent dilemma: on the one hand the 
heritage conservation is conditioned by the flew of revenues produced by its exploitation, on the 
other, the exploitation of the heritage put at risk its own value as a heritage. There are some 
actors who are mainly interested in one side of the dilemma (like owners of the land interested 
on the high reputation of wine to increase rents in the long-term) and others with the other side 
(like traders interested in volume to increase their profit in the short term). Designing an 
institution that satisfies the whole set of participants in this dilemma is not automatic.  
 
Indeed, the idea that a well-designed institution can orderly regulate actors’ uses of their 
property rights for their mutual gain, has been criticized for not taking into account actors’ games 
in creating and following institutions. Power relations between actors “highly matter, in order to 
explain why institutions emerge and what function they perform” (Johann Dupuis & Knoepfel, 
2014, p. 17). 
 
This remark has motivated new contributions to study the sustainable management of 
Resources. Clement (2010) “politicized” the AID framework by incorporating two exogenous 
variables (politico-economic context and discourses) to the previous three considered 
(biophysical conditions, rules-in-use, attributes of the community) to study the state 
afforestation policies in Vietnam, taking into account not only the collective action among local 
communities but also the influence of higher government institutions45. This contribution shed 
light on the need to take into account politics but as an abstract concept hardly systematically 
observed to produce robust explanatory claims.   
 
A more comprehensive framework built on the property rights theory of the new institutional 
economics, incorporated the public policy analysis to systematically observe the politics and its 
effects on the (un)sustainable use of Resources. The Institutional Resource Regime (IRR onwards) 
framework developed by J. D. Gerber et al. (2009) focuses its attention on the actors’ uses of 
(their property rights on constituents of) the Resource to produce services that are affected by 
institutions and, simultaneously, on the actors’ strategies to play the power game in order to 
                                                     
45 Other applications of this framework (Brodrechtová, Navrátil, Sedmák, & Tuček, 2016; Clement, 2013; Whaley, 
2018; Whaley & Weatherhead, 2014) 
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influence the institutions. This game is systematically observed by looking how actors mobilize 
ten types of action resources (Peter Knoepfel, 2017) to activate institutions steaming from the 
Institutional Regime (IR onwards): namely those that (not)allow uses of their property rights 
through the regulatory system, or that (des)incentivize uses of their property rights through 
public policies. Its principal hypothesis is that sustainability is increased if the whole set of 
services derived from the Resource are coherently regulated by an integrated regime.  
 
Empirical studies using the IRR framework pointed out two mechanisms that question this 
hypothesis encouraging further improvements. First, the IR is not directly applied in the field. 
There is a gap between what should be implemented and what is actually implemented on the 
ground because actors act strategically to activate or not 46  certain institutions in different 
manners (Schweizer, 2015). This post-activation phenomenon47, observable in a given time and 
space, is known as the Local Regulatory Arrangements (LRA onwards) that “is the result of the 
activation process that is effectively used by the actors to stabilize their uses of the resource. It 
is always worded in concrete terms that allocate use-rights” (de Buren, 2015, p. 21). Secondly, 
there is a paradox that impedes the consolidation of integral regimes: when regulations increase 
to cover the whole set of services demanded from the Resource, it could produce higher 
incoherencies. Consequently, before approaching an integrated regime, the regime goes into an 
institutional complexity trap caused by both transaction cost and transversal transaction costs 
(Bolognesi et al., 2018). 
 
These contributions do not refute the basic idea that unregulated and incoherent regimes tend 
to decrease sustainability, but that there are more mechanisms that have to be untangled. At the 
state of the art of the Institutional Regime literature, it can be said that the question should be 
redefined in terms on how do actors overtake transaction costs to produce LRAs that coherently 
regulate the whole set of services demanded from a Resource to avoid falling into the 
institutional complexity trap and increase Resource’ sustainability.  
 
1.4.2. Our contribution: mechanisms that explain positive coordination.       
 
An immediate challenge of such an actor-oriented approach is that, as long as services provision 
does not endanger the stock and reproductive capability of the Resource, all demanded services 
are “legitimate”. So, participation in the agreement to govern the Resource is not just a 
normative desire, it is an explanatory factor of the Resource’s sustainability: if some actors are 
excluded, their demanded services would be hardly produced and the sustainability would be 
low. It implies that when the number of participating players increases, the transaction costs rise: 
not only it is complicated to arrange an adequate combination of services provided by the 
                                                     
46  Schweizer (2015) systematized five types of activation: passivity (no activation); concretization (activation as close 
as it is intended); diversion (activate a rule with an intention other than the original one); circumvention (resist the 
rule by activating another) and innovation (develop a tailor-made solution to address the issue). 
47 De Buren (2014) claim that the LRA would be influenced by the IR depending on the level of coherent regulation 
of the whole set of services. In its maximum level, the LRA would be mostly influenced by the IR, in the minimum 
level, when the IR is inexistent, the LRA would be influenced by the leeway for action.   
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Resource but also it is difficult to agree who should assume the costs of the change of use and 
receive the benefits from it.   
 
The latter had been described by Lax and Sebenius (1987) as the “negotiator’s dilemma” in which 
the needed cooperation among actors for reaching the adequate combination of services is 
counterbalanced by the intrinsic competition derivate from distribution. Depending on these two 
dimensions (salience of both production and distribution) Scharpf (1997) distinguished between 
four modes of negotiation: spot contracts when both are low; distributive bargain when the 
result itself is not relevant but the distribution of costs and benefits is highly important; problem-
solving on the other hand, distribution does not matter but the joint effort to produce the result 
is pivotal; positive coordination when both issues are of high relevance.  
 
Scharpf (1997, p. 133) observed the positive coordination through the work done by successful 
inter-ministerial project groups to deal with problems affecting jurisdictions of several 
departments: “the members of such task forces were, for a limited period, excused from their 
ordinary duties and free from hierarchical directives within their home departments (…) it was 
expected that such task forces would be able to develop innovative approaches that departed 
from the established policy routines of the ministries involved but that the solution proposed 
would, in the end, also be acceptable to these ministries (…) these elaborate arrangements were 
thought necessary to overcome the conservative bias (…), in which each department developed 
project ideas only with a view to its own responsibilities and capabilities and opposed other 
initiatives that would have encroached on its own routines”.  
 
Because positive coordination becomes prohibitive when transaction costs escalate due to the 
increase in the number of actors, Scharpf (1997, p. 146) moved into the direction of aggregated 
preferences in which individual actors group together as collective actors (like coalitions; club, 
movements; association) or corporate actors 48 . So, his theoretical focus shifts from the 
interaction among actors to the internal interaction within actors.  
 
Assuming that this aggregation of actors makes it feasible to overcome the transaction costs 
(because negotiation is not developed among several individuals but just a few collective actors) 
we focus our research on the positive coordination among these few actors. We retrieve the 
elements transcribed of the previous example of successfully inter-ministerial project groups 
because they shed light on some dimension that we are interested in. Firstly, a “deliberative 
scenario” for negotiating both the production and the distribution; secondly, “innovative 
solutions” (on both production and distribution) must be embedded in the Institutional Regime 
because this gives legitimacy to the agreement so representatives of the collective actor can 
                                                     
48 According to four characteristics (action; purpose; resources; decisions) there are six types of actors: aggregate 
actors when action, purpose, resources, and decisions are all individual; coalitions when action is joint and decisions 
are agreed whereas purpose and resources remain individual; clubs when purpose remain individual but action is 
joint, resources are collective and decisions are taken through voting; movement when action is joint and the 
purpose is collective, so even resources are individual decisions are consensual; association when action is joint, 
purpose and resources are collective and decisions are taken through voting; corporate actors when action, purpose, 
and resources are featured by the organization and decisions are taken by hierarchies- 
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convince their individual members; thirdly the overcoming of the conservative bias to maintain 
an immovable position.  
 
In the Institutional Resource Regime literature, Laesslé (2016) developed the concept of 
Institutional Creativity as the capacity of local actors to make use of the strategies of (in) 
activation of institutions with the objective of shaping the final output in such a way that the 
demanded services are produced. We consider that this concept could be refined by adapting it 
to the elements observed by Scharpf (1997, p. 133) in the previous example of positive 
coordination. Firstly, this concept could implicitly incorporate the deliberative scenario, but we 
consider relevant to make it explicit because hardly any agreement can be reached without it; 
Secondly, the "innovative solutions" embedded in the IR are fully incorporated through a 
systematized observation of the final output to produce the demanded services; thirdly, this 
"immovable position" is operationalized in terms of the power game, namely strategies to 
mobilize the action resources in order to shape the output in the actor's interest. 
 
We are particularly interested in this third dimension. We conjecture that to overcome the 
conservative bias there is a negotiation previous to the one mentioned on both the “production” 
and the “distribution” and refers to the initial distribution of power among the actors. A huge 
imbalance would maintain the conservative bias essentially because powerless actors would not 
be able to put forward their position, hence the production (services to be produced from the 
Resource) and distribution (who pays the costs and obtain the benefits) agreements would be 
solved in favor of the powerful actors, leaving forcefully behind the services demanded by the 
excluded actors, therefore decreasing the Resource sustainability.  
 
In this order of ideas, we conjecture that a power-balanced starting point could explain the 
overcoming of the conservative bias in order to trigger positive coordination that could end in a 
negotiated agreement which produces the whole set of demanded services. Clearly, as the 
power-unbalance is the most common starting point, we conjecture that the “negotiation 
dilemma” starts when powerful actors face the initial dilemma either to deceive and take 
advantage to govern the Resource in its favor putting at risk sustainability, or to cooperate and 
endow enough the powerless to “balance” the initial discussion and open the door for the 
positive coordination needed to guarantee the sustainable management of Resources. 
 
1.5. Intermediary synthesis: A research to analyze the two-face sustainable 
management of Resources through the “lens of negotiation”.        
 
We started this chapter criticizing the international consensus on the sustainability of coffee 
because it was built on an objective definition of a group of actors, namely the actors vertically 
linked in an input-output relation. Then, we demonstrated that sustainable management of 
Resource systems has to be evaluated on two dimensions: the objective one that assesses the 
appropriated level of the stock and reproductive capacities of the Resource, and the subjective 
one, that assess the socially constructed services demanded from the Resource. 
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We showed that this problem only make sense when humans produce accidents that limit the 
expected life span of the Resource system, so we conceptualize it as a problem of collective action 
and we briefly presented how scholars had dealt with it. We focus on the “lens of contract” to 
study this collective action problem of the sustainability of the coffee Resource and we showed 
that a well-designed institution could incentivize a transaction of property rights that could solve 
the problem in the defined terms. However, as different actors have their own subjective 
“objective definition of the problem” we propose to use the “lens of negotiation”. 
 
We place our contribution in enriching the IRR framework to explain the sustainability of both 
the Resource and the socially constructed services through the local regulatory arrangement. At 
the state of the art of the IRR literature, the main question is how do actors overtake transaction 
costs to produce LRAs that coherently regulates the whole set of services demanded from the 
Resource before falling into the institutional complexity trap. So, we conjecture that this could 
be possible through the positive coordination that can be reached when, in a first negotiation 
dilemma, actors cooperate to empower their weaker counterpart so the negotiation is balanced 
enough to solve the second negotiation dilemma on both the production and distribution.   
 
We intend to test this conjecture using the Institutional Resources Regime Analytical Framework 
(chapter 2) to identify possible causal mechanisms that could improve collective action and the 
sustainable management of coffee culture (chapter 3).  
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Chapter 2. Conceptual framework 
 
To address the problem of collective action in the sustainable management of coffee culture, we 
propose to use the Institutional Resource Regime framework (de Buren, 2015; J. D. Gerber et al., 
2009) and particularly, its adaptation for the analysis of heritage Resources (Boisseaux et al., 
2012; Laesslé, 2016).   
 
Using the “lens of negotiation” we do not focus on the institutions but on the agreements. Thus, 
the analysis intends to understand how the actors negotiate the activation of institutions to 
influence the use of the Resource in order to guarantee a provision of services that satisfy them 
all, increasing the sustainable management of the Resource.   
 
We propose to develop this conceptual framework in two stages, firstly a general approach that 
develops the link between our two main concepts: The Resource System and the Local Regulatory 
Arrangement. Secondly, we dig deeper into the detailed description of the explanatory 
mechanism from an operative perspective, through which we present the variable to explain: the 
level of services provision; the intermediary explanatory variable: The Local Regulatory 
Arrangement; and the explanatory variables: the actors’ games. 
 
2.1. The general model 
 
We start analyzing the Resource System from three elements: The Resource constituents that are 
profiled by actors to produce the demanded services. Then, we describe the link between these 
three elements through a conceptual tool that we denominate the Local Regulatory 
Arrangement.    
 
2.1.1. The artificial Resource Coffee  
 
The coffee trees and their fruits in a forest are not a Resource. They only become a Resource to 
the extent that human beings use them to obtain services. The Resource could be composed of 
a dozen of coffee trees planted in a yard owned by one person, who harvest 37 kilos of coffee 
cherries annually. He then hulls to remove the pulp; ferments the byproduct for few hours with 
the last layer of pulp until it is washed away; and then, he dries the beans to obtain 7.5 kilos of 
parchment coffee (the type of coffee usually sold by farmers). Afterward, he threshes it into 6 
kilos of green coffee (the type of coffee usually bought by roasters), so he can roast it into 5 kilos 
of roasted coffee. Finally, he mills so he can brew two cups of coffee daily all year long49. In this 
                                                     
49 Assuming an annually production of 3.1 kilos of coffee cherries per three (equivalent to 0.62 of parchment coffee; 
0.5 kilos of green coffee and 0.42 kilos of roasted coffee) and a cup containing 7 grams of roasted/milled coffee. 
(conversion factors to convert different types of coffee by Pérez et al. (2008)). This example pretends to briefly 
familiarize the reader with the profiling process.   
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case, the Resource system is composed of a dozen coffee threes whose fruits are used to produce 
one service: the pleasure of drinking two cups of coffee per day50.   
 
Also, the Resource system could be composed of the whole coffee harvest equivalent to 150 
million green coffee bags produced by two-dozen millions of coffee farmers in tropical countries 
(ICO, 2014), plus traders, roasters, brewers and so on, for producing services to hundreds of 
millions of human beings all around the globe.  
 
This conceptualization allows us to analyze Resource systems at different levels (e.g. a country 
level or a subnational one). But at least, in a given time, the stock of the Resource (a coffee crop 
identified in a geographical area) and the group of users interested in its services (hereinafter 
referred to as actors) must be defined. We denominate this heuristic division: The Resource 
perimeter.   
 
However, if the coffee crop can be straightforwardly defined as an area planted with coffea51 
trees, the group of actors might be tricky to identify because services are both materially 
produced and cognitively constructed by humans.    
 
From the point of view of the “material production”, services are not autonomously derived from 
the Resource, it is necessary a set of human processes to produce them. Following Nicol (2012, 
pp. 26-27), we considered Coffee as an artificial Resource that produced services because of 
human intervention. We denominate this process “to profile” (the Resource) and the resulting 
combination of services as “the profile" (of the Resource) following Boisseaux et al. (2012).  
 
In this sense, we can identify the first type of users of the Resource and the first type of services: 
The profilers who demand monetary services. They are natural or juridical persons that use the 
Resource in a logic of input-output throughout the coffee value chain to add value, in exchange 
for money. We have described the Resource system as a very small perimeter with a dozen coffee 
threes and just one profiler. If we focus on a bigger geographical space (e.g. the coffee harvest in 
one municipality), it is highly probable that we can observe a larger group of profilers. 
 
Initially the profilers-farmers who conduct the first three processes of the profiling process: 
planting the coffee trees of a certain variety, with a particular density and renovation cycles, 
alongside (or no) other plants species, in a portion of their owned land; cultivation of the coffee 
crop providing the conditions for a good picking of coffee cherries: managing the soils, the pest 
and diseases, the nutrition and the natural protection; post-harvesting activities to initiate the 
transformation of the bean, adding value through the hulling, fermentation, dying (in some cases 
waste management and reselection), developing the aroma precursors52 within the parchment 
coffee beans.  
                                                     
50 In a real case, there could be several services, to maintain the example as simple as possible we assume just one 
service.  
51 A genus of flowering plants in the family Rubiaceae (Arcila, Farfán, Moreno, Salazar, & Hincapié, 2007) 
52 The changes in the chemical composition of green coffee beans are due to metabolic activities that occurred on 
farm and fermentation after the harvest (Lee, Cheong, Curran, Yu, & Liu, 2015). 
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Then, local merchants, coffee cooperatives, exporters, international commodities merchants 
among others, which we denominate profilers-traders, trade the coffee between farmers and 
roasters. Usually, they buy parchment coffee directly from the farmer, or indirectly among them. 
Eventually, a trader will add value by threshing the parchment coffee in green coffee and sorting 
by quality in coffee bags of 70 kilos (an internationally accepted practice). Afterward, the trader 
will bulk and ship the quantities needed by its clients: local or international roasters (frequently 
the highest quality is exported and the lowest quality goes to the domestic market).    
 
Finally, Profilers-roasters would roast coffee to add value selling to consumers. They buy green 
coffee from traders and in some cases directly from farmers, to offer a consistent value proposal 
for the final consumer either a roasted-packaged coffee or a brewed coffee cup.  This value 
proposal depends on both the aromatic profile and the bundle of sensations attached to its 
consumptions. The aromatic profile results from a series of Maillard Reactions (a chemical 
reaction of sugars, proteins, amino acids, and phenolic compounds amino acids and reduced 
sugars that produce coffee aroma induced by heat when the green coffee is roasted (Lee et al., 
2015)). Two ingredients are essential: the aroma precursors on the green coffee, affected by 
external factors like availability and purchase prices, and the completely controlled S-Curve Roast 
Profile, meaning the relationship between temperature and time. Hence roasters are incentivized 
to rely on their roasting technique and to diminish their vulnerability by blending coffee coming 
from different origins easy to acquire from different suppliers. The bundle of sensation is shaped 
through the communication strategy, usually, a marketing strategy that defines a clear message 
and a set of promotional activities to spread it like personal selling, advertising, publicity, etc.  
   
We have briefly described the seven human processes into which we divide the profiling of the 
Resource coffee.  Each process is composed of innumerable activities, the vast majority has not 
a relevant influence on the profile of the Resource but there are some who are essential to 
produce services. We have identified a closed list of 26 activities in which profilers face tradeoffs 
between one expected profile or potential alternative ones that we present in Annex 1, with a 
brief description and the identified tradeoff. For example, farmers have to choose between two 
coffee arabica varieties, the pest-resistant Castillo or the pest-vulnerable Borbón, the latter does 
require pesticides (negatively affecting the environment) but it is believed that has a higher 
possibility of producing a high-scored coffee (positively affecting its aromatic profile) that could 
be better paid in the upper-market segment (positively affecting the monetary services). The 
former could have a lesser impact on the environment, but a common aromatic profile which 
would be paid at standard market prices.    
 
The “choice” between different profiles in one activity is observed through the uses of the 
Resource made by an actor in that particular activity. To systematize the observation, we 
conceptually divide the Resource into three components categorized by Boisseaux et al. (2012, 
p. 17) as the Resource constituents  (hereafter constituents).  
 
1- Infrastructures: the basic structures that give existence to the Resource. The soil in which 
the coffee tree is planted and the plant itself are essentials to its existence; also, the 
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logistic structure that permits its trading and shipping to multiply the services demand at 
a global scale; and the distinctive sign which encapsulates the bundle of sensations that 
defines the Resource, among other basic structures. Particularly relevant is the coffee 
fruit in a given state, namely: coffee cherry, parchment coffee, green coffee, roasted 
coffee.   
 
2- Know-how: human interventions that consume the activity using particular techniques 
and/or utensils. For example, planting practices according to the moon cycle using 
ancestral ceremonies for encouraging a good harvest; blending different doses of 
synthetic fertilizers to compensate soil deficiencies previously evaluated, namely the 
chemicals elements demanded by the coffee crop; attaching a chip to the coffee bags to 
trace coffee origin; using certain colors in the packaging to attract consumers attention, 
etc.    
 
3- Know-to-appreciate: the social construct of the Resource links it to a meaning that once 
activated, produce a sensory and/or cognitive experience. For example, if a high-scored 
coffee cultivated under the organic legislation by indigenous communities from a 
Unesco’s world heritage site, is served to a person who does not have any meaning 
attached to the coffee beverage, he could use it to rinse its shoes. On the other hand, if a 
person appreciates the complex aroma delighting himself; travels on his mind to this 
heritage site with astonishing landscapes; feels safe drinking a product that avoided toxic 
pesticides, and responsible protecting cultural diversity, the Resource produces its full 
potential. In both cases, actors had used their infrastructures and know-how to influence 
(un)successfully the use of the know-to-appreciate of both consumers.  
 
This last constituent highlights the cognitive construction of services. “Humans, unlike other 
animals, “eat with the mind as much as the mouth” and are “immersed in the symbolic nuances 
of food” (Alan Beardsworth and Teresa Keil quoted by Biltekoff (2010, p. 175)). Starting from 
coffee taste classification as “delight” or “disgusting” to the reputation of the roaster that 
produces “affection” or “repulsion”, or the labeling that produces “confidence” or “distrust” and 
the coffee crop defined as “lush” or “predatory”. Adjectives that are just limited by the 
vocabulary.  
 
This social construction of services in human minds, triggered by the whole profiling process 
triggers, allows us to identify two additional types of actors: consumers and stakeholders, and 
two additional types of services taste related and symbolic.   
 
For consumers, the beverage acts as a transmitter of meaning created by the social context and 
their own experience, including the communication strategy move forward by profilers or by 
stakeholders. For them, coffee is a vector of sensations derived from the sensory experience that 
we denominate taste related services, like the sweet citric acid of a coffee grown in Buesaco or 
the fruity aroma of a natural coffee (a long fermentation in which coffee is left to ferment with 
the pulp for several days until it dries completely). Also, coffee consumption triggers feelings 
derived from the cognitive experience that we denominate symbolic services, like the 
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environmentally responsibility of a coffee grown under a trusted environmental label, or the 
prestige when drinking a worldwide reputable coffee appellation. Usually, consumers perceive 
both services.     
 
Stakeholders are individuals or groups of individuals from whom the profiling of coffee is defined 
as a collective issue that demands collective action: E.g. The coffee crop is perceived as a cultural 
killer that has to be eradicated or an opportunity to improve income and well-being that has to 
be encouraged. In both cases, the social construction is moved forward by stakeholders to 
encourage collective action and provide the symbolic service. In the first case the sensation of 
the “cultural protection”, in the second the impression of “well-being”. Collective issues are 
horizontal to the vertically linked input-output relationship among profilers, so following 
Abdulsamad, Stokes, and Gereffi (2015) we will use the terms of stakeholders in production and 
stakeholders in consumption to differentiate between the origin of the collective issue, namely 
public authorities, NGOs, agricultural associations, consumer associations, etc. 
 
Moreover, a specific profile does not automatically imply that actors obtain their demanded 
services. Rather insufficiencies on the demanded services are the norm because of the inherent 
rivalry between profiles that maximize monetary services through the intensification of coffee 
farming at the expense of the taste related services when aromatic precursors were poorly 
developed. Or a profile that privileges taste related services through complex fermentation 
techniques that implies several washing cycles at the expense of the symbolic services by 
polluting water creeks. Or a profile that focuses on the symbolic services derived from ancestral-
indigenous production at the expense of the monetary services, and so on. Eventually, these 
rivalries would put at risk the provision of a particular service. Then, it could be expected that 
actors who value the endangered service would react to ensure the provision of it, in quality and 
quantity, during the life span they consider appropriate. Analyzing through the IRR framework, 
actors may engage in the political arena to activate institutions steaming from the public policy 
and the private law to influence the use of constituents made by other actors, which in turn could 
generate new rivalries. 
 
It is through these claims for services that we identify the whole set of actors and the whole set 
of services that are included within the perimeter of the Resource. Indeed, we can assume that 
each individual that has a relationship with the Resource demands a particular combination of 
services, from the inhabitant affected by the polluted water due to his coffee farmer neighbor to 
the tourist astonished by the coffee landscapes or the urban citizen that feels his identity 
attached to the coffee crop. To make the analysis feasible, we use the criterion of critical mass 
developed by Jean-David Gerber (2004). It implies that only the services demanded through a 
legal, a political, or a contractual claim on the uses of the Resource are taken into account. For 
example, the winy-like taste related service produced in some terroirs when the coffee cherry is 
picked just after it is properly ripe, is taken into account if there is a group of actors who demand 
this particular use (late-picking), by activating either institutions coming from the private law (like 
contracts) or public policies (like the technology transfer public policy). Hence, we only consider 
as an actor the persons or the group of persons that have moved forward their political, legal or 
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contractual claim because they are the only ones that could affect the final profile of the 
Resource. 
 
To conclude this initial section, to analyze the Coffee resource system in a given perimeter 
(composed of a geographical zone and the whole set of actors and services demanded from the 
Resource in a given time and space), it must be observed the uses 53  actors made of the 
constituents in each one of the 26 activities throughout seven processes, to profile a combination 
of services (figure 1).      
 
Figure 1 Resource System: Resource constituents; profiling processes and actors; services. Source: The author 
 
 
2.1.2. The Local Regulatory Arrangement  
 
We ended the previous section describing briefly the rivalries between actors. By demanding a 
particular service, an actor encourages some uses of the constituents that could endanger the 
provision of services demanded by others. The affected actor could fight back encouraging other 
uses that could put the first service at risk, and the cycle restarts. So, the common sense says that 
the ideal solution would be to ensure a combination of services that satisfy all the actors.  
 
However, the social construction of services makes this ideal situation hardly reachable. It can 
happen that the whole set of actors interested in services from the Resource in a given perimeter 
reach a profile in “balance”. But then, for unpredictable reasons like a weather phenomenon or 
a new trend in consumers’ habits, some individuals perceive that this profile put at risk they 
demanded services and gather together with other individuals to activate institutions to 
influence the uses of constituents producing a new imbalance54.  
 
This inherent dynamic of the profile demands a heuristic tool, which like a photo, can assess the 
profile, or profiles, of the Resource in a given perimeter. The IRR has a conceptual tool that we 
consider fit for our purposes developed firstly by P. Knoepfel, Imesch, Bonnefond, and Larrue 
(2011): The Local Regulatory Arrangement (LRA hereafter). Once defined the Resource 
                                                     
53 When we are using the word “use(s)” as a substantive, we are referring to “use(s) of the Resources constituents”.  
54 It must be said that also, it can happen that an “imbalanced” profile threats the provision of services for a group 
of people, but as they do not react, the profile could remain for a while. 
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perimeter, namely the Resource system in a given time and space, it can be observed the uses of 
constituents by profilers. Thus, it can be assessed the services provision. E.g. If we can observe 
that the whole population of coffee farmers, traders, roasters, and consumers within a Resource 
perimeter are using the constituents following the organic legislation, we can claim that the 
organic symbolic service is produced.    
 
Once this photo is taken, one can doubt that the observed uses spontaneously appeared. Indeed, 
profilers can use the constituents because they have the ownership over them: the commercial 
infrastructures and know-how to both transform the coffee from the fruit to the beverage and 
influence the non-commercial know-to-appreciate owned by consumers. But, when tracing back 
their origin, one would realize that uses were a result of various (dis) incentives to make profilers 
modify their behavior.  
 
Analyzing through the IRR lenses, this behavior is observable because actors had activated 
institutions steaming from the Institutional Regime (IR onwards) for encouraging the provision of 
their demanded services: namely institutions that (not)allow uses of their property rights through 
the regulatory system, or that (des)incentivize uses of their property rights through public 
policies. For example, the observed planting of a pest-resistant coffee variety is a consequence 
of a subsidized loan produced by an output of the coffee public policy. When using the IRR’s lens: 
the institution incentivized the change on the farmer use of his ownership on infrastructures 
namely the land and the coffee three. Also, the unobserved natural coffee (the mentioned long 
fermentation) in Colombia is a consequence of a prohibition to export other than washed coffee 
(once the coffee is hulled, coffee cherries are fermented with the mucilage for a few hours, then, 
the mucilage is removed with water). The institution forbids farmer a particular use of his 
ownership on both the infrastructures (the coffee cherry) and the know-how (the fermentation 
equipment and knowledge). 
 
• The profiling institution on which an LRA is built.  
 
As we showed in the previous chapter and will be further developed in chapter four, the coffee 
issue has been part of the international public agenda for a while, thus actors had developed 
some institutions like the mentioned GI and the VSS that play a major role during the profiling 
process. 
 
Laesslé (2016), using the IRR framework showed the institutional mechanisms that profile the 
Resource analyzing the actors’ games that produce LRAs derived from the GI for wine in 
Switzerland and New Zealand. However, we take distance from his conceptualization of the 
Resource: for him, the Resource is the wine profiled by an LRA that concretize at the local level 
the institution “appellation d’origine”. The wine produced outside this LRA cannot produce the 
services sought by it and therefore is not considered a Resource55.  
                                                     
55 E.g., the wine produced by the vine growers of Beudon (an organic crop of the Fendant strain in the commune of 
Fully) was not accepted by the tasting commission of l'interprofession (competent body the ARL Fully) to be sold as 
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For our research, we utilize Laesslé (2016) idea of the profiling power of an institution, however, 
we disagree with his narrow definition of the Resource: By defining the Resource through the 
activation of a GI, forcefully it is biased towards a group of actors. This institution is usually 
activated by producers to guarantee the services they demand. Other actors like traders, 
roasters, and stakeholders in production and consumption could mobilize other institutions like 
the VSS for example. Hence, we do not define the Resource from an institution like the GI or a 
VSS that would produce a single LRA with some producers included and others excluded. We 
define the Resource through the Resource System in a Resource Perimeter in which different 
LRAs derived from different institution could be found. These LRAs would reflect the whole set 
of actors’ strategies to guarantee the different combinations of services demanded. 
 
In fact, the observable reality in coffee culture is the production of this kind of institutions created 
and activated by different actors that have the potential to extend vertically (profilers 
farmers/traders/roasters and consumers) and horizontally (stakeholders in the production and 
consumption) throughout the whole Resource system. Once activated, these institutions would 
assign, at an individual and concrete level, rights and obligations of use of Resource constituents, 
creating constraints and opportunities for constituents’ owners. Following Schweizer (2014, pp. 
37, 79-86), we call a final output this last state of the institutional cycle.    
 
We identified six types of this kind of institutions that we denominate profiling institutions56: 
official quality standards (based on the Law); private quality standards (developed by companies 
or organizations like the standards and protocol of the Specialty Coffee Association of America 
SCAA); protected geographical indications (based on the rules of origin legal framework); 
Voluntary Sustainability Standards (the seven main ones mentioned Organic, Fairtrade, 
Rainforest Alliance, UTZ, 4C, Starbucks' CAFE Practices, and Nespresso AAA); and Heritage 
Protection (based on international conventions for the protection of cultural heritage). All this 
profiling institutions comes either from the public law like the Organic Standards established by 
the Organic Food Production Act of 1990 passed by the Congress of the USA; or in private law 
like the SCAA standards and protocols created in 1982 by a group of associates to define the 
Specialty Coffee as a coffee that scores higher than 83 over 100 in their cupping protocol.   
 
• The purchase transaction to identify the LRA.  
 
Laesslé (2016) identifies the LRAs through a specific wine GI, whose scope is operationalized 
through the possibility that the wine could be sold under the aforementioned wine appellation. 
We similarly identify the LRAs through a specific profiling institution but we reduce the scope to 
the actual portion profiled by the institution in a given Resource perimeter.  
                                                     
AOC Valais and therefore was excluded from the LRA and the production of services from it (Laesslé, 2016, pp. 228-
229). 
56 Initially we identify a set through the documentary analysis that was enriched through our exploratory interviews 
and finally validated in our field work in Colombia. However, this set of profiling institutions could be enlarged by 
replicating the research in other coffee regions.  
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Our heuristic technique is to use the purchase transaction between coffee growers and the 
traders, in one region and one harvest, to identify the various LRAs present at this Resource 
perimeter. We select this transaction (which itself is a final output) because it reflects the effect 
of all the previous final outputs (intended to (dis) incentivize farmers’ use of constituents) to 
produce the services sought by profiling institutions. Reusing a previous example, the "IG Café 
de Colombia" profiling institution regulates uses of infrastructures and know-how during the 
post-harvesting process to conduct a short fermentation. If the coffee grower uses 
infrastructures and know-how during the post-harvesting process differently (e.g. by doing a long 
fermentation), at the time of the purchase transaction, it would be excluded from the LRA 
derived from the "IG Café de Colombia" profiling institution, but it can join another LRA, whose 
profile accepts the taste related services associated with the long fermentation. In the end, the 
scope of the LRAs is the amount of coffee that was bought because it fulfilled the minimum 
requirements demanded by a profiling institution. Therefore, once the total purchases of the 
coffee harvest in a given Resource perimeter are exhaustively categorized in different LRAs 
through this heuristic technique, we can recognize the entire set of profiling institutions activated 
by the actors. And through this set, we can identify the whole set of demanded services that had 
been the object of legal, political, or contractual vindication.  
 
• The features of the LRA.  
 
The Local Regulatory Arrangement is an arrangement because the profilers agree to modify (or 
not) their behavior. Even if in some cases it is perceived as an imposition, profilers can always 
decide not being part of an LRA (either by limiting the flow of services or by diminishing the stock 
of the Resource, e.g. cultivating another crop) because the high costs of constriction make it 
unfeasible, in comparison with the coffee price in the highly competitive green coffee market. It 
is regulatory because the profilers change their use of the constituents according to pre-
established (regulated) uses of constituents to profile an expected combination of services; it is 
local in the sense that it is localized on the Resource System featured by a local geographical 
origin (the coffee lands); an international profiling processes (local and foreigners profiling actors 
use  constituents throughout the seven described processes) and a global demand of services 
(consumers and stakeholders around the world).  
 
In the following section, we will dig further into this general statement looking into the 
regulations of the uses of Resource Constituents through a conceptual tool we denominate the 
extent; we will disentangle the arrangement focusing on the governance mechanism to reach 
agreements and to enforce them through a conceptual tool we call coherence. And, we will 
critically observe the previous two elements “localized on the Resource System”, through a third 
conceptual tool we call closure because the fact of being localized does not mean that it is 
“equally” localized, especially when talking about the distribution of cost and benefits among 
participant actors.   
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This voluntary nature does not imply that all the actors feel completely satisfied with the LRA’s 
services production/distribution. Some actor’ demands could be better satisfied than another’s, 
but the latter must maintain the services provision (in quality and quantity) that it considers, at 
least, appropriate. Otherwise, this unsatisfied actor would seek to activate other institutions 
from the public policy and private law, including other profiling institutions, creating instabilities 
that insecure the life span of the incumbent profile.  
 
Of course, as we said before, this could be solved if the LRA produces (and distributes) the 
combination of services that satisfy all actors. It implies that services provision is decided in 
advance, therefore, uses of constituents must forcefully be negotiated. Otherwise, the chances 
to profile this ideal type of all-demanded-services combination would be too low when each 
profiling actors, throughout the seven processes, use the constituents in their own interest.  
 
We will use the “lens of negotiation” to focus on the actions that actors had done to reach these 
agreements on the uses of constituents: actors’ games. We conceptualize it as a three-step 
process in which firstly actors who share similar demands get together into actors’ coalitions; 
secondly, they move forward their demands of services using the power that we systematically 
observe through a conceptual tool called mobilization of action resources, and finally, they reach 
the agreements activating in different ways the institutions to shape the final output that we 
denominated institutional creativity.    
 
2.1.3. Intermediary synthesis: General model.  
 
Figure 2 shows our general model in which the Resource System in a given Resource perimeter 
is profiled through a Local Regulatory Arrangement resulted from the activation through actors’ 
games of profiling institutions and other institutions coming from the public policy and the 
private law.   
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Figure 2 Model for profiling the Resource System in a given Resource Perimeter. Source: the author adapted from (Boisseaux et 
al., 2012a) 
 
 
 
2.2. Operational model  
 
Having explained the general model for profiling the Resource System in a given Resource 
perimeter, we take out our magnifying glasses to look into the three main components of our 
research and we will explain in detail each of them from an operational point of view, to end with 
an intermediary synthesis.  
 
1- The level of services provision as the variable to explain.  
2- The Local Regulatory Arrangement as an intermediary explanatory variable.     
3- The Actors’ games as the explanatory variable.   
 
2.2.1. Level of services provision  
 
Our dependent variable is the profile of the Resource that produces a particular combination of 
taste-related, symbolic and monetary services in a given time and space, satisfying a percentage 
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of the actors that demand services of the Resource. Indeed, services provision varies by external 
factors among territories and periods of time, for example, the monetary services could be 
affected by economic dynamics57 or the taste related services by the climate58. Given our interest 
in analyzing the relationship between the LRA and the level of service provision, we favor the 
synchronous approach: we compare several LRAs in the same territory during the same period 
of time. Other explanatory factors (such as climate/markets shocks) similarly affect all the LRAs 
present in the territory59, therefore, the differences in the level of services provided are plausibly 
explained by the differences between LRAs. 
 
• Monetary services 
 
Monetary services are measured quantitatively as the average annual income (kilos of coffee 
multiplied by the price per kilo) received by the family farm60 participant in an LRA. We do not 
subtract the costs of production because of both a substantial and practical reason.  
 
The cost of production itself could hinder valuable information for our purpose to assess the level 
of services provision: two coffee farmers have the same cost structure but what one spends on 
the cost of pesticides the other spends on the cost of weeding wages. The former cannot sell 
through an LRA that forbids pesticide use whereas the latter can. Hence even with the same cost 
structure, a different combination of services can be provided. Similarly, cost structures vary 
significantly among coffee farmers within an LRA and its average cost of production hinders again 
value information: two coffee farmers belong to the same LRA that forbids the use of synthetic 
fertilizers, one increases their costs by investing a significant portion in fertilization wages to 
provide the organic nutrition demanded by the plant while the other just skip fertilization and 
maintain a very low-cost structure. Hence the average cost of production hinders the information 
that explains the different level of monetary services within the LRA. Therefore, in both cases, it 
is more important to focalize on the uses of Resource constituents than in the cost of production 
itself.   
                                                     
57 The fall in oil prices since the end of 2014 decreased the income of foreign currency into Colombia and increased 
the price of the dollar. As a result, monetary services of coffee growers increased in Colombian pesos due to their 
coffee exports in US dollars. 
58 The Niño phenomenon in Colombia during the first semester of 2015 significantly increased the portion of 
averanado coffee in some regions: low density beans that produce a grass and dry straw taste related services due 
to the lack of water that limit the proper bean development. 
59 An example of an external factors that affects all LRAs is the correlation between climate shocks and international 
coffee prices provided by (Flury, 2015) which affects all the LRA in a given time and space.  
60 Family farmers are a subgroup of farmers who own a Family Farm: it implies that the family lives and works in the 
farm cultivating coffee alongside other economic activities. “Esta definición implica que: i) la familia es una unidad 
tanto económica como social; ii) una porción importante de los ingresos proviene de actividades agropecuarias, 
aunque pueden incluir otras fuentes; iii) la fuerza de trabajo preponderante es la de la familia, aunque pueden 
contratar en forma parcial u ocasional mano de obra asalariada; iv) los ingresos son normalmente diversificados (no 
dependen de un solo cultivo, o actividad pecuaria), aunque en algunos casos provienen de un solo producto; v) el jefe 
de la familia participa en las actividades productivas y vive en la parcela, o cerca de ella, con otros miembros de la 
unidad familiar; y vi) cobija a productores agropecuarios familiares propietarios y poseedores a cualquier título a 
pescadores artesanales y acuicultores” (FNC, 2014). 
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Secondly, cost of production is extremely difficult to collect in family farms: there is not a clear 
difference between the crop and the family expenses because both are attended according to 
urgencies rather than strategic planning, so records of these transactions are barely used.  
 
Furthermore, since most of the coffee in a territory can be followed to the threshing (given that 
once it is blended with coffee from other regions/countries it would be impossible to identify the 
other profilers) we have to extrapolate the monetary services received by other profiles 
according to the monetary services received by coffee farmers. Supported in our exploratory 
interviews, we assume that the monetary services received by each profiling actor, in the LRA 
that grants the greatest monetary services to the coffee grower, will be equal to or greater than 
those received by profilers of other LRAs that grant fewer monetary services to the coffee 
grower61. 
 
• Symbolic and taste related services 
 
Different from the quantitative nature of the monetary services, the symbolic and taste related 
services can only be qualitatively evaluated through both the narratives that actors are using to 
communicate to other actors and, the regulated uses of Resource constituents through the 
activated institutions. Using an example from the empirical chapters, to assess the winy-like taste 
related service that we identified in the LRA Nespresso during the purchasing transaction, we 
analyzed both the narrative of “grand crus” Nespresso used to influence the know-to-appreciate 
associating their single-dose coffee capsules with the upper-segment of wines, and the activated 
institution that regulates the uses to profile this service. Once the exercise is done from the whole 
set of LRAs, we produce a closed list of services demanded from the Resource in a given time and 
space.   
 
As we mentioned, IRR scholars have shown there is not an automatic link between the rule and 
its implementation “as expected”. For Schweizer (2015) in reality there is a wide spectrum of 
possibilities ranging from the non-application at one extreme, and the application to the letter at 
the other, in the middle there are different combinations in which the rule is somewhat 
implemented: in some cases in an unforeseen direction maybe even contrary to the spirit of the 
rule, or it goes further than expected in the right direction. Hence, predictably there is a gap 
between the narrative and the regulated uses, and also between both and the observed uses of 
constituents by actors, which are the ones that matter to produce the services.   
 
In some cases, the narrative of the “grand crus” is not partnered with a crucial regulation like the 
late-picking. In others, the narrative “grand crus” is far behind the regulations that are not only 
producing a wine-like taste related service but also a panoply of other symbolic services (e.g. a 
                                                     
61 Exporters and traders joined the LRAs which granted higher monetary services to farmers because there were 
higher margins even though they had to assume additional costs in procurement and logistics. Those that stayed in 
LRAs which granted lower money services to producers said that they have to compensate the lower margins with 
greater volume.  
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permaculture-like regulation that produce the “environmentally responsible” symbolic service). 
And of course, there is another gap between the regulated uses written down in the paper like 
the late-picking and the observed uses of Resource constituents by profilers, in which farmers 
are picking earlier because a major two-week long national celebration is scheduled for example.   
 
So, we incorporate a four-step assessment process: We start identifying a closed list of services 
demanded from the Resource. Secondly, we describe how these services are expected to be 
produced by analyzing how each LRA regulates the uses of Resource constituents. Thirdly, we 
summarize observed uses of resource constituents by each LRA to, finally, put on evidence the 
services provided by the Resource because of the observed uses62. The data we use will be further 
explained in the next chapter.  
 
In this sense, we can evaluate if the observed services are equal to the demanded ones, or they 
are lower in quantity and quality, or even, the observed services could be higher when observed 
uses compatible with several services.   
 
• Level of services provision 
 
Finally, we evaluate the level of services provided by comparing from the table of services 
demanded from the Resource in a given time and space, the number of services provided by each 
LRA.  
 
Following our definition of sustainability, two ideal-type LRAs can be drawn: the completely 
sustainable LRA which can guarantee in the long run the provision of the whole set of demanded 
services by the actors and the completely unsustainable that cannot provide a single one. From 
these two highly unlikely (in the real word) LRAs, we define the level of services provision: high 
when the proportion of the demanded services is closer to the former case, low when is closer 
to the latter. 
 
Our logic is that LRAs with a low level of services provision is unsustainable because some actors 
would feel their demanded services poorly provided or at risk, thus they will fight in the political 
arena to challenge it, and sooner or later the LRA will change. On the other hand, if the level is 
high, actors would judge provision of their demanded services guaranteed in their expected life 
span, thus they would not engage and the LRA would prevail. In other words, the LRA succeeds 
in solving the problem of collective action by regulating the uses of Resource constituents in such 
a way that the serviced demanded by different actors are provided.   
 
                                                     
62 It should be noted that we prioritized the observed uses of Resource constituents in the 16 activities of the first 
four processes (from planting to trading) given that as green coffee (before being blended and roasted), the Resource 
is at its maximum potential capacity to produce services. Subsequently, the services necessarily have to be prioritized 
(for example, a complex green coffee can produce a variety of sensory profiles depending on the roasting, so the 
roaster has to decide to highlight the profile of citric acidity). 
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Hence, we conduct a synchronic analysis in which we compare the proportion of the demanded 
services63 that are produced by each LRA. The LRA that optimizes the provision of services is 
under our conceptualization, the closest to solve the problem of collective action among the LRAs 
present in the territory.  
 
2.2.2. The Local Regulatory Arrangement  
 
Recapitulating, the combination of monetary, symbolic and taste related services are a result of 
the use of Resource constituents in the 26 activities distributed among the seven processes 
described in Annex 1. When “deciding” a particular use to favor one combination there could be 
a tradeoff against another combination. Eventually, in a given time and space one combination 
of services is produced because of the observable uses of the Resource constituents. Uses 
become observable because institutions were activated in the range of implementation-to-the-
letter to the complete omission. This time-and-space fixed picture of observed services (because 
of) observed uses (because of) (in)activated institutions is what we call the LRA.  
 
Our heuristic technique is to identify the LRA through the purchase transaction, in which coffee 
farmers sell their coffee beans to an intermediary in one region and one harvest. We use this 
transaction as the classification criteria because it is the juridical act that concretizes, at the 
individual and concrete level, a promised purchase price in exchange for the expected profile of 
the Resource. I.e. the coffee bean in its state (coffee cherry, dry parchment coffee, green coffee) 
could produce the services demanded by other actors because Resource constituents were used, 
so far, as expected.  
 
• Conditions overview 
 
From a neoclassical economics perspective, if there were not any agreement between actors on 
the uses of Resource constituents, the whole Resource would produce in the long run, the 
combination of services encouraged by market forces, namely those resulted from the highest 
efficiency of productive factors. Their idea is that, in perfect competition, there is no product 
differentiation and, as economic agents are interested in maximizing their profit, it is expected 
that only the agents that produce the highest quantity at the lowest cost would remain in the 
market. In this order of ideas, in that hypothetical world, there would be just one type of LRA 
that “regulates” all uses in order to optimize production, so in the end, the whole Resource would 
produce the same combination of monetary, symbolic and taste related services.   
 
Nevertheless, actors are not just economic agents that want to maximize the income, they have 
diverse concerns that we have previously conceptualized as services. Thus, actors produce 
additional regulations on uses of constituents to produce their demanded services over services 
encouraged by market forces. The more uses are regulated, the better the predictability on 
                                                     
63 In the case of monetary services more than the proportion we prefer to show an absolute number in COP and its 
equivalent in l.m.m.w (legal monthly minimum wage) in place during that time in Colombia.  
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services provision. E.g. To guarantee the winy-like taste related services actors have to use their 
constituents very precisely on various activities, at least on the variety planted, the late-picking, 
the short fermentation, the documentary traceability, the proper roast, and the communication 
strategy, thus it is highly implausible to reach this profile if actors do not regulate uses of 
constituent. Therefore, regulation of uses in the different activities along the seven process is a 
condition that we denominate extent, which explains the capacity of the LRA to provide services. 
 
The regulation does not mean implementation. Actors attached to the winy-like service could 
regulate the variety to be planted, the late-picking, the short fermentation, the separate storage, 
the proper S-curve for roasting and so on, but profilers do not follow. It is needed some sort of 
governance mechanisms to coordinate profilers so uses are implemented as expected. This 
second condition is called coherence. 
 
The governance mechanisms put in place to profile the Resource coffee are closely related to the 
market position of the actors: It is not the same relation between profiling actors if one 
concentrates all production64 or on the contrary if it concentrates the distribution65. In both 
extremes, the monopolizing actor will decide the governance mechanism to be implemented66. 
In the coffee industry, there are neither these two extremes nor perfect competition67, but of 
course, LRAs are located in between, with some that look as monopolies in production or 
distribution, whereas others look more competitive. To capture this market-position influence in 
the observable uses of resource constituents by profilers belonging to an LRA, we propose a third 
condition, the closure.  
 
So, we categorize the LRA depending on the combined high (presence) or low (absence) of these 
three conditions.   
 
• Extent 
 
If one actor was both the owner of the Resource constituents and the only interested in the 
services it produces, he would use them to produce his demanded services. The exact opposite 
happens when talking about Coffee, both ownership of the Resource constituents and services 
                                                     
64 As it happened during the Rasulids Dynasty which governed Yemen from the 13th to the 15th century. They 
controlled the seaport of Adean, a main trade route from the Indian Ocean to the Red sea, through an extensive 
bureaucratic apparatus. It allowed them to maintain the monopoly over coffee production and its profitability 
(Caton, 2013). 
65 As it happened for a few years after 1873, in which Ariosa started to sell roasted and packed coffee. It was the first 
successful national brand of packaged coffee in US (Ukers, 1922, p. 523). 
66 Gereffi (1994) goes in deep in his seminal paper on the governance of the GVC focused on “Big Buyers” and how 
purchase power shaped production networks. 
67 A market is classified as oligopoly if the first four firms concentrate more than 50% of market share. In the roasted 
coffee market, the first nine have a combined market share of 40%: Both Nestle and JAB Holding Company with 11% 
and the other 18% distributed between Smucker’s, Strauss, Starbucks, Tchibo, UCC, and Lavazza. (We used data 
coming from Panhuysen and Pierrot (2014, pp. 20-21), from which we aggregated the percentages of all companies 
bought by JAB Holding between 2014-2016.   
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demanded are widespread in the world68.  Therefore, actors interested in services who have 
neither ownership nor right of use over Resource constituents should act over the ones who had 
it to provide their demanded services. Forcefully, the former had to communicate to the later 
the expected change in behavior through regulation.  
   
Thus, the first condition of the LRA is its capacity to regulate (or not) the uses of the Resource 
constituents in each one of the closed list of 26 activities throughout seven processes, which we 
selected because of its effect in the final profile of the Resource. 
 
Processes and activities are detailed in Annex 1 but we list them below: 
1. Planting: diversification; variety; renovation cycles; density; shade. 
2. Cultivation: soil and weed management; coffee borer beetle handling; pest and disease 
management; nutrition; hedge rowing; picking; farm management. 
3. Post-harvesting: hulling; fermented; drying; waste management; reselection. 
4. Trading: procurement; threshing and sorting; bulking and export. 
5. Roasting: blending; roasting; Packaging and retailing. 
6. Communication strategy: communication. 
7. Brewing: grinding; brewing. 
 
It is worth reiterating that in our conceptualization, we do not only focus on institutions 
regulating the uses, but also on the effects of regulations on the behavior of the actors with 
ownership over the Resource constituents. That is why we define extent as the number of 
observable uses regulated by the LRA, thus, it is taken into account only the activities in which 
the observed use was conducted as it was regulated.  
 
Furthermore, it is considered that there is a high extent if two conditions are met: more than half 
of the activities weighted by the process are regulated69, and regulations are evenly distributed 
between the seven processes70.   
 
                                                     
68 Because of its production (150 million coffee bags produced annually by both thousands of capital intensive 
enterprises and tens of millions of family farms), its commercialization (70% of the world coffee harvest is consumed 
in non-producer countries), and its consumption at a global scale (ICO, 2014) 
69 There are seven processes but they differ in the number of activities, e.g. the cultivation process has six activities 
whereas the communication strategy has only one activity, so to give the equal weight to each process we use a 
weighted average. To be completely transparent we present our formula to calculate it. The letter A means 
“activity”; the first number codes the process (planting=1; cultivation=2; post-harvesting=3; trading=4; roasting=5; 
communication strategy=6; brewing=7) and the second number codes the activity in the same order as it is shown 
in the list of activities of annex 1 
((A1.1+A1.2+A1.3+A1.4+A1.5)/5*3.6)+((A2.1+((A2.2.1+A2.2.2)/2)+A2.3+A2.4+A2.5+A2.6)/6*3.6)+((A3.1+A3.2+A3.3
+A3.4+A3.5)/5*3.6))+((A4.1+A4.2+A4.3)/3*3.6)+((A5.1+A5.2+A5.3)/3*3.6)+(A6.1*3.6)+((A7.1+A7.2)/2*3.6)) 
70 Similarly, we present our formula to calculate the concentration:  
(((A1.1+A1.2+A1.3+A1.4+A1.5)/5*3.6)+((A2.1+((A2.2.1+A2.2.2)/2)+A2.3+A2.4+A2.5+A2.6)/6*3.6)+((A3.1+A3.2+A3.
3+A3.4+A3.5)/5*3.6)))/(((A1.1+A1.2+A1.3+A1.4+A1.5)/5*3.6)+((A2.1+((A2.2.1+A2.2.2)/2)+A2.3+A2.4+A2.5+A2.6)/6
*3.6)+((A3.1+A3.2+A3.3+A3.4+A3.5)/5*3.6))+((A4.1+A4.2+A4.3)/3*3.6)+((A5.1+A5.2+A5.3)/3*3.6)+(A6.1*3.6)+((A7
.1+A7.2)/2*3.6))) 
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The first condition develops the assumption that only regulations can produce foreseeable 
services. On the contrary, if there is not any regulation it is impossible to predict which service 
would be produced. So, if more activities are regulated, more predictability on the services to be 
produced. The second condition adjusts the first one by including in the analysis, the distribution 
of regulations. If more than half of activities are regulated (first condition) but all of them are 
concentrated in a few processes, predictability over their final profile is also impossible because 
of unregulated processes would produce random services. So, with both conditions, we are 
assuming that to produce foreseeable services they must be regulations, evenly distributed, 
throughout the value chain.    
 
• Coherence 
 
From the regulated uses to the observed uses there is not a linear and automatic relation. There 
are governance mechanisms that encourage profiling actors to behave as expected in order to 
match as close as possible the observed uses with the regulated ones. So, the institutionalist 
character of the extension is complemented by a neo-institutionalist perspective of coherence, 
to the extent that the actors refine institutional instruments to align the profilers around the 
desired profile of the Resource. Coherence, as a condition, tries to capture this relation in order 
to complement the previous one (the extent) as a combined condition needed to trigger the 
provision of demanded services. 
 
Indeed, assuming there is no coherence, only markets, and its prices will encourage profilers in 
one unique direction: more production with lower cost. We can imagine one farmer investing in 
a costly practice to treat water. When he goes to the market, he might encounter other farmers 
that did not treat water selling at lower prices than his own production cost. Buyers will take 
advantage of paying the minimum price accepted by the polluting farmer, so the responsible 
farmers either abandon that practice or abandon the business. Coherence, on the other hand, 
allows profiling actors to align themselves using infrastructures, know-how, and know-to-
appreciate to profile the Resource in such a way that a panoply of services demanded by different 
actors could be provided. 
 
Thus, transparency is a condition of coherence. The profilers must be identifiable from the origin, 
and actors must be able to communicate among themselves to fine-tune both their uses of 
Resource constituents and the desired services to be provided. This implies the existence of a 
two-way coordination bridge along the value chain. In one direction, the same services are 
profiled by the LRA and in the other, the same LRA is profiled by the actors.  
 
Actors develop mechanisms to define the combination of services and profile them from the 
selection and prioritization of (profiling) institutions. Governance of the LRA is developed 
(formally or informally) whose objective is to produce (either intermediary or final) outputs in 
order to change the behavior of participant profilers and produce the demanded services.   
 
To systematize our observation, we analyze coherence using five elements. 
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1- Services: The starting point of coherence is that there are some services that could not 
be produced without an agreement.   
2- Actors: There are some actors that must be coordinated to produce the expected profile. 
Not only profilers but also stakeholders in the consumption and in the production.  
3- Institution: We identifies the main (profiling) institutions that are activated to trigger the 
change in the behavior.     
4- Governance: We describes how actors govern the LRA in both directions from services to 
actors, and from actors to services.    
5- Output: It describes how the output causes a change in behavior.  
 
As a result, high coherence implies that the five elements managed to align actors around a 
commonly agreed profile, hence profilers use the Resource constituents as expected.  
 
• Closure  
  
The extent and the coherence are necessary conditions explained by local actors games, as 
showed by the empirical applications of the IRR for Resources like forest (De Buren, 2014), 
heritage (Laesslé, 2016), landscape (Jean-David Gerber, 2006) because the very existence of the 
Resource can be extinguished due to overexploitation motivated by the local demand for 
services71. Indeed, Resources are fully controlled by actors at the local level so market forces can 
be contained, even annulled by prohibiting uses of the Resource to produce goods and services 
regardless of the existence of a demand for them and using force for effective enforcement. 
 
But in the case of artificial Resources that are profiled through a long chain, the property rights 
over the Resource constituents are in the hands of both local and foreign actors (constituents of 
the Resource coffee are usually in the hands of producers, traders, and stakeholders at the local 
level, and roasters, stakeholders and consumers at the global level). Actors’ games at the local 
level are not enough to profile the Resource because foreign profilers, through prices, can 
generate incentives to expand or reduce the local stock according to the consumption of its 
fruits72. Hence, the extent and coherence are explained by the actors’ games but "given" the 
markets. These are not considered controllable or voidable, but they could be influenced. 
 
In this regard, there is an actors’ game on one board whose objective is to profile the Resource 
that is captured by both conditions of extent and coherence. But there is another actors’ game 
on a bigger board that seeks to influence the market. The results of the game in this second board 
strengthen the position of the actor in the first one. To capture this relative market power that 
                                                     
71 Using the concept of strong durability (Peter Knoepfel & Nahrath, 2005) a consumption of fruits of the resource 
faster than the capacity to supply them by the stock of the resource, causes its exhaustion. 
72 In the case of the coffee resource, the crop (coffee trees) is the stock and the coffee beans its fruit. When 
consumption exceeds supply, the increase in prices motivates new plantings that increase the stock and with two 
years of delay, the fruits for consumption. If prices tend to fall, it is likely that the stock will be reduced (by knocking 
down the coffee trees) and with it, the quantity of coffee beans that would be collected in the next harvest. 
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ends up prioritizing (in favor of some actors) the services to be obtained from the Resource, we 
propose closure as a third condition.  
 
We define closure as the result of strategies carried on by actors to create barriers of entry in 
order to counter competition forces73 and win a market position that allows them to profile the 
Resource in their advantage by producing in higher quantity and/or quality their demanded 
services.  
 
Like the previous two conditions, the absence of closure could allow a perfect competition coffee 
market that would incentivize uses of constituents to profile the Resource prioritizing a high-
productive-low-cost coffee farming. The activation of intellectual property rights such as rules of 
origin, trademarks or patents, for example, created barriers of entry to shield the provision of a 
lower-productive profile (usually because it was prioritized symbolic and sensory services) from 
the forces of a competitive market. 
 
Profilers that strategically manage to constitute barriers of entry in their market segment 
(production of coffee cherries, procurement of parchment coffee, trading of green coffee, 
roasting/retailing roasted coffee and brewing a coffee cup74), strengthen their position in the 
actors’ game to define not only the profile of the Resource but also the set of profilers in the 
profiling process. 
 
As we define sustainability as the result of collective action to produce all services demanded 
from the Resource in a given time and space, we conjecture that the closer the barriers to the 
territory, the greater the production of services demanded by local actors. So, we are interested 
in the production of services that satisfies the majority of actors in a specific territory, hence we 
scale the barriers of entry from the farm to the community of relatively close farmers located in 
a geographical area that shares the same soils and climates.  
 
To systematize our observation, we analyze closure by looking throughout the coffee value chain 
the barriers of entry identified by M. E. Porter (2008, pp. 7-13): economies of scale; product 
differentiation; capital requirements; cost disadvantages independent of scale; access to 
distribution channels; government policy. 
 
• Configuration 
 
Due to the combined presence/absence of LRA’s condition, there are eight different 
configurations which are both exhaustive and excluding. Theoretically, any LRA could be 
                                                     
73 According to the five competition forces proposed by M. E. Porter (2008, p. 4): 1-Industry rivalry; 2- Threat of new 
entrants; 3- Threat of substitutes; 4- Bargaining power of suppliers; 5- Bargaining power of buyers. If the combined 
effect of these forces reduces overall profitability, as it is the case in “pure competition”, the industry is unattractive 
(M. E. Porter, 2008, p. 4). 
74 In its two main segments: Sale of roasted coffee retail (soluble coffee, roasted / ground coffee, coffee in personal 
doses) and sale of roasted coffee drink (mainly coffee shops). 
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incorporated in a box of figure 3. We will make the first traditional division of the IRR between 
the extent and coherence (four boxes), and then, we open them to incorporate the closure 
condition (eight boxes are possible but seven are plausible).  
 
Figure 3 Seven plausible configurations. Source: the author 
 
 
• Inexistent regime: low extent and low coherence.  
o Invisible hand: More than an inexistent regime, this term coined from economics 
signs us that there are economic forces that regulate the use of Resource 
constituents. Neither non-farmers nor farmers regulate and coordinate uses of 
constituents. That is why even though visually this box is divided into two sections, 
conceptually both are the same because the presence of closure is implausible 
when both extent and coherence are completely absent: Barriers of entry are a 
result of regulations to provide services not achievable through perfect 
competition.  
• Simple: low extent and high coherence when the coalitions have a consensus to regulate 
just a few uses of the Resource.  
o Cunning entrepreneur: A coalition led by non-farmers coordinated very well a few 
regulated uses of constituents crucial for profiling the Resource. E.g. an LRA lead 
by a “big buyer” who defines the few uses to be regulated and the governance 
mechanisms.   
o Protectionist: Similarly, a coalition led by farmers regulates very well a few crucial 
uses of constituents. E.g. an LRA lead by an organized group of producers who do 
not allow rules imposed by outsiders to maintain control on the few uses they 
consider must be implemented.   
Coherence +
Closure -
Closure +
Extent - Extent +
Coherence -
Cunning Entrepeneur
Responsible Entrepeneur
Naive 
Ambitious
Implausible
Invisible hand
Protectionist
Integral
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• Complex: high extent and low coherence. The consensus is more the exception than the 
rule. More actors tend to bring new regulation on more uses, increasing the extent at the 
expense of the coordination, meaning the uses are regulated but there are not 
implemented as expected. 
o Ambitious: A coalition led by non-farmers in which plenty of uses are regulated 
but observed uses by profilers are different. E.g. an LRA derived from a profiling 
institution developed by an NGO, in which costs of implementation of regulated 
uses are unaffordable for farmers.    
o Naïve: Similarly, farmers led a coalition in which too many uses are regulated but 
are not implemented as expected. E.g. a community organized around a 
geographical indication that regulates uses from production to consumption but 
cannot influence the behavior of other profilers like roasters. 
• Integral: high extent and high coherence in which observed uses are similar to regulated 
uses.   
o Responsible Entrepreneur: A coalition led by non-farmers, in which all actors have 
a saying in the development of both regulation and its ends, manages to motivate 
profilers so they use constituents as expected. E.g. an LRA led by a Roaster who 
open the table to discuss with all actors, the uses to be implemented by the whole 
set of profilers.   
o Integral: All actors are coordinated around farmers, so they all have a saying in 
the regulation of uses and the profile sought. E.g. an LRA featured by a coalition 
of roasters, traders, local authorities, NGOs, associated with the reputation of one 
community of producers.      
 
2.2.3. Actors’ games 
 
The observed LRA’s configuration and the final profile of the Resource in a given time and space 
are produced by the (in)activation of institutions steaming from both the public policy and the 
regulatory system (Schweizer, 2015) that would encouraged/discouraged uses of constituents to 
provide the services that actors (usually grouped together in coalitions) want to produce. This 
(in)activation is neither automatic nor guided, but following Peter Knoepfel (2017) it is a result of 
a power game between different actors’ strategies in the use of action resources75 as it has been 
validated by IRR literature (de Buren, 2015).  
 
The analytical concept of activation process overcame the traditional dichotomy between 
strategies to activate institutions “to the letter” and complete avoidance. It depends on the 
actors’ capability to take advantage of institutions by hand-picking their elements that support 
the provision of their demanded services. This capability denominated institutional creativity 
(Laesslé, 2016) becomes visible in the final output (the juridical act that creates, at the individual 
and concrete level, rights and duties for using Resource constituents in a particular manner). 
Using as an example an empirical observation in chapter six, the board of administration of the 
Fairtrade Coffee in Riosucio (composed of the farmers’ cooperative interested in monetary 
                                                     
75 We will differentiate them from the Resource coffee using italics and minuscule.  
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services and the indigenous organization in the indigenous symbolic service) agreed to use the 
Fairtrade premium in technical assistance, in which members of the indigenous community 
selected by the indigenous organization would be trained by the farmers’ cooperative to become 
extension agents. Therefore, when the final output (the extension service that would incentivize 
producers to use constituents) reaches the farmer, it would incorporate both the indigenous 
organization and the farmers’ cooperative demand.     
 
Henceforth, from the IRR literature mentioned (Boisseaux et al., 2012; Laesslé, 2016) we 
conceptualize the actor’s game as a sequence composed of three explanatory factors: Actors’ 
coalition; mobilization of action resource and institutional creativity. These are our analytical 
dimensions to assess the actors’ games and their impact on the LRA’s configuration.     
 
• Actors’ coalitions 
 
The public problem, the perceived risk on the provision in quality and quantity of a demanded 
service from the Resource during its expected life span, is a social construction76. In this sense, “if 
men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas theorem quoted by 
(Merton, 1995, p. 380)). Thus, what explains actors’ involvement in the problem of collective action 
is the actors’ definition of a “real situation” in which their demanded services are at risk.  
  
This definition is an actor’s perception (it could be a one-person or a shared belief by a group of 
people) grounded in the physical reality. So, it is susceptible to varying due to both changes in the 
perception itself or in the physical reality. A change in the external-to-the-actor consensus (e.g. the 
International Coffee Agreement 2001 that spread socio-environmental concerns); a change in the 
internal-to-the-actor consensus (e.g. a new decision in the administrative board of the Fairtrade 
Foundation to create a certification mark in order to correct market failures); or a change in the 
physical reality (e.g. a climate event which affected the coffee harvested and changed actors’ 
perception towards a diversified and climate adapted coffee culture).   
 
Furthermore, as this definition (of a real situation in which demanded services are at risk) is 
defined in terms of the behavior of those actors who use the Resource constituents, it could 
change if actors change their perception that behaviors are (in)compatible. Using again an 
example of chapter six, the indigenous movement defined the “indigenous coffee” symbolic 
service in terms of the threat to the indigenous culture due to coffee cultivation and considered 
the behavior of those who use the infrastructures to plant coffee as incompatible. But some years 
later, they redefined the same “indigenous coffee” symbolic service in terms of buen vivir and 
therefore using the infrastructures to plant coffee was compatible by providing some cash for the 
material wellbeing of the household. 
 
In the case of the coffee Resource, as for many others, there is not a single actor that seeks to 
appropriate a single service (regardless of how it is defined) as the literature on the IRR has shown 
                                                     
76 A claim that has been validated by my predecessors in the empirical application of the IRR (de Buren, 2015; Laesslé, 
2016; Schweizer, 2015). 
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(de Buren, 2015). Usually, there is a group of actors that demand similar (or different) service (s) 
and qualify as a public problem the risk of its provision. Thus, they gather together to consolidate 
coalitions in order to influence uses of constituents compatible with their demanded services 
and, to get access during the life span they consider appropriate. In this sense, this public problem 
is not necessarily tackled down by public authorities but by actors (among whom authorities 
could be part (Schweizer, 2015, p. 62)).  
 
Coalitions, as defined by Scharpf (1997, p. 57), are one kind of collective actor in which some 
individuals, collective, and corporate actors (like companies, associations, public entities) gather 
together to joint action in order to profile a particular combination of services from the Resource, 
using their individual resources to fulfill their individual purposes, through an agreement.  
 
Coalitions can be developed among actors in the same category or in different categories: 
Coalitions among profilers (e.g. producers, traders and roasters); or among some profilers and 
some stakeholders in the production (e.g. producers and the local public authority) or among 
stakeholders in production and stakeholders in consumption (e.g. indigenous movement and 
consumers’ foundations).  
 
We operationalize the actors' coalition by describing both the perceived common threat that is 
at stake and the participant actors.  
 
• Mobilization of action resources 
 
Then, the second explanatory factor is the mobilization of action resources to activate 
institutions.   
 
We bring back our consideration through which, due to the empirical difficulty of exhaustively 
assessing the legal/political claims over the Resource, the IRR empirical studies have privileged 
an analysis of rivalries in which different actors fight for different services but eventually a final 
output is delivered solving the rivalry in favor of one of the groups of actors. From our regard, 
this focus would systematically provide a zero-sum competitive game, in which some actors 
would win and their services would be provided at the expense of other actors and services.  
 
As expected, the evidence is robust when claiming that actors’ coalitions mobilized their action 
resources strategically in order to counter other coalitions. Indeed, among IRR scholars the 
strategic mobilization of action resources is a fact that has not been contested. The strategic 
mobilization was victorious if it was smarter77; or cooperative (meaning it has partnered with 
                                                     
77 The case of Green Peace when strategically using their resource money to have access to the resource law by 
buying a plot of land near to the Bonfoil landfill (Johann. Dupuis & Knoepfel, 2013)   
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appropriate actors)78; or it was better endowed in action resources79; or it had activated the 
“right” institution80, among others81.   
 
If we assume that the production of the whole set of demanded services during the appropriate 
life span is the objective of collective action, it cannot exclusively focus on rivalries between a 
couple of uses (and services). It forcefully has to analyze synchronically all the services demanded 
from a Resource in a given time and space. So, the mobilization of resources of action is assessed 
not on the base of its success to stabilize a rivalry in the favor of one actor (meaning its service 
provision was guaranteed) but on the basis of its capacity to stabilize rivalries so the higher 
number of actors are satisfied.  
 
This opens a window to question the intention of the mobilization of action resources itself. 
Common sense tells us that if all actors are interested only in the provision of their demanded 
services without thinking in the demanded services of others, profiling the Resource so it provides 
the whole set of demanded services by all actors would be an extraordinary casualty82. In this 
case, the actor obtains a benefit at the expense of the long-term sustainability of the Resource 
unraveling what we are going to denominate the first negotiation dilemma. Either the actor 
deceives to take advantage at the expense of the sustainability, or the actor cooperates by 
empowering other actors to move forward their demanded services, enhancing the chances for 
a collective action that improves the sustainable management of the Resource. 
 
In this order of ideas, we incorporate as an analytic dimension this intention of the mobilization 
of action resources that could range between two extremes. Either it is done with a visible 
intention to impose a demanded service at the expense of the service of another actor, which we 
call selfish. Or it is done with a visible intention to empower another actor so it could move 
forward their demanded services, which we denominate cooperative. Between these two, there 
is a reactive intention that usually tries to counterbalance previous mobilizations, which we call 
strategic.  
 
So, we conjecture that actors’ coalitions mobilize selfishly; strategically or cooperatively their 
action resources to (in) activate institutions from the private law (contracts or conventions) or 
from the public law (public policies), in order to produce intermediary or final output to 
incentivize uses of Resource constituents to profile their demanded services.  
 
                                                     
78 Partnership with apparently not-engaged actors like the landowners during discussions about the geographical 
indications for wine in Switzerland (Laesslé, 2016) 
79 (Jean-David. Gerber, 2005) 
80 Property rights are more powerful than public policies (de Buren, 2011) 
81 Additionally, the normative approach when studying non-renewable Resources is unavoidable. There is always 
better uses that do not deplete the Resource and other who put it at higher risk, and of course, some long-term 
thinkers prioritized the former while other short-term the later. This provides an additional reason why the IRR has 
focused on the rivalries analysis.  
82 In fact, game theory scholars would say that if the dominant strategy for each actor is to deceive, collective action 
is not possible because the equilibrium is not to cooperate (Nash, 1951). 
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It could be said, that even though they have not been distinguished, the first two types of 
mobilization are developed by the IRR literature (de Buren, 2015; Johann Dupuis & Knoepfel, 
2014; Jean-David. Gerber, 2005; Laesslé, 2016; Schweizer, 2015; Tippenhauer, 2014). We are 
interested in providing evidence of the third type that has not been explored in depth in previous 
IRR studies. In this cooperative mobilization, the actors’ intention intends not only to guarantee 
the provision of their own demanded services, but also that third actors can be supplied with 
their demanded services. This mobilization is featured by the intention of increasing the 
allocation of action resources of the actor whose initial endowment is so poor that their demand 
for services is not taken into account. 
 
Thus, using the classic definition of cooperation in game theory “one individual pays a cost for 
another to receive a benefit” (Rand & Nowak, 2013, p. 413), we define the cooperative 
mobilization in terms of collective action: the transfer of action resources from one (coalition of) 
actor(s) to other (coalition of) actor(s) to empower them so that their demands for services could 
be effectively incorporated into the LRA.  
 
We operationalize it by describing how the (coalition of) actor mobilized their action resources 
from a portfolio of ten identified by Peter Knoepfel (2017):  law, personnel, money, information, 
organization, consensus, time, property, political support, force. We focus on the intention of the 
mobilization which is exposed in three ways when conducting the diachronic analysis. 1- At the 
origin of the actors’ game in minutes, rapports and public information written down by the actors 
involved; 2- At its conclusion once the output was produced; and 3- From the activities carried 
on during the sequence. We would triangulate the data to convincingly categorize the 
mobilization in one of the three categories proposed.   
 
• Institutional creativity 
 
In between of the mobilization of resources of action and the LRA, there is the third factor with 
explanatory force: the institutional creativity originally proposed by Laesslé (2016).  
 
“Dès lors, la présente recherche met l’accent sur la créativité institutionnelle dont font preuve les 
acteurs et qui se reflète dans les modalités concrètes de régulation que revêt, in fine, 
l’arrangement. Plus exactement, la créativité institutionnelle renvoie à la capacité locale à 
contourner, ignorer, détourner ou compléter les règles institutionnelles du régime (…) et à les 
articuler avec les règles non locales (cantonales, nationales, etc.)” (Laesslé, 2016, p. 91). 
 
We slightly adapt this concept to highlight the accent on the provision of the demanded services 
due to our interest in collective action. So, we define the institutional creativity as the capacity 
of participant actors in the LRA to make use of the strategies of (in) activation of institutions from 
the IR with the objective of shaping the final output in such a way that their demanded services 
are produced.  
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We propose to analyze this capacity using the “lens of negotiation”. Hence, we divide this 
construct into two elements: one procedural: how do participant actors in the LRA reach an 
agreement? And one substantive: what do participant actors in the LRA agree upon?  
 
From the procedural point of view, there should be some form of deliberative scenario so actors 
could discuss, argue, debate, etc., to eventually agree on something. In this sense, actors have to 
be able to meet, so both a scenario is needed (either real or virtual) and a coordination 
mechanism to bring them in contact. As these kinds of negotiations on the uses of constituents 
are complex and dynamic, usually the deliberative scenario starts informally with some phone-
calls and spontaneous personal meetings but eventually could become formalized with elected 
members with the right to speak and/or vote, and periodically predefined meetings.    
 
From the substantive perspective, actors have to solve the traditional negotiation dilemma by 
agreeing on both the profile and the distribution of the cost/benefit of changing the incumbent 
uses of constituents. Hence, actors negotiate on the final shape of the final output, which would 
influence the uses of constituents to anticipate the final profile of the Resource. We denominated 
it as the second negotiation dilemma to differentiate from the first negotiation dilemma 
previously described.   
 
We conjecture that as long as there are deliberative scenarios in which all the participant actors 
in the LRA can negotiate, an agreement can be reached on the uses that should be (dis) 
incentivized through a collectively shaped final output to produce (on the entire Resource or a 
portion of it) the set of the actors’ socially constructed demanded services. 
 
We operationalize the institutional creativity among participant actors in the LRA, describing its 
presence or absence through both the procedural and the substantive element:  
 
1- Presence of institutional creativity.  
a. Deliberative scenario: The existence of a scenario and a coordination mechanism. 
b. The second negotiation dilemma: The shape of the final output to influence 
inclusive (in any profiling actor) or exclusive (only in selected profiling actors) uses 
of Resource constituents was a result of: 
i. Negotiation of the profile of the Resource. 
ii. Negotiation on the distribution of the cost/benefit of the uses of Resource 
constituents.  
 
2- Absence of institutional creativity.  
a. Deliberative scenario: The inexistence of a scenario or/and a coordination 
mechanism. 
b. The second negotiation dilemma: The shape of the final output to influence 
inclusive (in any profiling actor) or exclusive (only in selected profiling actors) uses 
of Resource constituents was a result of: 
i. The imposition of the profile of the Resource  
72 
 
ii. The imposition of the distribution of the cost/benefit of the uses of 
Resource constituents.   
 
• Outcome 
 
This sequence through which we analyze the actors’ games starts with an incumbent LRA 
perceived as hostile towards a demanded service and have two possible ends: either new 
agreements on the uses of Resource constituent to provide this threatened service would be 
negotiated or no agreement would be reached. In the former, the configuration (the combined 
presence/absence of the extent, the coherence, and the closure) of the incumbent LRA would 
change. In the latter, the incumbent LRA configuration would remain stable but eventually, the 
unsatisfied actors would either renounce their pretensions or create a newborn LRA.   
 
In the first case, the actors’ games manage to enhance the collective action needed to change 
LRA’s configuration in order to provide the demanded services of the whole set of participant 
actors, increasing the sustainable management of the Resource system. In the second, the 
leading coalition maintains an LRA that provide its demanded services, leaving behind the 
demands of excluded actors and reducing the sustainable management of the Resource system.  
  
2.2.4. Intermediary synthesis: Operational model.  
 
Figure 4 shows our operational model in which the services provision is explained by the 
combined presence of the three conditions (extent, coherence, and closure) of the Local 
Regulatory Arrangement. And, the LRA is explained because of the actors’ games (actors’ 
coalitions; mobilization of action resources and institutional creativity).  
 
Figure 4 Operational Model. Source: the author. 
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Chapter 3. Hypothesis and adaptation for the empirical study of the Resource 
Coffee  
 
By conceptualizing the threat to the sustainable management of the coffee Resource System 
through the IRR framework, the Resource coffee is sustainable in a given time and space, when 
collective action succeeds in stabilizing LRAs that provides all of the services demanded in their 
expected life span. As an ideal type, LRAs that optimize the provision of services are more 
sustainable.  
 
Using the operative model presented in the previous chapter, we formulate the following 
research question: How do actors negotiate LRAs that optimize the provision of symbolic, sensory 
and monetary services from the Resource Coffee? 
 
Two sub-questions emerge: 
1- How can we explain the optimization of symbolic, sensory and monetary services by variations 
of the conditions of the LRA? 
2- How can we explain the variation in the conditions of the LRA due to the actors’ games? 
 
To answer these questions, we propose to divide the research into two main stages. 
 
The first is interested in the relationship between the long-term provision of all the services 
demanded of the resource and the Local Regulatory Arrangement (operationalized through the 
combined presence/absence of three conditions: extent, coherence, and closure). We propose a 
synchronic approach by using the Qualitative comparative analysis - QCA (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) 
to test insofar services provision depends on the combined presence/absence of the three 
conditions of the LRA. 
 
The second analyzes the relationship between the actor’s games (operationalized through the 
three analytical dimensions: actors’ coalitions; mobilization of action resources and institutional 
creativity) and the LRA. We propose a diachronic approach in which we describe the process that 
ends in a selected LRA by using Process Tracing (Bennett, 2010; Collier, 2011)  to identify those 
actions that transmit causal forces. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections, firstly, we present our hypothesis; secondly, we would 
like to explain why we selected Coffee as a Resource, how we selected our contexts of study and 
how we reached our cases of studies, namely the LRAs. Thirdly, we would like to transparently 
present the data we used.  
 
3.1.   Hypotheses   
 
The IRR literature establishes a positive relationship between an integrated regime (high extent 
and high coherence) and the sustainable management of the resource (J. D. Gerber et al., 2009). 
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This relationship has been questioned by the persisting gap between the behavior as regulated 
in the regime and the behavior observed in the field.  
 
Schweizer (2015) explains this gap because the implementation process is far away from linear 
because actors use activations strategies that range from the concretization to the letter to the 
complete passivity in which the rules are ignored. Hence, it prevents the integrated regime to be 
translated into the changes in behavior necessary to ensure the sustainable management of the 
Resource.  
 
To exclude this implementation gap problem, we evaluate the extent, the coherence and the 
closure on the Local Regulatory Arrangement, which we have previously defined from the 
“observed” uses of Resource constituents, following de Buren (2015, p. 31) “thus, the hypothesis 
should focus (…) on a causal relationship between the LRA (post-activation) and the 
sustainability”. 
 
In response to our first question, we propose the following hypothesis. 
 
• LRAs that are lacking high extent, high coherence and high closure cannot simultaneously 
optimize the provision of symbolic, taste related and monetary services.   
 
To answer our second question, we mobilized the literature on public policy analysis (Peter 
Knoepfel, Larrue, & Varone, 2006) in particular the notion of power as the endowment in action 
resources to participate in the actors’ game and influence the production of outputs that would 
change profilers’ behavior (Peter Knoepfel, 2017). Likewise, we mobilized the IRR application for 
patrimonial resources  (Boisseaux et al., 2012), in particular, the institutional creativity developed 
by Laesslé (2016) through which, the winners (actors who cleverly used their action resources) 
shape the final output to profile their combination of demanded services. 
 
On the basis of IRR literature, it is evident that some actors’ coalitions mobilized their action 
resources to counter other coalitions (de Buren, 2011; Johann Dupuis & Knoepfel, 2014; Jean-
David. Gerber, 2005; Schweizer, 2015). Given the empirical difficulty of assessing synchronically 
the legal, political or contractual claims of the totality of services demanded from a given 
Resource perimeter, IRR’s analyses had prioritized particular claims over certain uses that 
reflected a zero-sum competitive game, in which services are forcefully produced at the expense 
of others. 
 
If we assume that the production of the whole set of demanded services during the appropriate 
life span from a given Resource perimeter is the objective of collective action, a synchronic 
analysis of the whole set of services provided by an LRA would make possible a diachronic analysis 
to assess other types of mobilizations of action resources categorized depending on their 
“intention”. If the mobilization intents to back up other actors’ interests, it could produce a non-
zero-sum game. Moreover, if the institutional creativity could shape the output to produce the 
combination of services of some actors, as Laesslé (2016) showed, it is plausible to assume that 
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the same institutional creativity could shape the output to profile the combination of services 
demanded by most of the actors, as long as all have equal chances to influence it. 
 
This last sentence demands the “lens of negotiation” approach, because if all actors have an 
equal chance to influence the use of the Resource, the number of participating players increases 
and the transaction costs will increase: not only it is complicated to arrange an adequate 
combination of services provided by the Resource but also it is difficult to agree who should 
assume the costs of the change of use and receive the benefits from it.  
 
Bolognesi et al. (2018) have shown the mechanisms through which the transaction costs impede 
the consolidation of integral regimes: when regulations to cover the whole set of services 
demanded from the Resource produce higher incoherencies, the regime fells into an institutional 
complexity trap.  
 
Scharpf (1997, p. 146) argues that transaction costs due to large numbers can be reduced through 
“the aggregation of individuals and corporate actors into larger units that are capable of 
representing the aggregated preferences or interest of their members in negotiations with other 
such units”, like negotiation among coalitions of actors. Nevertheless, in this small negotiation is 
the conservative bias that impedes the positive coordination, meaning the agreement on both 
the “production” and the “distribution” (Scharpf, 1997, p. 133).  
  
We conjecture that there is a negotiation previous to the traditional one, which concerns the 
initial distribution of power among the actors. A huge imbalance would maintain the conservative 
bias essentially because powerless actors would not be able to put forward their position, hence 
the production (services to be produced from the Resource) and distribution (who pays the costs 
and obtain the benefits) agreements would be solved in favor of the powerful actors, leaving 
forcefully behind the services demanded by the excluded actors. Hence, obtaining a benefit at 
the expense of the sustainable management of the Resource System. 
 
In this order of ideas, we conjecture that a power-balanced starting point could explain the 
overcoming of the conservative bias in order to trigger positive coordination that could end in a 
negotiated agreement which produces the whole set of demanded services. As the power-
unbalance is the most common starting point, we conjecture that the “negotiation dilemma” 
starts when powerful actors face the initial dilemma either to deceive and take advantage to 
govern the Resource in its favor putting at risk sustainability, or to cooperate and endow enough 
the powerless to “balance” the initial discussion and open the door for the positive coordination 
needed to guarantee the sustainable management of the Resource. 
 
• If actors’ coalitions do not cooperatively mobilize their resources of action to bring about 
institutional creativity, actors’ games will not produce LRAs with high extent, high 
coherence, and high closure. 
 
76 
 
3.2. Case selection  
 
So far, we have claimed that a Resource is sustainable only if all interested actors feel provision 
of their demanded services guaranteed in their expected life span and, that there is an LRA, which 
depending on its configuration, could explain how far the actual use of the Resource is 
sustainable by measuring the gap between demanded and observed services.  
 
To generalize our results, we are interested in choosing a Resource, which on the one hand, 
sparks the highest quantity of services for the highest quantity of possible actors while on the 
other, the actors’ games are played at the smallest possible geographical space to make the 
research feasible.  
 
Firstly: As we said before, we focus on artificial Resources because its capacity to adapt to market 
demands frees us from the normative perspective that encompasses the literature on the 
sustainable management of natural resources. I.e. when the Resource itself could disappear, it 
could be understood a “Resource oriented” analysis that, in a given time and space, recommends 
the “best” use of the Resource to produce the services demanded by actors while maintaining its 
reproductive capacity.  
 
For artificial Resources, its disappearance is not a concern but rather the services it produces. 
Services disappearance is not an issue from a positive perspective. There is not one service that 
must be preserved hence there is not one “best” use of Resource constituents. When no use of 
Resource constituents is preferred, the scientist is free to focus rather on the process through 
which the highest quantity of services is produced avoiding the normative approach 83 . 
Henceforth, the scientist could focus on the collective action itself not on the collective action to 
reach a desirable “use”. The latter forcibly would end in a zero-sum power game which would 
bias the collective action analysis.        
 
Secondly: artificial Resources Systems could be studied at different perimeters: Micro in which 
the profiler is the owner of all the Resource constituents and is the only interested in the services 
it produced. Small in which different members of one community are the owners of Resource 
constituents and the services are claimed by the whole community. Worldwide, in which owners 
of Resource constituents are dispersed all over the world and services are produced for the 
worldwide population.  
 
Thirdly: What could look like an impossible quest is feasible with an informed selection of the 
geographical space to focus on. Indeed, this complexity at the global level could reach a very 
small geographical area. I.e. users of Resource constituents and actors who demand services from 
all over the world could converge in some uses of some Resource constituents attached to a 
territory, so making the analysis feasible. Nonetheless, if the area is too small, the complexity 
                                                     
83 It has to be said that this one is rather a minority position. The gross body of literature takes a normative approach 
to this kind of renewable resources when claiming that a combination of monetary services for producers and socio-
environmental services for communities must be prioritized.    
77 
 
would be lost and just a couple of actors would be identified. So, the filigree is to reach the proper 
balance in this tradeoff: the smallest area with the highest complexity, so the research is both 
feasible and representative.  
 
3.2.1. Why coffee   
 
Coffee could be one of the more complex artificial Resources on the planet both for the 
dispersion in the use of Resource constituents throughout the world and the production of 
services at a global scale.  
 
Uses of Resource constituents is shared between profilers in different countries: According to 
ICO (2014) from roughly 150 million green coffee bags produced annually both thousands of 
capital intensive enterprises and tens of millions of family farms established in the global 
tropics84, 70% of which was imported into non-producers countries. Moreover, according to the 
MIT’s Observatory of Economic Complexity (Simoes, 2010), just a couple of dozen of countries 
from 170 in their sample did not register any export of coffee, meaning that the value added (the 
use of Resource constituents during the last processes) is performed at a global scale. E.g. in 2015 
an emblematic case could be Switzerland which imported USD 758 million in coffee and exported 
USD 1.58 billion in coffee85, but there are plenty of non-emblematic cases like Greece which 
imported USD 214 million and exported 21.8 million86.  
 
On the other hand, as any local Resource, it provides services for actors involved in its value chain 
and the communities positively or negatively affected by its production. Especially like other 
agricultural products, its close relation to the territory usually brings about different services 
associated not only with the economic activity, but also with the social and political life, and 
moving further meaning associated with the spiritual and the environmental dimensions. 
Moreover, its consistent physical presence in billions of households around the globe sparks 
several kinds of services far away from its native land.   
 
The international demand of services that is translated into global coordination of economic 
activities is studied in economics as the governance of global value chains categorized by Gereffi 
et al. (2005) in the previously described between markets and hierarchies: modular, relational, 
captive. In the coffee industry, the product specification could be high or low depending on the 
services to be provided, and of course, depending on them, it could be codified or not. But in any 
case, the capabilities in the supply-base are high because each activity demands knowledge, 
flexibility, and adaptability depending on various factors like weather, water availability, raw 
material cost, etc. Thus, both captive and hierarchical are highly unusual and we would identify 
                                                     
84 The Coffee tree thrives between the tropic of Cancer (23°27′ N) and the tropic of Capricorn (23°27′ S).  
85 Statistics are present for the product “coffee” but it included both the raw material (green coffee) and the final 
product (roasted packaged coffee among others). 
86 A geographical visualization accounting from the total value of imports and exports by country could be consulted 
in the following link https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/geo_map/hs92/import/show/all/0901/2015/  
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three out of five types of global value chains in the coffee industry: markets, modular and 
relational.  
 
As we have said before, market type provided the baseline services and over it, regulations are 
put in place to profile different services. A good example of the modular type are the 68 different 
standards for the production of coffee from the 244 “standards, codes of conduct, audit protocols 
addressing sustainability hotspots in global supply chains” (ITC, 2018)  that were listed in the 
Sustainability Map87. These standards, which detail the uses of Resource constituents by different 
owners, are a result of a political/juridical claim for services demanded from the Resource. So, 
they are a straightforward vector towards the services demanded from the Resource. E.g. the 
“Alliance for Water Stewardship”88 demands uses that protect the water resources or the “Bird 
Friendly® coffee” demands 100% shade-grown coffee so birds do not lose their habitats. 
Nonetheless, they are not the only one: groups of consumers and companies with different 
demands put in place other than standards mechanism to (dis)incentivize uses of Resource 
constituents and provide their demanded services. E.g. artisan coffee roasters 89 who value the 
aromatic profile of coffee, or Stakeholders like the Swiss Max Havelaar organization90 who value 
symbolic services, in a given territory, partnered with a group of profilers to agree on the uses of 
Resource constituents and ensure the access to the Resource. In this case, a more relational type 
of global value chain is in place.      
 
In fact, since the two-thousands, there was a global consensus on the necessity to move away 
from the market type governance into firstly the modular type and more recently the relational 
type.  
 
The ICA-2001 reinforced by the ICA-2007 posed their hope in a modular type around an 
institution (The VSS to enhance in their terms the economic, social and environmental impacts 
of coffee culture) to correct the information failures and consequently to correctly align the 
social-environmental preferences of the consumers that, via prices, would encourage the 
implementation of good practices by the coffee growers.  
 
As presented, an extensive literature has shown mixed results on the sustainability of coffee 
growing produced by the VSS. However, there is a consensus that the impacts are reduced by the 
fact that the demand for VSS products is significantly lower than the supply of them. Panhuysen 
and Pierrot (2014) claimed that 40% of the world coffee production in 2013 was certified or 
                                                     
87 One output of the partnership-based program “trade for sustainable development” which help business to better 
understand the sustainability initiatives (ITC, 2018). 
88  “Our Vision is that water users and managers are responsible water stewards, who protect and enhance 
freshwater resources for people and nature” (ITC, 2018). 
89 Like Peet’s house founded in 1966 in San Francisco and considered to be one of the first Specialty Coffee Roaster.   
90 Founded in 1992 the by Third World aid organisations Brot für alle, Caritas, Fastenopfer, HEKS, Helvetasand 
Swissaid. 
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verified in one of the 7 main VSS91, but only 15% was actually purchased as certified/verified 
coffee. This phenomenon has superimposed a mantle of doubt on this model of governance to 
which the actors have responded insinuating two ways: Reinforcing or changing it. 
 
In the first case, Governments, NGOs and major players in the coffee value chain, which have 
converged (through a political process around the concept of sustainability according to Levy, 
Reinecke, and Manning (2015))  in the Global Coffee Platform92,  proposed to align the different 
VSS around a common baseline code. The big roasters would commit to acquiring all of their 
coffee verified with this code. Likewise, national platforms are proposed as public-private 
deliberative scenarios that could design and implement a national curriculum (sustainable 
agricultural practices at the national level) aimed at maximizing the profitability and sustainability 
of coffee farms in a climate change environment. Given marginal differences predictable by the 
standardization of sustainable coffee (verified in the common code), profitability is achievable 
only through increased production in the farm. This modular type wants to dig further by 
standardizing coffee culture at a global level.  
 
In the second case, actors outside the VSS model such as artisan coffee roasters or excluded 
players such as producers whose practices are not certifiable, take advantage of the coffee trade 
fairs (the Global Specialty Coffee Expo in Seattle or Expoespeciales in Bogotá) to propose a 
reorientation of the public-private effort towards the aromatic profile of coffee, namely 
incentivize farmers to enhance quality (measured through the cupping protocol of the Specialty 
Coffee Association of America (SCAA hereafter). At the same time, they advocate for 
sophistication in the commercial channels to directly link that offer with a demand that values it, 
so the producer captures more value and improves his income. The direct contact between 
consumers, roasters, and producers must be translated into information flows that result in an 
improvement in environmental and labor practices. 
 
The latter approach has been described as a relational type by Hernandez-Aguilera et al. (2015). 
This approach is sustained on the assumption that sustainability is enhanced because of 
transparency: Services demanded by consumers are transmitted to farmers through prices, 
thanks to a short and transparent value chain managed by highly coordinated traders and 
roasters that guarantee traceability at the farm level. This costly traceability operation is offered 
by traders specialized in the Specialty Coffee Market. 
 
3.2.2. Why coffee in Colombia 
 
                                                     
91 Four certified by external audit: Fairtrade Labelling Organization (FLO), Organic (IFOAM), Rainforest Alliance (RA) 
and UTZ Certified (UTZ). Three verified by internal audit: Starbucks’ Coffee and Farmer Equity Practices (C.A.F.E. 
Practices), Nespresso AAA, and the 4C Code of Conduct. 
92  The 4C Association merged with the Sustainable Coffee Program (both programs funded by government 
cooperation entities: German, English, Dutch, Danish and Swiss) to give life to the Global Coffee Platform in March 
2016 during the fourth World Coffee Conference in Ethiopia. It aimed to align more than 300 stakeholders from the 
coffee industry around the implementation of the commitments of the Vision2020 agenda developed by the first 
two entities and the International Coffee Organization in 2015. 
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We select Colombia as the best case in which the global complexity can be found at the local level 
because the three types of governance models of the global coffee value chain are present, 
namely the market type, modular type, and the relational type.  
 
Colombia is the third exporter of coffee after Brazil and Vietnam93, but whereas Brazil and 
Vietnam had let market forces to shape almost their entire harvest as a low-cost/high-productive 
bean  (Esguerra & McAllister, 2014) Colombia, still in the “market forces” game, had tried to fight 
back producing regulations to profile the Resource differently in order to provide a different 
combination of symbolic, taste related and monetary services.  
 
Colombia has a national quality norms system to protect the reputation of Café de Colombia 
which is protected through intellectual property rights in its main markets (it would be developed 
further). From roughly 14 millions of coffee bags produced in Colombia during the harvest 2015, 
12.7 million were exported because it fulfilled the quality norms (the difference that could not 
be exported was sold to the domestic market), of which 71% was sold as standard café de 
Colombia (FNC, 2015, p. 34), meaning that almost nine million coffee bags were sold through a 
markets type governance. 
 
Coffee produced as regulated could have represented more than 6 million coffee bags according 
to Panhuysen and Pierrot (2014, p. 12). However, roughly three million of coffee bags, equivalent 
to the 23,5%, was sold through the modular type, by more than 209 thousand farms (from nearly 
550 thousand) cultivating coffee in 391 thousand hectares (from 941 thousand), associated to 
the big seven VSS (Fairtrade, Organic, Rainforest Alliance, UTZ, 4C, Nespresso, CAFE Practices) 
(FNC, 2015, p. 34).  
  
The relational type is less evident because it is featured by numerous small transactions that are 
registered as standard café de Colombia, but when visiting artisanal roasters and following 
specialty coffee magazines it is quite clear that Colombia is one important supplier of Specialty 
Coffee (coffee bought because of its cupping score that would be developed further). So, to 
identify the Specialty traders (that bough and sell coffee depending on their cupping grade) we 
used the FNC reports of coffee exports by company (FNC, 2017b) to sort the first 54 exporters in 
2016 (equivalent to 99% of the total exports)94. Then we reviewed their coffee products offered 
to their clients in their webpages to identify which companies were offering high-scored coffee: 
45 of them, including the biggest exporters95, traded both standard Café de Colombia and coffee 
                                                     
93 In 2015 Brazil produced 37 million coffee bags, Vietnam 20.6 million, Colombia 12.7 million, Indonesia 8.3 million, 
and India 5 million. (I. C. O. ICO, 2018)  
94 They were 131 more companies that exported the least 1% coffee    
95 75% of the eleven million coffee bags exported from Colombia were exported by eleven companies: 23% FNC 
(COL); 8% Espinosa (COL); 7% Carcafe (GBR); 6% Louis Dreyfus (CHE); 6% Expocafé (COL); 6% La Meseta (COL); 4% 
Neumann (DEU); 4% Olam (SGP); 3% Engel (BGR); 3% COFCO (CHN). ISO Codes represent the country in which 
headquarters are placed.  
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certificated/verified under different VSS96. Nine companies mainly sold coffee because of their 
cupping scores: two of them were farms (so, trading is not their main business) and the other 
seven97 were the specialized traders that participate in the relational type governance model.  
 
Furthermore, in addition to this global demand for services, Colombia also has six regional 
denomination of origin that highlight the local demand for a particular profile featured by the 
terroir’s aromatic profile and its reputation of the origin to increase the monetary services of 
producers in that protected area. And, it has the only coffee cultural landscape inscribed in 
UNESCO’s world heritage list that reflects a local demand for the “identity” symbolic service 
provided by the coffee culture that was escalated at the global level.   
 
3.2.3. Why Riosucio (Caldas) and Buesaco (Nariño) 
 
We focus on the two Colombian coffee regions in which we can show how that complexity in the 
global level, landed at the local one in the most antagonistic way. So, one that is featured by the 
modular type, which represents the global consensus about the intensification model through 
public-private governance and market-based mechanisms. The other featured by a relational 
type, which represents a liberal approach sustained in private governance and shorter and 
transparent value chains. As the market type is the baseline, it will be present in both regions.  
 
Thus, to select both territories we focus on profiling institutions that could produce both modular 
and relational types. Firstly we did a pre-selection among the fifteen departments that cultivate 
coffee in Colombia analyzing the Informe de los Comités Departamentales de Cafeteros al 
Congreso Cafetero 2014 (FNC, 2014)98, which provide a picture of the coffee culture in each 
department. Caldas and Nariño were the departments that could replicate this diversity of 
profiling institutions: in both they apply the national norms; Caldas has 64% of the total area 
cultivated in coffee certified/verified in at least one of seven big VSS (it is the only department in 
which the entire set are present), Nariño has 59% of the total area cultivated in coffee in six VSS 
but are quite concentrated in two main VSS; both are participating in the Specialty coffee market 
but while in Caldas it is a minimum portion, Nariño could have the highest proportion among all 
the Colombian coffee departments. From the local perspective, Caldas is part of the Coffee 
Cultural Landscape of Colombia inscribe in the UNESCO’s World Heritage List, whereas Nariño 
had the first Protected Denomination of Origin for a region in Colombia. In the same rapports, a 
few municipalities within the departments are already highlighted because of the presence of 
profiling institutions. 
 
                                                     
96 If they sold a lot of coffee because of cupping score, it was because they had participated in a contest, but it 
remained marginal to their business. Interview with the President of the Asoexport (Asociación Nacional de 
Exportadores de Café de Colombia). 
97 Colombia based: Banexport (37.465 coffee bags); Caravela (35.912 bags); Café Condor (35.161 bags); Loha Beans 
(31.610); Selecto (31.188); Azahar coffee (12.713 bags); Inconexus (11.993 bags).  
98 The collection of annual rapports of the Comités Departamentales can be consulted since 2004 in the official 
webpage of the FNC. www.federaciondecafeteros.org.  
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With this pre-selection of Departments and municipalities, we made some exploratory interviews 
firstly at the national level99 and then, when both departments were confirmed, at the local 
level100 . This allows us to select the coffee territories of two municipalities, Riosucio in Caldas 
Ecotopo 106B (L. Gómez et al., 1991, p.48) and Buesaco in Nariño Ecotopo 220A (L. Gómez et al., 
1991, p.75).  
 
Figure 5 Riosucio and Buesaco among the six regions with a regional reputation. Source: FNC/Café de Colombia.  
 
 
Through the first rounds of interviews with local traders, we obtain data on purchases. And with 
stakeholders (Comité Municipal/Departamental) we obtain data on land cultivated and farmers, 
we could depict a statistical description of both regions in table 1: Both territories sold more than 
half of their 2015 coffee harvest through different profiling institutions that profiled a different 
services combination, including monetary services in terms of the premium over the standard 
Café de Colombia. And both have similar conditions of land tenure: Riosucio has 3,099 hectares 
cultivated in coffee by 3,771 coffee farmers, Buesaco has 2,950 hectares cultivated in coffee by 
2,925 farmers.  
 
Nonetheless, the governance types are completely opposed. Riosucio is a very well 
representative of the modular type because almost the entire harvest is bought by the Coffee 
                                                     
99 Interviews with the founders and CEOs of the Colombian Specialty Export companies: Banexport, Caravela and 
Selecto. Then with commercial representatives of two of the main Exporters of standard coffee: Caravela and Olam. 
And with both employees at the FNC, Espinosa and Olam. 
100 In Caldas with the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas and el Centro de Estudios Regionales Cafeteros 
y Empresariales. In Nariño also with the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño, la Universidad Javeriana y la 
Fundación Social.   
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farmers’ cooperative and distinction is based on different VSS (Organic, Nespresso AAA, 
Fairtrade, Starbucks CAFE Practices, and Rainforest Alliance). On the other hand, Buesaco is a 
very well representative of the relational type because from the seven traders in the municipality, 
three are in the specialty coffee business in which the final consumer could trace back the origin 
of its beverage to the farm because of the short and transparent value chain.      
 
Table 1 Statistical description of the coffee culture in Riosucio and Buesaco. Source: the author 
 Riosucio Buesaco 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Coffee Ha 2014 3,099 Ha  2,950 Ha  
Change 2008/2014 -452 Ha -13% +850 Ha 40% 
Coffee growers 3,771  2,925  
Coffee growers with 
purchases data 3,009 80% 92 (Veracruz) 
This census in Veracruz 
represents the 3% of 
coffee growers in 
Buesaco. 
Purchases (kilos/2015) 4,575,984 100% 2,832,500 100% 
Purchases with +800/kilo 
premium 126,429 3% 372,000 13% 
Purchases with 400/kilo 
premium 1,474,206 32% 385,000 14% 
Purchases with +/-
200/kilo premium 1,128,147 25% 168,000 6% 
Purchases with +/-
100/kilo premium 366,890 8% 540,000 19% 
Purchases without 
premiums (kilos/2015) 1,480,316 32% 1,367,500 48% 
 
3.3. Data  
 
We divide this subchapter into two sections devoted to our two contexts of study. In each one, 
we briefly present some features of the municipality and then, we describe the data collection 
process.    
 
3.3.1. Riosucio (Caldas) 
 
Riosucio is a dynamic municipality in the northwestern edge of the Department of Caldas at 91 
km of Manizales, the capital city. Bordering with the departments of Antioquia to the north, and 
Risaralda to the west.  
 
It has a long history of communication between the historical southern Cauca (bordering with 
Ecuador) and northern Antioquia (with a coast on the Caribbean Sea). Natural resources had 
attracted people since pre-Columbian times for its salt mines at the top of the Cordillera, and 
Gold mining on the basins during the conquest and the early republic. Even today alluvial gold is 
an important economic activity but it had been longtime overtaken by agriculture. More than 
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two-thirds of the 62 thousand habitants predominantly live in the rural area in small farms (On 
average, 43% of farms are smaller than 1 ha; 40% have between 1 and 3 ha, and 17% are bigger 
than 3 has). A small proportion in the highly concentrated (in a few owners) five thousand 
hectares (40% of the total agricultural area in Riosucio) devoted to raising 29 thousand cattle in 
both the highlands for dairy farming and lowlands for fattening cattle, and the majority in the 
small farms in between that produce 28 different agricultural products including coffee 
(Planeación, 2012, pp. 55-57).  
 
Almost all (96%) of the rural households are owners of their land and 77% of them had an 
adjudicación del resguardo (the collective land is owned by the Resguardo, and they gave a 
property right on the use of the land to the farmer) while 18% have an escritura pública (an 
individual property right on the land) (Planeación, 2012, p. 58). In fact, with the exception of the 
urban area of Riosucio (highlighted in white in figure 6), the whole municipality is divided among 
the four Indigenous Resguardos. 
 
Figure 6 Resguardos Indígenas en Riosucio (Duque Escobar, 2014) 
 
 
Coffee farming in Riosucio is located in the middle strip (between 1,400 and 2,000 m.a.s.l.) on 
the eastern side of the western Andes of Colombia, of two tributary basins (Supia and Imurra 
Rivers) of the Cauca River that flows into the Caribbean Sea. The warm winds of the Cauca River 
valley (+/- 800 m.a.s.l.) rise through the basin of both rivers while the cold winds of the high part 
of the Western Mountain range (+/- 3.000 m.a.s.l.) descend. This encounter stabilizes the 
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temperature above the 16 degrees centigrade at 1.700-1.800 m.a.s.l. which usually would be 
much lower during the night. A lower temperature would kill the coffea arabica tree but at this 
edge, it stresses the plant, which decreases its metabolism by storing energy in its grains, namely 
chemical precursors of flavor. This mechanism of defense in the plant, activated by the climate, 
is relatively similar in both basins, so a complex coffee is predictable (rich in flavor precursors) 
but its aromatic profile is different due to the soil properties that vary between them. 
 
Figure 7 shows at the top left the location of the department of Caldas in Colombia, and the 
municipality of Riosucio in the department of Caldas. Then a larger map detailing with green 
points the location of all coffee farms in the municipality of Riosucio. The highlands of the 
Cordillera covered the north and west of the municipality, whereas the southeastern touches the 
Cauca River.    
 
Figure 7 Coffee growing in Riosucio (CDCC & CCAOC, 2016) 
 
 
• Data collection  
 
Our quantitative and qualitative data was collected during the fieldwork in Riosucio in the July-
August 2016 period.  
 
Using both the Sistema de Información Cafetera de la Federación Nacional de Cafeteros– SICA 
database, which has the census of the coffee farms of the municipality and the coffee farmers, 
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and the purchasing database of the Cooperative that contains information on the supply of coffee 
by type (profiling institution) and by coffee grower, we consolidated a database of 3.056 coffee 
growers in Riosucio who have 2,723 hectares grown in coffee and sold to the Cooperative 
3,788,674 kilos of coffee in 2015101 (hereinafter the Coop / SICA database). 
 
Of the 3.056 coffee growers, 2.943 coffee growers (96% of the total) have registered a total area 
(on one or more farms) of less than 5 ha in their name and sell 86% of the coffee purchased by 
the cooperative102, equivalent to 3.25 million kilos of coffee in 2015. While 113 coffee growers 
(4% of the total) have registered in their name (on one or several farms) a total area of more than 
5 ha and sell 14% of the coffee purchased by the cooperative, equivalent to 540 thousand kilos 
of coffee in the year 2015103. 
 
Additionally, this Coop/SICA database contains information on the observed uses for the whole 
activities during the planting process: total area; area cultivated in coffee; variety of coffee 
planted; age of the coffee crop; number of coffee three per hectare and percentage of the coffee 
tree with shade.  
 
To gather information about the observed uses on the processes of cultivation and post-
harvesting, the author conducted a survey with 21 coffee growers belonging to different LRAs. 
They were randomly selected from a sample of coffee growers, from the SICA database, with a 
similar number of coffee trees and with farms located in a similar altitudinal fringe. As this 
aleatory sample cannot be generalized, it was checked against a database of 832 of coffee 
farmers associated with Asprocafé who belongs to four LRA (Fairtrade, la Vereda, Nespresso and 
Organic) and enriched with information from the Cooperative’s and Asprocafé’s annual reports. 
Also, we relied on qualitative information gathered by the author in interviews conducted in 
Riosucio, Manizales, and Bogotá with the profiling actors who were participating in each LRA 
identified in Riosucio. 
 
3.3.2. Buesaco (Nariño) 
 
Buesaco is located in the northwestern part of the department of Nariño, 37 kilometers north of 
Pasto, the capital, and 50 kilometers south of la Unión, the regional hub in the north. Pasto-
                                                     
101 The difference of 17% with the total supply of the cooperative in Riosucio can be explained because farmers of 
neighboring municipalities sell their coffee production in the purchase points of the Cooperative. The difference of 
19% with the total number of coffee farmers registered in the SICA can be explained because the farm belongs to 
one person but the sale is made in the name of another. 
102 582 coffee growers (19% of the total) have less than 0.49 ha and sell 7% of the coffee purchased by the 
cooperative; 1,552 (51% of the total) have between 0.5 ha and 1.49ha and sell 36% of the coffee purchased by the 
cooperative; 809 (26% of the total) have between 1.5 ha and 4.99ha and sell 44% of the coffee purchased by the 
cooperative. 
103 The above are figures relative to the total area, but if we only take into account the area of the crop, we would 
have to say that only 24 coffee growers (0.8% of the total) have an area cultivated in coffee of more than 5 ha: 17 
coffee growers between 5 ha and 10 ha; six coffee farmers between 10 ha and 16 ha and one has 23 ha. 
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Buesaco-La Unión are connected through the ancient roadway to Popayán and the rest of the 
country, built in the thirties and completely restored in 2015. 
 
As it can be noted in figure 8, Nariño is divided into three main zones: The Pacific Plain on the 
west, a dense tropical forest below 500 m.a.s.l., in which hot temperatures are combined by high 
humidity; the Andes on the east, characterized by a lush and fertile plateau at 2.900 m.a.s.l., 
enriched by mineral provided by the seven active volcanoes104 in the department; finally a small 
portion (and the gateway) to the Amazonian basin on the Southeast. It should be highlighted that 
the zone within the Cordillera placed at the range 1.000 – 2.000 m.a.s.l., have the proper altitude 
to cultivate Arabica coffea. In addition to the one rainy / one dry season a year and favorable 
solar irradiation near the equator line, it was/is favorable enough for coffee harvest.  
 
Figure 8 Physical Map of Nariño. Source : Adapted from Viloria De la Hoz (2007) 
 
 
Buesaco is a poor105 rural municipality featured by both smallholders that cultivate coffee as a 
cash crop and other staple crops below 2.2 thousand m.a.s.l., and, foreign landowners of pasture 
lands over it. According to the municipality106, three-fourths of its 22.000 inhabitants lived in the 
rural area and 90% depend on agriculture. There are 62 thousand hectares: 40% to natural 
                                                     
104 Galeras, Chile, el Cumbal, el Cerronegro, Doña Juana, Tajumbina y el Azufral 
105 Unfortunately, there is not more actualized data, but my personal opinion is that the percentage would be lower 
if a new poverty survey is conducted. If three million kilos of coffee were bought in Buesaco in the harvest 2015-
2016 at seven thousand the kilo during the main harvest, three thousand farmers and its families (equivalent at least 
to the half of the population) obtained COP$ 20 billion (USD$ 7 million). Assuming all coffee farmers sold the same 
amount of coffee, each one obtained COP$ 7 million (USD$ 2.333) or COP$ 583 (USD$ 194), equivalent to 85% of 
the minimum monthly legal wage in 2016 (two times the threshold income to be placed under the poverty line for a 
household). Even though there are different sizes farms that would concentrate the income in the relatively big ones, 
there are not “big” coffee farms in Buesaco (the biggest one I knew had 70 thousand coffee trees or 10 hectares).  
106 Official web page of the municipality of Buesaco. Last visited 11-17-2017.  
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forests; 40% in pasture land and 20% in agricultural crops of coffee, maize, kidney beans, peas, 
citric fruits, and legumes (with the exception of coffee, 80% of production goes to local 
consumption). The land is distributed between 5.658 properties in the hands of 7.913 owners, 
55% of them are smaller than 2 ha; 32% between 2 and 10 ha; 13% are bigger than 10 ha. Using 
data from 2005 and 2009, the average per capita expenditures was USD$ 82.7, placing them in 
the third superior quartile in the department in which poverty affected 70.8% of the population 
(Béland, 2012, pp. 15-19). 58.64% of the population of Buesaco had its basic needs unsatisfied107 
according to the national statistic office’s last available actualization in 2011108. 
 
In 2014, the 2.950 ha coffee crop was cultivated by 2.925 coffee farmers in Buesaco (FS, 2014), 
producing 2.1 million kilos of coffee in the harvest 2013-2014 (FS, 2014, p. 5). In August 2016 
when we conducted our fieldwork, we did not find more updated data on area of number of 
coffee farmers but if the tendency is followed it could be assumed 3.149 ha109 that produced 2.8 
million kilos of coffee, approximate the figure obtained through interviews with the traders as it 
can be seen in table 2.  
 
Table 2 Coffee from the harvest 2015-2016 bought by Buesaco merchants. Source: the author. 
  Especial Nespresso Estándar plus Estandar  Pasilla  Total 
Coop del Norte           295,000                                   5,000            300,000  
Coop de Occidente              90,000                                10,000               2,500          102,500  
CAltura             90,000            540,000              630,000  
CNilson             72,000            168,000              240,000  
 CCEspeciales         200,000                                800,000          200,000       1,200,000  
 Rodrigo Viveros             10,000                                200,000             50,000          260,000  
Jairo Romero                                    50,000             50,000          100,000  
 Total          372,000          385,000          708,000                        1,065,000          302,500       2,832,500  
 
Geographically speaking, the South and East portion of the municipality is characterized by the 
highlands of the Andes reaching more than four thousand m.a.s.l., which descent smoothly until 
the two thousand m.a.s.l., and then, sharply until the one thousand m.a.s.l., creating the 
breathtaking canon del Juanambú which flows directly into a depression known as la Hoz de 
Minamá (at 400 m.a.s.l it cuts in two the western Andes). Similar to Riosucio, this geographical 
feature allows cold winds from the Andes highlands descend towards the Pacific plain, whereas 
following the opposite direction, the hot winds from the lowlands are channeled through the 
canyon to climb up the Buesaco mountains, increasing the relatively moisture and producing an 
optimal physiological temperatures for coffee production at higher altitudes than on average in 
Colombia (Gast et al., 2013, p. 191). High altitude coffee is highly appreciated by specialty 
                                                     
107 The NBI (Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas) is a method to characterize poverty (widely used in Latin-American), 
according to the lack of basic needs. Namely access to housing, sanitation system; education and economic capacity.  
108 Dane, official webpage, “Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas, actualización cifras cabecera y resto 30 de junio de 
2011”. Last visited 11-17-2017.  
109 From the 2.100 ha in 2008 claimed by the Gobernación de Nariño and the 2.950 claimed by Café con Altura, we 
can use the same annual growing rate of 6.7% to project in 2015 a total of 3.149 ha cropped in coffee.  
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markets because it assists in the creation of aroma precursors: the coffee tree tends to slow its 
metabolism in order to survive in an ecological niche that is at the edge, reducing total coffee 
cherry production while increasing sugars and acids concentration within the coffee cherries 
produced. If we add the already mentioned volcanic ash soils that characterized a Department 
with seven active volcanoes, and the fact that is just one degree north from the equatorial line, 
which implies perpendicular solar irradiation of 1620 sunshine-hours per year Colombia (Gast et 
al., 2013, p. 191).  Buesaco has the proper soil and climate conditions to produce a complex 
coffee, which will depend on the agricultural practices that will be discussed afterward. 
   
In figure 9, the 73 veredas in Buesaco are shaded depending on the number of coffee farmers. 
The northwestern of the municipality are low lands which few coffee farmers, as it is the 
highlands to the South and East over 2.300 m.a.s.l. We can roughly say that from Buesaco urban 
center at 1.959 m.a.s.l., coffee farms to the north and west are at a lower altitude, whereas to 
the south and east are higher. So, specialty traders supply mainly from those veredas. 
 
One of them is la vereda Veracruz, which happens to be located in that portion of the Cordillera 
between 1.950-2.200 m.a.s.l where soil and climate are the most appropriated for specialty 
coffee. In addition, as it is very close to the urban center (and the main route), it had 143 coffee 
farmers in 2014 according to (FS, 2014).    
 
Figure 9 Map of the municipality of Buesaco and the vereda Veracruz. (FS, 2014, p. 5) 
 
 
• Data collection   
 
We decided to do our fieldwork in la vereda Veracruz because it had two main features that 
increased the probability of finding different LRA. On the one hand, it has the ecotope so it was 
probable that different kinds of specialty traders would be present, in addition to the other 
Vereda 
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established in Nariño. On the other, as it has a high number of coffee producers, it was more 
probable to find an acceptable amount of coffee producer in each LRA, thus we were going to be 
able to compare means.  
 
Two main organizations had data on coffee farmers in Buesaco: the Fundación Social and the 
FNC, both of them did not allow the use of their databases. Nevertheless, the Fundación allowed 
the author to “ask” questions that were answering by the data manager using some descriptive 
statistics. With almost one thousand coffee farmers in Buesaco with whom they have a relation, 
information about the area, number of coffee trees, production, and commercial relations was 
key to select the vereda Veracruz and the relevant figures to obtain a sample of coffee farmers 
in this vereda. Afterward, a representative random sample was amiably provided by the FNC, 
produced from their coffee information system known as the SICA110.      
 
The author conducted a survey on August – September 2016. The method to reach the farmers 
was through the community members who describe the directions111 (because the sample had 
only the names), but unfortunately, the author was not able to reach half of the coffee farmers 
in that sample. It could be possible that farmers were not reached because they had already sold 
their land and the information was not updated. Because on the one hand, during a period of 
expansion (as in other industries) newcomers are attracted while others are ejected. On the 
other, one technical assistant in charge of five or six hundreds of coffee farmers in various 
veredas, as it is the case in Buesaco, make it difficult to properly update the information. So, in 
the end, the information gathered was nor representative of the Vereda.  
 
We decided to conduct a second round in which we surveyed the whole population of coffee 
farmers: the data was collected by Viviana Ramos, a local agronomist that surveyed the whole 
population of the Vereda Veracruz during two months (June-July 2017) about the previous 
harvest that ended in September 2016. The survey was divided into four sections: 
- Household data (geolocation, altitude, identification, member of the FNC, etc.) 
- Income (sources of income, farm area, coffee area, canopy, number of coffee trees, 
variety of coffee, number of coffee trees by age) 
- Coffee income (Kilos of coffee produced during the harvest 2015-2016, proportion sold 
as dry parchment coffee, through whom (intermediaries) and how (regulations) those 
kilos were sold)  
- Agricultural practices (soil management, pest and diseases management, nutrition, 
picking, reselection, farm management, hulling, fermentation, drying, water, waste 
management) 
 
This database that we will call “Veracruz Data Base”, contains 92 coffee growers, the whole 
population in the vereda Veracruz.  
                                                     
110 El Sistema de Información Cafetera – SICA is a dynamic information system with georeferenced data at the 
household level, from nearly half a million coffee farms in Colombia. It is constantly updated by the technical 
assistance service.     
111 I started by a local rural store, who supply farmers with daily consumption goods. And then, to each farmer I was 
visiting, I asked directions from the other farmers I did not have information.   
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- 13 of them did not sell any kilo of coffee during the previous harvest because all their 
coffee trees were too young. Either because they had planted a new coffee tree or they 
had pruned them.  
- In a similar case, 4 farmers sold a production lower than 0.04 kilos of coffee per coffee 
tree112 that was caused by an external factor (a fire in one case, a heritage issue in 
another, etc.), so we drop their data. 
- Four farmers that sold through a neighbor that could have sold to one of the merchants 
in Buesaco, or not. So, we cannot classify them properly and we have to drop them. 
- One farmer that is an outlier, so we preferred to exclude him.  
 
So, we use the data on 70 farmers with information on coffee production and sales, and all other 
items described above.  
 
3.4. Intermediary synthesis: the research design at a glance.  
 
We started this chapter with the following question: How do actors negotiate an LRA that 
optimizes the provision of symbolic, sensory and monetary services from the Resource Coffee? 
 
To answer this question, we propose a research design divided into two stages: First, the 
sustainable management of the Resource is originally defined as a proportion between the 
services provided and the services demanded from it that is explained by an agreement among 
actors: The Local Regulatory Arrangement (LRA) categorized through eight configurations (the 
combined presence/absence of two conditions, extent and coherence, steaming from the IRR 
literature and a third one, closure, as an original contribution). Second, the LRA configuration that 
is explained by the actors’ games, originally conceptualized as a sequence of three analytical 
dimensions: an actors’ coalition which could decide on a cooperative, strategic or selfishly 
mobilization of action resources to produce or not institutional creativity.  
 
We move into the empirical stage with a promising logic of generalization: if the theoretical 
mechanisms explain a complex Resource in which different actors demand different services, it 
would explain another less complex. Hence, we use coffee as a Resource because its international 
trade produces the highest quantity of services for the highest quantity of possible actors, while the 
very local coffee cultivation allows us to observe the power game played at a small-enough 
geographical space to make the research feasible.  
 
We use antagonism as our logic for generalizing among the LRA. So, we select the two most 
antagonist coffee zones according to the classification of the input-output relation between 
actors of the coffee value chain. So, we selected Riosucio (Caldas) and Buesaco (Nariño) in Colombia.  
  
                                                     
112 The range of production per coffee tree varied in Veracruz from 0.73 kilos per coffee tree per year to 0 (in the 
case of coffee trees with less than two years), on average it was 0.2 kilos/tree/year.  
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Chapter 4. Contextualization: Coffee in Colombia   
 
Both the actors’ social construction of the problem and the action to face this problem are 
dependent on the Institutional Regime (IR onwards). Indeed, if actors perceive a threat to the 
provision of a service it is because the actual uses of Resource constituents are either allowed or 
not by the Institutional Regime. To change those uses, actors activate, menace to activate, or do 
not activate the institutions of this IR, or they change the institutions from the IR.   
 
Our research focuses on the mobilization of actions resources to activate institutions from the 
coffee public policy. So, we propose this chapter to describe the evolution of this coffee public 
policy using secondary documentary analysis. It is complemented with annex 2 which privileged 
the evolution of the IR on other productive factors (land and labor) to understand the creation 
(and dissolution) of two contextual institutions: Resguardos Indígenas and Haciendas. 
 
Our objective of this chapter is that the reader can understand the evolution of the main coffee 
public policies that provided a contextual framework from our both contexts of study divided 
into two sections: A first one in which an international agreement produced a regulated coffee 
market that empowered a coffee farmers’ elite who would shape the coffee public policy to 
encourage the commercial coffee farming; and a second one in which the international 
agreement was dismantled and produced a free market that would allow demand of services at 
the global level to reach the very local coffee farming sparking the peasant coffee farming that 
features our both contexts of study. 
 
4.1. A coffee-quota regime that disintegrated ancient structures to consolidate coffee 
commercial farming before 1990 
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Since the beginning of the 19th century coffee crops was an attractive enterprise in today’s 
Colombia113  due to the independence of the Caribbean French Colonies (who were in that period 
the main coffee producers in the world) to supply a marked that had growth since coffee 
introduction in Europe by Venetian merchants, Marseilles sailors and Turkish ambassadors in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries from the Ottoman empire (Topik, 2004, p. 25). Coffee 
originally came from Venezuela and the first plantations were located near these borders114. 
From there, it moved south to neighboring departments before crossing westwards to the 
departments of Antioquia and Cauca in 1870 until it covered the whole Cordillera in 1890.  
 
Coffee prospered from 1880 to 1940 because of two main forces in the international coffee 
market: On the one hand, the increase of consumption in United States, characterized by 
concentration of imports and innovations in roasting and the retail business that created demand 
for Colombian coffee; and on the other hand the increase in coffee production in Brazil 
characterized by an active intervention in markets, mainly by private companies, to guarantee a 
higher international coffee price that directly benefited Colombians producers (Renard & 
Hennequin, 1999; Topik, 2004; Ukers, 1922) 
 
According to Palacios (2009), owners of commercial capital used their trade expertise and 
financial networks in Europe and North America to start the coffee culture in their haciendas (see 
annex 2), and then spreading it throughout peasant farms115. As local capital markets were very 
small at the end of the nineteenth century, they had to obtain funds with European and North 
American companies to buy the local coffee harvest, thereafter they would pay the loan with 
green coffee. Locals took the entire risk: They buy coffee at the local price to resell it at highly 
volatile international prices. If the latter were lower than the former, they had to assume the loss 
because they were bound by financial ties. As a countermeasure, they implemented two 
strategies: the first was to collude between other local buyers in secret agreements to force down 
purchase prices. The second, allowed by the emerging financial market in Colombia at the 
beginning of the 20th century, was to open commercial offices in the main markets and operate 
as importers and brokers. It was common that Hacendados export their own brand coffee by 
                                                     
113 “A esta hora concidero que la hacienda de Añil estará muy adelantada, y la de Cafeé ya comensada como degé 
dispuesto pues aun quando hayan habido algunos tropiesos… De este modo no deberán poner incombeniente a que 
se establesca la hacienda de Cafeé proyectada. Cada día tengo más ancias de ber en Ceuce una hermosa hacda. de 
cafeé porque es un fruto este que infaliblemente ha de tener buen precio como lo tiene en el día, mientras que las 
Colonias Francesas no se restablezcan” (Sic) Bolívar (1804).  These words, with the original orthography, were written 
in Cadiz by Simón Bolívar the 29th of January in 1804 to his steward in the Viceroyalty of New Granada. 
114 There are testimonies of coffee cultivation in Colombia since 1730 (FNC, 2010b) 
115 According to M. Arango (1977), the Hacienda was not a unique productive unit but a sum of smallholdings 
individually exploited by sharecroppers families, which were owned by an hacendado. He argued that coffee 
prospered mainly in regions in which the relation between Haciendas and sharecroppers were more of less capitalist. 
In those regions like the Cundiboyacense plateau in which the relation could be describe as pre-capitalist coffee 
expanded slower: sharecroppers cultivate staple food for their own (crop coffee was forbidden and the surplus had 
to be sold to the Hacienda) and paid in labor by cultivating coffee in the land of the hacendado. On the other hand, 
were sharecroppers had contracts to exploit the land avoiding forcing labor like Antioquia the crop expanded and 
hacendados were able to buy a significant amount of coffee to commercialize it in the international markets.  
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both harvesting in their own land and processing the coffee obtained/bought from their 
sharecroppers and other smallholders116.   
 
Bejarano (1987) added that vertical integration allowed the appropriation of more value and 
acted to counterbalance higher labor costs, which in 1880 represented 55% of total production 
costs, but made them vulnerable to severe fluctuations on international prices due to 
technological advances that encouraged speculation 117. Volatility eventually bankrupted the 
Colombian trading companies118 which were absorbed by North American Banks: the former 
became local agents of the latter. With a few but very powerful players in the international capital 
market, and several intermediaries in the local trading markets, the small prices received by 
producers broke out the vertical integration and spurred the peasant economy 119  tripling 
production120 . Bejarano (1987, p. 198) explained the smallholding success through both the cost 
structure of the coffee crop and the coffee market features: The small size of farms allowed them 
to rely on Trabajo Familiar (unpaid work done by family members) and the precarious life of 
peasants to maintain their lifestyle with little income; The separation into different productive 
and trading agents reduced the impact of price volatility, allowing more stability for small coffee 
producers and for the economy as a whole.  
 
In any case, for Palacios (2009), the Hacendados triggered the infrastructures to link ports with 
coffeelands, created the international commercial network and create a coffee consciousness 
that paved the way for a successful coffee peasant economy in Colombia that fueled local 
                                                     
116 “Todavía en la década de 1920 eran frecuentes las "marcas" de las haciendas que se negociaban en los mercados 
extranjeros mediante un sistema similar al de los vinos franceses”(Palacios, 2009, p. 60). 
117 “When a submarine cable tied South America to New York and London by telegraph. (1870) Information about 
prices and demand and supply became internationally homogeneous… (And) the creation of the New York Coffee 
Exchange in 1882… (Hamburg, Le Havre and London followed with major coffee exchanges)” (Topik, 2004, p. 27).  
118 By the end of 1918 prices increased 71% due to both a frost in Brazil and the end of the WWI. As foreign capital 
was scarce since Colombian companies settled down in New York, they funded the harvest purchase with local 
capital, smothering other local economic activity. “Las restricciones monetarias internas eran tan severas que fue 
casi imposible comprar la cosecha de café en 1920. En Manizales la escasez de numerario llegó al punto en que el 
comercio local tuvo que organizar de prisa un sistema de trueque, utilizando el café pilada de primera clase como 
medio de pago” (Palacios, 2009, p. 411). Unfortunately in 1920 prices fell dramatically. “En la plaza de Medellín estas 
empresas habían comprado café desde octubre de 1919 hasta mayo de 1920 a un promedio de 6.50 pesos la arroba; 
en diciembre de este último año la arroba se pagaba a 2.10 pesos” (Palacios, 2009, p. 412). Banks were unable to 
recover their money and were very close to suspending their payments, it was the kind of situation that North 
American companies were waiting for to regain control in the Colombian coffee trade. “El Banco López de Bogotá, 
el Banco Sucre de Medellín y el Banco Ruiz de Manizales recibieron fuertes inyecciones de dólares para sacarlos a 
flote, y quedar dominados por los negocios extranjeros. Al finalizar 1920 The Bank of New York y The Battery Park 
National Bank, anunciaron en Nueva York que tomaban en sus manos el café que embarcaban las compañías de 
Alejandro Ángel, Vásquez & Correa y la Antioquia Commercial Co” (Palacios, 2009, p. 412). 
119 The first Coffee Census conducted in Colombia in 1932 showed a coffee land featured by the smallholding: 86% 
of coffee trees were cultivated in farms with less than 10ha.  “Si definimos hacienda de café como la unidad con más 
de 60.000 arbustos en producción, en 1932 había en Colombia 645 haciendas, fundadas en su gran mayoría entre 
1870 y 1895; representaban apenas 0.45% de todas las unidades agrarias cafeteras y 14% de los cafetos" (Palacios, 
2009, p. 59). 
120 This structural change from Haciendas to smallholdings spurred an astonishing triplication of coffee production:  
from 1.1 million bags in 1918 (Ukers, 1922, p. 279) to 3.4 million bags in 1932 (FNC, 1933, p. 119). 
95 
 
markets with foreign currencies 121. It was materialized in the foundation of the Federación 
Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia122, FNC onwards in June of 1927 in the II National Congress 
of Coffee Growers in Medellín to, officially, improve the wellbeing of the coffee producers and 
representing the industry interest in allocating public revenues123.  Scholars claim other reasons 
like counterbalancing the subordination of the commercial houses to the foreign capital124 and 
to tackle down the deterioration of the social cohesion in the coffee lands125. 
 
During its early days, the FNC required capital for operating, and after an intense internal 
debate126, the path of what is now known as the parafiscal contribution was decided127. The 
Colombian National Congress established a tax on coffee exported that was going to be effective 
after the signing of a provision-services contract with the FNC. Indeed, the Ley 76 de 1927. Sobre 
protección y defensa del café, delegate in the FNC provision of public services under a ten-year 
renewable contract using as monetary resources the taxation of coffee exports (USD 0.10128 for 
60k bag of coffee exported): promotion of Colombian coffee (numeral a); crop health protection 
(numeral b); commercial services (c); research (numeral d); industry promotion (numeral e); data 
                                                     
121 In 1932 reached USD$ 42 million, equivalent to 61% of the USD$ 69 million total exports (FNC, 1933, p. 115). 
122  The FNC has its roots in the SAC Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia created in 1870, a landowner’s 
organization, which by sharing technical and market advice, oriented the political position of its members. Divergent 
interests within the agricultural sector showed the need for a specialized coffee union and after two meetings, the 
FNC was founded in 1927.  
123 “The growth of the railways, the funding of public utilities, and the financing of the roads: all significantly 
depended on revenues derived from the coffee industry” (Bates, 1998, p. 60) In fact, the coffee regions on the Andes 
were completely connected through railways to both the Pacific Ocean to the west, and the Atlantic Ocean to the 
North through the Magdalena River (Meisel-Roca, Ramírez-Giraldo, & Jaramillo-Echeverri, 2016). 
124 “(fue resultado de) una unión ente la burguesía comercial exportadora y una burguesía cafetera terrateniente, 
para enfrentar el capital extranjero que amenazaba sus intereses". Machado (1982, p. 182) 
125  “Se produjo como una reacción frente a los graves problemas sociales que estas burguesías (burguesía 
conservadora terrateniente y comercial de Medellín y la burguesía liberal terrateniente y comercial de Bogotá) 
percibían en las zonas cafeteras de Colombia y con el apoyo entusiasta del gobierno conservador”. Saether (1999, p. 
139). 
126 See Saether (1999, p. 157) about the first meetings of the National Committee of Coffee Growers in which the 
producers were divided among those who expected to finance the activities of the FNC with their own contributions 
and others with the contributions of the Government. 
127 Incorporated into the Colombian legal system by the 1991 Constitution, la parafiscalidad “hace referencia a unos 
recursos extraídos en forma obligatoria de un sector económico para ser nuevamente invertidos en el propio sector, 
con exclusión del resto de la sociedad” (Corte Constitucional C-449 del 9 de junio de 1992 citado por Villegas (1998, 
p. 19)). However, for the coffee sector, coffee resources have been decreed under different denominations since 
the same year the FNC was founded. Currently, article 25 of Law 1151 of July 24, 2007 established a coffee 
contribution of 6 cents per pound of coffee exported that was made permanent through article 5 of Law 1337 of July 
21, 2009 (effective field work in 2016). 
128 We will use the ISO currency code in which USD replace the United States Dollar. Also, we will use the COP for 
the Colombian Peso. In all cases, we will provide an equivalence in USD taking into account the exchange rate in that 
period using as a reference the average annual value according to dolar web, a colombian company that provides 
exchange rate data from 1923 in the following webpage: https://dolar.wilkinsonpc.com.co/dolar-
historico/index.html. To give an idea to the lector, in 1923 the exchange rate was UDS 1 = COP 1. The COP slowly 
lost its value until 1956 in which the relation was USD 1 = 2.5 COP. From this year forward the COP needed to buy 
one USD increased faster: In 1966, it was needed 13.5; in 1976 it was 33; in 1986 it was 175; in 1996 it was 987; in 
2006 it was 2.225; and in 2016 it was needed COP 2.833 to buy 1 USD.    
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collection (numeral g); communications within coffee producers (numeral f) and planning 
(numeral h)129. 
 
Afterward, the structure of the FNC was agreed through El Acuerdo 2º del IV Congreso Nacional 
de Cafeteros en Bogotá el 14 de diciembre de 1930 sobre los Estatutos de la FNC. It gave the 
federated-coffee-producers130 the right to elect representatives131 to the main decision-making 
bodies of the coffee public policy through the Comités Departamentales y Municipales de 
Cafeteros: El Congreso Nacional Cafetero132 and El Comité Nacional de Cafeteros133. The first one 
guides all the FNC’s apparatus and the second one that articulates the coffee public policy among 
the FNC and the Government134.  
 
                                                     
129 The first contract between the Government and the FNC was signed on October 15, 1928. In 1930 they received 
from the government the product of the coffee export tax (Ocampo Gaviria, 1987, p. 251). Since then, ten contracts 
have been signed, the last signed between both parties on July 9, 2016, with a term of 10 years until 2026 (as the 
most of the above) 
130 In its first article of the Statutes of 1930 the federated were “productores y demás interesados en la industria del 
café”. But in time it concentrated only on coffee farmers. Currently according to art. 4 of the Statutes of the FNC 
2003 (reformed in 2007) , only the coffee producer "owner or holder of a farm" with an area sown with coffee equal 
to or greater than average (0.5) hectare, and that have at least 1,500 coffee trees, in the aforementioned area, can 
be federated. Art 6 establishes that also legal persons whose corporate purpose is coffee production, and 
communities, illiquid states and de facto corporations that own coffee farms (in all cases a person must be 
designated to be the owner of the register as federated) and people who have cultivated a property without 
possession for more than five years as long as the owner has renounced trade union rights.  
131 Art 17 of the statutes of 1930 empowered them to elect the 3 members of the Comité Municipal, which in turn 
elected three of the five members of the Comité Departmental, and the latter in turn (Article 12) elected the 
delegates to the Congress National. Today “los caficultores cedulados eligen directamente Delegados al Congreso 
Nacional de Cafeteros y Miembros de los Comités Municipales de Cafeteros. Los Delegados al Congreso Nacional de 
Cafeteros integran el Comité Departamental de Cafeteros (…).” Art. 40 FNC statutes 2007. From the half a million 
coffee farmers in Colombia, more than 300 thousand coffee farmers are federated, and each four years they elect 
their representatives directly, for example in 2014 there were polling stations (also it was possible to vote by 
cellphone) in 559 municipalities in 17 departments which elected with more than 60% of participation, 4.608 
representatives to both the Comités Municipales de cafeteros and Comités Departamentales de Cafeteros (which are 
the ones elected to participate in the Congreso Nacional Cafetero). (FNC, 2015)  
132 Since its founding, it has been the main governing body of the FNC.Today, the article 13 of the FNC statutes 2007, 
gives it both institutional (numeral c “adoptar iniciativas que propendan por un mejor desempeño de las instituciones 
y la organización cafeteras”) and substantial duties (numeral d “estudiar los problemas de la caficultura y dictar las 
medidas que considere adecuadas para su solución” y numeral e “aprobar el Presupuesto de la Federación y el Plan 
Estratégico que someta a su consideración el Comité Directivo y evaluar sus resultados”).   
133 The art. 7 of the statutes of 1930 integrated it with the Minister of Industries and five members elected by the 
Congreso Nacional de Cafeteros. Currently, four senior government officials (the ministers of finance; agriculture; 
commerce and planning) and one representative elected by each of the 15 Comités Departamentales de Cafeteros 
(approved by the National Coffee Congress, participate). This composition depends on the Contract signed between 
the FNC and the Government. Art. 14, FNC statutes 2007. 
134 Since its foundation, this body has been responsible for “cumplir y velar por que se cumpla el Contrato entre el 
Gobierno Nacional y la FNC” (art. 7, numeral a de los estatutos 1930). Today “actuar como órgano de concertación 
de la política cafetera del país entre el gremio y el Gobierno” (art. 20, numeral b de los estatutos 2007).  
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Currently, the Ley 101 del 23 de diciembre de 1993 “General de Desarrollo Agropecuario” 
establishes the public goods and services to be financed with the parafiscal contribution135. They 
would be prioritized by the FNC’s Strategic Plan approved by the Congreso Nacional Cafetero in 
order to be provided by the FNC as a union entity representative of the coffee sector136 through 
its hierarchies: the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros implements from a top-down perspective 
the FNC’s policies137 while the Comité Municipal de Cafeteros is featured by both the bottom-up 
and the top-down: they have competences to escalate demands from the farmers to the 
Department level (which in turn have to do the same to the national level138), at the same time 
to provide legitimacy and support for the implementation process at the local level 139. This 
double-face feature can be seen in the article 7, numeral f from FNC’s statutes in which the 
Comité Municipal de Cafeteros, cooperates to implement the initiatives of the national order but 
it shapes them to be locally adapted140.    
 
In the practice, the FNC has focalized its energy in three main policy areas: purchase guarantee; 
quality control and reputation; and technology transfer.   
 
4.1.1. Purchase guarantee  
 
The oligopsony structure in international trade allowed merchants to capture more than half of 
the utility at the expense of producers (Ocampo Gaviria, 1987, p. 251).To tackle this problematic 
and sustained on the legal framework provided by the Ley 76/1927, the FNC established in 1929 
the Superintendencia General de Almacenes a network of local purchase points to compete 
                                                     
135 “Los recursos que se generen por medio de contribuciones parafiscales agropecuarias y pesqueras deben ser 
invertidos en los subsectores agropecuario o pesquero que los suministra, con sujeción a los objetivos siguientes: 1. 
Investigación y transferencia de tecnología, y asesoría y asistencia técnicas. 2. Adecuación de la producción y control 
sanitario. 3. Organización y desarrollo de la comercialización. 4. Fomento de las exportaciones y promoción del 
consumo. 5. Apoyo a la regulación de la oferta y la demanda para proteger a los productores contra oscilaciones 
anormales de los precios y procurarles un ingreso remunerativo. 6. Programas económicos, sociales y de 
infraestructura para beneficio del subsector respectivo”. Art. 31 de la Ley 101 de 1993 
136 “La administración de las contribuciones parafiscales agropecuarias y pesqueras se realizará directamente por 
entidades gremiales que reúnan condiciones de representatividad nacional de una actividad agropecuaria (…) y que 
hayan celebrado un contrato especial con el Gobierno Nacional”. Art. 30 de la Ley 101 de 1993 
137 Art. 30, Numerals o and p of the FNC’s Statutes give the competence to the Comités Departamentales to orientate 
the extension services and the education program strictly linked to FNC’s policies; and to execute the diverse 
campaigns ordered by the General Management of the FNC. 
138  “servir de voceros de los productores de café para las solicitudes que éstos deseen hacer a los Comités 
Departamentales” Art. 37, numeral c, FNC Statutes 2007.  
139 “Adelantar, en coordinación con el Comité Departamental, campañas para el mejoramiento del cultivo, el control 
de plagas y enfermedades, la renovación de los cafetales, el correcto beneficio del café, y todas las que redunden en 
el mejoramiento de las condiciones sociales y económicas de los productores de café”. Art. 37, numeral b, FNC 
Statutes 2007 
140 “cooperar para el buen éxito de las campañas que en sus Municipios adelante el Comité Departamental, para lo 
cual harán oportunamente las sugerencias que estimen convenientes”. Art. 37, numeral f, FNC Statutes 2007 
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against international merchants and its local branches. It did not work because the FNC did not 
have the financial muscle to pay for the harvest, but it was valuable learning141.  
 
As a consequence of WWII and the virtual disappearance of the European coffee market, prices 
plummeted to a historical minimum. According to Palacios (2009), the USA supported the Inter-
American Coffee Agreement that was signed in Washington in November 1940142 to maintain 
political stability in the region and guarantee alignment against the Axis powers143. Indeed, to 
fulfill it, the Colombian Government through El Decreto-Ley 2078 del 22 de noviembre de 1940 
created a special account to accumulated the capital needed to be known as the Fondo Nacional 
del Café - FoNC144. La Ley 66 de 1942 prorogated the agreement and in its article 4, declared 
FNC’s ownership over all assets needed to fulfill the quota commitment. This institutional 
framework accompanied by a fortunate combination of events145 allowed them to consolidate a 
nationwide purchase network (48 purchase points and 200 private agencies), its milling capacity 
(13 mills) and its exporting activity (a shipping company known as Flota Mercante 
Grancolombiana). In the end, they were able to storage 3.4 million bags annually and to export 
directly one quarter or the total (CEPAL, 1958, pp. 95-98).  
 
Consumption increased faster than production during postwar recovery, resulting in booming 
prices from 25 cents per pound in 1947 to more than 60 cents per pound in the first half of the 
fifties that stimulated new plantations in new regions and countries146. With the end of this 
hemispherical agreement in 1948, oversupply plunged prices and again Latin-American countries 
tried unsuccessfully to negotiate new quota agreements during the fifties147. According to Renard 
(1999), in a cold war context featured by the imminent victory of the Cuban Revolution, the USA 
                                                     
141 During the thirties, according to Ocampo (1990), the “valorization” policy implemented by the coffee producers 
in Brazil was a heavy burden that they needed to share. At the London Economic Conference of 1933, the Brazilian 
government made a quota-agreement proposal to the Colombian one. A secret agreement was reached in 1936 
between the two countries that worked for the first year, but then the FNC’s financial capacity was insufficient to 
maintain the coffee purchasing. Together with the ceased exportations to Germany, the agreement was disbanded 
in 1938 but the lesson was learned: financial muscle was needed to support these kinds of agreements.    
142 “with a view to assuring terms of trade equitable for both producers and consumers by adjusting the supply to 
demand” (IACA, 1941, p. 160) using a quota system to distribute the 15.5 million coffee bags consumed in United 
States between 14 Latin-American producing countries (art I). United States consumption accounted in those days 
for the 80% of world’s imports (Renard, 1999, p. 92).  
143 Some Latin-American countries were heavily dependent on coffee exports: before the WWII coffee represented 
80% of Colombian exports and more than 70% of Brazilian exports (Sacco dos Anjos, Belik, & Velleda, 2011). 
144 art 8º “crear una cuenta especial bajo el nombre de Fondo Nacional del Café”. Art. 9, “para la adquisición y demás 
gastos anexos a ella de las cantidades de café que sea necesario comprar como consecuencia de la perspectiva de 
aplicación del Convenio de Cuotas Cafeteras”. El Decreto-Ley 2078 del 22 de noviembre de 1940 
145 As Brazil did not fulfill its promises due to wartime difficulties, Colombian inventories were used to cover the gap. 
As the coffee tax that was implemented to finance the FoNC operations was an obligation to sell the dollar obtained 
at a fixed price of 1 (against 1.75) over a minimum international price, and the price was quickly surpassed, the 
amount received by the FoNC was the equivalent of 21% of the international price. Also, as an obligation to 
guarantee the quota,  
146 Especially in new areas like African colonies and countries, and others Brazilian regions like Paraná, in which Brazil 
doubled its production to 44 million in 1959 (Renard, 1999, p. 94), 
147 el Acuerdo de México in 1957, and then El Acuerdo Latinoamericano del Café as an extension of the previous 
agreement. 
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Government lead negotiations that ended with almost all coffee countries, both producers and 
consumers bounded by the International Coffee Agreement in 1962148.  
 
The ICA-1962 focused on increasing the income of coffee-exporters149 through a quotas system 
as the principal instrument to guarantee a minimum price 150 governed by the International 
Coffee Organization (ICO hereafter) to supervise its fulfillment151. There were three subsequent 
International Coffee Agreements (in 1968, 1976 and 1983) without fundamental changes in the 
quota system that nursed a powerful FNC. Indeed, once it was guaranteed an international 
minimum price, the Colombian Government through the Decreto-Ley 444 del 22 de marzo de 
1967 institutionalized a local minimum price in its art. 256 that had to be fixed by a committee 
with both the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture in addition to the General 
Director of the FNC, and the purchase mechanisms with the explicit aim to benefit coffee 
producers152. In parallel, they reshaped their supply network: deconcentrating its purchases in 
the Cooperativas de Caficultores at the local level, owned and operated by local farmers 
themselves which would work as multi-active entities153.  El Congreso Nacional Cafero decided 
that the FNC would not only fund cooperatives’ purchases of coffee154 but also gave to them their 
warehouses infrastructures and commercial activities previously concentrated in the FNC’s 
hands155. Additionally, they created the División de Cooperativas as a department within the FNC 
                                                     
148 “Finding reason to expect a tendency toward persistent disequilibrium between production and consumption… 
Believing that, in the absence of international measures, this situation cannot be corrected by normal market forces” 
(ICO, 1962, p. 2).  
149 “ to assist in increasing the purchase power of coffee-exporting countries by keeping prices at equitable levels 
and by increasing consumption” (ICO, 1962, p. 2). Paragraph 4 of the Art. 1. ICA 1962. 
150 “To attain these purposes through the fixing of quotas as provided for in this Chapter and in other ways carrying 
out the provisions of the Agreement, the Members agree on the necessity of assuring that the general level of coffee 
prices does not decline below the general level of such prices in 1962” Art. 27. Ibíd. 
151 The idea was to control prices by controlling the supply. At the beginning of the coffee year in September the 
quotas were distributed between producers depending on the consumption forecast. The mechanism to control was 
by reducing quotas if prices were lower than negotiated. In 1962 the agreement was to avoid a price lower than the 
one of that year, from 1972 onwards it was to establish a range between 120 – 140 cents/pound and the mechanism 
also allowed the increase of quotas if prices were higher than negotiated (Renard, 1999, p. 103).     
152 “Los precios internos del café para las compras que realice la Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia con 
recursos del Fondo Nacional de Café se señalarán por un comité integrado por los Ministros de Hacienda y Agricultura 
y por el Gerente de la Federación. Este mismo comité adoptará medidas que faciliten la compra del café de los 
pequeños productores directamente por la Federación, con el objeto de que los precios que se fijen para tales 
operaciones los beneficien efectivamente” 
153 “Con un criterio de unidad empresarial se prestan (…) varios servicios, tales como comercialización de café, crédito 
a los socios, suministros (venta de artículos de consumo, droguería, y provisión agrícola) (…) servicios asistenciales 
de salud, seguridad y educación cooperativa”  (D. C. FNC, 1978, p. 1) 
154 “la aprobación de dos líneas de crédito: una creada mediante la Resolución Nº 8 de mayo 4 de 1977, emanada de 
la Gerencia General, cuyo monto asciende a $ 150.000.000.00, con el objeto de financiar la apertura y ampliación de 
las Secciones de Consumo de las cooperativas de Caficultores; otra creada mediante el Acuerdo Nº 4 del 21 de abril 
de 1977 del Comité Nacional de Cafeteros, cuyo monto asciende a $ 50.000.000.00, destinada a financiar programas 
de mercadeo de productos alimenticios de origen agropecuario producidos en las zonas cafeteras y de influencia 
geoeconómica cafetera.” (D. C. FNC, 1978, p. 2) 
155 “las agencias de compras de grano a las cooperativas de caficultores y además, los Almacenes de Depósito y en 
algunos Departamentos el manejo de los Almacenes de Provisión Agrícola” (D. C. FNC, 1978, p. 1) 
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that was going to provide both legal and administrative assistance and, control and supervision. 
Finally, they would concentrate and modernize the logistics needed to export coffee through a 
new entity called Almacafé. 
 
So, with the capital accumulated through the FoNC, the fixation of a local minimum price156 and 
the FNC presence in all the coffee regions during the whole year157, the FNC could buy in cash 
during the whole year, all coffee produced by Colombian coffee farmers (both federated or not 
to the FNC): This policy is known as la garantía de compra (the purchase guarantee).          
 
4.1.2. Quality control and reputation 
 
La Ley 76 de 1931 in its article 2 delegated in the FNC the authority to classify and define green 
coffee158 quality159 depending on the region and, to prohibit coffee exports without regard of 
this classification; to be enforced, it vested the FNC’s employees with the authority needed in its 
article 4. Afterward, for protecting Colombian Coffee’s reputation during the validity of the ICA, 
el decreto 444 de 1967 authorized only exports of coffee bags with minimum quality 
requirements (known as Excelso Coffee). Coffee bags that were not able to fulfill this threshold 
had to be sold for domestic consumption. In 1969 the FNC created the Unity of Quality Control 
which defined the Excelso Coffee depending on the size of bean and the number of grains with 
defects that were found in a sample of 500 grams, but in practice, inspectors applied the norm 
subjectively, and were more or less tolerant depending on the port location and the exporter 
(Moreno Gonzales, 2015, p. 17).   
 
In the nineties, La Ley 9 del 17 de enero de 1991 maintained this competence in the hands of the 
FNC, but it was only when they released the Resolución 5 del 6 de junio de 2002 del Comité 
                                                     
156 The minimum price is daily calculated by the FNC: The closing price of coffee (USD per pound for arabicas ex-
dock) in the New York Board of Trade; plus, the Colombian premium; multiplied by the exchange rate USD/COP 
minus the trading expenses assumed by the FNC from the point of purchase to the dock in the consumer country.   
157  Today there are 36 cooperativas de caficultores with 541 points of purchase throughout the country.  
https://www.federaciondecafeteros.org/particulares/es/que_hacemos/cooperativas_de_caficultores/. Last visit 
01-30-2017. 
158 The green coffee is obtained after picking (from the coffee tree), hulling (to remove the pulp), ferment (to remove 
the mucilage), drying and milling (to remove the parchment). This presentation is the preferred one to transport 
coffee because it preserves at the lower cost, the integrity of the coffee bean and its aromatic potential before it 
reaches roasters.  
159 “En desarrollo de la ley 76 de 1931, el decreto 1461 de 1932 adoptó las clases de café, las únicas exportables: 
- cafés trillados: el supremo, el extra, el caracol, el excelso, segunda, pasilla, consuma y maragojipe; 
- cafés sin trillar: primera, segunda, maragojipe primera y maragojipe segunda”(Villegas, 1998, p. 185). 
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Nacional del Caféteros that qualities were homologated and Café Excelso was clearly defined 
according to its size160, defects161, moisture content162, odor, color and cup taste:  
- Screen size 14 with a tolerance for 1.5% on screen 12. At least 50% must be screen 15163. 
- A 500-gram sample of green coffee can contain up to 72 defects, with a maximum of 12 
beans from Group 1.   
- Moisture content must not exceed 12%,  
- Coffee must have its characteristic odor, a uniform color, and be free from defective 
flavors. 
 
These tolerances allowed the FNC and other merchants to supply from every region in Colombia 
without negatively affecting its reputation. So, they were (are) able to spread numerous lots164 
of cheaper small poor-quality beans (due to either natural or cultural causes) in many lots of 
more expensive large high-quality ones. In the mainstream coffee business, profitability depends 
on maximizing the use of cheap coffee and minimizing the use of expensive coffee to reach the 
minimum quality requirements to be able to export.  
 
In fact, the product to be exported is a bag of 70 kilos of coffee that fulfilled the minimum 
requirements of Excelso. So, merchants (including the FNC) bought parchment coffee from 
intermediaries or directly from farmers through their own purchase points, and then, they mill it 
to remove the parchment and sort it mechanically 165  to separate the product that can be 
exported (Excelso quality) from sub-products that must be sold to domestic consumption (smaller 
and defective beans) and the parchment and other impurities (like leaves or pieces of wood).  
 
This logic is the one that drives the minimum prices paid by the FNC in Colombia. Thus, it is the 
line base for other agents.  As in Colombia, on average it is needed 92.7 kilos of parchment coffee 
to produce 70 kilos of Excelso, this ratio is known as the factor. The calculated minimum price (as 
a result of the purchase guarantee said before) is paid when a sample provided by a producer 
                                                     
160 Green coffee is sorted by size using screens: metal sheets with specifically sized, round holes punched into them. 
The width of the hole is referred in multiples of 1/64th of an inch. So, screen size 14 refers to a width of 14/64 of an 
inch, and so on. The size is relevant because, being all factors equal, the bigger the bean the proper the ripeness and 
the higher the aromatic potential. In addition, for roasters size homogeneity is extremely important because large 
beans roast slower than smaller ones. So, if size is not consistent, in the final product some beans are going to be 
over-roast and others under-roast, diminishing the quality of the final product.           
161 Defects are classed in two groups, the first one that have higher negative impact on the cup than the second one. 
-Group one: Fully or partially black beans; sour or partially sour beans; faded or oldest beans; faded, amber or buttery 
beans.  
-Group two: Wet or under dried beans; moldy beans; crystallized beans; faded or streaked beans; over-dried beans; 
cut or nipped beans; insect damaged; shrunk beans; immature beans; pressed or crushed beans. 
162 Too much moisture will make it rot, to little will over dry the bean.   
163 They are other categories: Premium in which 95% of coffee had to be over screen size 18, Supremo 95% over 
screen size 17, Extra 95% over scree size 16, Maragogipe (coffee from this variety) 95% over screen size 17. In all 
cases, 5% tolerance must be over screen size 14.   
164 The term lot is used to refer to a group of coffee bags to be sold without regards of the size. They must have the 
same characteristics because a representative sample will be withdrawn by the buyer. So, a farmer can sell a lot of 
10 coffee bags, or a merchant a lot of 5 thousand coffee bags.  
165 Depending on client demands, there are some mills that use optical sorting to produce bags with zero defects.  
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has a factor166 94 (it is needed 94 kilos to produce 70 kilos of Excelso), if the factor is higher, each 
additional point is penalized with a discount, if the factor is lower there are not premiums, 
creating the leeway that allows merchants to benefit and poor-quality coffee to be sold167.  
 
4.1.3. Technology transfer 
 
Since the first congress held by the FNC, a portion of the budget was already separated to the 
“scientific section” (FNC, 1931), and during the following Congresos Nacionales Cafeteros the 
technical department took shape and experimental farms were established in the main coffee 
regions168. This served as a basis for delegates to the  IX Congreso Cafetero to create El Centro 
Nacional de Investigaciones de Café - CENICAFE169 “to experiment under the conditions of our 
country (Colombia) to provide practical solutions to agronomic issues, and to reduce production 
cost”(G. Cadena, 2016, p. 484).  
 
The physical installation of Cenicafé was built in Chinchina (Caldas on the fifth parallel north), in 
which the departments of biology, soils, agronomy, and zootechnics started their research. G. 
Cadena (2016, p. 483) highlighted their work in soils and climates during their first period, but it 
was afterward, in the fifties in which their work was hierarchically integrated within the FNC 
structure, when they conducted the experiments that in the seventies were going to provide the 
most relevant results to increase productivity. A full-sun productive system with Coffea 
arabica variety Caturra170 in high density (planted 1*1 meters or 10 thousand coffee trees per 
hectare), implementing a hard prune every five years and using synthetic fertilizers to nourish 
the soil, resulted in an astonishing increase of coffee production per hectare (G. Cadena, 2016, 
pp. 487-488).  
 
                                                     
166 To calculate the factor, a sample of 250 grams is milled manually to eliminate the parchment, then the sample is 
sorted by screens (only those over screen size 14 remain) and then defective beans are separated from the sample. 
By calculating the weight of the remaining beans over 250 grams, it is known how many kilos of that particular coffee 
are required to produce 70 kilos of excelso. Than number is the factor. If it is needed 94 kilos, then the coffee farmer 
will receive the price published. If, for example, that sample has to many small and defective beans, the proportion 
of “remaining” beans will be lower and thus, it will be needed more kilos of that coffee to produce 70 kilos of excelso.       
167 A merchant pays a lot of X kilos of coffee factor 88 as if it was factor 94, and then he pays a lot of X kilos with 
discount factor 100. Then he can blend both lots and sell them factor 94, earning in that transaction the amount of 
the discount (all other factor being equal). As the average is 92.7, more than half of the coffee produced in Colombia 
has a better factor than 94 but will be paid as factor 94, whereas the rest will be paid with discount.    
168 In 1933 there were five coffee farms in the departments of “Cundinamarca (La Esperanza), Tolima (Líbano), Caldas 
(Chinchiná), Antioquia (Las Mercedes) y Norte de Santander (Blonay)” (CENICAFE, 2013, p. 33). It must be noted that 
all those farms were either to the north or near the 5th parallel north, whereas Nariño is one degree north from the 
Equatorial line.  
169 Acuerdo 2º del IX Congreso Cafetero del 9 de noviembre de 1938. 
170 Caturra had its origin in a natural mutation of the variety Borbon, in which the distances between the branches 
were shorter. Then, through selective breeding it was developed by the Instituto Agronomico of Campinas (Brazil). 
As coffee grows in the branches of the plant, less distance not only allows the tree to expend more energy in beans 
than in vegetative mass, but also as it is shorter, more coffee trees can be planted in the same hectare. So, a higher 
yield per hectare is achieved.    
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Technologies that were transferred initially through written documents like the la Revista 
Cafetera de Colombia created in 1928 to spread the latest information from the FNC; el Manual 
del Cafetero Colombiano since 1932 171 , a book that condensates all agronomic practices 
recommended by Cenicafe for the coffee culture in Colombia; la Revista Cenicafé since 1949, a 
journal with the latest scientific information172 (G. Cadena, 2016, p. 484).  
 
In parallel, the IV Congreso Nacional Cafetero in 1930 decided that technical assistance was a 
competence for the Comités Departamentales de Cafeteros, the local branch of FNC, which had 
to nominate (and to pay) agronomists and experts. In those days, los Comités Departamentales 
de Cafeteros paid agronomist that “provide its services for free to coffee farmers, giving them 
the instructions needed to obtain the best results in their plantations using the fitter productive 
and processing systems. Coffee farmers can demand assistance directly to their Comité” (FNC, 
1933, p. 157). In the fifties, the XXI Congreso Nacional de Cafeteros in 1959 decided to create the 
Servicio de Extensión Rural, integrating the technical assistance within the hierarchical structure, 
alongside with Cenicafe, into the Technical Department: centralized but with a presence in all 
coffee regions.    
 
In fact, the disconnected and immature technology transfer system that characterized the first 
three decades of the existence of the FNC changed dramatically with a mission in Colombia 
conducted by the CEPAL in 1959 to study “the technical and economic aspects of coffee 
production which have the greatest impact on economic development” 173 . It showed how 
Colombian participation in the world coffee market had decreased from 20% during the forties 
to 13% at the end of the fifties (Ocampo Gaviria, 1987, p. 278). Two factors were blamed for this 
deceleration174, on the one hand, the increase in political violence since the fifties that hurt coffee 
regions and the depletion of traditional coffee technology of the small coffee farms175 that were 
uncompetitive in a context of global competition176. So, they proposed a restructuration of the 
system in which all the components were oriented towards the same objective: the increase in 
productivity. Cenicafé had to focus its research on how to produce more coffee per hectare, and 
the Servicio de Extensión had to focus on transfer that particular knowledge to farmers. A third 
element was put forward with the creation in 1965 of the Fundación Manual Mejia, an 
educational institution to train the extensionistas to produce the link between Cenicafé and the 
Servicio de Extensión.  
 
                                                     
171 It has been actualized periodically. The latest version was presented in 2013 and can be downloaded freely by 
coffee growers federated to the FNC.  
172 All numbers, since the first one in 1949, can be downloaded freely by anyone from the portal  www.cenicafe.org 
173 Resolución 63 (V) aprobada en el quinto período de sesiones de la Comisión Económica para América Latina el 25 
de abril de 1953 (E/CN.12/350). 
174 Until 1970 production had increased a timid 26% from 1949 to nearly 8 million bags. (Ocampo Gaviria, 1987, p. 
305). 
175  La producción se hacía todavía predominantemente en unidades pequeñas (63.9% del área correspondía a 
cafetales de menos de 10 has., una proporción similar o ligeramente superior a la de 1932)” (Ocampo Gaviria, 1987, 
p. 307). 
176 “Tales labores eran muy intensivas en mano de obra e ineficientes; el informe estimó, por ejemplo, que exigían 
más del doble de mano de obra por una misma cantidad de café que en El Salvador” (Ocampo Gaviria, 1987, p. 307). 
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The three pieces formed the “knowledge circuit” (CENICAFE, 2013, p. 48) and were put in 
practice, since 1965, through the “programas de desarrollo y diversificación”177 (Junguito, 1974): 
It targeted farms with more than 10 ha, which received a personalized technology transfer to 
improve productivity using subsidized loans178.  
 
Even though smaller farms also were targeted and received technology transfer through group 
meetings (CENICAFE, 2013, p. 49), for Palacios (2009) these programs appeared more to 
encourage small farmers to cultivate other crops179. In one decade, the smallholding culture that 
had characterized coffee crop production in Colombia changed radically: In 1932 small coffee 
farms represented almost 98% of the farms and 75% of production. In 1970 they represented 
71% of the coffee farms but only 29% of the production (Palacios, 2009, p. 490).  
 
However, in the end, the objective to increase productivity was achieved. Coffee production 
increased by half from the roughly eight million of coffee bags produced annually on average in 
the seventies, to the twelve million in the eighties. In parallel the total cultivated area slightly 
diminished in the same period from roughly 1.1 million hectares to 1 million  (Santiago. Silva 
Restrepo, 2011, pp. 111-120).     
 
4.2.   A free regime that collapsed commercial farming and sparked the peasant coffee 
farming after 1990. 
 
Since the green revolution, technical advances have transformed the countryside and changed 
the way in which crops were maintained and produced. For a wide portfolio of agricultural 
products, modernization either attracted farmers or banished them from their lands through 
competition. For some observers, this situation is just a logic reallocation of productive factors 
encouraged in a market-based economy in which the only problem is public intervention.  
 
The liberalization of the global coffee market responded to this understanding of the problem as 
we can infer from the message about the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) that was finally 
agreed upon in 1994 by the International Coffee Organization (ICO, 1994) made by the Federal 
                                                     
177 Due to the ICA’s quota, the idea was to reduce the total area cultivated in coffee by diversifying agriculture, and 
fulfill que quota producing more coffee bags per hectare. At the beginning the plan focused on coffee farms under 
20 hectares, but results were not satisfactory because of la mentalidad campesina (Palacios, 2009, p. 501). 
Therefore, in the Plan Quinquenal launched in 1973 selection of participants was made by a case by case cost-benefit 
analysis.  
178 “El aumento de las densidades de siembra, la utilización de semillas mejoradas (de variedad caturra), la siembra 
de los cafetales en curvas de nivel, la regulación y disminución progresiva del sombrío y la utilización sistemática de 
abonos químicos eran los elementos básicos de esta “revolución verde”. Adicionalmente, se estableció una 
zonificación ecológica de las zonas cafeteras, con el propósito de limitar la difusión de la nueva tecnología a las zonas 
óptimas para el cultivo del grano y orientar las zonas marginales hacia nuevos productos agrícolas, dentro de la 
campaña de diversificación de las zonas cafeteras que se emprendió simultáneamente” (Ocampo Gaviria, 1987, p. 
307). 
179 “En 1974 el área cafetera plantada con las técnicas de la caficultura moderna llegaba a 132.000 hectáreas (un 
10% del área total en cafetales) y producía aproximadamente el 30% de la cosecha nacional, pero sólo 10.500 
estaban dentro de fincas familiares” (Palacios, 2009, p. 503). 
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Council to the Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation, an influential consumer country180 
within the International Coffee Organization (ICO) since 1964. «Les dispositions sur les 
contingents des précédents accords appliquées jusqu'en juillet 1989 ont entraîné d'importantes 
distorsions de la concurrence sur le marché du café » (SECO, 1995, p. 267). When comparing the 
ICA 1994 text with that one of the International Coffee Agreement in 1983, state intervention, 
especially the whole chapter VII “Regulation of Exports and Imports” (ICO, 1983, pp. 133-140) 
which regulated the market through the quota system, was completely erased. The new ICA was 
merely an administrative agreement in which the ICO has to collect and publish market 
information and make analyses and studies about economic conditions in the coffee sector 
(SECO, 1995, p. 272).  
 
According to Esguerra and McAllister (2014), producing countries dismantled their national 
institutions to regulate the coffee industry (with the exception of Colombia) flooding markets 
with their coffee stocks. Traders accumulated this surplus 181 transferring price control from 
producing countries to importing countries. Meanwhile, Brazil and Vietnam182 increased their 
production to supply more than half of the world coffee production183 relying on the cheaper, 
high yield and pest resistant Coffea Robusta184. Roasters took advantage of it, investing in their 
brands and technology to increase the use of Robusta in their blends without changing too much 
the final taste of their coffee185. It reduced demand for Arabica186 which in turn pushed down 
                                                     
180 Switzerland has a significant role in the market. “plus de deux tiers du négoce de café dans le monde se déroule 
directement ou indirectement en Suisse” (Procafé, 2013, p. 2). With a participation in almost all echelons of the coffee 
value chain but production. “la partie du processus de valorisation qui se déroule en Suisse est essentiellement 
l'apanage d'acteurs du commerce international de café brut, d'importateurs, de torréfacteurs, de constructeurs de 
machines à café, du commerce de détail et de la gastronomie… qui correspond presque à un pour cent du produit 
intérieur brut suisse” (Procafé, 2013, p. 1). Switzerland imports 2.3% of world coffee imports (Switzerland imported 
2.6 million coffee bags of the 114.8 million coffee bags imported worldwide in 2014, data from the ICO) to consume 
three-fifths of it and re-export the remaining two-fifths as transformed coffee products (Procafé, 2013). 
181 At the end of 1990 inventories in importing countries were around 20 million bags, double what they were in 
1988 (Renard, 1999, p. 118). 
182 Vietnam, where war and communism froze coffee production until Doi Moi reforms in 1986 and coffee exports 
were immobilized until US-Vietnam relations were normalized in 1995, became a major player in coffee industry. 
Vietnam increased production from 1.3 million bags in 1991 to 14.8 million in 2001 and 18.7 million in 2011. 
(Greenfield, 2012). 
183 Brazil with 49 million bags and Vietnam with 27.5 million bags produced 52% of the 146.8 million bags worldwide 
in 2014 (ICO, 2014). 
184 Coffea robusta is more productive than the Coffea Arabica because the coffee tree produces more beans; it is 
immune to the coffee leaf rust (a major pest for coffee crops) and it thrives in low altitude zones (so it is easier to 
mechanize because at that altitude plains are much more available than the ones that could be found over the 1.500 
m.a.s.l demanded by the arabica specie)   
185 “(Los torrefactores lograron) optimizar sus costos al cambiar las proporciones de los orígenes en la mezcla sin 
variar en lo posible la consistencia del producto de manera perceptible al consumidor final en el corto plazo… No es 
entonces sorprendente que muchas de las marcas de café comercializadas en el mundo describan sus productos como 
mezclas de diferentes orígenes, evitando así comprometerse con un origen único frente a sus consumidores” (Lozano 
et al., 2011, pp. 25-26). 
186 “Debido a la alta elasticidad de sustitución cruzada entre las distintas calidades de café, la variedad robusta ha 
ganado terreno en la composición de las mezclas en el mercado mundial. Esto se hace evidente en regiones como 
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Arabica prices187 vanishing profitability of traditional arabica coffee farming due to the more 
competitive Robusta production in Brazil and Vietnam which has a better performance in the 
narrow profit margins188.   
 
Colombian was an exception, and the FNC was strengthened. Under a new Constitution that 
provided support for delegating administrative authority to associations 189 , and a new 
agricultural law that regulates this delegation into rural associations like the FNC190, a new 
contract between the Government and the FNC was agreed in 1997. It was funded by la 
Contribución cafetera191, created by the Ley 9 de enero 17 de 1991, to sustain the enforcement 
of the FNC’s authority to regulate both coffee qualities192and the exporting activity193. During the 
first half of the decade, they intended to maintain their public services provision while playing in 
the international arena to revive the regulated market194.  
 
The FNC, as representative of the Colombian government, tried to push up international prices 
by founding the Association of Coffee Producing Countries the 24th September of 1993 in Brazil, 
in which 28 coffee producers’ countries accounting for 85% of the world coffee harvest decided 
to behave as a cartel fixing production quotas per country per year in order to produce the 
monetary services demanded by producers. For its implementation, the FNC purchased and 
stored the difference between the national production and the quota (the Colombian coffee 
harvest 94/95 was 13 million coffee bags whereas the quota was 9.3 million. In addition to the 
                                                     
América del Norte y Europa Occidental: por ejemplo, en Alemania el uso de robusta en las mezclas creció entre 35% 
y 40% entre los años 2006 y 2011” (Esguerra & McAllister, 2014, pp. 21-22). 
187  International prices plunged after the ICA breakdown from USD 1.4 per pound in May 1989 to a record low of 
USD 0.37 in August 1992 
188 Regions characterized by traditional arabica coffee crops like Latin America (without Brazil) and Africa lost 
participation: from 60% of the world coffee harvest in 1995, they produced only 30% in 2014 (ICO, 2014). 
189 The Constitución Política de Colombia 1991 guarantees freedom of association (art. 38 y 39), allows delegation of 
administrative function in private institutions (art. 210), obliges the creation of parafiscal contribution through Law 
(art 12) and regulates privates who are in charge of public functions (art. 123).  
190 Rural association were allowed by the General Law of Agricultural Development (Ley 101 del 23 de diciembre de 
1993). They were authorized to administer parafiscal contributions under a contract between the rural association 
and the Government (art. 30) in order to fulfill six different objectives (research and technical assistance; sanitary 
control; commercialization; promotion; market intervention; social and economic programs (art 31)). 
191 “Artículo 19. Contribución cafetera. Establécese una contribución cafetera a cargo de los productores de café, 
destinado al Fondo Nacional del Café, con el propósito prioritario de mantener el ingreso cafetero de acuerdo con los 
objetivos previstos que dieron origen al citado Fondo” (E. C. d. C. CC, 1991, p. 5). 
192 “Art. 23 El Comité Nacional de Cafeteros dictará las medidas conducentes a garantizar la calidad de café de 
exportación… La Federación vigilará el cumplimiento de estas medidas”(E. C. d. C. CC, 1991, p. 8) 
193 Art. 25 Ley 9/91 gave a veto power to the FNC for any export initiative, by requiring its previous concept in the 
process to obtain the authorization to export. Additionally, they regulated the access to coffee exporters’ data 
through the Resolución 1 de 2009 del CNC in which exporters have to provide (among other dispositions) data about 
quantities of coffee exported and about their clients.  
194 After the breakdown of the quota agreement in 1989, FNC efforts were oriented essentially to reach a new quota 
agreement. During the nineties, even though it was quite clear there was not going to be a step back towards quota 
agreement, FNC hope was not completely vanished and Colombian authorities decided to keep going in the same 
direction while trying to stabilize internal prices using FoNC reserves until money was consumed.  
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previous retention the FNC had six million coffee bags at the cost of USD 300 million in 1995195). 
Even though from the very beginning, few believed it could work because not all countries were 
fulfilling their quotas and outsiders like Vietnam and Indonesia started to grasp a greater market 
share 196, the international coffee price overtook the USD 1 per pound in May 1994 and it 
remained stable over this threshold for the rest of the decade. Some believed that thanks to 
maintaining the coffee institutions (the FNC, the FoNC, etc.) the crisis was not heavier197, but it 
consumed almost the entire savings of the previous generations of coffee farmers. Four-fifths 
parts of the accumulated assets in the previous five decades198 were sold199 to maintain the 
internal price when the international price started the progressive low trend until there was no 
financial muscle to support the internal price and the crisis severely hit farmers200.  
 
Indeed, the international price started a progressive low trend at the beginning of 1998 when it 
descended from an acceptable USD 1.5 per pound to a historical minimum of USD 0.37 per pound 
in October 2001. A global crisis burst, producing worldwide attention201. As a result, it brought 
                                                     
195 “Los cálculos indican que para diciembre habrá seis millones de sacos de existencias y su bodegaje valdrá 300 
millones de dólares”. (ElTiempo, 1995) 
196  “El próximo año el único país que va a disminuir la producción es Colombia: de 13 a 12 millones de sacos. Brasil 
volverá a subir a 26 millones; Centroamérica no ha bajado producción y surgen nuevos cultivadores fuertes como 
Vietnam que cosechará nueve millones de sacos e Indonesia 4,5 millones”. (ElTiempo, 1995) 
197 “El gerente (Jorge Cardenas, the CEO of the FNC from 1983 to 2002) defendió la labor de la Federación (...), a 
pesar de la crisis de la industria. El café sufrió una pérdida muy considerable de ingresos, pero la caficultura 
colombiana logró superar la crisis. Ese solo balance sería suficiente para justificar la vigencia de las instituciones 
cafeteras, dijo”. Redacción el tiempo, “Recursos De Cafeteros, Solo Para Cafeteros” El Tiempo. 13th of November 
1997.  
198  “Respecto al Fondo Nacional del Café, la crisis de los últimos años se refleja en una reducción del patrimonio del 
Fondo, que pasó de representar US$1.600 millones en 1996, a US$248 millones en 2002”(F. N. d. C. FNC, 2002, p. 5) 
199 They sold their participation in ACES (an airline); la Flota Mercante Grancolombiana (a shipping company); el 
Banco Cafetero (a bank), among others in this period.   
200 In fact, according to Bernal Vargas (2016, p. 17) during the nineties, the FNC focused all its efforts in maintaining 
internal prices for supporting farmers. Additionally, they implemented some institutional adjustments to reduce 
pressure on the FoNC and conducted studies to adapt themselves to the free market environment. 
201 For stakeholders at consumption the coffee crisis was the straw that broke the camel's back. It was depicted by 
the title of an Oxfam report: “Mugged: Poverty in your coffee cup” (Gresser & Tickell, 2002), showing that not only 
quality and prices were important for them. Indeed, “Humans, unlike other animals, “eat with the mind as much as 
the mouth” and are “immersed in the symbolic nuances of food” (Alan Beardsworth and Teresa Keil quoted by 
Biltekoff (2010, p. 175)). That is why the fear for the unknown health consequences and scars of the production 
process in the territory weighs in the individual's mind when consuming the product: “they are attracted to try a 
new product but at the same time are afraid of probable negative consequences due to its consumption (…) They 
point to the tension that is generated by the fact that food can provide pleasure and gratification, but can also bring 
displeasure and discomfort”(Biltekoff, 2010, p. 175). From the seventies onwards, different stakeholders in 
consumption tried to draw the attention about negative perceived effects of coffee production: the risk on peoples’ 
health because of agrochemicals widespread use by the organic movement since the seventies (like the Federation 
of Organic Agriculture Movement (IFOAM) in 1972); the depletion on natural resources by environmental 
organizations (Like Rainforest Alliance in 1987); the threat to social cohesion by humanitarian organization (like Max 
Havelaar in 1988), and so on. It was the accumulation of these negative consequences of coffee production, triggered 
by the incertitude over food production that caused the consumers anxiety (Acampora & Fonte, 2009, pp. 13-14) 
that eventually changed the position of authorities in consumers countries 
108 
 
together producers and consumers countries202 in the International Coffee Council to approve 
the resolution 393, a new International Coffee Agreement in 2001 (ICO, 2001). It conceptualized 
the problem from a market perspective, where information failures produced an undesirable 
surplus of coffee that put ecosystems at risk while farmers were trapped in poverty. Signatory 
actors agreed on both developing a tridimensional (economic, social, environmental) sustainable 
coffee economy 203  and, promoting private-public governance mechanisms 204  to motivate 
farmers improving their quality and promoting their improved coffee in order to stimulate 
consumers’ demand and improve prices205. 
 
In Colombia both coffee prices reduction and uncompetitive production costs206 made collapse 
the fincas de economía empresarial (entrepreneurial farms with more than 10 hectares) while 
scattered fincas de economía campesina (family farms with less than 10 hectares but more than 
1.5 hectares)207 that relied on unpaid family workforce and a low-cost lifestyle208 but prices in a 
persistent downtrend dramatically reduced the wellbeing in the coffee household (Dussán López, 
2012). The once prosperous coffee lands were presenting an impoverished face one decade after 
the liberalization when small coffee farmers had similar wellbeing as poor rural inhabitants 
                                                     
202 An example could be seen by comparting the message from the Federal Council (Swiss Government) to the 
Federal Assembly (Swiss Parliament) a propos of the International Coffee Agreement in 1995 to liberalize the coffee 
market, and in 2009 to enhance the sustainable management of the coffee production.  
1- «Les dispositions sur les contingents des précédents accords appliquées jusqu'en juillet 1989 ont entraîné 
d'importantes distorsions de la concurrence sur le marché du café » (SECO, 1995, p. 267);  
2- « En général, le nouvel accord renforce le principe d’un développement durable du secteur du café en 
mettant explicitement l’accent sur les trois piliers fondamentaux de la durabilité, à savoir les dimensions 
économiques, sociales et environnementales. L’accord prévoit également la possibilité de renforcer la 
coopération avec le secteur privé et les organisations non gouvernementales appropriées. Ces 
développements répondent aux demandes clés de la délégation suisse» (SECO, 2009, p. 210). 
203 “Members shall give due consideration to the sustainable management of coffee resources and processing, 
bearing in mind the principles and objectives on sustainable development contained in Agenda 21 agreed at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.” Article 39 of the ICA 
2001.  
204 Article 21 of the ICA 2001 created the World Coffee Conference “which shall be composed of exporting and 
importing Members, private sector representatives, and other interested participants”. Article 22 created the Private 
Sector Consultative Board “which may make recommendations on any consultations made by the Council”. Article 
34 created the Promotion Committee which “shall promote coffee consumption by appropriate activities, including 
information campaigns, research and studies related to coffee consumption”.  
205 Objectives 7 and 9 of the ICA 2001. 
206 In Colombia, the minimum quality rules obligated the cultivation of Arabica coffee so it has to be cultivated in the 
mountains in which mechanization has not being yet developed. Additionally its localization in the Intertropical 
Convergence Zone makes coffee cherries to ripe all year round, so several pickings are needed increasing labor cost 
(70% of production costs (F. N. d. C. FNC, 2006)) which were affected by urban labor markets due to economic 
development in the cities (Botello Moncada, 2010) and labor shortages due to migration (Leibovich & Botello, 2008).  
207 Lozano Karanauskas (2007, p. 103) provided evidence of this structural change comparing the Coffee Census since 
1970, but it explains this change using an unconvincing econometrical analysis that tries to explain the change 
because small farmers are more productive than the bigger ones.  
208 “Cerca del 70% de los caficultores en Colombia tienen fincas de 1.5 Has en café o menos, los cuales, según nuestro 
concepto, serán los últimos en dejar la producción en la zona andina, concepto basado en las características de esta 
producción que se sustenta en la aportación de su propia mano de obra, en estas explotaciones los egresos en efectivo 
son muy pocos.” (Herrón Ortíz, 2013). 
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(UNDP, 2004), provoking a massive national and international emigration from the coffee 
regions209. 
 
At the national level, el Comité Nacional de Cafeteros funded La Comisión de Ajuste de la 
Institucionalidad Cafetera210, which recommended, on the one hand, to use all diplomatic efforts 
to revive political solutions and to use legal institutions to fight unfair competition and 
monopolies. And on the other, to protect at all cost the “social coffee network”211 that was 
considered a strategic development asset for the country. Not because its support for the 
national economy as a whole but to guarantee the social cohesion. Therefore, they 
recommended a strategic change: “La reconversión del minifundista y del campesino tradicional 
cafetero en empresario competitivo” (Ramírez et al., 2002b, p. 19). Indeed, during the quota 
agreement, public investment in productivity focused on large and medium coffee farms. In the 
free market period, it was perceived that labor costs would allow only small farms, which benefit 
from the family workforce and maybe some large farms with the economies of scale needed, to 
be profitable. Therefore, they proposed that public intervention should focus on helping small 
coffee growers to be competitive212 by providing a specific set of public goods213 following the 
new tendencies of the markets.  
 
From 2003 the expenses of the FNC started to be higher than the money received by the FoNC 
and especially from 2009 to 2013 the FoNC hardly covered half of it. Thus, the deficit was covered 
by the national budget until 2015 in which the FoNC had equilibrated again214. Indeed, the 
Colombian Government agreed on an Action Plan known as the Acuerdo de Política 
Cafetera 2002-2007 (APC 2002) in September 2002. It was backed with COP 700,000 million (USD 
320 million) from the National Budget, of which ⅔ parts were used to subsidize production 
paying 10% over the international price (FNC., 2004).  Once over, under the new ICA 2007, a new 
action plan was negotiated with the same National Government and the same administration of 
the FNC, the new Acuerdo de Política Cafetera 2008-2011 (APC 2008) had important changes in 
terms of financial muscle and prioritization: they doubled financial resources to COP 1.4 billion 
(USD 820 million) and prioritized the renovation program and technical assistance over price 
                                                     
209 Studies from this subject can be read in (Garay, 2005; Leibovich & Botello, 2008; Matijasevic, 2009). 
210 The objective was to “analizar de manera independiente la difícil situación que atraviesa el sector con el propósito 
de hacer recomendaciones y propuestas de política que le permitan al cultivador del grano encontrar un camino de 
esperanza hacia una caficultura económicamente viable, sostenible y mundialmente competitiva” (Ramírez et al., 
2002b, p. 15) 
211 “El café más que un producto agrícola de exportación es ante todo un tejido social, cultural, institucional y político 
que ha servido de base para la estabilidad democrática y la integración nacional” (Ramírez et al., 2002b, p. 16). 
212 Even more, they proposed alternatives for medium size coffee growers to reallocate their resources and to leave 
their coffee lands to a new “campesinado empresarial cafetero” (Ramírez et al., 2002b, p. 19).   
213 It should be restricted to technical assistance, research and marketing. “La función de proveer bienes públicos… 
debe materializarse y limitarse a asistencia técnica a los productores, investigación y experimentación científica y 
mantenimiento y consolidación de la posición del café colombiano en el exterior” (Ramírez et al., 2002b, p. 22). 
214 Sala de Prensa de la Presidencia de Colombia, “Gobierno renovó por diez años contrato de administración del 
Fondo Nacional del Café”, 9 de julio de 2016.  
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subsidy 215 . Furthermore, due to the la Niña phenomena 216  that increased cloud cover and 
precipitation while reducing solar irradiation, Colombian production dropped from 11.5 million 
coffee bags in 2008 to 7.8 million in 2009. A new Action Plan was signed “Acuerdo por la 
prosperidad cafetera 2010-2015 (APC 2010)” that executed COP 359.000 million (USD 195 
million) in the four years when a new National Government took office in August 2010217. 
 
The FoNC funded the main instruments mentioned before (purchase guarantee, quality, and 
technology transfer)218. With resources from the national Government, the technology transfer 
was strengthened and two new instruments were developed: The Specialty Coffee Program and 
the coffee renovation program219.  
 
4.2.1. Specialty Coffee Program   
 
The regulation of coffee prices during the second half of the 20th century led to a standardization 
of coffee quality that homogenized the sensory profile of the Colombian harvest (a guarantee 
that became effective when the Colombian coffee that fulfilled the minimum quality 
requirements were blended to produce the Excelso with its characteristic flavor and aroma) and 
to some extent the global harvest when national entities in charge of monitoring ICA’s 
compliance blended their locally produced coffee. In response, a group of roasters and 
                                                     
215 It changed from a fixed amount for coffee sold to an insurance to guarantee a minimum price of purchase 
subsidized by the FoNC.  
216 This phase of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle, is featured by a period of below-average sea surface 
temperature across the east-central Equatorial Pacific (NOAA, 2017). 
217 It is to say that the FNC cunningly used the information collected to interpret, in a completely opposite manner, 
according to the circumstances, the same information to guarantee access to financing by the national government: 
in 2008, the results of programs that had been supported in the first administration of the current government were 
interpreted positively. “A través de este programa se ha logrado intervenir en los últimos cinco años, 195 mil 
hectáreas debido a lo cual la edad promedio de los cafetales tecnificados de alta productividad bajó a 4,8 años y la 
densidad promedio se incrementó a cerca de 6.000 árboles/ha… Debido a los resultados alcanzados por el programa, 
en noviembre de 2007 se destinaron recursos del Gobierno Nacional por $40 mil millones para incrementar en 2008 
el valor del incentivo por planta a $240 en fertilizante.” (FNC, 2008a, p. 26). But in 2014, to justify the intervention 
of the new Government (Juan Manuel Santos 2010-2014), the same statistic of renewal of coffee plantations was 
interpreted in a negative way focusing on the entire coffee park and not only that highly productive portion of 
technology. “Los precios bajos… sumado a los problemas de inseguridad… trajo consigo el descuido e incluso el 
abandono de muchos cafetales y lo que era más preocupante, su envejecimiento. En efecto, el parque cafetero se 
encontraba envejecido, puesto que en 2008 la edad promedio de los cafetales era de 13 años situación que atentaba 
contra la productividad de las plantaciones” (FNC., 2014, p. 19).  
218 The annual budget of the FoNC was approximately COP 200.000 million (USD 100 million), and it was used to fund 
the FNC’s operations (60%) and the technical assistance and research programs (40%)) (Lora, Meléndez, & Tommasi, 
2014, p. 8) 
219 In the period 2010-2014: COP 124.000 million (USD 67 million) to partially fund the work of 1.500 professionals 
doing technical assistance to coffee producers and the in research and development in CENICAFE; COP 340.000 
million (USD 184 million) were invested in subsidizing loans to coffee renovation which was the first step to 
participated in the fertilizers subsidy program that invested COP 246.000 (USD 133 million) and; COP 26.000 million 
(USD 14 million) in sustainable programs (forest protection, sustainable water management, promotion of 
sustainable coffees) (FNC. (2014)). 
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consumers who valued the diversity of aromatic profiles gathered around the Specialty Coffee 
Association of America (SCAA hereafter) in 1982 to produce standards and protocols 220  to 
encourage diversity and reward through prices the exceptionality of the "specialty coffee"221.  
 
In Colombia, the stability produced by the regulated market allowed the FNC to ignore these 
market trends. However, once the coffee market was liberalized, these trends progressively 
entered into their radar, inspiring some implementation acts of the FNC: The first one was the 
commissioned study of Ecotopes by  Gómez, Caballero, and Baldión (1991). It was the first 
national study that recognized the diversity of soils and climates of the Colombian coffee lands 
to understand their zone-differentiated influenced on the coffee crop. Their main objective was 
to improve productivity by implementing zone-differentiated agricultural practices. But it left in 
the air the suspicion, for some officials of the FNC, that the sensory profile was also different 
depending on the region222. It is worth to mention that, according to  Fernández, Samper, and 
Silva (2007), the entire commercial strategy of the FNC had been based since 1960 on the 
successful positioning of Juan Valdez and the Café de Colombia as one single profile. Some actors 
within the FNC could have considered that talking too much of different regional profiles would 
falsify the flavor and aroma promise, hence it would break from within the reputation so 
expensively (in time and money) shaped. 
 
However, this plausible suspicion, added to the fact that the new Colombian legal framework 
gave the competence and the means to the FNC to create the Office of Coffee Quality, could have 
influenced its director Salim Hanna to start in 1994 the first protocols to evaluate exceptional 
coffee profiles. Two years later, the Comité Nacional de Cafeteros, through Resolution 3 of 1996, 
created the “Programa de Registro y Promoción de Cafés Especiales” centralized in the Coffee 
Quality Office and controlled by the commercial team of the FNC with the probable objective of 
taking advantage of the market opportunity without affecting the reputation of Café de Colombia 
(Moreno Gonzales, 2015, p. 25). 
 
Through this program, the FNC requested samples of the best coffees to all Comités 
Departamentales and Cooperatives in their area of influence. These samples were analyzed 
during several harvests by the Quality Office to evaluate their sensory consistency. Alongside, 
socio-economic studies were carried out to evaluate their supply feasibility. Selected samples 
                                                     
220 The SCAA has five categories of coffee standards (green coffee standards; cupping standards; roasting standards; 
water standards, brewing standards and two coffee protocols (green coffee grading protocols and cupping protocols. 
SCAA, Official webpage.   
221 “So how do we define specialty coffee? Well, in the broadest sense we define it is as coffee that has met all the 
tests of survival encountered in the long journey from the coffee tree to the coffee cup. More specifically, we 
measure it against standards and with methods that allow us to identify coffee that has been properly cared for… it 
is possible to employ the standards developed by SCAA to make a meaningful judgment on the preparation of the 
coffee through aspect grading and to employ a standard cupping protocol to assess the quality of the cup.” 
(Rhinehart, 2009) 
222 Interview with Jairo Rebolledo. Fomer executive director of the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño.  
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were offered by the FNC commercial division (spread all over the main coffee markets) to their 
clients or potential clients either bilaterally or at fairs and specialized events223. 
 
During the nineties this program was modestly developed because the FNC's priority was to face 
the coffee crisis, until the results of the Comisión de Ajuste a la Caficultura Colombiana were 
presented224 “El Café: capital social estratégico” (Ramírez et al., 2002a). This expert commission 
recommended changing the focus from the commercial perspective towards the development of 
local capabilities to improve quality through the cooperatives and coffee farmers associations225.  
 
As a result, the Comité Nacional Cafetero, through Resolution 04 of 2002, reformulated the 
"Specialty Coffee Registration and Promotion Program" to provide a wider portfolio of coffee 
products divided into three main categories: Cafés de Origen226 because of particularities in their 
aromatic profile due to the ecotope in which they were grown; Cafés sostenibles227 because 
particularities in their cultivation that reduce negative impacts in the growers’ communities and 
their environment; and Cafés de Preparación228 the mainstream business model in which coffee 
is bough, no matter its aromatic profile or negative/positive effects around, because of the 
physical characteristics like the size of the bean and the number of beans with defects.  
 
 Given the depletion of the FoNC, the money needed to implement the recommendations of the 
commission selected was obtained through the APC 2002. A small portion of US $ 3.6 million 
went to finance the "Strategic Specialty Coffee Plan" that began in 2003  (DNP, 2004, p. 17), but 
then it was strengthened through the APC 2008 through which growers could enjoy a 40% 
subsidy on the capital229 in infrastructures needed to be certified in sustainable coffee schemes 
(F. N. d. C. FNC, 2009). 
                                                     
223 Interview with Pedro Felipe Gómez, coordinator of the specialty coffee program at the Comité Departamental de 
Cafeteros de Caldas.  
224  This was a mission of experts hired by the Colombian Government to give recommendations for coffee policy 
225  “La Comisión considera urgente complementar el programa de apoyo a la exportación de cafés especiales 
mediante el ofrecimiento de asistencia técnica para el desarrollo de calidades diferenciadas real y consistentemente, 
posicionamiento de marcas, financiación y comercialización externa, centrado en torno a la gestión de las 
cooperativas y asociaciones de productores” (Ramírez et al., 2002b, p. 9) 
226 Estos se clasifican a su vez en tres grupos: “Cafés Regionales” dada la asociación de su perfil sensorial con su 
origen; “Cafés Exóticos” cuya reputación adicional a la proveniencia se enriquece por las condiciones excepcionales 
del cultivo; o “Café de Finca” cuándo estas particularidades provienen de una sola finca (Arcila et al., 2007, p. 241).  
227 Estos se clasifican por los Estándares Voluntarios de Sostenibilidad, entre ellos los “Cafés Orgánicos” por estar 
certificados en alguna norma de agricultura orgánica; los “Cafés amigables con las aves o de sombra” por cultivarse 
bajo sombra; los “Cafés de Precio Justo o Social” por ser producido por pequeños productores y mantener un precio 
mínimo garantizado (Arcila et al., 2007, p. 241). 
228 En este grupo se clasifican el café de acuerdo al producto de trilla demandado por el torrefactor: los “Cafés 
Supremos” es una selección de granos de mayor tamaño (que el café Excelso de exportación); los “Cafés Caracol” es 
una selección de los granos conocidos como caracol (la cereza del café desarrolla en vez de dos, una sola semilla 
redonda enroscada como un caracol); los “Cafés Selectos” es una selección de granos de acuerdo a la solicitud del 
cliente. (Arcila et al., 2007, p. 241).   
229 “El Gobierno Nacional creó el Incentivo a la Capitalización Rural – ICR a través del cual se otorga un incentivo 
consistente en un abono hasta por el 40% del monto del crédito solicitado para realizar inversiones bien sea en 
mejoramiento o construcción de infraestructura productiva y/o en el establecimiento de nuevos cultivos” (F. N. d. C. 
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Through this Plan, the FNC joined the global consensus adopted in the AIC 2001 and reinforced 
by the AIC 2007, on intervention in the coffee farm through public-private projects to implement 
the VSS market. 
  
4.2.2. Coffee renovation Program   
 
From the beginning, one of the objectives of the FNC was to participate in the financial business 
so it could guarantee access to capital for coffee farmers: Since the IV Coffee Congress in 1930, 
the creation of the Agrarian Credit Fund was proposed to expand access to working capital and 
reduce dependence on commercial houses. In 1953, given the weight of coffee production, the 
FNC, using FoNC’s capital, founded the Banco Cafetero to expand the portfolio of financial 
services offered to coffee farmers. In 1959, they settled the Fondo Rotatorio de Crédito to make 
this access to capital much more dynamic. In the seventies, thanks to the coffee boom, the whole 
system was strengthened, and in particular, given the advances made by CENICAFÉ, in 1976, the 
Fondo de Crédito Cafetero was created specifically for renovation and new plantings of coffee 
plantations (Castro Forero, 1988, p. 56).  
 
Hence, through access to credit at competitive rates, and a business featured by stability in 
prices, the FNC encouraged the uses proposed by CENICAFE without the need to resort to direct 
subsidies. Indeed, during the times of the quota agreements, discussions on how to use the 
capital (FoNC surpluses) were more oriented towards soft and strategic incorporation into the 
economy without affecting negatively macroeconomic variables than the use of the money to 
influence the behavior of coffee growers through subsidies 230 . However, a decade after 
liberalization, the fall in prices (and the expectation that they would continue to fall) reduced the 
attractiveness of coffee production and among several consequences, decreased the 
engagement of farmers with their coffee crops (and with their debts) which resulted in aged-
unfertilized coffee trees that shrunk productivity and indebted-poorer coffee farmers (wealthy 
ones migrated to other economic activities).  In fact, to maximize de income, the farmer should 
renovate annually between 14% and 20% of its coffee crop (depending on the coffee productive 
system) according to studies made in CENICAFÉ231.   
 
In this context, the FNC implemented the “Programa de Incentivos a la Renovación” through 
which they sought to renovate a third of the entire Colombian coffee crop during the period 
1998-2002, so they could reduce the average age from 7,4 years in 1997 to 5 years at the end of 
the period (DNP, 2004, p. 6). This program provided a subsidy of COP 90 (USD 0.07) per tree 
                                                     
FNC, 2011, p. 54). ”Entre 2001 y 2010, 224 mil créditos beneficiaron a los pequeños productores” (F. N. d. C. FNC, 
2011, p. 54). 
230 According to Pizano (1987, p. 8), the FNC used the FoNC surpluses in three strategies:  The first was to capitalize 
the FoNC in order to strengthen its stabilizing capacity in the future; the second was to increase the FoNC’s assets 
by buying participation in strategic entities or acquiring debt with the producers; the third was to give loans to the 
national government and to invests in public services like roads and educations in zones of coffee influence. 
231  “la edad óptima de renovación del cafetal sería a los 5 años para un lote con 10.000 plantas/ha, a los 6 años 
para 5.000 plantas/ha y a los 7 años para 2.500 plantas/ha” (Arcila et al., 2007, p. 149) 
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renovated either by planting 232  or by pruning 233  that ended at the beginning of the new 
millennium due to the financial situation of the FoNC.  
 
In 2002 financial support was obtained from the government through the APC - 2002 (that was 
reinforced with the new APC APC 2008) to fund the same previous subsidies under the new name 
of “Programa de Competitividad" 234. Progressively, this program was adapted to incentivize 
practices alongside the renovation: first, a larger subsidy was granted to the renovation by 
planting to encourage higher densities; then, it was granted only when planting the coffee-leaf-
rust-resistant variety Coffea arabica Castillo235) (due to the Niña phenomena236 that produced an 
outbreak of this fungus). It encouraged during the period 2007-2011 an approximate annual 
renovation of 5% of the Colombian coffee crop237.   
 
In parallel, the illiquidity of the FoNC and the financial difficulties of the coffee growers motivated 
the intervention of the National Government in the FNC’s banking business. On the one hand, by 
means of the Decreto No.1257 del 22 de junio de 2001 del Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo 
Rural, it was created the “Programa Nacional de Rehabilitación Cafetera” through which more 
than 75 thousand coffee growers’ loans were refinanced (DNP, 2004, p. 7). On the other, the 
Government demanded to make effective the recommendations of the expert commission to 
restructure the FoNC, which ended with the sale of the Banco Cafetero in 2006. 
 
As the FNC went out of the banking business, they needed finding new ways to give farmers 
access to credits238. Thus, the Government and the FNC developed a shared scheme for providing 
funding known as “Reconversión Productiva y Social de la Caficultura” in 2007: the aim was to 
allow this access to small coffee growers239 for renovation by replacing (since 2011 with resistant 
varieties) their aged crops. The Ministerio de Agricultura through Finagro240  subsidized 40% of 
                                                     
232 Uprooting the aged coffee tree and planting a new one. 
233 Pruning the aged tree in its main trunk above about 15 centimeters from the ground so that a new stem grows. 
234 “Para la defensa de la rentabilidad y el bienestar de los caficultores, a finales de 2007, el gremio consiguió que el 
Ministerio de Agricultura aceptara que $40 mil millones del AGC se destinaran a fortalecer el Programa de 
competitividad para la renovación de cafetales tecnificados” (F. N. d. C. FNC, 2009, p. 4). 
235 In 1998, they paid COP 90 (USD 0.7) for each plant renovated, it did not matter neither variety nor renovation 
method. In 2011, they paid if farmers planted a pest-resistant variety, dependent on the method, COP 70 (USD 0.4) 
if they pruned the plant and COP 160 (USD 0.9) if they planted a new coffee tree.    
236 This phase of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle, is featured by a period of below-average sea surface 
temperature across the east-central Equatorial Pacific (NOAA, 2017). 
237 “En promedio, anualmente (para el lustro 2007-2011) el programa ha ejecutado cerca de $28.646 millones de 
pesos, beneficiado a 68.656 caficultores y renovado 46.504 hectáreas de café” (Santiago Silva Restrepo, 2013, p. 53). 
238 “Por lo tanto, se hace imperativa la búsqueda de soluciones alternativas al problema de acceso a crédito para los 
caficultores” (DNP, 2004, p. 7). 
239 Entre las condiciones para ser beneficiario se incluía no tener un patrimonio entre el caficultor y su cónyuge 
superior a 145 salarios mínimos mensuales legales vigentes (equivalente a unos US$ 35 mil de la época); que el 75% 
de sus activos estuviesen invertidos en el sector agropecuario y que ⅔ de sus ingresos proviniesen de actividades 
agrícolas; y que la renovación se hiciese como mínimo en 0.2 ha y máximo en 5 ha de café (Santiago Silva Restrepo, 
2013, p. 54).  
240  Fondo de Financiamiento del Sector Agropecuario organizado como establecimiento de crédito adscrito al 
Ministerio de Agricultura.  
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the capital, and the FNC with resources from the FoNC covered the current interests during the 
term of the loan241.   
 
This program was funded by the APC 2008 through which it contemplated annual investments of 
COP 114.000 million (USD 70 million) (FNC, 2008b, p. 27). And then, it was reinforced with a new 
APC 2010 that executed COP 359.000 million (USD 195 million) in the four years. It leveraged 216 
thousand loans to renovate 184 thousand hectares (FNC., 2014), equivalent to another 5% of the 
coffee park renovated annually. 
 
Both the direct subsidy and the credit subsidy for renovation, in a context of climatic events that 
showed the importance of stabilizing the income, played an important role to encourage the 
adoption of the practice of renovation of approximately one-tenth of the crop annually to 
renovate almost half of the Colombian coffee crop in the period 2010-2014242.  
 
4.3. Intermediary synthesis  
 
Coffee culture was salient in the history of Colombia for roughly one century (1890-1990) shaping 
the economic, social and political life through a coffee public policy that encouraged the 
commercial coffee farming through three main instruments: purchase guarantee, quality control 
and reputation and, technology transfer in order to support the economic development of the 
country.   
 
The breakdown of the ICA produced a free global coffee market in which Colombian commercial 
coffee farms were decimated and peasant coffee farms were impoverished by the much more 
competitive coffee culture in Brazil and Vietnam. Then, the logic was inverted in which the 
country encouraged the peasant coffee farming through two main instruments: the specialty 
coffee program and the coffee renovation program in order to maintain the social, economic and 
political tissue previously sew.    
 
These five instruments of the coffee public policy were the most important inputs used by actors 
in both Riosucio and Buesaco to profile their demanded services.   
 
  
                                                     
241 Consistent with the expected income stream of the plant the credit had a term of seven years with the first two 
of grace. Indeed, the coffee tree takes two years to produce its first harvest and according to the productive system, 
between 3 to 5 more years to maximize productivity per unit of land. Additionally, the 100% of the credit was 
guaranteed with resources from both the Fondo Agropecuario de Garantías and the Fondo del Garantías del Café 
(Santiago Silva Restrepo, 2013, p. 54). 
242 “Como resultado, entre 2010 y 2014 se renovaron en promedio anual más de 90 mil hectáreas (de un poco menos 
de 1 millón de ha), lo que permitió alcanzar un total de 466 mil hectáreas renovadas en el cuatrienio” (FNC., 2014, p. 
24) 
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Second Part: Riosucio (Caldas) 
 
This second part contains two chapters: chapter five produces the inputs to tests our first 
hypothesis, and chapter six produces the inputs to tests our second hypothesis. 
 
Chapter 5. LRAs that enhance sustainable management of Coffee  
 
We divide this chapter into three subchapters to produce the inputs to test our first hypothesis 
in the conclusive chapter.  
 
The first one tries to disentangle the collective action problem in a five-step process through an 
analytical tool from the IRR, the Local Regulatory Arrangement (LRA): firstly, it identifies a closed 
list of services demanded from the Resource by spotting the LRAs presented in the territory 
during the 2015-2016 coffee harvest. Secondly, it describes how these services are expected to 
be produced by analyzing how each LRA regulates a particular use of resource constituents. 
Thirdly, it summarizes observed uses of resource constituents by each LRA. Fourth it puts on 
evidence the services provided by the Resource because of the observed uses of constituents by 
each LRA. Fifth it compares and ranks the LRAs by its provision of services. 
 
The second subchapter analyses each LRA from the three conditions. So, it is divided into three 
subsections (namely extent, coherence, and closure), which in time, are subdivided by LRAs. 
 
We conclude with the input to test our first hypothesis, namely the results of our synchronic 
analysis, in which we assess the level of service provision depending on the LRA configuration.  
 
5.1. The collective action problem: services demanded from Coffee 
 
Guaranteeing the capacity of the resource to produce the services demanded by the different 
actors is the solution to the problem of collective action. We assume the challenge of illustrating 
it using the concept of Local Regulatory Arrangements. 
 
This subchapter begins by presenting our exhaustive categorization of Riosucio coffee and coffee 
growers in different LRA, which will allow us to identify the totality of the services that were 
demanded by the actors of the coffee Resource in Riosucio in 2015. The provision of these 
services is the collective action problem that is to be solved. 
 
We divide this subchapter in the five-step process already describe with the aim to convincingly 
assess the observable provision of services by each LRA, so in the end, we can compare and rank 
them in terms of our dependent variable: the level of services provision.  
 
5.1.1. Services demanded from Coffee in Riosucio during the harvest 2015 
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For the date of the field work (June / July 2016), we collected information on the previous 2015 
harvest. As the Cooperative monopolized the purchases, we used their purchases transactions 
during 2015 to identify that they were seven different profiling institutions activated in that 
period.  
 
It means that firstly, the farmer had been selected and then, he had implemented the regulated 
uses by the profiling institution so it was able to sell its coffee through one of these seven 
different pathways.  
 
As we said before, this purchase transaction acts like a probe that the expected uses were 
implemented and, so it determines the following uses that are going to be implemented to 
produce the expected combination of services. On the other hand, the uses that were not 
implemented before this transaction, makes impossible for the Resource afterward, to produce 
those uses’ dependent services.  So, in the end, both the farmer and the coffee bean243 can be 
placed in one LRA only if they both fulfill the LRA requirements244.   
 
Our criterion for exhaustively classifying the 3,056 coffee farmers (for which we have data on 
their coffee sales) in different LRAs was that at least 50 percent of their production had been sold 
through one of the seven profiling institutions present in the municipality (which we will detail 
later): 3,011 coffee farmers were classified under this criterion. The remaining 45 records were 
classified under the criterion of the highest proportion sold through a profiling institution. Thus, 
Table 3 presents our exhaustive categorization of the 3.78 million kilos of coffee sold by 3,056 
coffee growers to the Cooperative in Riosucio in 2015 in seven different LRAs.  
 
Table 3 LRAs in Riosucio carried out with quantitative information from the Coop / SICA database, reports from the Cooperative 
and Asprocafé and interviews with actors such as the employees that buy coffee. Source: the author.    
LRA by profiling 
institution 
Coffee 
farmers 
Purchases Quality Premium 
Kilos Percentage 
Broca Pasilla Factor  Premium when 
buying (COP) 
Premium after 
buying (COP) 
LRA Organic 
147 
124,405 3% 
broca+pasilla 
6.33% 
95  560/k  150/k SS + 1300/k 
SO + 
517/k SOP 
LRA Nespresso  
698 
1,364,461 36% 
2.5% 2% 91 560/k 75/k SS + 
40/k RF  
                                                     
243 It is necessary to clarify that the quality of coffee in the same plot varies during the year, for example the beans 
homogeneity and ripeness varies significantly during the harvest: It is low at the beginning/end while it is best at the 
middle, but of course it depends on climate events that can affect the last development of the bean.  
244 In the particular case of Riosucio, a particular system is used that mixes elements of both the “factor” and the 
“almendra sana” purchase system developed by the FNC: A sample of coffee is threshed, then moisture (only when 
too much humidity is suspected, a test would be performed to evaluate a range between 10% and 12.5% moisture), 
color and smell are evaluated by the fiel de báscula using its own skills. Afterwards, the total almond is weighed and 
divided into three groups: firstly, the defective grains (both the first and the second group) are separated with the 
help of a mesh (size 13) to form a pasilla group; secondly the brocaded grains is separated manually, thirdly the 
remaining healthy/well developed beans. All groups are weighted separately and the “quality” depends on both the 
individual and combined percentage of the first two groups on the sample. The lower this percentage, the higher 
the quality.   
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LRA La Vereda 783 677,822 18% 2.5% 2% 91 360/k NA  
LRA Fairtrade 
171 
300,017 8% 
broca+pasilla 
6.33% 
94 120/k 130/k SS 
LRA 
Regional/Starbucks  
239 
282,258 7% 
2.5% 2% 92 120/k NA 
LRA Standard (base) 
363 
330,725 9% 
broca+pasilla 
6.33% 
94 0 NA 
LRA Standard 
(discount) 
655 
708,987 19%  
N.A. N.A. N.A.  (-) discount NA 
 
It should be stressed that this transaction has two conditions. First that the coffee grower can be 
part of the LRA and second that the coffee can be. The first condition is verified at the time of 
purchase with the identification of the coffee grower and the farm, the second is verified by the 
quality of the coffee. 
 
• Coffee and farmer inclusion in a particular LRA 
 
The evolution that will be narrated in the next chapter had produced a complex system of 
farmers’ inclusion-exclusion to different LRAs, so it cannot be properly said that one farmer 
belongs to one LRA, but that a farmer can choose between those LRAs to which he has the right 
to belong. In this order of ideas, we can use a model of two overlapping layers featured by rivalry, 
at the same layer, a coffee farmer that belongs to one LRA cannot belong to another one; 
complementarity, a coffee farmer that belong to an upper layer, also belongs to the lower one, 
but not on the contrary.   
 
• The base layer covers the entire area of the municipality (the 3.771 coffee farmers245). It 
is composed by the LRA Standard.  
• The first layer also covers the whole municipality but it is composed of 1.164 coffee 
growers 246  who are members of the Cooperative and could sell to the LRA 
Regional/Starbucks.  
• The second layer covers the whole area of the municipality but it is made up of the 832 
coffee growers247  who are partners of Asprocafé and could sell to LRA Fairtrade. 
• The third layer divided the coffee area of Riosucio between:  
o Approximately 1500 coffee growers248 who have registered their farm inside the 
Resguardo de San Lorenzo and could sell their coffee through the LRA La Vereda. 
o Approximately 700 coffee growers249  who cultivate coffee over 1.700 m.a.s.l. of 
the municipality (excluding those of the Resguardo de San Lorenzo) were invited 
                                                     
245 SICA Database.  
246 Informe de cafés especiales del Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas, Versión 4.0, del 16 de octubre de 
2015. 
247 Asprocafé Database.  
248 SICA Database. 
249 In 2015, the cooperative bought coffee as Nespresso coffee for 708 coffee growers. 
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to join the Nespresso AAA program so they could sell their coffee through the LRA 
Nespresso.  
o 153 coffee growers250 who are part of Asprocafé's organic group, whose farms are 
distributed throughout the coffee-growing area of the municipality with certain 
points of greater concentration, could sell their coffee through the LRA organic. 
 
The inclusion of the coffee farmer to the base layer is derived from the SICA database updated 
routinely by the technical assistance service provided by the FNC. When saying routinely, we 
meant that on a daily basis, each time the technical assistant goes to the field and identify a new 
crop of coffee, he will inquire who the owner is and eventually the coffee farmer will be contacted 
and would be added to the SICA database. It could be also the way-round in which the new coffee 
farmer will contact the technical assistant to be included, aiming to benefit from public policies 
implemented through the FNC.  
 
Inclusion to the first layer depends on the farmers’ decision to join the Cooperative because it is 
an exclusive layer for associates. Any coffee farmer in Riosucio (whatever the area or the coffee 
production) can pay a fee to be associated and fulfill some statutory duties (like selling a 
minimum percentage of its coffee to the Cooperative) to maintain this status251. The first layer 
was developed by the Cooperative in 2015 with the aim of selling at better prices the LRA 
Regional coffee, which could not be sold through the others LRAs of the second and third layers. 
 
The second layer includes the active members of the Association of Small Producers of Coffee 
Ingruma - Asprocafé Ingruma252, whose only entry barrier is that the coffee grower does not own 
more than 10 hectares cultivated in coffee253 (In fact, of the 3056 in Riosucio only 6 farms would 
be excluded, the seventh largest (23ha) is owned by Asprocafé),  
 
In the third layer, there are the last three LRAs that are mutually exclusive, but complementary 
to the LRAs of lower layers as long as the coffee grower has multiple memberships: they could 
sell as Fair Trade if they are partners of Asprocafé, and as Regional / Starbucks if they are partners 
of the Cooperative, in all cases they could sell through the LRAs in the base layer: Members of 
Asprocafé who refrained from using pesticides and chemical fertilizers are incorporated in the 
database of the branches of purchase of the Cooperative so that their coffee is bought through 
the LRA Organic254; indigenes that cultivate their coffee within the Resguardo de San Lorenzo are 
automatically incorporated into the LRA la Vereda; and also in this layer, the LRA Nespresso is 
built on the federated coffee farmers (it excludes coffee farmers with less than 0.5 ha cultivated 
in coffee that cannot be federated the FNC) whose farms are located in the altitudinal fringe 
above 1500 m.a.s.l approximately (excluding the Resguardo of San Lorenzo). This altitudinal 
                                                     
250 Asprocafé Database. 
251 Informe de administración y gestión, Cooperativa de caficultores del Alto Occidente de Caldas, 2015. Pág. 17. 
252 It was created in 1997 by the Cooperative as a result of an evaluation of the Fairtrade program in Riosucio, 
precisely to improve the administration of the premium generated by this program. 
253 Artículo 11, Estatutos de la Asociación de pequeños productores de café Ingrumá – “Asprocafé Ingrumá”. Tercera 
reforma en la XVI Asamblea General de Delegados del 23 de marzo de 2016.   
254 Entrevista con la coordinadora del Sistema Interno de Control de Asprocafé Ingruma.  
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criterion is due to the improbable development of the aromatic profile sought by this LRA on 
farms at lower altitudes 
 
However, it is not enough for the coffee grower to be included in one or several LRAs, it is 
necessary that each time he approaches the point of purchase to sell his product, regardless of 
quantity or seasonality (the farmer can go as many times as he wishes) either to sell a few grams 
or once after having collected the entire harvest), coffee can be included in the LRA, so the quality 
of the coffee is the element that defines its inclusion to a specific LRA. As mentioned, the 
centerpiece of its definition is the Resolución 5 del 6 de junio de 2002 del Comité Nacional del 
Caféteros that determines the criteria for exporting Colombian coffee, which is materialized in 
the supply system of the Cooperative. 
 
The maximum tolerance for the different LRAs is presented in Table 3, however, the fiel de 
báscula (the person who buys the coffee from the coffee grower) from the cooperative has a 
certain margin of maneuver to optimize the provision of highest quality coffee. For this, he 
compensates the coffee of two producers, one with lower quality with another of higher quality, 
belonging to the same LRA. Given that the price paid will be the same for all coffee that overtakes 
the minimum quality (e.g. the same price either if coffee has 0% defects or 2.5% of defects), the 
fiel de báscula has incentives to overcome these barriers individually with the coffee growers as 
long as the total lot keeps below the maximum tolerance, it is not an obvious balance but the fiel 
refines it with the experience and the coffee reports received by the clients. 
 
This is a clear example of the alignment of interests: The coffee grower feels directly supported 
by the fiel de báscula and indirectly by the management of the Cooperative, increasing their 
loyalty to this institution and their confidence in the administrative team; customers happily 
receive more coffee of better quality that improves their margins; for the Cooperative financially 
it is more profitable to commercialize these types of coffee than standard coffee (whose margins 
are very low given the competition) and the fiel de báscula, who is part of the community, 
reinforces its links with it. 
 
Table 3 identifies two clusters by quality, one composed by the LRA: Nespresso, La Vereda and 
Regional whose maximum tolerance is 2.5% of broca and 2% of pasilla. The other one by the 
LRAs: Organic, Fairtrade and Standard whose maximum tolerance is 6.33% including both broca 
and pasilla. Additionally, a portion of the LRA Standard that does not fulfill the minimum quality 
is going to be purchased with a discount, that is, a value lower than the standard price 
proportional to the quality of the coffee. Zero tolerances imply a greater probability that the 
coffee supplied has its full organoleptic potential according to the soil, climate and cultivation 
practices, but also a lower probability of finding who supplies it. Thus, more demanding 
tolerances demonstrate the demand for more unique profiles close to that expression of the 
territory and, others less demanding, to a profile that is perceived without defects and reflects 
common characteristics of a much wider territory.  
 
It has to be said, that we do not break apart the LRA Standard in two different LRAs (Standard 
and Discount as we do in the case of Buesaco) because the coffee bough as discount did not 
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necessarily stay for the domestic market (as it is the case of Buesaco). Indeed, as the Cooperative 
buys the 90% of the coffee in Riosucio including a big portion of high-quality coffee, it will be able 
to blend the high-quality coffee, which was not sold as it, with the low-quality coffee to produce 
more Excelso bags: from the 53.753 coffee bags sold in 2015, only 142 where not sold as Excelso 
(so they were sold for the domestic market) 255.  
 
Additionally, to the inclusion and the quality assessed through the purchase transaction, farmers 
have to use their constituents accordingly to the profiling institution.   
 
At the base layer, when the farmer fulfills the quality requirement of the Resolución 5/2002 del 
CNC, coffee can be exported as Café de Colombia, according to the profiling institution: 
Reglamento de Uso de la Indicación Geográfica Protegida Café de Colombia (IGP Café de 
Colombia). So, it could be sold through the LRA Standard as a Colombian Excelso.   
 
In the first layer, farmers are following the profiling institution demanded by the American 
roaster Starbucks: The C.A.F.E. (Coffee and Farmer Equity) Practices. It does not imply that coffee 
growers are effectively meeting the criteria of the standard but are in the process of complying 
with it. Given that it started in 2015, at the end of that year only 9,300 kilos of coffee from 21 
coffee farmers that were supplied through the LRA Regional/Starbucks, were sold as coffee 
C.A.F.E. Practices during 2015. 
 
In the second layer, associates of Asprocafe must comply with the environmental, social, 
economic and labor requirements of their profiling institution Fairtrade Standard with its local 
application called Normas y sanciones que rigen a los asociados de Asprocafé Ingruma (Normas 
Asprocafé hereafter). Permanence is more of a process than a result. The Fairtrade movement 
seeks to open the doors to the small coffee grower and accompany him in his improvement 
process before closing the doors for breaches of requirements. However, the permissiveness of 
the partners has its limits, as evidenced by the 2015 Asprocafé report, which qualifies the last 
external audit for the renewal of as very demanding256. There is room for maneuver but it is 
restricted due to the need to maintain the Fair Trade / Fairtrade certification. In 2015, of the 832 
Asprocafé coffee farmers, only 171 sold 8% of the harvest through this LRA Fairtrade.  
 
In the third layer, members of Asprocafé who refrained from using pesticides and chemical 
fertilizers and who additionally fulfill most of the environmental, social, economic and labor 
requirements of the previous institution would fulfill the profiling institution USDA Organic 
standard. A group of them could upgrade towards the high-value market activating the profiling 
institution Q system of the Specialty Coffee Association of America. 147 coffee growers sold 3% 
of the harvest through this LRA organic in 2015; indigenes who were part of the profiling 
                                                     
255 Informe de administración y gestión, Cooperativa de caficultores del Alto Occidente de Caldas, 2015. Pág. 8 
256  “muy exigente (…) aunque el resultado fue regular, con las medidas correctivas y las evidencias objetivas 
documentales seguimos certificados Fairtrade” Informe de administración y gestión 2015, presentada a la XIII 
Asamblea General de Delegados de la Asociación de pequeños productores de café ingruma. Pág. 14.   
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institution Socios y Amigos del Café Exótico La Vereda (SACEV hereafter) 257. The cooperative 
acquired almost one-fifth of the Riosucio harvest from 783 coffee farmers through the LRA 
Vereda in 2015. Federated farmers over 1.500 have to fulfill the profiling institution known as 
the Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality™ Coffee Program (Program AAA hereafter). Which 
implies selling to the Cooperative a minimum of 375 kilos per year per hectare 258  and the 
TASQ259. That is, the process, rather than the result, is relevant for the permanence of the coffee 
farmer. In 2015, 36% of the harvest was purchased from 698 coffee farmers through the ARL 
Nespresso. It is worth noting that more than half of these coffee growers (387) are associates of 
Asprocafé. 
 
In conclusion, this double belonging of the coffee grower according to its commitment to specific 
practices and coffee according to the result of its evaluation at the point of purchase, reflect the 
sensory services and symbolic services demanded by the actors of the coffee produced in 
Riosucio. 
 
• A closed list of services demanded by actors in Riosucio in 2015 
 
This exhaustive categorization of coffee bought in Riosucio for the harvest 2015/2016, allowed 
us to identify the institutions concretized by the actors to profile the Resource, namely the 
Resolución 5/2002 del CNC; the IGP Café de Colombia; the CAFE Practices; the Fairtrade Standards 
including its local application Normas Asprocafé; the USDA Organic; the SACEV; the AAA Program 
and the Q System.  
 
In Annex 3, we analyzed each one of these institutions as were activated in each LRA so we could 
identify the symbolic, taste related and monetary services. In the end, we produced a closed list 
of services that were demanded from the Resource in Riosucio during the coffee harvest 2015 
that are summarized in table 4.  
 
Table 4 Services demanded by the resource in Riosucio in 2015. Source: the author supported in Annex 3. 
Monetary services Description 
Household income  Kilos of coffee produced in one year by price per kilo.  
Symbolic services Description 
Energy dose A ready-like feeling   
Typical coffee from Caldas 
Positive feelings attached to the coffee coming from the department of 
Caldas 
Reputation of the appellation Café 
Colombia Positive feelings attached to the appellation Café de Colombia 
                                                     
257 Despite the fact that since 2013 a project for the certification of some farmers in the Rainforest Alliance - RA 
standard was initiated at the time of the field work, for the fieles de báscula it was not a selection criterion.  
258 The average for the 3056 coffee growers of which we have data in Riosucio in 2015 was 1,391 kilos / ha.  
259  “con los procesos de mejoramiento continuo para cumplir con los criterios de calidad, económicos, sociales y 
ambientales de la TASQ™” Clúster Expocafé, Sistema de Gestión para el programa de calidad sostenible Nespresso 
AAA, versión 3.1 septiembre de 2012. Pág. 10. 
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Natural coffee 
Feeling of confidence when consuming a product free of chemicals 
potentially harmful to health.   
Environmentally responsible 
A feeling of responsibility for investing in the conservation and 
protection of natural resources.   
Brand Reputation Positive feelings attached to the private brand 
Indigenous coffee A sense of awe and support for cultural diversity 
Fairtrade coffee 
Feeling of altruism to be willing to pay more just to improve the quality 
of life of producers.  
Ethically traded A feeling that coffee is paid as fair markets signaled.  
Shared value 
A feeling of co-responsibility in the wellbeing of the coffee farmers’ 
community.  
Servicios sensorial Descripción 
Clean cup 
A coffee flavor free of taints and defects. In Colombia, it implies a mild 
coffee, with a medium to high acidity and body, and a pronounced and 
complete aroma 
Expresión del terroir 
A coffee that represents the aromatic profile developed in a particular 
region due to its climate and soils. 
Winy 
Pleasant taste, almost spicy with a retronasal sensation similar to that 
of the fermented grape. 
Citric acid aroma 
A flavor produced by sugars in the bean and an intense and pleasant 
flavor that adds vivacity to the coffee with a retro-olfaction sensation 
of ripe citrus aromas such as orange or lemon 
Exceptional coffee A rare and highly pleasant aromatic profile. 
 
We propose to understand it as a closed list of 15 symbolic and taste related services in addition 
to the monetary ones demanded in Riosucio/2015. 
 
5.1.2. Regulated uses 
 
Profiling institutions, namely the the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC; the IGP Café de Colombia; the 
CAFE Practices; the Fairtrade/Normas Asprocafé; the USDA Organic; the SACEV; the AAA Program 
and the Q System, produce a combination of services because they regulate the uses that 
profiling actors made of the resource constituents, namely infrastructure, know-how, and know-
to-appreciate in 26 activities detailed in Annex 1. 
 
In Annex 4, we had described how these profiling institutions regulated these uses in order to 
produce the services demanded in Riosucio in 2015. As profiling institutions are both result and 
process oriented, in the first case we focused on the uses encouraged by the actors that 
concretize the institution. As an example, the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC is a result oriented, but 
all the knowledge circuit (from research in CENICAFE to the technical assistance to farmers 
explained in chapter 4.1.3) encourages uses of resource constituents to achieve that result. In 
the second case, the profiling institution itself details the expected uses of resource constituents. 
As an example, Rainforest alliance mandates a certain percentage of the canopy. Results are 
summarized in Annex 4.4.  
 
124 
 
The first analysis of these observations is the almost exclusive concentration of rivalries during 
the planting process. Excluding the activity of nutrition, the remaining activities in the processes 
of cultivation, post-harvesting, and trading are complementary, hence uses to produce a service 
do not exclude provision of another one. Consequently, there are no incentives to promote 
different uses and on the contrary, different LRA’s could converge around a specific use and we 
expect to observe the uses as described in the white boxes of the expected result column of table 
5. 
 
On the other hand, in all the activities of the planting process and one activity (nutrition) in the 
cultivation process, there is a tradeoff when producing one service at the expense of another 
one. It can be anticipated that different LRA are (dis)incentivizing different uses of Resource 
constituents so, we expect that the observed uses are going to be heterogeneous.   
 
Table 5 Rivalries and complementarities analysis. Source: The author using tables in Annex 4.4. 
Processes Uses Rivalries Expected result 
Planting 
Diversification  3 Specialization vs. 5 diversification  Heterogeneous  
Variety  4 pest resistant vs. 2 non-pest resistant Heterogeneous 
Renovation of Coffee trees    2 younger vs 2 older  Heterogeneous 
Planting density  2 higher density vs 2 lower density  Heterogeneous 
Shade 4 more canopy; 2 regulated canopy; 1 less canopy  Heterogeneous 
Cultivation 
Soil management  6 integrated plan Integrated plan for soil management 
Pest and disease management 6 integrated plan Integrated plan for pest management 
Nutrition  4 chemical vs 2 organic Heterogeneous 
Hedge rowing  3 hedge rowing Hedge rowing 
Picking   12 ripe fruits plus timely  Ripe fruit  
Farm management 5 planning  Planning 
Post-Harvesting 
Hulling   6 immediately vs 1 (if the farmer decides differently)  Immediately  
Fermentation   6 short vs 1 (if the farmer decides a longer one) Short 
Drying    6 vs 1 ((if the farmer decides differently) 
Solar o mechanical while 
moisture is between 10% - 12% 
Waste management 5 integrated plan  Integrated plan for waste management 
Reselection  0 vs 1 ((if the farmer decides differently) Reselection is not practiced.  
Trading 
Purchasing 14 sorted by "bean" quality  
Quality sorting by Res 02/05; 
documentary traceability per 
lot. 
Threshing and sorting 12 milled in Excelso coffee  Traceability per a lot of Excelso coffee 
Bulking and export  12 performed documentary traceability 
Traceability per a lot of Excelso 
coffee 
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5.1.3. Observed uses  
 
In the previous section, we were interested in regulations to identify how the services demanded 
from the resource are produced. In this section, we document our observations on how are 
profiling actors using resource constituents by each LRA. In other words, we assess the actual 
behavior over the Resource in Riosucio in 2015 with the regulated behavior needed to produce 
services, in order to credibly claim service provision. 
 
The observations of the uses for each LRA, which is presented in table 6, were documented based 
on quantitative and qualitative information collected during the fieldwork in Riosucio in the July-
August 2016 period.  
 
The data documented for the process planting was obtained from the Coop / SICA database: As 
differences among farmers could explain the use of resource constituents, we wanted to 
compare the most similar farmers so the difference can be convincingly explained by the LRA 
they belong to. This is the reason we conducted a statistical analysis known as analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA)260, which allow us to compare the average uses per LRA by controlling for 
a series of covariances, for example, the number of coffee trees per farm. We will use it as a 
descriptive statistic a little bit more precise than a regular mean because we are interested in 
describing how farmers are using their resource constituents on average, in each LRA, so we can 
assess service provision. Why are they using them in that particular way would be a matter of the 
next chapter.   
 
 In the specific case of Riosucio, we conducted an ANCOVA for each activity in the planting 
process (independent variable) depending of the LRA to which the farmer was placed (dependent 
variable) controlling by the figures of the other four activities (number of coffee trees, resistance, 
age, density and specialization (covariate)). For each activity, there is an indicator and its 
measurement is showed for each LRA, meaning that on average, farmers belonging to that LRA 
are using resource constituents in that particular way. The whole statistical support is presented 
in Annex 5.1. 
 
The data for the other processes were obtained through a triangulation of a survey conducted by 
the author with 21 coffee growers of different LRA; the database of 832 of coffee farmers 
associated with Asprocafé who belongs to four LRAs (Fairtrade, la Vereda, Nespresso and 
Organic); the documentary information from the Cooperative’s and Asprocafé’s annual reports 
and the qualitative data gathered by the author in interviews conducted in Riosucio, Manizales, 
and Bogotá with the profiling actors who were participating in each LRA identified in Riosucio.       
 
Table 6 Observed uses by LRA. Source: The author. 
Processes Uses LRA Standard LRA Regional LRA Fairtrade LRA La Vereda LRA Nespresso LRA Organic 
                                                     
260 We used the SPSS statistical software. For conducting the series of ANCOVAS we relied on Field (2005), specially 
chapter 9.  
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Planting 
Diversification   
(- Coffee 
area/total area**  
70% of the 
total area is 
cultivated in 
coffee. 
69% of the 
total area is 
cultivated in 
coffee. 
74% of the 
total area is 
cultivated in 
coffee. 
76% of the 
total area is 
cultivated in 
coffee. 
72% of the total 
area is 
cultivated in 
coffee. 
71% of the 
total area is 
cultivated in 
coffee. 
Variety (pest 
resistant coffee 
trees 
planted/total 
coffee trees 
planted in the 
farm )** 
 76% are pest 
resistant 
73% are pest 
resistant 
74% are pest 
resistant 
65% are pest 
resistant 
69% are pest 
resistant 
68% are pest 
resistant 
Renovation 
(Average age of 
the coffee 
crop)** 
9.29 years old 9.16 years old 8.91 years old 7.74 years old 7.31 years old 8.92 years old 
Density (average 
density of the 
coffee crop)** 
5.155 coffee 
trees per 
hectare 
5.040 coffee 
trees per 
hectare 
5.157 coffee 
trees per 
hectare 
5.255 coffee 
trees per 
hectare 
4.957 coffee 
trees per 
hectare 
5.025 coffee 
trees per 
hectare 
Shade (average 
shade in the 
coffee crop)** 
22% of the 
crop grows 
under shade  
26% of the 
crop grows 
under shade 
25.5% of the 
crop grows 
under shade 
26% of the 
crop grows 
under shade 
26% of the crop 
grows under 
shade 
40% of the 
crop grows 
under shade 
Cultivation 
Weed/soil 
management* 
Cultural practices predominantly: weeding with machete 2/3 times a year depending on the 
age of the crop 
The shade and 
the fall of 
leaves reduce 
the growth of 
weeds, hence 
weeds are less 
frequent and 
easier to 
perform than 
in other cases. 
Pest and disease 
management* 
Since prices are set based on the percentage of broca, coffee farmers strive to control it. The cultural control 
lies in not allowing the fall of mature grains, therefore the coffee growers do the picking every 15 or 20 days 
when there is no harvest.  
Pest and disease 
management* 
Rarely use of chemicals  
Nutrition***  
 
A generalized practice of 
fertilization is observed twice a 
year but not necessarily with the 
products that the soil needs or in 
recommended doses. 
Only 13% of 
coffee growers 
do not fertilize. 
The remaining 
87% is similar 
to standard. 
However, since 
79% have 
compost to 
make solid 
fertilizers and 
41% make 
liquid 
fertilizers, soil 
nutrition may 
be higher 
Both organic 
and synthetic 
fertilization is 
observed 
similarly to 
standard: 92% 
make solid 
organic 
fertilizer and 
58% make 
liquid organic 
fertilizer 
(Asprocafé 
associates). 
94% fertilize. 
They have 
support in soil 
analysis and 
interpretation, 
and the 
entrepreneurial 
administration 
of the farm 
produces 
resources for 
fertilizers. 
(Members of 
Asprocafé: 87% 
make solid and 
38% make 
liquid organic 
fertilizer) 
100% are 
organic but it 
does not mean 
that the plant's 
requirements 
are 
compensated 
with organic 
fertilizers. The 
extremes of 
well/bad 
fertilization are 
observed. 91% 
make solid 
organic 
fertilizer and 
92% make 
liquid organic 
fertilizer. 
Hedge rowing * 
The use of live 
barriers is not 
evident. 
The use of live 
barriers is not 
evident. 
In many farms, the use of live barriers is observed 
because at some point they were in the organic 
program. 
The use of live 
barriers is 
observed. 
Picking* 
During harvest, if the family workforce is not enough (usually more than 5 thousand coffee trees) occasional 
labor must be hired or exchanged through the manos cambiadas scheme. In the first case, they join the 
collectors and motivated them to harvest ripe fruits, in occasions offering better conditions such as food or 
price. In the second, a tit-for-tat is expected so farmers have incentives to pick well ripen fruits (which means 
better price).  
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Farm 
management* 
The farm and the family are the same economic unit. Hence, its 
management is joint and is characterized by prioritizing business 
planning on everyday emergencies. 
Also, a family 
farming. But 
requirements 
to keep records 
and the fact 
that the farms 
generate 
higher income, 
allow reserve 
capital to 
attend to 
emergencies 
without 
neglecting the 
scheduled 
activities. 
Also, a family 
farming. Unlike 
the others, 
activities 
demand less 
capital so, it 
does not 
compete for 
cash to attend 
to 
emergencies. 
 
Post-Harvesting 
Hulling*  
The coffee growers are the owners of the pulping machine (although there are cases that the same was once 
distributed the inheritance was in a relative's house, in that case, they hull there without incurring additional 
costs) and used to hull daily to avoid losses in quality. 
Fermentation* 
The farmers do the fermentation using the equipment they have available immediately after pulping. The 
fermentation time responds more to the daily routines of the coffee growers than to the needs of the profile 
(the washing is not done when the mucilage has completely dissipated but after leaving children in the school). 
Drying* 
Coffee farmers dry the grain in the sun, on the floor or using plastic covers to avoid contamination immediately 
after washing until it reaches the minimum moisture (physically identifiable) to be sold as dry parchment 
coffee. Once the capacity of the equipment is taken over, the excess of coffee collected has to be sold as wet 
coffee 
Waste 
management  
* 
Not conclusive data 79% treat the 
pulp (fertilizer) 
and 60% treat 
the waters 
before pouring 
them or using 
them as 
fertilizer. 
92% treat the 
pulp (fertilizer) 
and 75% treat 
the water 
before pouring 
it or using it as 
fertilizer. 
(Asprocafé 
associates). 
87% treat the 
pulp (fertilizer) 
and 70% treat 
the water 
before pouring 
it or using it as 
fertilizer. 
(Asprocafé 
associates). 
91% treat the 
pulp (fertilizer) 
and 95% treat 
the waters 
before pouring 
them or using 
them as 
fertilizer. 
Reselection * Reselection is not implemented in Riosucio because anyone paid more for this activity in 2015.  
 
Trading 
Purchasing* 
Classification 
by quality 
according to 
Res 02/05; 
Documentary 
traceability by 
lot. 
Classification 
by quality 
more 
demanding 
than Res 
02/05; 
Documentary 
traceability by 
lot. 
Classification 
by quality 
according to 
Res 02/05; 
Documentary 
traceability by 
lot. 
Classification 
by quality 
more 
demanding 
than Res 
02/05; 
Documentary 
traceability by 
lot. 
Classification 
by quality more 
demanding 
than Res 02/05; 
Documentary 
traceability by 
lot. 
Classification 
by quality 
according to 
Res 02/05; 
Documentary 
traceability by 
lot and by 
farm. 
Threshing and 
sorting* 
5.2 million kilos in 2015 (68% of 
total coffee sold in 2015) were 
sold as standard; 1.8 million kilos 
were threshed by Trillacoop and 
were sold as Excelso UGQ and 
Excelso Supremo (which were 
obtained by mixing the lower 
quality coffee (standard) with 
higher quality coffee (regional, 
FLO, La Vereda and Nespresso 
that were not sold under the seal) 
through Expocafé, 2.1 million 
were sold without threshing to 
Almacafé (logistic operator of the 
FNC) and 1.2 million were sold to 
277 thousand 
kilos in 2015 
(4% of total 
coffee sold in 
2015 and 24% 
of coffee 
purchased as 
FLO) were sold 
as Fairtrade 
coffee. 177 
thousand kilos 
were threshed 
by Trillacoop 
and were sold 
as Excelso UGQ 
and Excelso 
410 thousand 
kilos in 2015 
(5% of the total 
coffee sold in 
2015 and 37% 
of the coffee 
purchased as 
Vereda) were 
sold as La 
Vereda coffee. 
The whole was 
sold without 
threshing to 
Almacafé  
791 thousand 
kilos in 2015 
(10% of total 
coffee sold in 
2015 and 37% 
of coffee 
purchased as 
Nespresso) 
were sold as 
Nespresso 
coffee. 789 
thousand kilos 
were threshed 
by Trillacoop 
and sold as 
Nespresso AAA 
112 thousand 
kilos in 2015 
(1% of total 
coffee sold in 
2015 and 66% 
of coffee 
purchased as 
organic) were 
sold as Organic 
coffee. The 
whole was 
threshed by 
Trillacoop and 
sold as Excelso 
UGQ through 
Expocafé. 
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other companies also without 
threshing. 
Supremo 
through 
Expocafé and 
100 thousand 
were sold 
without 
threshing to 
Almacafé  
through 
Expocafé. 
Bulking and 
export* 
Expocafé and 
the FNC 
(through 
Almacafé) bulk 
and export the 
coffee using 
documentary 
traceability.  
The 
Cooperative is 
an investor of 
Expocafé, a 
coffee 
exporting 
company, 
which allows it 
to have direct 
relationships 
with Starbucks 
Expocafé and 
the FNC 
(through 
Almacafé) bulk 
and export the 
coffee using 
documentary 
traceability. 
The FNC 
(through 
Almacafé) 
export this 
coffee directly 
to Keurig.  
The 
Cooperative is 
an investor of 
Expocafé, a 
coffee 
exporting 
company, 
which allows it 
to have direct 
relationships 
with Nespresso 
The 
Cooperative is 
an investor of 
Expocafé, a 
coffee 
exporting 
company, 
which allows it 
to have direct 
relationships 
with Equal 
Exchange 
 
Roasting 
Blending* 
Standard 
coffee buyers 
usually mix 
coffee of 
different 
origins looking 
for a balance in 
both quality 
and price. 
Starbucks 
bought 9 
thousand kilos 
to mix them 
with CAFÉ 
Practices from 
other regions 
and countries.  
Blended with 
other Fairtrade 
coffee 
Timothy's 
bought 254 
thousand kilos 
that he used to 
produce his 
"pure origin 
Colombia la 
Vereda" 
without mixing 
it with other 
origins. 
Nespresso 
bought the 789 
thousand kilos 
to mix them 
with triple AAA 
Nespresso 
coffee from 
other 
Colombian and 
foreign origins 
to produce 
their capsules. 
Equal 
Exchange 
bought 112 
thousand kilos 
to either blend 
it with organic 
coffee from 
other parts of 
the country to 
produce his 
packaged 
Organic 
Colombian 
Coffee, or to 
produce the 
“Cuernos del 
Diablo” single 
origin. 
Roasting * NA 
Starbucks uses 
S-Curves to 
guarantee a 
consistent and 
replicable 
flavor. 
NA 
Keurig uses S-
Curves to 
guarantee a 
consistent and 
replicable 
flavor. 
Nespresso uses 
S-Curves to 
guarantee a 
consistent and 
replicable 
flavor. 
Equal 
Exchange uses 
S-Curves to 
guarantee a 
consistent and 
replicable 
flavor. 
Packaging and 
retailing* NA 
C.A.F.E. 
Practices Fairtrade VSS N.A. Nespresso AAA Organic 
Communication  Communication* NA 
Private 
investment in 
the Starbucks 
Brand 
Private 
investment in 
the collective 
trademarks 
Fairtrade and 
private brand. 
Private 
investment in 
the private 
Brand. 
"Timothy's 
Colombian La 
Vereda" de 
Keurig Green 
Mountain. 
Private 
investment in 
the Nespresso 
Brand. 
Private 
investment in 
the collective 
trademarks 
Organic and 
the private 
brand Equal 
Exchange’s 
"Organic 
Colombian 
Coffee". 
Brewing 
Grinding* NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Brewing* NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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* Qualitative information of the field work.   
** At a significant value of 1% there are statistically different.   
*** Qualitative information of the field and quantitative work of the database of associates of Asprocafé. 
 
The ANCOVA technique allows us to reject the null hypothesis that uses in the five activities 
during the first process are equal between the various LRAs presented in Riosucio in 2015. So, it 
confirms the expected “heterogeneous” use of Resource constituents in the red boxes of table 
5, in which rivalries between regulations to produce different services would trigger 
heterogeneous uses between LRAs that sought for those rival services.  
 
Our qualitative observations enriched with some quantitative data coming from the aleatory 
survey conducted by the author, the Asprocafé database and the reports of some profiling actors, 
partially confirm the expected uses in table 5.  
 
Firstly, the data provides evidence to reject the null hypothesis that uses in the nutrition activity 
is equal among the various LRA presented in Riosucio in 2015: farmers in the LRA organic do not 
use synthetic fertilizers whereas farmers from Asprocafé who sold through the LRAs Fairtrade, La 
Vereda, and Nespresso used both synthetic and organic fertilizers. Additionally, the average of 
coffee farmers who fertilize and who prepare solid and liquid organic fertilizer is different among 
LRAs.  
 
Secondly, the data provides no evidence to reject the null hypothesis that uses in the following 
activities: “pest and disease management"; “picking”; “hulling”; “fermentation”; “drying” and; 
“reselection” are equal among the various LRA presented in Riosucio in 2015. The fact that they 
all share a similar cost structure featured by the family farming and that there is only one coffee 
buyer that use the same minimum quality measure for all the LRAs, could explain why these 
activities are equal no matter the LRA and differences are mainly explained by internal factors of 
the farms like localization (the lower in altitude, the higher the predominance of broca) or 
number of coffee threes (very small farms do not obtain the money to acquire or properly 
maintain their post-harvesting facilities).   
 
Nevertheless, with our data we have evidence to reject the null hypothesis that uses in the 
following activities “weed/soil management”; “hedge rowing”; “farm management” and; “waste 
management” are equal among the various LRA presented in Riosucio in 2015. In the field, it is 
evident that weeds growth stronger when having access to more solar exposition, as organics 
have more shade on average, weeds are weaker and easier to control. Also as hedge rowing is 
mandatory for organic farmers to protect the crop from neighbors who are using prohibited 
chemicals, this activity is carried by all who are certified and a lot of farmers that once were 
certified as organic and maintain it because the benefit is higher than the cost to eradicate it (all 
ancient members of Asprocafé were certified organic until the mid of two-thousands as will be 
explained in the next chapter) but clearly for coffee farmers that never have been certified as 
organic, it is an additional and useless cost. In the case of farm management, training is needed, 
so participants in LRAs that provide them with this are using know-how in this activity differently 
from farmers in other LRAs who had not received it; namely participants in the LRA Nespresso, 
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LRA Organic tend to have much more support than participants in the LRA Regional and Standard 
for example. Similarly, in the case of waste management, there is not only the training but also 
the delivery of equipment that produce a gap between participant farmers in LRAs that provides 
them and those which do not do it.           
 
5.1.4. Services provision  
 
Once we have identified how services are produced by the regulated uses and systematized the 
observed uses on average by LRA, we can now proceed to assess the services provision by each 
LRA.  
 
We will start with the observed monetary services received on average by farmers who had the 
most similar characteristic but sold their 2015 coffee production through different LRAs. These 
observations are based on the database Coop/SICA. Secondly, we will use the results of table 6 
to assess symbolic and taste related services depending on the average observed use in each 
activity by each LRA. If all the regulated uses to produce a service were observed in an LRA, our 
assumption is that the LRA produced that service. 
 
• Monetary services 
 
Using the Coop / SICA database, we calculate the monetary services of the producer in two times: 
First the money paid at the time of purchase for the 3056 coffee growers. Second, the premium 
after buying whose value paid per kilo is known because of information in the Cooperative’s 
reports. For this second value, we assume that it was received by the coffee grower. 
 
Firstly: to compare the averages of income for each LRA and to control for these other variables 
that influence the income, we perform a series of ANCOVAS, for which we selected the most 
robust and most parsimonious model. With this one, we tested if there was a difference in the 
average income between groups (LRA’s) and we concluded that the null hypothesis (average 
income is equal) was rejected. This ANCOVA in table 7 shows us that the four covariates (Number 
of crop plants; Density; Resistance; Age) and the LRA are significant (with a significance level of 
0.1). Furthermore, the R squared of 0.58 explain that 58% of the variance in income within our 
sample is explained by our model. So, we can confidently say that once controlled, the average 
income a coffee farmer differs by LRA.  
 
Table 7 Coffee sales. ANCOVA Test. Source: the author using SPSS. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Ventas Pesos   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 2362388331000
00000.000a 
9 2624875923000
0000.000 
483.973 .000 .588 
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Intercept 1909474642000
000.000 
1 1909474642000
000.000 
35.207 .000 .011 
NPLANTAS 1896291463000
00000.000 
1 1896291463000
00000.000 
3496.368 .000 .534 
NDENSIDAD2 6318228900000
00.000 
1 6318228900000
00.000 
11.650 .001 .004 
Resistencia 6715083214000
00.000 
1 6715083214000
00.000 
12.381 .000 .004 
Edad 4315364205000
00.000 
1 4315364205000
00.000 
7.957 .005 .003 
ARL 1096511518000
0000.000 
5 2193023037000
000.000 
40.435 .000 .062 
Error 1652029706000
00000.000 
3046 5423603761000
0.000 
   
Total 5652439279000
00000.000 
3056     
Corrected Total 4014418036000
00000.000 
3055     
a. R Squared = .588 (Adjusted R Squared = .587) 
 
The interpretation is that for coffee farmers that have 4,581 coffee plants (which reflects an area 
in coffee of 0.89 hectares), ¾ parts of which are pest-resistant, with an average age of 8.4 years 
and, planted with a density equivalent of 5,120 plants per hectare but they participate in different 
LRA, the income they received on average, is statistically different261 . From COP 5.4 million (USD 
2.3 thousand) when selling through the LRA Standard to COP 10.6 million (USD 4.5 thousand) 
when selling through the LRA Nespresso as can be read in table 8.  
 
Table 8 Coffee sales. Estimates. Source: the author using SPSS. 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Ventas Pesos   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
0 5484875.782a 232649.213 5028710.441 5941041.123 
1 6941484.274a 478131.223 6003991.776 7878976.771 
                                                     
261 The model does not exceed the Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances which implies that the assumption 
that the relationship between the dependent variable and the covariate is equal between the groups cannot be 
validated. For our research objective, it is a secondary need to develop a statistical model that allows us to increase 
the robustness of the same to have more accurate predictions. But it does not invalidate our results. On the contrary, 
it confirms that belonging to an LRA not only implies different incomes but also different uses of the Resource 
constituents.  
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3 8293344.527a 563817.046 7187844.143 9398844.911 
4 6856906.943a 266334.853 6334692.716 7379121.169 
5 10606457.000a 283751.143 10050093.910 11162820.100 
6 6398530.996a 609115.790 5204211.411 7592850.581 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: 
NPLANTAS = 4581.14, NDENSIDAD2 = 5120.68, Resistencia = 1.2919, Edad 
= 8.3903. 
 
Secondly, the LRA encourages particular uses paying premium when buying that are incorporated 
in the previous model, but also premium after buying when the coffee is effectively sold by the 
Cooperative to participant farmers in LRAs Fair Trade (COP 130/USD 0.06 per kilo), Nespresso 
(CO 115/USD 0.05 per kilo) and Organic (COP 1967/USD 0.83 per kilo)262.  
 
 As this premium is paid by kilo sold to the cooperative, we conducted the same ANCOVA model 
to calculate the average kilos of coffee sold to the cooperative by farmers belonging to each LRA. 
Table 9 shows that the four covariates (Number of crop plants; Density; Resistance; Age) and the 
LRA are significant (with a significance level of 0.05). Furthermore, the R squared of 0.58 explain 
that 58% of the variance in income within our sample is explained by our model. Table 10 
provides with the estimates ranging from 989 kilos of coffee sold by the cooperative by a farmer 
(with the characteristics previously described) belonging to the LRA Standard, to 1718 kilos sold 
by a farmer belonging to the LRA Nespresso.  
 
Table 9 Kilos sold. ANCOVA Test. Source: the author using SPSS. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Ventas Kilos   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 6519562003.00
0a 
9 724395778.100 475.611 .000 .584 
Intercept 53934432.500 1 53934432.500 35.411 .000 .011 
NPLANTAS 5319940170.00
0 
1 5319940170.00
0 
3492.872 .000 .534 
NDENSIDAD2 16582793.560 1 16582793.560 10.888 .001 .004 
Resistencia 19222616.550 1 19222616.550 12.621 .000 .004 
Edad 12863951.370 1 12863951.370 8.446 .004 .003 
ARL 234327703.900 5 46865540.770 30.770 .000 .048 
Error 4639316559.00
0 
3046 1523084.885    
                                                     
262 In section 8.1.1 we described this premium after buying and transparently we explained we used a roughly 
average value of this premium.   
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Total 15855884670.0
00 
3056     
Corrected Total 11158878560.0
00 
3055     
a. R Squared = .584 (Adjusted R Squared = .583) 
 
Table 10 Kilos sold. Estimates. Source: the author using SPSS. 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Ventas Kilos   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
0 989.174a 38.987 912.731 1065.618 
1 1192.590a 80.124 1035.487 1349.694 
3 1450.321a 94.484 1265.063 1635.579 
4 1142.359a 44.632 1054.847 1229.871 
5 1718.541a 47.551 1625.306 1811.775 
6 1052.053a 102.075 851.910 1252.195 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NPLANTAS = 4581.14, NDENSIDAD2 = 5120.68, Resistencia 
= 1.2919, Edad = 8.3903. 
 
By adding this purchasing after buying for each kilo of coffee sold to the cooperative, in table 11 
we consolidated the total monetary services received by coffee farmers (with the previous 
characteristics) by each LRA. We divide the amount in legal monthly minimum wages to provide 
some sort of a contrast for the reader. In any case, we are interested in the comparison rather 
than the absolute value.    
 
Table 11 Total monetary services by LRA. Calculations made by the author. 
LRA Sales (COP) Sales (Kilos) 
   
Premium after 
buying Total sales 
Divided between 
l.m.m.w.* 
Difference with 
respect to the 
LRA Standard 
0 5,427,236 989 0 5,427,236 8 0% 
1 6,842,748 1,193 0 6,842,748 11 26% 
3 8,334,672 1,450 150 8,552,172 13 58% 
4 6,847,468 1,142 0 6,847,468 11 26% 
5 10,562,929 1,719 115 10,760,561 17 98% 
6 6,356,746 1,052 1,967 8,426,134 13 55% 
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*For 2015 the Legal Monthly Minimum Wage was COP 644.355 (USD 273) 
 
Coffee farmers that possessed 4,581 coffee trees, ¾ parts of which were pest-resistant, with an 
average age of 8.4 years and, planted with a density equivalent of 5,120 plants per hectare, 
obtained on average, on the harvest 2015 the following monetary services. 
• COP 5.427.236 (USD 2.300263), equivalent to 8 legal monthly minimum wages (l.m.m.w)264 
if they are selling their coffee through the LRA Standard. 
• COP 6.842.748 (USD 2.899), equivalent to 11 l.m.m.w., if they are selling their coffee 
through the LRA Regional/Starbucks (26% higher than LRA Standard). 
• COP 8.552.172 (USD 3.624), equivalent to 13 l.m.m.w., if they are selling their coffee 
through the LRA Fairtrade (58% higher than LRA Standard).  
• COP 6.847.468 (USD 2.901), equivalent to 11 l.m.m.w., if they are selling their coffee 
through the LRA La Vereda (26% higher than LRA Standard). 
• COP 10.760.561 (USD 4.560), equivalent to 17 l.m.m.w., if they are selling their coffee 
through the LRA Nespresso (98% higher than LRA Standard). 
• COP 8.426.134 (USD 3.570), equivalent to 13 l.m.m.w., if they are selling their coffee 
through the LRA Organic (55% higher than LRA Standard). 
 
• Symbolic services 
 
To assess the provision of symbolic services, we conducted a test in which a service was produced 
if all uses observed in table 6 were conducted as they were regulated in Annex 4.4 to produce 
that particular service.  
 
As a result, we bring about Table 12 which shows all services produced by each LRA after 
evaluating observed uses against regulated uses. It presents in the columns each one of the LRAs 
and in the rows, each one of the services demanded from the Resource.     
 
Table 12 Services provision by LRA. Source: The author. 
  
LRA 
Standard 
LRA 
Regional 
LRA 
Fairtrade 
LRA La 
Vereda 
LRA 
Nespresso 
LRA 
Organic 
Energy dose X X X X X X 
Appellation Café de 
Colombia X X X X X X 
Typical coffee  X  X X  
Brand reputation  X  X X X 
Environmentally 
responsible X X X X X X 
Ethically traded  X X X X X 
Shared value   X  X X 
                                                     
263 The exchange rate on average in 2016 was USD 1 = COP$ 3.050  
264 In Colombia in 2015, the Salario Mínimo Mensual Legal Vigente was COP 644.355.  
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Natural Coffee      X 
Fairtrade coffee   X   X 
Indigenous coffee      X 
Clean cup X X X X X X 
Terroir expression  X  X X  
Citric acid aroma    X   
Winy      X  
Exceptional coffee      X 
 
Even though there are differences among LRAs in the five activities during the first process, 
rivalries had decreased in intensity and converged toward a more or less stabilized use of 
Resource constituents that allows a provision of various services, when defined less strictly.  
 
For example, is diversification and shade: a few years ago, coffee growers recalled the strong 
rivalry between the actors that privileged monetary services and motivate them to crop the 
whole land in coffee eliminating the shade, and the ones who wanted to cultivate food in an 
agroecological productive system. Eventually, as it will be shown in the next chapter, these rival 
forces shaped the coffee crop in Riosucio no matter the LRA. Today, farms in Riosucio cultivate 
between ⅔  and ¾  parts in coffee and the rest in other types of crops such as orchards, 
herbal/medicine gardens, fruits, cane, tomato, pastures, pigsty, and chicken shed that guarantee 
the food and/or supplement the income. Along the coffee tree, there are plantain trees that 
produce food (both for people and for the soil) and when it is growing, the coffee plant 
interspersed with temporary crops of corn and beans. It is also common to find other species of 
plants within the crop that also provide shade and food such as fruit trees, avocados, guamos, 
cassava, papaya, etc.  
 
Consequently, the percentage of the cultivated area under shade (between 22% - 40%) is far 
superior to the average of 12% of the other municipalities of Caldas265. Thus, although there are 
differences between LRA, the way in which these activities are performed, can trigger both a “fair 
trade” 266 and “environmentally friendly” 267 symbolic services no matter the LRA.  
 
In Riosucio, it can be seen that the various LRAs produced a set of symbolic and taste related 
services higher than the set initially expected. The LRA Organic do not only produce the “natural 
coffee” symbolic service but also other ten services demanded by different actors. The LRA 
                                                     
265 Author's calculations using data from the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros / SICA, Datos Generales de la 
Caficultura de Caldas al año 2016, enero 2016.  
266  “aprovechar al máximo la finca y en lo posible cultiva especies tradicionales para garantizar la seguridad 
alimentaria humana y animal”. Numeral 2.14 sobre las condiciones ambientales de las “Normas y sanciones que 
rigen a los asociados de Asprocafé Ingruma” desarrollado por la primera acción de mejoramiento del tercer tema del 
cuadro resumen de los criterios de mercado justo FLO del mismo texto.   
267 A minimum of 15% of the crop is required under canopy. Criterio crítico 2.9 del Sustainable Agriculture Network 
Standard de Julio 2017. 
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Nespresso follows closely providing 10 of the 15 services demanded from the Resource in 
Riosucio. On the other hand, the LRA Standard is producing a set of four services.  
 
5.1.5. In short, which are the LRAs that optimize the provision of the services 
demanded from the Resource in Riosucio in 2015?  
 
To conclude this first subchapter, we present the services produced by each one of the LRAs in 
Riosucio in 2015. Monetary services are presented in COP and its equivalent in legal monthly 
minimum wages of 2015, and symbolic and taste related services are presented in the number 
of this kind of services produced from the total of fifteen identified.  
 
• LRA Standard: COP 5.427.236 (8 l.m.m.w.) and 4/15 symbolic and taste related services.   
• LRA Regional/Starbucks: COP 6.842.748 (11 l.m.m.w.) and 8/15 symbolic and taste related 
services.   
• LRA Fairtrade: COP 8.552.172 (13 l.m.m.w.) and 7/15 symbolic and taste related services.   
• LRA La Vereda: COP 6.847.468 (11 l.m.m.w.) and 9/15 symbolic and taste related services.   
• LRA Nespresso: COP 10.760.561 (17 l.m.m.w.) and 10/15 symbolic and taste related 
services.   
• LRA Organic: COP 8.426.134 (13 l.m.m.w.) and 11/15 symbolic and taste related services.   
 
5.2. What does explain the solution to the collective action problem?  
 
We ended the first subchapter with a screenshot of the results of the collective action in terms 
of the services provided by the Resource from the ensemble of services demanded. And we 
showed that services provision was different in each one of the LRAs that were identified in 
Riosucio in 2015. 
 
In this second subchapter, we pretend to analyze each one of the LRA in terms of the three 
conditions: the extent or the amount of observable uses regulated by the LRA; the coherence or 
the governance mechanism to both coordinate actors by the LRA and coordinate the LRA by the 
actor; and the closure or the market power to profile the Resource.  
 
5.2.1. Extent 
 
The previous subchapter developed extensively this condition by describing for each LRA both 
regulated and observed uses. So, we are not going to describe it again. Nevertheless, it focused 
on the services provision no matter the actual intention of the LRA. Here the focus is the 
combination of services sought by the LRA, so we compare observed uses against the regulated 
uses to produce those services intentionally looking for.    
 
As it is the same information previously presented but rearranged in terms of the combination 
of services by LRA, we explain transparently the procedure as it was conducted so we avoid a 
redundant presentation of new tables. Thus, we evaluated the extent by conducting an additional 
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exercise in which firstly, we used the combination of services sought for by each LRA presented 
in Annex 3, and then, comparing with our data on observed uses, we evaluated among three 
possible options: the observed use was conducted as it was regulated; it was conducted 
differently, or it was not regulated that is presented in Annex 7.1. 
 
In Riosucio we can distinguish a kind of in crescendo provision of services by LRAs that are built 
on previous ones. That is why we utilized the same “overlapping layers” logic that we used for 
the inclusion of the coffee grower to a particular LRA: We started with the regulated and 
observed uses of the LRA Standard that influence the whole population of coffee farmers. Then, 
we move upwards with regulated and observed uses in the additional layers that influence coffee 
growers according to their belonging to a particular LRA. 
 
The base layer is composed of the set of observed/regulated uses derived from the "reputation 
of the appellation" symbolic service for the whole set of LRA in Riosucio.  One activity during the 
planting (variety), three activities during the cultivation (pest/broca management and picking), 
three activities during the post-harvesting (pulping, fermentation and drying), and three activities 
during the trading (purchasing, threshing, export). The LRA Standard-Discount can be understood 
as a "non-application" of the rules of the base layer, while the LRA Regional/Starbucks, can be 
understood as a more than acceptable application of these rules which bring about better results 
in terms of quality. 
 
A first layer is composed of the set of observed/regulated uses derived from the “ethically 
traded” symbolic service, specifically during the three activities of the trading process. And then, 
a second layer composed of those that produce the “Fairtrade" symbolic service for all LRAs 
whose members are also members of Asprocafé. First, it reduces vulnerability to price volatility 
by diversifying income and guaranteeing food security and by formalizing the commercial 
relationship (through producer organizations) and guaranteeing a minimum purchase price and 
a premium fair Trade. Secondly, it reduces the impact on the ecosystem when the productive 
system manages to protect and feeds itself using vegetal cover, prioritizes the cultural practices 
and takes advantage of farm waste to fertilize soils. Hence two additional activities during 
planting (diversification and shade), two activities during cultivation (soil management, 
nutrition), one during the post-harvesting (waste management) and all during trading.  
 
In a third layer, both the LRA Nespresso and the LRA la Vereda try to optimize a symbolic service 
(“environmental responsible”), without jeopardizing the production of a taste related services 
(“winy” in the first case, “citric acidity” in the second) to produce the "reputation of the brand" 
symbolic service. It was done from a completely opposite direction: within both LRAs some actors 
motivated a young, resistant and densely cultivated coffee trees while others preferred to 
maintain the older, traditional and disperse cultivated coffee plants. It generated a stable mid-
way practice in two additional activities (renovation, density) and all the trading activities 
(cupping is added). Additionally, new observed/regulated uses in all the roasting activities, the 
communication strategy and the brewing in both cases. 
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In this same third layer, the LRA Organic sought to guarantee the production of the "natural 
coffee" symbolic service maximizing the production of the "exceptional coffee" taste related 
service. It demands an autonomous productive system, free of toxic agents to control pests and 
synthetic fertilizers to nourish the crop. Hence, the needs for the canopy, cultural practices, and 
organic nutrition (from waste) are stricter than all the previous ones. Consequently, in addition 
to higher exigence, another observed/regulated use is included in one activity during cultivation 
(hedge rowing). Additionally, in all trading activities (in addition to traceability it is necessary to 
use equipment that does not contaminate organic products), in one activity during the roasting 
(packaging of products sold as "organic") and all activities during the communication strategy 
process.  
 
As a result, Table 13 shows that both the LRA Standard and the LRA Regional/Starbucks do not 
meet the two conditions because less than half of the activities observed are conducted as it was 
regulated. In the case of Standard coffee, regulated uses to produce the “appellation Café de 
Colombia” symbolic service, are not observed during both the roasting and communication 
strategy process. In the case of the LRA Starbucks, as it has been recently implemented, regulated 
uses to produce the “environmentally responsible” symbolic service are not observed.      
  
On the other hand, the two conditions were fulfilled by the other four LRAs (Fairtrade; La Vereda; 
Nespresso; Organic). In these cases, more than two/thirds of the total number of uses were 
observed as they were regulated by the LRA. In the case of Nespresso, 95% of the regulated uses 
were observed. In addition, all were below 48% of the concentration in the first three processes 
(it means that more than half of the observed/regulated uses occurred in the last half of process) 
so, they can be considered evenly distributed among all profiling actors.    
 
Table 13 Extent assessment by each LRA. Source: The author. 
  LRA Standard 
LRA 
Regional/Starbucks LRA Fairtrade 
LRA La 
Vereda 
LRA 
Nespresso 
LRA 
Organic 
Average of 
observed/regulated 
uses (weighted by 
process)  
37% 37% 74% 93% 95% 83% 
Concentration in the 
first three 
processes.  
62% 62% 48% 38% 40% 48% 
Extent assessment  Low Low High High High High 
 
5.2.2. Coherence  
 
As mentioned in the conceptual component, coherence refers to the governance mechanisms 
that incentive profiling actors to behave as expected in order to match regulated uses with the 
observed ones.  
 
Unlike the extension attribute that is synthetically presented because data was presented in 
Annex 4 and 5, this section evaluates the presence (or absence) of coherence depending on the 
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capacity of the LRA to align actors around a commonly agreed profile. Capacity that is 
systematized in the five elements previously described: Services; actors; institutions; governance 
and output.  
 
• Base layer: LRA Standard  
 
The LRA Standard has developed since the beginning of the twentieth century by coffee 
producers organized around the FNC to increase farmers’ monetary services. Essentially this 
service is sought through both productivity improvement to increase quantities (because 
“productivity is not everything… it is almost everything”268) and reputed quality to reach better 
prices. In this line, the Resource is profiled to produce the “clean cup” taste related service, on 
which it is built the “reputation of the appellation” symbolic service.  
 
This profile requires two alignments of all profiling actors: farmers, traders and rosters and, all 
profilers and consumers: In the first case, roasters are aligned because the “clean cup” taste 
related service is an ingredient for the profile they offer to their clients. Indeed, Colombian coffee 
is highly appreciated by the big roasters because they can rely on the consistency of the “clean 
cup” taste related service. This preference is evident when comparing differentials from 
Colombian Coffee in the period 1990-2016: It has been USD 0.32 higher than the ICO composite 
indicator price (31% more)269, and USD 0.72 higher (6% more) than its closest competitors “other 
milds” (Annex 6). In the second case, this profile reaches the final costumer: 172 companies 
utilized in their final product 100% of Colombian Coffee and attach to their brand the legend 
“Café de Colombia” (F. N. d. C. FNC, 2015, p. 34).   
 
The central piece of the LRA Standard is the application of the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC. Firstly, 
coffee that does not fulfill the requirements cannot be exported as Café de Colombia. Secondly, 
the whole coffee public policy (chapter 4) is oriented to encourage coffee farmers to fulfill this 
profiling institution.   
 
This institutional framework results in governance mechanism lead by coffee producers in which 
other profilers have limited, or any chance to influence this LRA270. Firstly, the main decisions 
over the instruments to influence profiling actors is completely monopolized by producers: both 
the members of the Congreso Nacional Cafetero that takes the decisions and the Comités 
Departamentales y Municipales de Cafeteros, which implement them, are elected by federated 
                                                     
268 “la productividad no lo es todo… es casi todo”. Final message of the Technical Manager of the FNC, quoting 
partially Paul Krugman (he changed Krugman’s “but in the long run” for the suspension point), in his public speech 
during the ninth version of Expoespeciales (the most important coffee fair in Colombia) held on the 6th October 2016 
in Bogotá.   
269 “The ICO composite indicator price, a historical series which can be extended back to 1947, provides an overall 
benchmark for the price of green coffee of all major origins and type, considered to be the best available measure 
of levels of green coffee transactions on a global basis”. Source: International Coffee Organization official webpage. 
270 If traders for example, whose alignment is mandatory, want to influence this LRA, they cannot do it through its 
governance mechanism. They have to try at the National Congress of Colombia or through the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Interview with Carlos Ignacio Rojas, presidente de la Asociación Colombiana de Exportadores de Café.  
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farmers. The latter escalates demands from the farmers and provide legitimacy and support for 
the implementation process at the municipal level (see chapter 4.1). Secondly, they monopolize 
the funding: On the one hand, producers pay the parafiscal contribution, known as contribución 
cafetera, of USD 0.6 for each pound of coffee exported that was equivalent to COP 227.000 
million (USD 83 million) in 2015 (F. N. d. C. FNC, 2015, p. 68). On the other, through the Comité 
Nacional de Cafeteros composed of five ministers of the National Government, they increase the 
chances benefit directly from the national budget271. Both channels strengthen the FoNC and the 
FNC capacity for providing public services (in behalf of the Government through a contract signed 
between the President of Colombia and the CEO of the FNC coordinated by the Comité Nacional 
Cafetero).  
 
Indeed, producers use the FNC’s apparatus272, which consumes 35% of the total annual expenses 
of the FoNC273, and FNC’s political support to strengthen its capacity, to motivate a change in 
behavior of profiling actors through the Plan Estratégico de la FNC, a strategic plan that is 
approved in the Congreso Nacional Cafetero, through two parallel and complementary efforts.  
 
The first one is the “knowledge circuit” explained in detail in chapter 4.1.3. Roughly 6% of the 
FoNC expenses were oriented towards the phyto-technology research to increase efficiencies in 
the coffee productive system in Colombia carried on by CENICAFE274. Then 20% was invested in 
the transfer of these results. Firstly, to extension agents through the vocational institute 
Fundación Manuel Mejia. Then, to the coffee growers as practical knowledge by extension 
agents. This knowledge circuit tries to identify the most efficient uses of infrastructures and 
know-how in the coffee farm to produce the profile sought by this LRA.  
 
In the specific case of Riosucio, the extension service coordinator divides the three thousand 
coffee farmers into six districts, each one in charge of one agronomist who is in charge of 
delivering technical assistance. In order to prioritize the type of technology transfer, the 
Committee had developed the “coffee quality program in Caldas”, through which random coffee 
samples from different farms are taken to be analyzed in the Comité’s Lab in order to identify the 
most frequent cup defects that are derived from correctable practices275. Then, some practices 
                                                     
271 From 2003 to 2015, the FoNC deficit was covered by the national budget until an equilibrium was reached thanks 
to a financial restructuration and the increase in coffee exports. From roughly eight million coffee bags a year in the 
period 2009-2012 to 14 million in 2015. (F. N. d. C. FNC, 2014) 
272 Including 2.800 employees (source: FNC official webpage) that is more than the Colombian Ministry of Commerce 
for example.  
273 We use data from Lora et al. (2014, p. 8) to assess the FoNC’s expenses.   
274 As showed in chapter 4.1.3, the fact that the research is oriented towards productivity was a political decision 
since the IX Congreso Nacional Cafetero.   
275 In 2015, the Comité Departamental de Caldas analyzed 1897 samples. “El Laboratorio de Análisis de Calidad de 
Café, del Comité de Cafeteros de Caldas recibió la auditoría externa que le permitió continuar con la Acreditación 
otorgada en 2011 por el Organismo Nacional de Acreditación de Colombia (ONAC), bajo los requisitos de la NTC 
ISO/IEC 17025:2005 para la realización de análisis físico de café pergamino seco y análisis sensorial cualitativo y 
cuantitativo de café”. Informe de Gestión 2015.Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas.  
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are prioritized to be transferred through the extension service of the FNC in Riosucio276, so 
farmers can increase their chances to get the minimum quality and obtain the base price277. 
 
Additionally, some uses prioritized by the Plan Estratégico are incentivized through the 
agricultural public policy. The uses of infrastructures and know-how by coffee farmers in four 
activities in the planting process (planting pest-resistant varieties, with high density, shorter 
renovation cycles and controlling shade) were incentivized through two instruments of the coffee 
public policy funded mainly by the Ministry of Agriculture but implemented by the FNC described 
in chapter 4.2.2: direct subsidies and subsidized loans for coffee renovation. 
 
The second effort is the marketing strategy. The FNC invest almost 5% of the FoNC to influence 
the use of know-to-appreciate by consumers so they can align roasters. This strategy built on the 
Juan Valdez icon278 intends to associate the “Café de Colombia” with the “best coffee in the 
world” because of the hard and careful effort made by committed Colombians farmers to 
guarantee quality. FNC’s management of the brand portfolio has guaranteed a consistent 
message by coordinating the different communication strategies and protecting the reputation 
under the norms of intellectual property279.  
 
Nevertheless, the instruments produced by the governance mechanism are powerless to 
effectively influence the uses of constituents by roasters. As “reputation of the appellation” is a 
symbolic service demanded by producers to capture more value within the value chain through 
differentiation in the green coffee market, if roasters were fully aligned, when selling it in the 
roasted coffee market there would not be any difference between their final products. Indeed, 
roasters buy Colombian coffee to profile a different combination of taste-related and symbolic 
services because struggling to increase their profit margins, they desperately need to be 
differentiated from their competition in consumers’ minds.  
 
To conclude, even though this LRA has quite sophisticated governance mechanisms, they work 
in benefit of one profiling actor (producers) at the expense of the others (traders and roasters). 
                                                     
276 Through a combination of massive activities (radio/tv shows, press releases, conferences, etc.); group activities 
(periodically meetings with coffee farmers at the vereda level with the extension agent; less frequently “field 
journeys” and “method demonstration” in which a much wider (like all coffee farmers in one district) or selected (a 
portion of coffee farmers in a municipality who are struggling with some plant disease) audience are invited to dig 
much deeply with the whole extension team of the Comité Municipal de Cafeteros and in some cases, with external 
advisors; and individual activities carried on in almost a daily basis by the extension agent, who visits the farm to talk 
directly with the owner.  
277 Interview with Alfonso Ángel Uribe, the Executive Director of the Comité de Cafeteros de Caldas,  
278 In 1959 the FNC created Juan Valdez: a symbol for differentiating Colombian coffee in the global coffee market. 
After half a century of investment in marketing (for further details see Fernández et al. (2007)), in 2005, consumers 
in United States elected it as their favorite advertiser icon according to Adweek magazine. In addition, 83% of them 
knew about Colombia Coffee and more than 50% believed that Café de Colombia was the best in the world 
(Fernández et al., 2007, p. 15). 
279 In 2015 the FNC’s “Intellectual Property team was recognized as the Latin America Team of the Year for its efforts 
in the defense of the trademarks of Colombian coffee growers and for the reputation that these assets have gained 
in the international market” by the World Trademark Review Magazine. Official webpage 
https://www.wtrindustryawards.com/winners/2015/. Last visited 02–05–2018.      
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Institutions activated by producers have little influence on the uses that should be made by 
traders and roasters, thus reducing LRA’s capability to maintain to the very end its own profile. 
Therefore, both the non-inclusive governance mechanism and the powerlessness to maintain 
aligned all profiling actors around the same profile are characteristic of a low coherent LRA.  
 
• First layer: LRA Regional/Starbucks 
 
This first layer is the portion of the coffee supplied in the base layer which, having minor defects, 
expresses the aromatic potential of the territory providing the "terroir expression" taste related 
service. A portion of which is meant to produce, in addition, both the “environmentally 
responsible” and the “ethical traded” symbolic service to provide the "reputation of the brand" 
symbolic service280. 
 
The LRA Regional/Starbucks arrived in Riosucio in 2015 281  because the LRA Nespresso was 
producing more coffee than was bought by Nespresso, so when looking for commercial 
alternatives they identify Starbucks as a potential customer282. Although Starbucks does not offer 
premiums it pays the market price for high-quality coffee (in order to produce the “ethical coffee” 
symbolic service) and, given the potential for purchases (when buying 700 thousand bags a year, 
it is one of the largest individual coffee buyers in Colombia 283 ), it was attractive for the 
Cooperative (and its allies) to open this market opportunity to sale the highest quality coffee that 
is not sold through the other LRAs.  
 
Hence, the Cooperative and its commercial allies: associated coffee growers, Trillacoop (a mill), 
Expocafe (an exporter) and Cafexport, (an operator), aligned themselves through commercial 
agreements in order to profile the Resource as demanded by Starbucks around the profiling 
institution “Coffee and Farmer Equity Practices” (CAFE Practices hereafter)284: more than two 
hundred comportments regulated that should be followed by farmers to improve quality while 
protecting the environment, and by traders to enhance economic accountability and social 
responsibility. This profiling institution acts as an ideal type, and its implementation could be 
seen as a continuous improvement: at the beginning of the process, all the registered farms are 
part of the CAFE Practices program, even though only a few among them complied with the norm.  
 
                                                     
280  Since 2004 Starbucks was looking for a profile featured by high quality coffee while enhancing economic 
accountability, social responsibility and environmental protection (CI, 2011, p. 4). 
281 This section, in addition to the sources cited, is based on the interview with Alfredo Nuño, Director del Centro de 
Apoyo al Caficultor de Starbucks en Manizales. 
282 “Para el año 2015 nos hemos propuesto avanzar en la búsqueda de alternativas comerciales y nuevos proyectos 
de cafés especiales para nuestros asociados (…) identificar un grupo de caficultores asociados, interesados y 
comprometidos para ingresar al programa C.A.F.E. Practices de Starbucks” Informe de Administración y Gestión a la 
trigésima séptima Asamblea General Ordinaria de la Cooperativa de Caficultores del Alto Occidente de Caldas, 2014. 
Pág. 11. 
283 Interview with an employee of the FNC that did not want to reveal its name.  
284 Starbucks Coffee Company & SCS Gobal Services, C.A.F.E. Practices Smallholder Scorecard. Its 3.4 version January 
2016 can be consulted in https://www.scsglobalservices.com/starbucks-cafe-practices. Last visited 01-27-2017. 
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Governance mechanisms control the fulfillment of three requirements of the commercial 
agreement 1- Quality; 2- Economic accountability; 3- External audit.  
 
Quality means that coffee is going to be able to produce the taste related services demanded by 
Starbucks. Controls and traceability were established throughout the value chain: purchasing 
from farmers with a minimum factor (Cooperative); threshing Excelso quality and sorting by 
cupping profiles (Trillacoop); aleatory cupping tests before exporting (Expocafé), and finally 
cupping tests in Starbucks facilities before roasting.      
 
Accountability means that all purchasing records must go alongside coffee bags in order to 
produce the symbolic services “ethically traded” and through it to enhance “brand reputation”. 
Thus, the Cooperative must provide a receipt in which it can be read at least three pieces of 
information: the amount, the price and the provider; Expocafé has to aggregate this information 
to deliver alongside coffee lots, which in turn will be escalated until it reaches its final destiny in 
Starbucks roasting facilities.  
 
The external audit means that the CAFE practices profiling institution is being implemented in 
order to produce both the “environmentally responsible” symbolic service alongside monetary 
services (in terms of productivity) for farmers aiming to enhance the “brand reputation” symbolic 
service. To control this provision Starbucks demanded from suppliers and independent audit, 
which will produce data on non-compliance in the coffee zone the supplier procure from.  
 
In Riosucio the process consisted of presenting the census of all potentially beneficiary farms 
(equivalent to the 1,326 cooperative members of the Cooperative in their area of influence285), 
then they carried out the sensitization process, documentation and certification of 981 coffee 
growers (602 in Riosucio286) through an audit of 15 of them287. This unrepresentative audit shows 
that it is more important the process (the Cooperative working alongside coffee farmers to fulfill 
the CAFE Practices) than the result itself. Nonetheless, although audits are not necessarily 
representative (which makes it difficult to know with certainty the production of the services 
intended by the norm) they show percentages of noncompliance with the norm that is used as a 
useful tool to the Farmer Support Center in Manizales, which identify improvement gaps to 
focalize efforts through improvement plans that are going to be implemented by the commercial 
allies 
 
                                                     
285 Of the 11,537 coffee growers present in the four municipalities (Riosucio, Supia, Marmato and Quinchía) where 
the Cooperative is supplied, only 2,241 coffee growers were partners in 2015. It is necessary to clarify that both 
partners and non-members can sell their coffee to the Cooperative, but the first ones have to make a contribution 
and can receive other benefits. Informe de cafés especiales del Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas, 
Versión 4.0, del 16 de octubre de 2015.   
286 Informe de cafés especiales del Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas, Versión 4.0, del 16 de octubre de 
2015.  
287 Informe del Comité de Educación a la XXXVIII Asamblea General de Delegados de la Cooperativa del Alto Occidente 
de Caldas de las operaciones del año 2015.    
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Regarding the flow of information in the other direction, the producers participating in this LRA 
are the same members of the Cooperative, which allow them to use their deliberative institutions 
such as Asamblea General Ordinaria to escalate their demands and eventually through the 
relationship with Expocafé and Cafexport, it is plausible to consider that they can influence the 
LRA.  
 
The alignment of all the profilers, and the possibility that two-way communication bridges exist 
allow us to qualify this LRA as a high coherent. 
 
• Second layer: LRA Fairtrade 
 
In the second layer, coffee that produces the "clean cup" taste related services is meant to 
produce the monetary services for farmers so they could cover at least production costs and 
obtain a small merge of benefit, so it could produce the “Fairtrade” symbolic service. This LRA 
that arrived in Riosucio at the beginning of the nineties through the Max Havelaar Foundation, 
aligned the indigenous coffee farmers, Asprocafé, the Cooperative, the Comité-FNC, Trillacoop, 
Expocafé, Max Havelaar, international buyers/roasters (48 in 1999)288 and consumers.   
 
They were aligned by activating an institution of the private regulatory system: the “Convenio 
Programa Max Havelaar/Transfair/Fairtrade – Riosucio del 19 de septiembre de 1997”, whose 
purpose is the purchase of coffee at a minimum price (when the international market price is 
lower) plus a Fairtrade premium: A minimum price of USD 1.40 plus an after-buying premium of 
USD 0.2 per pound. This minimum purchase price intent to reduce the small producer 289 
vulnerability to international prices by guaranteeing monetary services that cover coffee 
production, including producers’ margin 290 . The Fairtrade Premium funds the producers’ 
organization (Asprocafe), so it can deliver services to their members in order to fulfill the profiling 
institution (Fairtrade Standards).  
 
The governance mechanisms of the Fairtrade Standard were developed so the interested parties 
could influence the profiling institution as well as it can influence the interested parties.  
 
Regarding the first relation, at the global level, the entire Fairtrade system is distributed equally 
between the network of national producer organizations and the network of national Fairtrade 
organizations (which incorporates the actors that sell/consume Fairtrade products). The General 
Assembly, for example, is divided 50% -50% and the Board of Directors includes four members of 
                                                     
288 “lista de importadores/compradores operando en el marco de FLO-Internacional del 19 de agosto de 1999” 
(incluyendo importadores y tostadores. Anexo 3, Convenio del programa MH en Riosucio, 1997.  
289 “Productor con menos de 10 hectáreas cultivadas en café”. Artículo 11 de los Estatutos de la Asociación de 
pequeños productores de café Ingrumá – “Asprocafé Ingrumá”. Tercera reforma en la XVI Asamblea General de 
Delegados del 23 de marzo de 2016.   
290 Fairtrade Internacional, “Guideline for Estimating Costs of Production (COSP)”, 21 de November de 2011.  
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the producer network 291 , four members of the Fairtrade network and three independent 
members (FLO, 2018). Consequently, the Fairtrade International's Standards & Pricing team 
(including the price unit and standards unit) develops the profiling institution in a participatory 
manner through detailed and transparent processes292 which are approved by the standards 
committee composed of representatives of producers; traders and experts293.   
 
At the local level, the Fairtrade Standard for Small Producer Organizations has an entire section 
devoted to the democratical procedures to govern this LRA. Hence, Fairtrade standards are 
shaped at the local level as “Normas y sanciones que rigen a los asociados de Asprocafé Ingruma, 
2011”. A locally agreed profiling institution which details the whole set of uses of the 
infrastructures and know-how that are mandatory for Asprocafé associates in various activities 
during the first four processes that are synthesized in Annex 4.2.  
 
Regarding the second relation, the “Normas Asprocafe 2011” created its Sistema interno de 
control de Asprocafé Ingruma. It intends to support the implementation and monitoring/auditing 
the compliance of their associates294. Indeed, this internal system is the first step to guarantee 
compliance of Asprocafé with the Fairtrade system, which is proved through an independent 
audit carried on by Flocert or its local allies.   
 
An implementation that is funded through the Fairtrade premium (in addition to other resources 
coming from the management and/or commercial activity of Asprocafé). The annual Asamblea 
General de Delegados de Asprocafé295 decides how to invest it: in 2015, the Fairtrade premium 
(resulting from coffee sales during the previous year) executed COP 380 million (USD 161 
thousand): One third was used for Asprocafé’s operating costs 296  including the technology 
                                                     
291  Rocio Motato, technical secretary of Asprocafé, is the Coordinator in Colombia of the “Coordinadora 
Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Pequeños Productores y Trabajadores de Comercio Justo”(CLAC, 2017), the network 
that represents the producers of the continent in the Fairtrade system.  
292  Demand for the standard by stakeholders; identification of the need by the Fairtrade International Board; 
formulation of the project by the Fairtrade system; iterative process: research - standard draft - consultation by 
stakeholders and the standards committee until a final draft is presented and approved by the Standards & Pricing 
Director and the Standards Committee. Fairtrade International, “standard operating procedure for the development 
of fairtrade standards”, Version. 24, June, 2016.   
293  The seven members of the Fairtrade International Standards Committee for January 2017 included three 
representatives of the producers (one for Africa, one for Asia and one for Latin America); a representatives of the 
merchants; three representatives of the fair trade system (two at the national level and one at the international 
level) (FLO, 2017).  
294 “Dinamizar las actividades de cada una de las familias asociadas, mediante las visitas a la finca y las inspecciones 
internas y externas para asegurar el cumplimiento de las normas de certificación”. Numeral 1 Objetivos, Sistema 
Interno de Control de Asprocafé, Normas y sanciones que rigen a los asociados de Asprocafé Ingruma, 2011.  
295 The Asprocafé’s associates elect their delegates to the Asamblea in an electoral day organized by Asprocafé, the 
quorum is satisfied with half of the delegates summoned and the decisions are taken by an absolute majority with 
the exception of some norms (such as reform of statutes, transformation, merger, dissolution, etc.) that require two 
thirds of votes. Artículos 20 a 35 de los Estatutos de la Asociación de pequeños productores de café Ingrumá – 
“Asprocafé Ingrumá”. Tercera reforma en la XVI Asamblea General de Delegados del 23 de marzo de 2016.   
296 Asprocafé has a Director (Secretaria técnica), a coordinator of the Internal Control System and four extension 
agents (promotores e inspectores).  
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transfer to associated farmers through group activities (field days and workshops 297 ), and 
individual activities (audit visits298). Another third was used for incentivizing through subsidies 
the change in the behavior of associates: half of this portion was given in fertilizer to encourage 
the renovation of coffee trees and, the other half, in water treatment equipment, school 
packages for the associates’ children, and the payment of the Fairtrade certification. The last 
third was paid back to farmers as a premium after buying: COP 130 (USD 0.06) per kilo sold during 
2014 for exclusively Asprocafé associates and, COP 75 (USD 0.03) per kilo for Asprocafé associates 
that sold through the LRA Nespresso. 
 
Traders and roasters are influenced by the “Fairtrade Standard for traders”: they must pay the 
minimum price and the Fairtrade premium, and also, they must implement some uses in their 
commercial activity (including contractual clauses in favor of their commercial counterparts 
detailed in Annex 4.2). Hardly a behavior that could be maintained in the absence of this Fairtrade 
Standard given that maintaining minimum prices and premiums would only lead to losing market 
share (if prices increase) or sacrificing the profit margin. 
 
This democratic multi-level governance model influences consumers’ know-to-appreciate in an 
exponential manner given that each member individually has incentives to promote the virtues 
of the Fairtrade system (for example, an entrepreneur who wishes to associate his brand with a 
sense of social responsibility or an organization of producers that wants a greater market for their 
products). The accumulated investment of all the actors of the system has a collective impact 
superior to the sum of the individual efforts. 
 
However, given the emphasis on the certification of the coffee bean, the effort to trace coffee 
origin is even more complex than the LRA Standard in which beans of all regions of Colombia are 
mixed. In the LRA Fairtrade, certified beans are blended from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
Unlike the Colombian coffee that has minimum quality rules to export, the absence of these rules 
in the other countries implies a heterogeneous, in terms of physical and sensory quality, Fairtrade 
certified coffee. Thus, the transparent alignment that allows identifying all the profiling actors 
that participate in the production of the Resource, contrasts with the opacity in the alignment of 
the Resource itself that significantly decreases its capacity to produce taste related services. It is 
for this last characteristic that this is a low coherent LRA. 
 
In the third layer, there are the three remaining LRAs: Organic, Nespresso and La Vereda. 
 
• Third layer: LRA Organic  
 
                                                     
297 Nine field days about water, soil and nuitrition management (“recurso hídrico en Colombia”; “Suelo sano, cultivo 
sano” and “fertilización de cafetales”) and 50 training workshops on the results of the Fairtrade auditing, including 
issues of chemical handling and child labor. Informe de administración y gestión 2015, presentada a la XIII Asamblea 
General de Delegados de la Asociación de pequeños productores de café ingruma. Pág. 10.  
298 603 audited coffee growers from the 1433 coffee growers associated to Asprocafé in the three municipalities 
(832 in Riosucio). Informe de administración y gestión 2015, presentada a la XIII Asamblea General de Delegados de 
la Asociación de pequeños productores de café ingruma. Pág. 10.   
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The LRA Organic is sustained above all the institutional scaffolding of the LRA Fairtrade including 
the provision of the “clean cup” taste related service and the “Fairtrade” symbolic service; the 
alignment of the same profiling actors (the indigenous (coffee farmers), Asprocafé, the 
Cooperative, the Comité-FNC, Trillacoop, Expocafé, Max Havelaar, international buyers and 
consumers; the same multi-level governance structure that shapes the profiling institutions (the 
Fairtrade standards) and its implementation through the local organization Asprocafé and, the 
same funding through the Fairtrade premium. 
 
However, this LRA additionally profiles “natural coffee” symbolic service demanded by some 
Fairtrade buyers. Thus, it created an extra layer of uses of constituents that implied another 
alignment with Equal Exchange299 since 1996. As one of the Fairtrade international buyers started 
supplying from Riosucio. The following years the public debate in the USA about the organic 
farming amplified the message of the threat to human health posed by conventional farming300. 
Equal in alliance with Max Havelaar decided to align, initially all profiling actors belonging to the 
LRA Fairtrade towards the LRA Organic, eventually (in a process that would be described in the 
next chapter) a portion of them (namely a group of Asprocafé members from all over Riosucio, 
Asprocafé, the Cooperative, the Comité-FNC, Trillacoop, Expocafé, Max Havelaar, Equal Exchange 
and consumers) were aligned in 2015 to profile the additional “natural coffee” symbolic service 
to the combination of services provided by the LRA Fairtrade.   
 
They are aligned by activating a profiling institution from the United States Agricultural Public 
Policy, USDA Organic, which have just an additional regulated use than the ones regulated by the 
profiling institution (Normas Asprocafé 2011) of the LRA Fairtrade: the complete interdiction of 
both synthetic fertilizers and prohibited agrochemicals.   
 
Also, from the governance mechanism described in the LRA Fairtrade, there is an additional one 
that guaranteeing the dialogue between the producers and the roaster: the annual visit of Equal 
Exchange that includes meetings with the staff of the Cooperative and Asprocafé (and if 
necessary with Trillacoop and Expocafé), and coffee farmers themselves. This annual visit allows 
that profiling actors can express themselves if they perceive a risk (in quality or quantity) in the 
provisioning of the services that they are interested in. Thus, as members of the LRA, they can 
collectively search for a solution. The best example of this was the triple circumstance301  that hit 
harsh coffee culture in Colombia in the second half of 2012 (and that would eventually produce 
an unprecedented crisis in February 2013302)) but was effectively anticipated by the actors of the 
                                                     
299The north American roaster Equal Exchange is a worker-owned cooperative (with sales of USD 70 million in 2016) 
characterized by equity and democracy: the 100 employees regardless of their position have an equal share of the 
shares and receive an equal portion of profit or loss; Additionally each employee has the right to vote, to be elected 
as a member of the board of directors, to information and to freedom of expression. (Exchange, 2017) 
300 Especially after USDA proposal for organic labelling in 1997 (Ellsworth, 2001, p. 10) 
301 The drop of production to record lows due to the prolonged winter produced by the phenomenon of the girl, the 
fall in coffee prices in parallel to that of other commodities due to the financial crisis of 2011, and a revaluation in 
Colombia due to the increase in the export of oil. 
302 The coffee strike between February 25 and March 8, 2013. According to Hernández (2013) it was "the most critical 
moment in the history of Colombian coffee".  
148 
 
LRA organic. In November 2012, during the annual visit they agreed that to counterbalance the 
low international prices for organic coffee, they should move upwards to the organic specialty 
market, so they established an agreement known as the Organic Plus303  to identify, supply and 
export organic coffee depending on its cupping score under the Q system304 in order to produce 
the “exceptional coffee” taste related services that could increase the value for the consumer 
and thus the monetary services for the producer. 
 
These agreements are then implemented through the mechanism provided by the LRA Fairtrade, 
mainly the Asprocafé team but also the Cooperative one. In fact, the organic group of Asprocafé 
is the most benefited by Asprocafé services provision because of the challenge of organic 
production, which can be more productive than conventional production but with significantly 
more demands in terms of time, knowledge and physical effort: feeding the soil without the use 
of synthetic fertilizers involves fertilizing each tree in a year with several kilos of organic matter305 
prepared in such a way by the farmer that compensates for the nutrients consumed by the 
previous harvest (which requires time for the decomposition of farm waste) and knowledge to 
know how, what and in what quantity organic ingredients must be mixed. A conventional coffee 
grower in Riosucio would have a good yield by fertilizing with 250 grams per year / coffee tree 
using the bulk of fertilizer recommended by the agronomist of the Committee with the 
proportions of macroelements (mainly nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium) that most closely 
match the needs of their crop, according to a study of soil306. That is why the extension service 
known as "promotores e inspectores" of Asprocafé made 3 visits to each organic producer in 2015 
(two accompanying plus one audit), while making 0.5 visits to each Fairtrade producer during the 
same period307; there were some field days with international experts for organic producers308; 
and the cupping test according to the SCAA is conducted exclusively by the Cooperative (using its 
quality lab and its personnel) to the group of organic farmers309.  
 
                                                     
303 “Informe Sistema de Control de Asprocafé Ingruma 2014-2015”, Asprocafé, 31 de agosto de 2015.   
304 “Se firmó un convenio para un programa piloto para comprar el café orgánico según el puntaje en taza, participan 
los productores cuyo puntaje sea igual o mayor a 83 puntos, el café que califique en este rango fue comprado y 
empacado en bolsas grainpo facilitadas por el comprador, debe ser trillado aparte, empacado y enviado separado 
del café orgánico común y tendrá un precio mayor.” Informe X Asamblea General de Delegados Asprocafé Ingruma 
2012”, Asprocafé, 27 de marzo de 2013, pág. 13.    
305 Research by CENICAFE shows that to compensate chemical fertilization, 12 kilos of decomposed pulp per tree per 
hectare are required (Khalajabadi, 2008, p. 34). In interviews with organic coffee farmers in Riosucio, 2 or 3 kilos are 
enough per tree, but it is not just pulp; a "cocktail" of organic matter is required. According to the Coop / SICA 
database, these coffee farmers have productions that are much higher than the average of conventional coffee 
growers.  
306 Interview with Nicolás Bañol, coordinator of the extension service in Riosucio. 
307 Informe de administración y gestión 2015, presentada a la XIII Asamblea General de Delegados de la Asociación 
de pequeños productores de café Ingrumá. Págs. 10 y 15. 
308 In July 2015, 3 field days were held with the expert Anna Caspersen on sensory quality; Equal Carlz Kadlec Green 
Coffee Procurement Manager on Commercial Issues; and the Honduran organic producer Fredy Pérez about 
microbiological broths and forest microorganisms. Informe de administración y gestión 2015, presentada a la XIII 
Asamblea General de Delegados de la Asociación de pequeños productores de café Ingrumá. Págs. 15.     
309 Informe de administración y gestión 2015, presentada a la XIII Asamblea General de Delegados de la Asociación 
de pequeños productores de café Ingrumá. Págs. 15. 
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Unlike the LRA Fairtrade, in the case of the LRA organic, both actors and the Resource are aligned 
so Equal Exchange can, according to the market, offer Riosucio coffee either in their blends of 
organic coffee or as a single origin like the seasonal coffee January-March 2015 "Los Cuernos del 
Diablo" mentioned above. This alignment of both actors and the Resource allow us to categorize 
this LRA as a high coherent. 
 
• Third layer: LRA Nespresso 
 
The LRA Nespresso was developed at the beginning of two thousand by the initiative of the Swiss 
roaster Nespresso. It wanted to align other profiling actors around a profile it needed to fulfill its 
value proposition for consumers, a combination of services, impossible to reach through markets 
alone310, featured by the “winy” taste related service; the “shared value”, “environmentally 
responsible” and “brand reputation” symbolic services and the monetary services in the form of 
productivity.  
 
Therefore, leading by the Roaster Nespresso, producers, traders and consumers are aligned: all 
farmers in Riosucio with more than 0.5ha cultivated in coffee and located over the 1.500 m.a.s.l 
(excluding the Resguardo de San Lorenzo); La Cooperativa de Caficultores del Alto Occidente; 
Cafexport in partnership with the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas; Trillacoop  
(threshing company of the cooperatives); Expocafé  (exporter of the cooperatives) which exports 
the coffee bags from Colombia to Nespresso facilities in Switzerland; Nespresso which roasts, 
packages in capsules, and delivers into customers’ hands; and ten million consumers around the 
globe who are members of the Nespresso Club. In addition, stakeholders in both production and 
consumption are aligned: Fundanatura an NGO in Colombia and Rainforest Alliance an 
international NGO, both associates to the international group the Sustainable Agriculture 
Network.  
 
 The central institutional piece is the “Tool for the Assessment of Sustainable Quality”, that is 
composed of both, the Generic Tasq™ Tool and the Tasq™- Colombian module. The first includes 
296 conducts that must be followed by profiling actors (including farmers and traders) around 
the globe to trigger the monetary and symbolic services, the second focus on local particularities 
to enhance the taste relates services, through an additional set of 34 conducts that must be 
carried on mostly by producers (Nespresso, 2013).   
 
The governance mechanism to translate these regulated uses into observed uses is the 
“Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality™ Coffee Program” that started initially through informal 
agreements with neither reporting mechanisms nor formal means of communication Alvarez et 
                                                     
310 “Of the 10 per cent that is considered high-quality coffee, only about 10 per cent complies with the flavour and 
quality profile that we need in our coffee. Securing long-term availability of this precious raw material is very 
important for us”. Nespresso’s quality manager quoted by (Alvarez, Pilbeam, & Wilding, 2010, p. 173) 
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al. (2010, p. 176).  As the program evolved311 the Colombian coffee supply area was divided into 
four “clusters”312. One is the cluster Expocafé that governs six sub-clusters in 17 municipalities of 
two departments (6,742 coffee farms (Cafexport, 2015b, pp. 2-3)). It is divided into five 
subclusters, one of which is led by the Cooperativa de Caficultores del Alto Occidente de Caldas 
to profile the Resource in Riosucio. 
 
The main governance mechanism is the Encuentro bianual del Clúster Expocafé 313 in which 
representatives of all profiling actors meet: representatives of coffee farmers; the Comité; the 
Cooperatives; Trillacoop; Expocafé; Cafexport as cluster coordinator and Nespresso 314 . The 
negotiation on quantities and prices goes after the negotiation on how to influence the use of 
constituents. Once the profile is agreed, the cluster responds with an intervention proposal (on 
both producers and traders). Some interventions are prioritized and financed through either the 
contribution of the members of the cluster or via the formulation of projects to be funded by 
third parties. Also, the monitoring and evaluation are agreed using goals and indicators for both 
the cluster team (e.g. agronomists paid by the cluster who provide the technical assistance) and 
for the allies (e.g. kilos provided by the Cooperatives or projects managed by the Comité). The 
questions that guide these meetings is: what are the uses required by the profile that are not 
being implemented? How can this undesirable behavior be modified? 
 
The answer is written down in an Annual Plan coordinated by Cafexport315. In Riosucio, the 
Comité leads the interventions in relation to the coffee crop316, and the Cooperative leads the 
intervention in relation to the farmer317. This central piece of the implementation is funded by 
                                                     
311 The AAA program was reorganized on four pillars in 2006: 1- structuring the program through geographical areas 
named clusters; 2- Refining the Tasq™; 3- Setting up key performance indicators; 4- Establishing formal contracts 
with partners (Alvarez et al., 2010, p. 176). 
312 Each cluster is composed of a group of actors lead by one coffee exporter: Two big international traders: Volcafé 
that operates the cluster in Cundinamarca and Neumann Group that operates in Huila. Two big local traders: the 
FNC that operates in Cauca and Nariño and Expocafé that operates in Caldas and Antioquia. 
313 All information in this paragraph comes from the Interview with Oscar Daniel Sánchez, the technical director of 
the cluster Expocafé in Riosucio.  
314 Five Encuentros bianuales have taken place in 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. 
315 That implies from the lifting of the baseline of beneficiaries and the design and implementation of action plans 
per farm to advance the TASQ ™ tool, to the administration of the information system that supports documentarily 
the knowledge of the resource.   
316 The Comité’s intervention seeks to innovatively activate the technology transfer from the coffee public policy. 
Indeed, Cenicafé’s practical results to maximize production and minimize environmental impact are complemented 
by the TASQ ™ criteria, which not only seek to improve productivity by reducing environmental impact but also 
improve quality to produce the aromatic profile demanded by Nespresso. Thus, technologies are transferred to the 
coffee growers through a more intense accompaniment in quantity and quality: in addition to the six-agronomist-
plus-a-coordinator team in Riosucio, the Comité funds two additional agronomists for working exclusively with the 
Nespresso coffee growers in group activities that emphasize quality issues (fermentation , drying and coffee 
varieties) and individual activities that emphasize compliance with the TASQ ™ (Cafexport, 2015a, p. 3). This LRA 
manages to provide three visits per farmer per year (two extension visits and one audit visit) as well as a higher 
number of group activities. 
317 The Cooperative’s intervention seeks to activate the private agreement with Nespresso in order to make coffee 
farmer feels proud to belong to this LRA. Hence, farmers would adopt technology more easily, would be honest 
when implementing the practice and the loyalty would be enhanced so the farmer would prefer the Cooperative for 
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Cafexport, the Comité and the Cooperative through a public-private project known as 
implementación AAA318 roughly USD 0.9 million of the USD 6 million budgeted by the Cluster in 
its area of influence, including Riosucio, between 2005 and 2012 (Cafexport, 2012b, p. 20). 
 
After 2012, four other public-private projects were funded mainly by Nespresso (USD 2.3 million) 
the FNC (USD 0.5 million) and other partners like USAID or the local environmental agency (USD 
2.3 million) were budgeted to incentivize a particular use of the infrastructures during the 
planting process 319 , and the know-how in two activities during the cultivation process 
(nutrition320 and farm administration) and all the activities of the post-harvesting process321. 
 
Additionally, another intervention of the cluster funded by the Sustainable Coffee Program322  
sought to influence the use of know-how by traders in all the activities of the trading process 
through three intervention: 1- the provision of equipment for a quality lab in the Cooperative, 
and the certification as SCAA cuppers of the cooperative personnel; 2 - the training in the 
warehouse practices required to maintain the profile; 3-  the cupping profile  of coffee in the 293 
veredas and the analysis of the information to identify the practices that have the highest 
incidence in this cupping profile, hence which have to be reinforced by the technology transfer. 
 
                                                     
selling his coffee. According to  Robledo (2012), this intervention has three components: 1- Cooperativism, through 
workshops provided by the Cooperative's Education Committee; the active participation in decision-making 
scenarios such as the Asamblea General de Delegados de la Cooperativa and, the access to benefits from the 
cooperative effort; 2- Communication, so they can position the Nespresso brand in the minds of coffee growers and 
associate it with positive feelings; 3- Traceability, it originates with a membership-card but it is materialized in the 
information system of Cafexport updated with every farm visit. 
318 It was the only project conducted before 2011 in Caldas by this LRA, which focused on a five step process: 1- a 
diagnosis for each farm according to the TASQ; 2- A formulation of an action plan for each farm; 3- The training of 
the farmers; 4- Support and monitoring; 5- Audit in the TASQ.  (Cafexport, 2012a, p. 4)  
319 “Proyecto Arbol de Vida” to increase the area cultivated in arabica coffea variety Castillo through which chapolas 
(coffee tree between 2 and 6 months) and mycorrhiza (fungus that symbiosis with coffee roots and increases the 
absorption of nutrients) were delivered to coffee farmers. Once the planting was verified, COP 300 (USD 0.13) for 
each new tree planted to cover the labor costs was delivered to the farmer. Three months later, another COP 300 
per tree planted was granted to cover the costs of fertilization (Cafexport, 2012a, p. 6) 
320 “El proyecto de fertilización” acted as a matching grant. If the farmer bought 450 kg of fertilizer/ha/year the 
project would give him the same quantity aiming to be closer to the optimum of 1200 kg of fertilizer/ha/year. (on 
Farms averaged between 4500-5500 plant/ha, hence an equivalent of 250 grams fertilizer/year per coffee tree  
(Cafexport, 2012a, p. 7) 
321 “El proyecto de certificación” involved providing the coffee farmer with septic systems for basic sanitation, 
warehouses for agrochemical storage and water treatment systems and composters to reuse waste; also hulling 
machines, fermentation tanks and other tools to reduce the likelihood of cup defects; and the delivery of first aid 
kits, signage and record books to improve the administration of the farm with the objective of certifying them in the 
Rainforest Alliance standard (Cafexport, 2012a, p. 5). “El proyecto de Central de Beneficio” intended to build a 
communal post-harvesting facilities in order to concentrate in one place the most pollutant activity to tackle down 
with proper water treatment system. It was built in another municipality so Riosucio farmers were not benefited.   
322 Today it is called, the Global Coffee Platform). Initially, the SCP was financed by the Cooperation for Development 
public policy of the Government of the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland. Expocafe cluster was benefited from 
the annual call for “field level proyects” in 2015 (SCP, 2016). 
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Also, this LRA goes upstream to influence the very end of the value chain, the consumers. Firstly, 
it identifies opportunities in the single-dose coffee market 323  and then, they create a 
communication strategy to influence consumers’ know-to-appreciate. This LRA targets the 
aspirational consumers324 for whom the company’s credible effort to make a better world is 
crucial. Aspirationals represent the biggest portion of consumers325 and their preferred brands 
(categorized as “meaningful brands”) are the winners in the global economy326. Henceforth, to 
attract this group of consumers the operation must be sustainable under the lenses of credible 
institutions327. Nespresso strategically invited the Sustainable Agriculture Network to advise the 
design and implementation of the AAA program, internalizing within the LRA the credibility of 
Rainforest Alliance a well-known stakeholder in consumer countries and credible stakeholders in 
producing countries328.  
 
To conclude, the LRA Nespresso in Riosucio has an alignment with a node (Nespresso) and two 
directions (from the roaster to the producer and, from the roaster to the consumer) that 
coordinates all the actors around the profile that produces the monetary services presented, the 
“winy” taste related service and the “environmental responsible” and “shared value” symbolic 
services to enhance the “reputation of the brand” (mainly its vectors of quality and exclusivity) 
symbolic service. Hence, we qualify this as a high coherent LRA. 
 
• Third layer: LRA La Vereda 
 
Finally, in this same layer, the portion of the Resource that grows within the borders of the 
Resguardo de San Lorenzo is meant to increase the monetary services received by producers, by 
profiling the “environmentally responsible” and "indigenous coffee" symbolic service, and the 
"citric acid" taste related services. An alliance led by the FNC in which participate: indigenous 
coffee farmers of the Resguardo de San Lorenzo; the Comité; the Cooperative, the FNC (a trader) 
and the American Roaster Keurig Green Mountain329. 
                                                     
323 Consumer acquire a brewing machine to prepare in his place a cup of coffee that was packed in personal doses.   
324 “they are materialistically oriented while at the same time aspiring to be sustainable in their purchases and 
beliefs.” (Bemporad, Hebard, & Bressler, 2012, p. 29).  
325 In the study "Re: thinking, consumers and the future of sustainability" in which an online survey was conducted 
in 2012 to 6,224 people in three developed markets and three in development, the segment categorized as 
aspirationals, with 37%,, represented the highest percentage (Bemporad et al., 2012).  
326 “Meaningful Brands have outperformed the stock market by a staggering 206% over a ten-year period between 
2006 and 2016”. Meaningful brands, official webpage.  
327 “Consumers across all six markets look to certification seals or labels on product packaging (40%) as the most 
trusted source of information about whether a product is environmentally and socially responsible (…) Barely one in 
ten consumers rely on company advertisements or website content, reinforcing the perception that the most reliable 
claims often come from sources largely beyond a company’s control” (Bemporad et al., 2012, p. 16). 
328 In 2006, for the Expocafé cluster in Colombia, the NGO Technoserve was integrated; in 2007, for the clusters of 
Mexico, Guatemala and Costa Rica, the International Financial Corporation was integrated; for 2008 the FNC was 
integrated for the clusters of Colombia (mainly operating the Cauca and Nariño cluster) and the business school 
INCAE of Costa Rica to evaluate the impact of the program (Nespresso, 2014). 
329 The information in this section comes from interviews with: 1- a leading SACEV coffee farmer who requested the 
reservation of his name. 2- Diego (Cooperative’s employee): 3- Pedro Felipe Gómez, coordinator of the Specialty 
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It begins when the FNC’s commercial division managed to reactivate the LRA La Vereda selling 
4,125 coffee La Vereda bags (290 thousand kilos) in 2012 to Keurig, after 4 years without a client 
(next chapter). As Keurig is the main competitor of Nespresso in the single-dose coffee market in 
the US, both compete for the same segment of aspirationals for whom real-perceived 
environmental sustainability is a major issue when buying. That is why, since 2012 with the arrival 
of a new CEO, Keurig formulated their sustainability strategy in three pillars to meet by 2020330  
funded with USD 38.2 million in 2015 (Keurig, 2015, p. 12): 1- Incorporating the necessary 
technology so that their capsules could be recycled; 2- Investing in protecting the basins to 
compensate for the total amount of water consumed when preparing coffee; 3- Partnering with 
third parties to improve the quality of life of coffee farmers and provisioning according to their 
own "Responsible Sourcing Supplier Guidelines" declared "fully acceptable" with the Rainforest 
Alliance Standards (Keurig, 2015, pp. 72-75).  
 
As a result, Keurig employees visit Riosucio in 2012 and committed to buy Café la Vereda with a 
premium and a direct investment in the communities 331 using the same SACEV governance 
structure: The “Socios y Amigos del Café Exótico La Vereda (SACEV)” was developed in the year 
2000 with roasters which agreed to pay a minimum price of USD 1.60 per pound and an additional 
premium of USD 0.15 per pound to be invested in the producer’s community (Ángel, 2008, p. 24). 
The premium was collected by the Cooperative to finance the provision of services (like hulling 
machines, fermentation tanks, and water treatment tanks) agreed with the Comité Asesor Café 
la Vereda and executed under the leadership of the Comité. In order to guarantee the consistency 
of the Resource’s profile, the Comité Asesor Café la Vereda used its foundational basis to hold 
each leader of the coffee growers in their village responsible for making coffee farmers behave 
as expected332. This leader had to accompany those who committed themselves333   and escalate 
to the Comité Asesor Café la Vereda meritorious infractions. The “grupo veredal” (a group of 
farmers in one Vereda) with its leader emerged as the intervention unit. By focusing the 
intervention on the grupo veredal rather than on the coffee grower, both the person in charge 
of the Cooperative that delivered the equipment and the extension agent of the Comité who 
                                                     
Coffee Program in the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros. Additionally, reports from both the cooperative and the 
FNC (CDCC & CCAOC, 2016; FNC, 2013).  
330 “1- Sustainable products; 2- Clean water for everyone; 3- Strong Supply Chain. 2020 Targets: 1- Engage 1 million 
people in our supply chains to significantly improve their livelihoods, including water security and climate 
resilience.2- Source 100% of primary agricultural and manufactured products according to established Keurig Green 
Mountain responsible sourcing guidelines. 3- 100% of K-Cup® pods will be recyclable. 4- Reduce life-cycle 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of brewed beverages by 25% vs. 2012 baseline. 5- Achieve zero waste-to-landfill at 
our owned and operated manufacturing and distribution facilities. 6- Engage 100% of employees to understand our 
vision and values and present opportunities that allow them to contribute to our targets. 7-Balance 100% of the 
water used in our 2020 brewed beverage volume in all our beverages, ounce” Source: (Keurig, 2015, p. 13) 
331 Informes de Administración y Gestión presentados ante la Asamblea General Ordinaria de la Cooperativa del Alto 
Occidente en los años 2011 y 2012.  
332 “cada vereda tenía un líder (…) y era él que tenía que hacer la concientización de cada cafetero”. Interview with 
the leading coffee grower of SACEV. 
333 Only after a personal commitment, the coffee farmer had an identification card, with which, he could sell his 
coffee as Café la Vereda, meaning best prices and benefits offered by the SACEV.  
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trained them in how to use the equipment, in a few-dozen visit they can cover the whole 
population.  
 
The renewed alliance with Keurig implied the provision of the “environmentally responsible” 
symbolic service, in addition to the two previously provided by the LRA La Vereda (the 
“indigenous coffee” symbolic service and the “citric acid” taste related services). So, actors 
agreed to implement the Keurig’s “Responsible Sourcing Supplier Guidelines” profiling institution 
by concretizing both the agricultural and the cooperation for development public policies.  
Initially, through a project financed by the program of Allianzas Productivas334  of the Ministry of 
Agriculture managed by the Comité to influence the use of know-how in one activity of the 
cultivation process (administration of the farm) 335  and in three activities of the post-harvesting 
process (hulling, fermentation and drying)336. Subsequently, another project financed in ¾ parts 
by Socodevi337 and ¼ part by Keurig to influence the use of know-how in one activity of the 
cultivation process (farm management)338 and one activity in the post-harvesting process (waste 
management) 339 . In this regard, Keurig decided to maintain the brand Timothy’s and its 
communication strategy to influence the know-to-appreciate by incorporating the legend "this 
coffee is Rainforest Alliance Certified ™"340. 
 
However, the new SACEV among indigenes of San Lorenzo, the Comité, the Cooperative, FNC (as 
marketer), Keurig and consumers, is incoherent because the investment in the infrastructures 
and know-how profiles a different combination of services (monetary services and citric acid taste 
related service) than the ones encourages through the investment in the know-to-appreciate 
(indigenous coffee and environmental responsible symbolic services). It is so because, one the 
one hand, there is a tradeoff between the provision of the "indigenous coffee" symbolic service 
and the monetary services. On the other, the communication strategy in April 2017 states that 
Café la Vereda is certificated Rainforest whereas up to the first quarter of 2017 the Cooperative 
had not supplied the first kilo of Café la Vereda certified in Rainforest Alliance (Clearly it is a time 
issue because is highly plausible that they will be certified). Thus, we qualify this as a low 
coherent LRA.  
 
                                                     
334 A program whose purpose is to support the small producer so that he can reach the standards required by a 
commercial ally. The requirement is that the project be presented and co-financed by both actors at least.    
335 162 agrochemical warehouses, 318 medicine cabinets, 1200 warning signs (CDCC & CCAOC, 2016, p. 18)  
336 9 depulping machines, 30 tank-tubs and plastic were delivered to cover the canopies of 160 beneficiaries (CDCC 
& CCAOC, 2016, p. 17.19 y 20.)  
337 Societé société de coopération pour le développement international, is a network of cooperative companies based 
in Canada that seeks to share their technical expertise with partners in developing countries to create, protect and 
distribute wealth. Socodevi, oficial webpage.  
338 Identification of nine training centers (25 neighboring coffee growers) to provide 14 training courses (four training 
courses on equality between women and men, three socio-business training courses and seven technical trainings). 
Cláusula 3.1.1 numeral I y II. Contrato de servicios entre Socodevi y la Cooperativa del 11 de junio de 2015.  
339 Delivery of 229 SMTA 70 Wastewater Treatment Systems to 229 producers. Cláusula 3.1.1 numeral III. Contrato 
de servicios entre Socodevi y la Cooperativa del 11 de junio de 2015. 
340 Keurig, website to order the capsules of la Vereda coffee.  
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5.2.3. Closure 
 
As mentioned in the conceptual component, closure refers to the market position of actors that 
allow them to profile the Resource in their advantage.  
 
This section evaluates the presence (or absence) of closure in each LRA, by analyzing throughout 
the coffee value chain the barriers of entry established by profiling actors. Namely:   economies 
of scale; product differentiation; capital requirements; cost disadvantages independent of scale; 
access to distribution channels; government policy. 
 
• LRA Standard 
 
The evaluation of this condition is shared by both LRAs Standard in Riosucio and Buesaco. 
Therefore, its development can be read in its section in chapter 7.2. It concludes that this LRA 
has low closure because of the lack of barriers within national frontiers. 
  
•  LRA Regional/Starbucks 
 
The evaluation of this condition is shared by both LRAs Starbucks in Riosucio and Buesaco. 
Therefore, its development can be read in its section in chapter 7.2. It concludes that this LRA 
has low closure because, in the end, both farmers and traders are easily interchangeable by 
Starbucks.  
 
• LRA Fairtrade  
 
This LRA lead by Asprocafé tries to generate the “product differentiation” barrier of entry by 
activating certification mark legislation341 that implies obtaining a license for using the Fairtrade 
distinctive sign. Once Asprocafé has been audited and certified by Flocert, they can take 
advantage of Fairtrade’s local and global reputation to increase their monetary services.   
 
Indeed, the Fairtrade System leverages individual effort of the whole set of profilers and 
stakeholders to collectively contribute to the global positioning of the Fairtrade distinctive 
sign342. The collective effort has produced a significant positioning for a collective mark343 This 
                                                     
341  “The countries of the Union undertake to accept for filing and to protect collective marks belonging to 
associations”. Art. 7b on collective trademarks of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1967. 
Some national legislations distinguish the collective mark that can only be used by members of a specific group of 
users; and the certification mark that can be used by anyone while complying with the standards defined by the 
owner of the same.  
342 E.g. Swiss Fair Trade (an umbrella organization for the Swiss actors engaged with the Fairtrade movement 
including Max Havelaar) carried out since 2014 the campaign "Fair Trade Town" that manages to engage the political 
actors at the municipal level to raise awareness and to take an active position in favor of fair trade. 
343 “D’après une étude réalisée auprès des consommateurs suisses par GlobeScan en 2015, 88 % des personnes 
interrogées connaissent Fairtrade Max Havelaar, 84 % lui font confiance, ce qui se traduit par 82 % d’acheteurs 
fidèles“ (Havelaar, 2014, p. 13). 
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“product differentiation” allows goods and services distinguished by the Fairtrade brand to 
increase the consumer's willingness to pay a higher price344. However, it faces ferocious critics 
that could undermine its attractiveness345.  
 
It could be considered that among the profiling actors, roasters are the main affected by Fairtrade 
standard because they have to pay a minimum price while their competition is provisioned at 
lower market prices. However, they usually produce various types of packaged coffee with their 
own trademarks to different market segments, one of which is the Fairtrade one. Roasters 
purchase a portion of Fairtrade certified coffee to sell it with their brand alongside the Fairtrade 
collective mark to Fairtrade consumers, while another portion of conventional coffee is 
purchased to be sold with their owned brands. So, more than a product differentiator it provides 
a piece of information for consumers similar to the food labeling legislation.  
 
Likewise, it could be considered that barriers are surmountable for small producers but not for 
bigger farms. In the case of Riosucio, there are three requirements: being associated with 
Asprocafé; being committed with the “normas Asprocafé”, and selling Excelso quality coffee. The 
first condition implies a maximum size of the crop of 10 hectares (excluding 6 of the more than 3 
thousand farms in the municipality). However, when we were doing the fieldwork in 2016, the 
Cooperative had already started its process to certify itself as Fairtrade through the Fairtrade 
USA346 that has no requirements in terms of land ownership. So, eventually, there would not be 
any barrier of entry for producers. This low barrier of entry for producers generates that a 
significant proportion of this certified coffee is not purchased as Fairtrade coffee. According to 
Panhuysen and Pierrot (2014, pp. 14-15), only one-third of Fairtrade certified coffee was acquired 
as Fairtrade in 2013. In Riosucio it was even lower, only 24% of the total Fairtrade produced 
coffee was sold as Fairtrade by the Cooperative in 2015347. 
 
To conclude, the Fairtrade trademark is well protected and is very well positioned. However, 
more than a product differentiation at the roasters level it provides information for consumers, 
and barriers of entry at the production segment are easily overtaken. Hence, we qualify this as a 
low closure LRA.  
 
                                                     
344 Tallontire, Rentsendorj, and Blowfield (2001) in a review of the literature at the beginning of the millennium 
demonstrate the complexity of ethical consumption and the relevance of methodologies that correctly capture the 
desire to pay without guiding the response. Later studies with methodologies that faced these challenges, have 
found positive evidence that the Fairtrade brand increases the willingness to pay by consumers (Didier & Lucie, 2008; 
Loureiro & Lotade, 2005).  
345 Critics comes from its failure to account for basic economic laws (Wydick, 2014) that do not improve wellbeing of 
the poorest ones (De Pelsmacker, Driesen, & Rayp, 2005). 
346 “The unexpected exit (from Fairtrade International) allowed Fairtrade USA to pursue its controversial strategy 
‘Fair Trade for All’ to certify large, private coffee plantations, aligning itself more closely with mainstream sourcing 
requirements” (Levy et al., 2015, p. 388). 
347Author's calculations using data from the Informe de Administración y Gestión a la trigésima octava asamblea 
general ordinaria de la Cooperativa en 2015.  
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• LRA Organic 
 
This LRA co-directed between the North American Roaster Equal Exchange and Asprocafé used 
the “government policy” barrier of entry to generate the “product differentiation” barrier of 
entry.   
 
The main barrier of this LRA is a result of the concretization of the public policy of agriculture of 
the United States of America: The Organic Food Protection Act of 1990348 that mandated the 
United States Department of Agriculture to develop the standard of organic food labeling. Since 
its introduction in 2000 as the National Organic Program349, it has increased both consumers’ 
willingness to pay350 and sales351, even though the high costs of organic production have been 
transferred to consumers (Foxnews, 2012). Although it works in practice as a certification mark 
that allows users to use it if it meets the specifications, "it's food labeling law rather than 
trademark law that governs its use"(Atkins, 2009). 
 
Similar to the case of the Fairtrade, the whole set of actors invest individually to jointly leverage 
the positioning of the USDA Organic standard in order to influence the know-to-appreciate of 
consumers. However, unlike Fairtrade, the genesis of the organic standard, by legitimate 
mandate of the US Congress and its consensual development, immunizes it from the efforts of 
actors who would earn a market position by discrediting it.  
 
Another difference between the previous LRA is that there is a real effort in the production 
segment to fulfill the profiling institution that creates a significant technical barrier. Coffee 
farmers have to change their behavior assuming practices that could be considered 
disadvantageous compared with the ones assumed by their competition. In the case of Riosucio, 
it started in 2001 when 83 farmers were certified from a group of 109 farmers that started a few 
years before. In 2005, this LRA reached its maximum when 388 producers were certified352. 
Afterward a slow but continual decline left only 153 farmers certified organic from more than 
three thousand farmers in 2015. This illustrates the technical barriers that imply an effort to be 
certified organic, and then, an effort to maintain the certification.  
 
On the other hand, the barrier is very low for other profiling actors whose main defy is 
guaranteeing the documentary traceability. In the end, there are more roasters demanding 
                                                     
348 “In 1990, Congress passed the Organic Food Protection Act (OFPA) to serve three stated goals: (1) to establish 
national standards governing the marketing of... organically produced products;" (2) to assure consumers that 
organically produced products meet a consistent standard;" and (3) to facilitate interstate commerce in fresh and 
processed food that is organically produced." (Ellsworth, 2001, p. 7). 
349 It allows the use of the following labels: "100 percent organic" when it only contains ingredients produced under 
the criteria indicated; "Organic" when it contains up to 95%; "Made with organic ingredients" when this proportion 
is less than 70%. 
350 In a survey of 30 thousand consumers in the United States, 80% reported having paid more for healthy labels on 
their products (Nath, 2015). 
351 Sales of organic products have grown from US $ 3.6 billion in 1997 to US $ 27 billion in 2011 (Nath, 2015). 
352 Asprocafé, “Proyecto Café Orgánico, Evolución”, diciembre de 2005, Riosucio, Caldas.  
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certified organic coffee, than producers selling353. In the case of Riosucio, the whole organic 
harvest that fulfilled the minimum quality rules to be exported is sold to Equal Exchange, the 
remaining portion is sold to the domestic market as roasted coffee354.  
 
In this LRA, Equal Exchange seeks to influence the know-to-appreciate of its consumers by 
exploiting to the maximum the principles of the Fairtrade and organic movement. According to 
their Fairtrade principle, they invest in the reputation of its suppliers like Asprocafé. Equal 
developed a piece of marketing presented in the summer 2013 (Exchange, 2013)  and another 
one in the spring 2015 "Los Cuernos del Diablo" (Exchange, 2015), in which they detailed the 
collaboration with the organic coffee farmers of Asprocafé and described the process by which 
the Cooperative Q grader selected the best lots of Riosucio coffee for that packaged product. The 
reputation that increases the differentiation of Riosucio organic coffee, constituting an 
insurmountable barrier for producers in other municipalities and regions. 
 
This double combination of the LRA organic that had generated a “government policy” barrier of 
entry at the production segment and through the marketing campaigns had produced the 
“product differentiation” at the municipality level, allow us to typify this as a high closure LRA.   
 
• LRA Nespresso 
 
The evaluation of this condition is shared by both LRAs Starbucks in Riosucio and Buesaco. 
Therefore, its development can be read in its section in chapter 7.2. It concludes that this LRA 
has low closure because, in the end, 53 thousand participant farmers are in “pure competition” 
among them, and with potential substitutes, i.e. neighbors that could produce similar taste 
related services but are not integrated, still.  
 
• LRA La Vereda 
 
This LRA lead by the FNC firstly used the “government policy” barrier of entry to create the 
“product differentiation”  
 
The activation of the Specialty coffee program of the FNC delimitated the geographical area 
where the production of the profile was likely to be produced, the Resguardo de San Lorenzo. It 
generated an insurmountable barrier for the producers whose farms were outside this area. 
Likewise, this program allowed the FNC to use its commercial division and its distribution 
channels (commercial offices) in different consumer countries to build the reputation of Café La 
Vereda. 
                                                     
353 In an interview with the Director of Banexport, a coffee exporter by rate test in Colombia, he said that he had 
more orders of certified organic coffee than possibility of offering. Also for Rocio Motato, the demand for organic 
coffee is far superior that their offer, but the issue is that each time less farmers want to engage in the very 
demanding organic farming.  
354 Coffee that Asprocafé roast in their facilities to sell as packaged roasted coffee with its registered trademark 
Aprocafé Ingrumá Orgánico to the local market.  
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The FNC sought to protect this reputation by successfully registering the trademark "la Vereda" 
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office since 2000355. This barrier allowed the FNC 
to have some control on the roasted coffee market: by offering “La Vereda” green coffee to 
several roasters, the competition among them would increase the prices of supply while 
reducing, at the same time, the possibility that roasters could generate barriers of entry. In 
parallel, by controlling the delimitated area at the production segment (increasing or reducing it 
depending on the demand) the FNC reduced the possibility to lose both the access to the supply 
of “La Vereda” coffee and their control on the “product differentiation” that could eventually be 
appropriated by farmers.  
 
In effect, the commercial team achieved to generate the “product differentiation” barrier of 
entry of the Café la Vereda in the green coffee market and got clients willing to pay a higher value 
to acquire it356. This doubled the demand357, so the FNC extended the supply zone of the Café la 
Vereda. Firstly to farms closer to the previously altitudinal fringe in the Resguardo de San 
Lorenzo, and then, to the neighboring two veredas in the municipality of Supía (FNC, 2013, p. 21).  
 
However, in addition to this border management, the FNC encouraged new methods of 
cultivation that changed the aromatic profile producing coffee rejections by buyers358, thus 
affecting the “product differentiation” barrier of entry. In a market with fierce competition, 
eventually this product differentiation was not such a barrier: firstly, with the cancellation of 
purchase orders from Bucks County and subsequently the loss of premiums with the sale of 
Timothy's359.  
 
The reactivation of the program in 2012 with Keurig, a subsidiary of the JAB Holding Company, 
the second largest buyer of coffee after (but very close to) Nestlé, rearranged the balance of 
power in favor of the roaster in a similar way to the LRA Nespresso. Through both the protection 
of their patents360 and a recognized marketing campaign361, Keurig has been positioned as the 
leader of the single-doses coffee market in the United States362. 
                                                     
355 Registration Number: 4602172 (TESS, 2018). 
356 Two North American companies Timothy's and Bucks County that after the SCAA Fair in Philadelphia in 1999 
agreed to pay a premium and guarantee a minimum purchase price 
357 142 thousand kilos of La Vereda coffee supplied by the Cooperative in 1999 to 372 thousand kilos in the 2000 
(Ángel, 2008, p. 32) 
358 “A ellos (Café la Vereda) les rechazaron café por pérdida de perfil hasta que se perdió la comercialización” 
Interview with Oscar Daniel Sánchez. “Las características se perdían por temporadas. No llegaba por el perfil y había 
rechazos. Pero eventualmente el perfil regresaba” Interview with Diego.  
359 The provision of Café Vereda, however, remained. Given the quality of this coffee, the FNC used it to fulfill their 
most demanding orders, which recognize better prices not for being Café La Vereda but for having superior quality. 
Expectedly, as being sold as high quality standard coffee, Café la Vereda did not produce premiums for participant 
farmers, so any barrier that had existed disappeared. 
360Keurig has patents on the filtration system and its capsules, called K-Cup® Packs. To see the full list of their patents 
(Keurig, 2017b) 
361 They have received the Harris Poll EquiTrend® "Brand of the Year" award since 2012, meaning it has been the 
strongest brand in the single-doses coffee market for several years (Harrispoll, 2018).  
362 US $ 4.2 billion in sales and an operating profit of US $ 962 million (Keurig, 2017a). 
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Among a portfolio of approximately 530 coffee and other beverages brands, Keurig had 
relaunched "Timothy's La Vereda", the brand associated with Café la Vereda in Canada. This 
single-sourced packaged coffee produced the “product differentiation” barrier of entry in favor 
of both the roaster and the producer: For the former in the single-dose coffee market, for the 
latter in the green coffee market. Indeed, producers and traders aligned by this LRA deliver the 
quantities (with the qualities) of Café la Vereda demanded by Keurig, in exchange for a premium, 
which includes investment in development projects. 
 
To conclude, as in the case of LRA Nespresso, in this one there are barriers in the roasters 
segment. However, unlike that LRA, in this case, there are also barriers in the production segment 
that impede the participation of a coffee farmer from the areas not included in the perimeter of 
Café La Vereda supply. Therefore, we consider this as a high closure LRA. 
 
5.3. Intermediary synthesis: Inputs to test our first hypothesis 
 
After analyzing each one of the LRAs in the light of the three conditions proposed in an 
independent manner, we can take a step forward to assemble together the combined variation 
of these dimensions by each LRA. Thus, we cluster them in six configurations.  
 
1- “Invisible hand”: In the LRA Standard, uses of Resource constituents are poorly regulated 
and coordination to enhance the provision of demanded services by all profiling actors is 
mainly absent, the strong competition incentivized profiling actors to prioritize monetary 
services maximization through boosting production while reducing costs.       
2- “Cunning entrepreneur”: In the case of the LRA Regional/Starbucks, the roaster 
(Starbucks) has the power to decide the few main uses they are interested in, and they 
produce the mechanism to control them strictly. It prioritizes a simple profile that hardly 
provides enough services demanded by actors in Riosucio.   
3- “Ambitious”: For the LRA Fairtrade, on the other corner, the Asprocafé regulations for 
profilers are well above the FLO regulation for traders and rosters. Thus, potential services 
profiled by producers vanish when scaling up the coffee value chain, especially taste 
related services.    
4-  “Naïve”: The LRA La Vereda regulates uses to profile a complex combination of services 
sought by a coalition of producers and stakeholders in production (FNC) without taking 
into account other profiling actors (roasters and consumers). Without the power needed 
to influence the latter, the whole combination of services demanded by the former is not 
going to be produced.   
5- “Responsible entrepreneur”: In the case of the LRA Nespresso led by the roaster 
(Nespresso), traders, producers, and stakeholders in production and consumption reach 
an agreement on the uses to profile a complex resource that is well coordinated. A profile 
that provides services as long as they are compatible with Nespresso’s demands.  
6- “Visible hand”:  In the LRA Organic, both the producers (Asprocafé) and the roaster (Equal 
Exchange) led a coalition which includes traders and stakeholders in both production and 
consumption to agree on the uses to profile a complex combination of services well-
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coordinated. A profile that provides services as long as they are compatible with both 
producers’ and roaster’s demands. 
 
Furthermore, we merged this LRA categorization with results from chapter 5.1 in figure 10. 
   
Figure 10 Services provision by LRA according to the combined variation of the three conditions. Source: the author 
 
 
The “invisible hand” LRA Standard profile the lowest combination of monetary, symbolic and 
taste related services. Whereas both the “cunning entrepreneur” LRA Starbucks and “ambitious” 
LRA Fairtrade with just one attribute high, provides a higher level of service provision, very similar 
to the level provision of the two-high-conditions “naïve” LRA Vereda. At the top, both the two-
high-conditions “responsible entrepreneur” LRA Nespresso and three-high-conditions “Visible 
hand” LRA Organic profile the highest combination of monetary, symbolic and taste related 
services.  
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8 (15) 10 (15)
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9 (15)
LRA Standard LRA Fairtrade
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Chapter 6. Actors’ games  
 
The variation of the extent, coherence and closure in each of the six LRAs that were identified in 
Riosucio, was a result of the activation of different institutions steaming from both the coffee 
public policy (described in chapter 4) and the regulatory system (described in Annex 2.1) in a 
complex process that could be traced to the Spanish arrival (described in Annex 2.2). In this 
chapter, we would explain the strategies to activate institutions followed by the actors in 
Riosucio, from the breakdown of the coffee quota agreement in 1989 to 2015.  
 
Having say the above, we divide this chapter in four consecutive actor’s games (1989-1996; 1997-
2003; 2004-2011; 2012-2015) composed of three actions (actors’ coalition; mobilization of 
resources of action and institutional creativity) that explain the change of the LRA’s conditions 
both within the incumbent LRAs and the newborn LRAs.   
 
6.1. Incumbent LRA Standard; newborn LRA MH (1989-1996) 
 
6.1.1. Actors’ coalitions:  Threat to the cultural diversity for both Stakeholders in 
production and consumption 
 
The International Coffee Agreement and its local application by the FNC in Riosucio, shaped the 
Resource at the national level through the LRA Standard producing one combination of services 
for the whole Resource in Colombia that was perceived (in)sufficient by different actors: 
Sufficient for a coalition of producers, stakeholders in production, traders and consumers 
(entrepreneur farmers; the FNC and the national Government; mainstream traders; price-
oriented consumers) who wanted to maximize monetary services (described in chapter 4.1). 
Insufficient for some producers, stakeholders in production and consumption and, consumers 
who saw the provision of two symbolic services seriously threatened: In the first place, family 
producers, Asproinca363, and the indigenous movement364 perceived the threat to the cultural 
diversity produced by the coffee culture, which we conceptualize as the “indigenous coffee” 
symbolic service. Likewise, Max Havelaar Foundation and ethical consumers feel anxious because 
they perceived the disappearance of an equitable distribution of money within the coffee value 
                                                     
363 Asproinca has its roots in the social doctrine of the Catholic Church in Latin America, known as Liberation 
Theology, through which the church fostered associative work among (indigenous) farmers to improve their quality 
of life. In Riosucio, the church fostered this type of pastoral activity supporting seven groups of (indigenous) farmers 
that at the end of the 80's achieved the financial support of Swissaid to both hiring two agronomists and creating a 
rotary fund that would allow associative groups to improve their agricultural activity (cassava, maize, red beans, 
bananas, livestock, minor species). The seven groups merged in the Asociación de Productores Indígenas y 
Campesinos –Asproinca in 1991. Interview with Angela María Gómez, currently advisor and former director of 
Asproinca in the nineties and early two thousand.  
364 We use the term “movement” according to (Scharpf, 1997) in which, in a consensual matter, the individual 
resources are jointly mobilized to fulfill a collective purpose. It is strongly advised to read the evolution of the 
indigenous issue in Riosucio from the national perspective in annex 2.1 and the local one in annex 2.2 
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chain at the expense of small coffee producers, which we conceptualize as a “Fairtrade coffee” 
symbolic service365. 
 
Two external phenomena modified the Institutional Regime to allow the joint action needed to 
consolidate one coalition366: On the one hand, the enactment of the 1991 Constitution that, by 
recognizing ethnic diversity and its protection, endowed the indigenous movement with both a 
legitimate basis for their definition of the real situation that put at risk the provision of the 
“indigenous coffee” symbolic service and, the administrative authority over the population in 
their area of influence. So, the indigenous movement that was composed of a few corporate 
actors los Cabildos de los Resguardos indígenas and one association (el Consejo Regional Indígena 
de Caldas – CRIDEC) but too few individuals in the municipality, mobilized the pro-indigenous 
institution367 to motivate the inhabitants "reluctant to re-identify themselves as indigenous" 
(CRIDEC, 2012, p. 48) to be counted indigenous 368 and eventually, to share their definition of the 
“real situation”.  
 
On the other, the break out of the negotiations for a new International Coffee Agreement in 1989 
collapsed the legal basis that supported the intervention of the FNC as the regulating authority 
of the coffee market. Although the FNC retained its legal competences in the Colombian legal 
framework, its purpose (for guarantee an acceptable purchase price for coffee growers) was 
seriously threatened by free access for all other market players, including civil society 
organizations, among them, the Max Havelaar Foundation (MH onwards). Being part of a 
movement that champion a “fair” trade in which value throughout the value chain was fairly 
distributed, MH started to bring together coffee buyers in consumer markets with coffee farmers 
in vulnerable communities, aiming to improve the wellbeing of the latter by a compromise of the 
former to pay both a minimum purchase price (when the market price is lower) and a social 
premium.  
 
                                                     
365 Inspired by Douwes 1860’s novel “Max Havelaar: Or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company” in which 
the cultivation system mandated by the Dutch colonial government of Indonesia produce widespread poverty and 
starvation. The Max Havelaar Foundation was founded by the Swiss aid organizations: Brot für alle, Caritas, 
Fastenopfer, HEKS, Helvetasand and Swissaid in February 1992 aiming to “ensure that products from producers / 
workers in disadvantaged regions of the south get access to our market at fair trade conditions” (Fairtrade, 2010). 
366 We are using the categories used by Scharpf (1997)  
367  Institutions mentioned at the end of annex 2.2.2. Its importance was evident in the interviews. Interviewees 
descendants of mestizos or whites (i.e non-indigenous), said they accepted to be counted as indigenous and gave 
their property title over the land to the Resguardo to receive in exchange a right of use known as “Adjudicación del 
Resguardo” on the same land with the only objective of avoiding paying the tax on property; others to avoid the 
inheritance transaction costs when distributing the land among the heirs; others to prevent their children from 
military service; others because they saw that it was the only option for their children to go to the Public University 
(where the indigenous people have reserved quotas); others because they felt indigenous and proudly gave their 
titles for commitment to the Indigenous Movement.     
368 So, they would belong to one Resguardo (territorial entity) under the authority of one Cabildo (local cabinet) that 
was led by one Gobernador (leader of the administrative cabinet).  
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MH approached the FNC through their director for Europe in the Brussels, Emilio Echeverri369, 
and proposed a partnership with an impoverished but organized coffee community, hopefully 
indigenous, that could be beneficiary of a premium paid by their buyers to be invested in their 
public goods prioritized by their organization 370 . The better price offered by the MH 
demonstrated to the FNC that higher monetary prices could be also achieved through other than 
the intensification of coffee farming, namely the coffee produced by an organized indigenous 
community that led towards Riosucio371 because of the recognition of the indigenous movement 
in this municipality.  
 
Once the MH’s “Fairtrade” service agreed with the FNC’s “monetary” service, it was easy to 
merge with the CRIDEC “indigenous coffee” service. A coalition was formed among these three 
main actors who shared the definition of the problem in terms of the threat to cultural diversity 
due to the forces of the free market. So, with their individual purposes and resources, they agreed 
on joint action.  
 
6.1.2. Cooperative mobilization of stakeholders in consumption to empower 
stakeholders in production 
 
In 1992, MH successfully linked coffee producers with Fairtrade buyers in Switzerland372, and in 
the following years, they enriched this network with buyers from different consumers’ countries 
producing the AR organization 373 . As the FNC had lost the AR Law provided by the ICA to 
guarantee price control, the MH’s organization was attractive to the FNC that required 
compensating with commercial management the monetary services they sought for. Hence, the 
FNC disclosed the information of one of its suppliers: the Cooperativa de Caficultores del Alto 
Occidente de Caldas (The Cooperative onwards). The cooperative had acquired since the sixties 
                                                     
369  Interview with Emilio Echeverri, International delegate for Colombia to the International Coffee Organization 
(OIC) between 1982 and 1990, former director of the FNC’s office in Brussels from 1990-1996, and former General 
Manager of the FNC 1996-2002.  
370  “Me plantearon el problema, mire necesitamos una colonia con un café que cumpla estas características de una 
comunidad pobre, nos gustaría indígena (…) que produzca café, le damos un precio extra, y ese precio en parte (...) 
se lo entregamos a la cooperativa (...) o a la comunidad organizada, para que invierta ese excedente en la satisfacción 
de necesidades comunes”. Interview with Emilio Echeverry. FNC, ibíd. 
371 “Con la caída del pacto, iniciaron los movimientos de café justo (...) es un movimiento que tiene algo de político, 
algo de sincera cristiandad posiblemente, no lo veo mucho pero posiblemente y de mejores prácticas. Con ese cuento 
crear ciertos estímulos para diferenciar el café y pagarlo mejor. (…) buscan crearle un beneficio al productor a cambio 
de estas prácticas que se supone benefician a la humanidad, si (los caficultores) la cumplen (…) Eso empezó cuando 
acabó el pacto porque empezó la libre competencia y bueno, los precios pa’ bajo y entonces ahí es donde nació esas 
oportunidades de mercado (…) Era realmente un margen interesante, entonces yo hice contacto con el Comité aquí 
de Caldas. Ellos me hicieron el contacto allá, con la gente de Riosucio”. Interview with Emilio Echeverry, who was 
also director of the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas between 1975 and 1983.   
372 “Max Havelaar labelled coffee was successfully introduced in 1992” (Fairtrade, 2010, p. 1) 
373 Including importers and roasters by country, as follows: 4 in the Netherlands, 7 in Belgium, 4 in France, 4 in 
Switzerland, 5 in the Netherlands, 3 in the United Kingdom, 8 in Germany, 2 in Italy, 3 in Japan, 6 in Sweden, 3 in 
Norway and 3 in Finland.  “lista de importadores/compradores operando en el marco de FLO-Internacional del 19 de 
agosto de 1999” Anexo 3 del Convenio del programa MH en Riosucio. 
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four purchase points in the municipality of Riosucio374 where they bought the coffee beans 
(either wet or dry parchment coffee) from the (in process of becoming) indigenous coffee 
growers. This AR property of the Cooperative was not limited to the assets needed to the 
purchase of the coffee but also to its commercialization: as a shareholder of Trillacoop (a milling 
company) it had access to the infrastructures necessary to produce the Excelso coffee bags375; as 
a shareholder of Expocafé (an export company) they had access to the necessary infrastructures 
to export and; as an owner of the offices and meeting places in Riosucio, they provided the space 
for the decision making. This property played a predominant role in influencing the behavior of 
the coffee grower since it is in the purchase point where usually the purchase transaction 
between the farmers and the trader is made: exchanging a price for a coffee bean that reflected 
an expected behavior, in this way, the individual and concrete legal act is consumed. As the 
coalition was formed around the threat to the indigenous culture, consequently the indigenous 
movement was empowered with the AR consensus. 
 
Using this initial endowment, the FNC strategically mobilized their AR law to make the MH 
definition compatible with their definition of the problematic in terms of the low provision of 
monetary services; the MH strategically mobilized their AR organization to define the 
problematic in terms of the low provision of the “Fairtrade coffee” symbolic service; the 
indigenous movement strategically mobilized their AR consensus to frame the previous two 
services as needed conditions of a higher goal oriented to protect their indigenous way of life; 
and the Cooperative strategically mobilized their AR infrastructure to expand the target group to 
include coffee produced by all coffee farmers in their area of influence (as long as they own farms 
up to 2ha) although it was supposed to be exclusively directed towards the indigenous 
population.  
 
Indeed, the FNC, endowed with the AR Law as the authority of the coffee public policy, promoted 
with its acquiescence this different-from-the-standard market that specifically in the case of 
Riosucio we conceptualize as the LRA Fairtrade, as long as the coffee quality fulfilled the 
minimum requirements for the standard coffee376; The MH exchanged their organization through 
which the coffee from the Resguardos in Riosucio would obtain a better price because it would 
be sold at higher prices in Europe because of MH commercial effort in that continent377; CRIDEC 
exchanged their consensus it administers on behalf of the indigenous community of Riosucio 
through which coffee can produce the “Fairtrade coffee” symbolic services; they were 
responsible for providing legitimacy of both symbolic services through a list of indigenous 
                                                     
374 (two in the relatively central urban area, one in the northwestern border in San Lorenzo and another in the 
southeastern one in Bonafont) 
375 Excelso in terms of the minimum quality required to export coffee (chapter 4.1.2).  
376 “convertir el café que compre en los Resguardos, en tipo excelso y entrégalo a Expocafé”. Numeral c, de la cláusula 
cuarta “obligaciones de la Cooperativa” del “Convenio para Compra de Café en Resguardos Indígenas” del 14 de 
febrero de 1992 en Riosucio. 
377  “tiene por objeto desarrollar operaciones mercantiles, relacionadas con compra de café por parte de la 
Cooperativa, con el patrocinio de la fundación Max Havelaar, a los Resguardos Indígenas (...) para ser vendido este 
café en mercados europeos, a un precio superior al del mercado internacional esto por gestiones que adelante en 
aquel continente la Fundación”. Cláusula primera “objeto” del “Convenio para Compra de Café en Resguardos 
Indígenas” del 14 de febrero de 1992 en Riosucio. 
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beneficiaries378  that cultivate less than one hectare of coffee379; and the Cooperative exchanged 
their property through which the transaction can effectively be made to concretize at an 
individual and concrete level one institution from the regulatory system: Art, 1495 of the 
Colombian civil code380 to be enforced through the signing of the “Convenio para Compra de Café 
en Resguardos Indígenas el 14 de febrero de 1992” (A coffee purchase agreement that we will 
refer as Convenio MH/year onwards) in Riosucio valid for one year.  
 
This transaction of action resources sought to generate the AR money to increase the endowment 
in action resources of the indigenous movement, and in this way, improving the well-being of the 
indigenous community381. The first intention is explicit when saying that the plus-value generated 
by the Convenio MH/1992 would go to the Resguardos382, and the second intention when saying 
that the profits would be distributed in two stages: initially the creation of a rotatory fund for the 
indigenous people, and then, provision of public goods for the indigenous community383.  
 
Consequently, it resulted in a logic of intervention where the (indigenous) coffee community in 
Riosucio was the target group because by selling their coffee through the LRA standard in 
Riosucio they put at risk the indigenous culture (the low provision of “indigenous coffee” 
symbolic service as a consequence of the low provision of both the “Fairtrade” symbolic service 
                                                     
378 “enviar a la Cooperativa una relación de los indígenas beneficiarios del programa”. Numeral a, de la cláusula 
tercera “obligaciones del CRIDEC”, ibíd. 
379 “deben ser productores de café que cumplan con una de las siguientes condiciones: producción máxima de 375 
kilos por año o poseer menos de 1 hectárea en café”. Numeral c, de la cláusula tercera “obligaciones del CRIDEC”, 
ibíd. 
380 “Contrato o convención es un acto por el cual una parte se obliga para con otra a dar, hacer o no hacer alguna 
cosa. Cada parte puede ser de una o de muchas personas”.   
381 “La idea es que esa plata la tenía que administrar el CRIDEC. Y como todo el mundo estábamos sin una…  imagínese 
que uno iba allá por colaborar, hacer adjudicaciones, hacer todo, pero no… pues, porque quería la causa, y todo el 
mundo era así, y reuniones y reuniones y uno llevaba el almuerzo. O por ejemplo yo que vivía acá me llevaba unos a 
almorzar a mi casa. Y así, sin … nada … sin… esas son las cosas que verdaderamente valen la pena”. Interview with 
Rocio Motato, Secretary of the Convenio MH (In its different phases) since June 1993. She had participated in the 
indigenous movement since the murder José Gilberto Motato in 1986 (mártir de la causa indígena y la recuperación 
de la tierra in her own words). As Secretary of the Cabildo del Resguardo Nuestra Señora de la Montaña (since 1989) 
she was part of the Junta de Administración del Convenio during the first year, and then, she was proposed to take 
over the Secretaria del Convenio in June 1993 (put by the CRIDEC against the will of Cooperative at that time). Today 
she is the technical secretary of Asprocafé and the Colombia coordinator of the "Latin American and Caribbean 
Coordinator of Small Producers and Workers of Fair Trade" (network that represents the producers of the continent 
in the Fairtrade system).    
382 “revertir en los Resguardos Indígenas, materia de este convenio, las utilidades, o mejor, la diferencia de la venta 
del café colocado en Europa, los costos de compra, comercialización, beneficio y exportación”. Numeral d, de la 
cláusula cuarta “obligaciones de la cooperativa”, ibíd. 
383 “las utilidades que resulten del ejercicio de este convenio se distribuirán en dos etapas, así: Primera etapa: La 
creación de un fondo rotatorio de crédito, para: a- mejoramiento de la calidad y productividad del café, en los 
minifundios de las comunidades indígenas. b- Mejoramiento de la calidad de vida de los habitantes de las 
comunidades indígenas. Segunda etapa: a- mejoramiento de la infraestructura en: acueducto, alcantarillado, energía 
y de la vivienda de los resguardos. b- Apoyo a los programas de diversificación de cultivos y mejoramiento del 
ecosistema. c- Programas de capacitación”. Cláusula sexta “inversión de utilidades”, ibíd. 
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and the monetary services), increasing the anxiety of consumers (beneficiary group), which could 
be traduced in less sales for traders and roasters (as third-party beneficiaries).  
 
The Convenio MH/1992 is an intermediate act of implementation that sought to influence the 
use of the Resource constituents to profile that combination of services over the LRA Standard 
with the explicit objective to increase the endowment of the indigenous movement in the AR 
money, so they could invest in the material wellbeing of its community and its organization as a 
whole. Indeed, in a new intermediate output: the “Convenio Programa Max Havelaar Riosucio” 
del 21 de abril de 1994 (with annual validity but automatically renewed), the indigenous 
movement used the AR money384 produced by the agreement as an instrument to obtain the AR 
political support385. As evidence, they influenced the final outputs of the Convenio MH/1994: 
Priority is given to the housing solution "Agrovillas" to build an indigenous-modern village for 
which it was necessary to freeze the rotatory Fund386, the premiums, the infrastructure works 
and to eliminate the team of promoters387. This sacrifice is plausibly explained because the 
indigenous movement needed to harvest the AR political support. Additionally, they managed to 
obtain a monthly disbursement for each one of the Resguardos388. 
 
This ultimate goal allows us to qualify the whole set of mobilization as a cooperative mobilization 
of action resources that innovatively activated the public coffee policy to allow the development 
of the fairtrade market that was created by concretizing the private law in the Convenio MH (a 
coffee purchase agreement) to profile the merged “indigenous coffee” and “Fairtrade coffee” 
symbolic services and monetary services. Institutional creativity: Joint provision of the 
“Fairtrade” and “Indigenous Coffee” symbolic services and, the monetary services demanded by 
profilers  
 
Being the object of the Agreement to strengthen the indigenous movement, the institutional 
creativity is evidenced when the “monetary” services and the “Fairtrade coffee” service are 
merged under the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service, which in its origins is materialized in 
                                                     
384 The year 1993 and the beginning of 1994 were particularly good given that the Cooperative was the only provider 
of Fairtrade coffee in Colombia to MH. “había tanta plata que cuándo venían a firmar esos convenios los 
recordatorios eran granos de café de oro”. Interview with Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, ibíd. In mid-94 other groups 
entered throughout the country, increasing the offer and therefore slightly reducing the money to the Convenio 
MH/1994.  
385 “Las comunidades indígenas ya participando en política entonces había candidatos al Consejo del Resguardo de 
San Lorenzo (…) y todo el mundo pa’ allá, pida pa allá (indígenas solicitando dinero del Convenio para sus necesidades 
particulares) pero hubo cosas buenas, se apoyaron muchachos que estaban estudiando en la Universidad, se les daba 
una cuota mensual para sostenimiento de ellos. Y todo el mundo pedía pa’ allá”. Interview with Rocio Motato.  
386 In the Acta 47 June/94, that decision is taken because the resources demanded by Agrovillas amounted to COP 
220 million, increasing the budgetary commitments to COP 500 million pesos when there was only cash available for 
COP 383 million.  
387 Acta 52 September/94. Previously the Convenio MH/1994, in its ninth clause "promotoría", had added to the two 
previous promoters, four additional promoters, one for each Resguardo.   
388 “se entregará mensualmente $500.000 al gobernador y al tesorero de cada uno de los territorios indígenas”. 
Parágrafo tercero de la Cláusula décima “inversión de los recursos”, ibíd. 
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supporting the consolidation of the Resguardos in a territory in which people identified 
themselves mostly as peasants389. 
 
Although the Convenio MH/1992 did not create any formal institution to govern it, the 
established process (through which the CRIDEC coordinates farmers to sell their coffee 
exclusively to the Cooperative 390; the Cooperative who sells through Expocafé 391  and then, 
Expocafé reverts the profits to the Resguardos392 that could (but not necessarily) mean to deliver 
the money to the CRIDEC) indirectly mandated a kind of an informal coordination mechanism. 
This was translated into monthly meetings between the CRIDEC and the Cooperative (and others 
local stakeholders by invitation) that are documented as Actas de la Junta Administradora 
(minutes of the administrative board) since March 1992 (hereinafter referred to as Acta # 
month/year)393. This Junta worked as a deliberative scenario where the demands for services of 
the actors that participate in the profiling of the Resource, translates into a local-shaping of the 
implementation acts (outputs) steaming from the regulatory system or the public policy. In other 
words, the Junta tried to make the output compatible with the demanded services of the actors 
involved, when defining the regulations (extent) and governance mechanism (coherence) that 
would influence the use of the Resource constituents of participant profilers. 
 
Hence, the Junta shaped the final output of the regulatory system (concretized through the 
Convenio MH/1992) to encourage some uses of the constituents to profile the “indigenous 
coffee” symbolic service. This one was not limited to a material improvement of the isolated 
coffee grower but the improvement of the indigenous-coffee community that was associated 
with the strengthening of the Resguardos (which were so weak that at the beginning they were 
unable to fulfill their own commitments394) so they could effectively exercise their constitutional 
rights to cultural diversity.  
 
Indeed, for producing the know-to-appreciate in consumers, some final outputs of the Convenio 
MH/1992 encouraged uses of infrastructures and know-how to strengthen the Resguardos more 
than to change the actual use of the land. So, they gave farmers access to credit if they work 
associatively under the acquiescence of the Cabildo and the supervision of an expert in 
agriculture395. Because of this veto power of the Cabildo, in practice, farmers would obtain credit 
                                                     
389 “Mientras que en el censo de 1993, el 41% de los 43.511 habitantes de Riosucio se identificó como indígena, en 
2005 el porcentaje aumentó al 75.4% de una población total de 54.537 personas” (Lopera-Mesa, 2010, p. 71) 
390 Cláusula tercera “obligaciones del CRIDEC”, ibíd. 
391 Numeral c, de la cláusula cuarta “obligaciones de la cooperativa”, ibíd. 
392 Numeral d, de la cláusula cuarta “obligaciones de la cooperativa”, ibíd. 
393 The author had access to the Actas mensuales de la Junta Administradora from 1992 to 2000, which are kept in 
Asprocafé’s file, but the access to the Actas after the 2000 that are in the Cooperative’s was not granted.   
394 Acta 3 June/1992 shows an indigenous Resguardos so weak that they could not deliver the list of beneficiaries of 
the agreement and it was the Cooperative with the Comité who made a provisional list that the Resguardos would 
improve later on.  
395 Acta 3 June/92 establishes that 80% of the money should be allocated in credits for the associative groups; Acta 
5 August/1992 states that the Technical Assistance that accompanies the credits must be provided by an entity in 
charge of agricultural development; and Acta 6 September/92 gives veto power to the Cabildo when establishing a 
mandatory prior visit to grant the credit. 
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and technical assistance for any agricultural activity (including but not limited to coffee) if they 
supported the indigenous movement. A predictable result was the increase of the AR political 
support that the leaders of the indigenous movement could leverage through this output funded 
by the Fairtrade premium. It was not a surprise that the indigenous movement wanted to receive 
the money directly avoiding the Cooperative396. 
 
On the other side of the coin, the few approved credits excluded the coffee cultivation397. The 
Cooperative and its long-term ally, the Comité de Cafeteros de Riosucio (the Comité hereafter, 
the local branch of the FNC) began to perceive a threat to the provision of the “monetary” 
services they demanded from the Resource: lower production of Excelso coffee implied lower 
exports and therefore lower premiums. In fact, the Convenio MH/1992 indicated that the 
quantities (quality Excelso) supplied by the beneficiaries (coffee farmers with less than one 
hectare or producing less than 375 kilos) would be insufficient to satisfy the demand, for what it 
gave the Cooperative one year to fulfill the orders using coffee from non-beneficiary coffee 
growers398. However, by the end of the first year of the Convenio MH/1992, the Cooperative put 
forward their worry in the Junta, diplomatically claiming that the Resguardos should focus on 
encouraging the coffee culture399. 
 
Through this deliberative scenario, actors who had a more or less equitable distribution of action 
resources succeeded in producing a new intermediary output to profile the Resource and 
produce the services required by the participants through the second agreement signed as 
“Convenio Programa Max Havelaar Riosucio” el 24 de marzo de 1993 in Riosucio (valid for one 
year).  
 
The deliberative environment is institutionalized by formalizing the Junta Administradora which 
would be composed of 7 members400: The Governor for each of the 3 Resguardos or their 
delegates; the President of the CRIDEC or his delegate; two representatives of the Cooperative 
                                                     
396 Acta 10 October/92 put on evidence the communication of the CRIDEC to MH, in which they demand to receive 
the money directly so they could autonomously invest.  
397 Acta 13 February/93 presented the report of activities during the first year of the Convenio/1992. It was stated 
that of the COP 177 million (USD 240 thousand) of assets, only COP 21 million (USD 28 thousand) had been disbursed 
in credits for raising pigs, calves and food crops (not coffee) to 19 associative groups.    
398 “En un comienzo y mientras se lleva a cabo el proceso de control y manejo de calidad de los productores, para 
cumplir las normas de calidad exigidas por Cooperativa, en forma especial se suministrarán al programa otros cafés 
de la zona, que permitan mediante los mayores recursos provenientes del mismo, desarrollar los sistemas necesarios 
para que los productores adscritos al convenio cumplan con las normas de calidad exigidas por la Cooperativa. Esta 
cláusula se podrá utilizar el primer año”. Numeral b, de la cláusula tercera “obligaciones del CRIDEC”, del “Convenio 
para Compra de Café en Resguardos Indígenas” el 14 de febrero de 1992 en Riosucio.  
399  The Manager of the Cooperative said “se ha hecho muy poco por el mejoramiento de la calidad del café” and he 
added conciliatively “no debemos trazar una línea divisoria entre la cooperativa y los resguardos indígenas porque 
los beneficiarios son en su mayoría asociados a la cooperativa”. Acta 13 February/93 
400 Cláusula quinta “La Junta Administradora” del “Convenio Programa Max Havelaar Riosucio” del 24 de marzo de 
1993 
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and one Representative of Asproinca 401. This Junta was competent for the planning 402, the 
execution403 , and the accountability before both beneficiaries404  and other profiling actors405. 
 
Then, the deliberation among these local actors with more or less the same power was translated 
into that no position of an actor could be imposed against the will of another one. On the 
contrary, there was a negotiation among positions for reaching a kind of a balance between the 
Cooperative and the indigenous movement to produce the services that both actors demand that 
could be perceived through three observations.   
 
First, to influence the know-how, it was decided to appoint two promoters whose requirements 
were developed in consensus within the Junta and, the Cooperative would select them from a 
proposal made by the Cabildos406. This procedure maximized the possibility that the selected 
ones would provide technical assistance to the coffee grower, which would promote practices 
that guarantee the provision of services for both parties.  
 
Second, there is a take-and-give strategy by both actors: The Cooperative manages to maximize 
monetary services with two decisions: to encourage the coffee grower with a premium407 and, 
to sell all the coffee that could be demanded by MH (because they managed to include in the 
Convenio MH/1993 the production of coffee farmers in the four municipalities of the 
Cooperative’s influence although there were not Resguardos in three of them408. In any case, 
despite coffee came from the four municipalities, indigenous (coffee) farmers in Riosucio 
remained as the target group 409). The CRIDEC was able to invest directly in the indigenous 
movement by allowing funding to self-governed community projects 410 . In this sense, they 
                                                     
401 Before 1993 Asproinca had already been in Riosucio for several years implementing the Rotary Fund (Through 
SwissAid International Cooperation) to improve agricultural activity (including coffee) through associative groups. 
This AR information derived from their experience and the fact that they were originally crop-neutral (they 
supported both food and coffee) could explain the acquiescence of the actors to include them as a decision-making 
part of the new Agreement.  
402 “Decidir sobre la utilización de los recursos con sujeción al plan de inversión adoptado previamente por ella”. 
Numeral 1, Cláusula sexta “Funciones de La Junta Administradora”, ibíd. 
403 Numerales 2,3,5, 8, 9, 10, 11 y 12 de la Cláusula sexta “Funciones de La Junta Administradora”, ibíd.  
404 “Revisar periódicamente con los usuarios del convenio para evaluar con estos la marcha del mismo y la inversión 
de recursos y obras ejecutadas o en ejecución”.   Numeral 4, Cláusula sexta “Funciones de La Junta Administradora”, 
ibíd.  
405 “Presentar a la Fundación, Expocafé, Cooperativa y CRIDEC un informe semestral sobre la ejecución del Convenio 
y evaluación del mismo”. Numeral 6, Cláusula sexta “Funciones de La Junta Administradora”, ibíd. 
406 Cláusula novena “Promotoría”, ibíd.   
407 “Conceder al pequeño productor que venda café con destino a la exportación materia del Convenio un sobreprecio 
en proporción a la cantidad vendida”. Numeral 1 de la Cláusula décima “Inversión de los recursos”, ibíd. 
408 “las partes convienen en precisar que el ámbito de operaciones (...) se extienda a el radio de acción de la 
Cooperativa de Caficultores del Alto Occidente de Caldas, los beneficiarios serán productores de café poseedores de 
predios no mayores a dos (2) hectáreas de extensión o quince (15) cargas al año (equivalente a 1875 kilos)” Otrosí, 
ibíd.   
409 Obligación del CRIDEC “enviar a la Cooperativa una relación de los indígenas beneficiarios del programa con el fin 
de ser carnetizados”. Numeral a2 de la Cláusula cuarta “Obligaciones de las partes”, Ibíd.  
410  “apoyar obras comunitarias (…) que conlleve procesos de autogestión”. Numeral 9 de la Cláusula décima 
“Inversión de los recursos”, ibíd. 
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appropriated COP 10 million (USD 14 thousand) in each of the three Resguardos to empower 
them with the AR property411.  
 
Finally, they reached an agreement to fund both productive systems: one that maximizes the 
“monetary” services according to the Cooperative by promoting integral coffee cultivation412, 
and the other one, that optimizes the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service. The latter began to 
be re-defined not only as a vector of political support but as an indigenous way of cultivating 
coffee focusing on diversification 413 . Six months after the signature, this agreement that 
considered compatible the two types of farming had shaped the final outputs: on the one hand, 
it influenced the use of infrastructures in one activity (diversification) in the planting process: 
credits for animal husbandry or food crops. On the other, it influenced the use of know-how in 
one activity (nutrition) in the cultivation process by giving credits to acquire synthetic fertilizers 
to increase coffee production and increase monetary services. 60% of the credits went to the 
former, 40% to the latter414. Additionally, thanks to the work of the promoters who accompanied 
the associative groups to structure the credits in their two modalities (fertilizer and 
diversification), the disbursements tripled between December/1993 and March/1994 totaling 
COP 237 million (USD 295 thousand)415 distributed in 292 associative groups416. 
 
6.1.3. Outcome 
 
The LRA Standard that prioritized the provision of “monetary” services was maintained until the 
nineties thanks the AR law and the AR political support derived from the International Coffee 
Agreement possessed by a coalition of entrepreneur farmers, the FNC and the Government. A 
few years after it broke down, in Riosucio, a new coalition emerged among MH the FNC and the 
indigenous movement in which they shared the definition of the problem in terms of the threat 
to cultural diversity due to the unequal distribution of value that reduced the share of monetary 
services received by producers.  
 
Their logic of intervention implied that indigenous (coffee farmers) traders and roasters had to 
modify their behavior through an innovative activation of the coffee public policy to create the 
                                                     
411 For two Resguardos (la Montaña y Cañamomo-Lomaprieta) the fairtrade premium was used to complete the 
administrative offices of the Cabildo and for the Resguardo de San Lorenzo, two lots were acquired to develop a 
housing project known as "Agrovillas" and to install a coffee drying silo. Informe de la gerencia del Convenio. Agosto 
19 de 1993.  
412 “promover el manejo integral del cultivo del café con miras a mejorar la calidad y el uso racional del suelo, se 
podrá pagar un subsidio especial al productor”. Numeral 3 de la Cláusula décima “Inversión de los recursos”, ibíd. 
413  “impulsar y desarrollar una estrategia de producción alternativa que tenga en cuenta manejo de suelos, 
diversificación y protección del medio ambiente”. Numeral 6 de la Cláusula décima “Inversión de los recursos”, ibíd. 
414 De los $84 millones en créditos colocados en diciembre de 1993, el 40% se destinaba a créditos para fertilizantes 
y el 60% a créditos para cría de animales o cultivos de alimentos. Acta 44 March/94. 
415 To give an idea to the reader of the foreign exchange during the last decades, one could say that during the 
nineties the ratio (annual average) progressively went from US 1 = COP 507 in 1990, to COP 1.140 in 1998, with a 
strong increase to a maximum of COP 2.876 in 2003 with an early correction around COP 2000 in 2005 and almost 
all the subsequent decade. At the end of 2014 he found a new balance around $ 3000 pesos for US $ 1.     
416 Acta 44 March/94.  
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Fairtrade market that produced financial surplus to strengthen the indigenous movement (and 
its capacity to exercise their constitutional right to cultural diversity), and the concretization of 
the regulatory system through a coffee purchase agreement between CRIDEC, MH and the 
Cooperative,  
 
The Junta as a deliberative scenario allowed to incorporate the demands of the various actors 
who demanded services from the Resource in Riosucio in that period.  The cooperative 
mobilization of action resources empowered the indigenous movement so they could be heard. 
And using the institutional creativity actors reached an agreement on uses of the Resource 
constituent that was not perceived incompatible at the time: diversification to reduce the 
indigenes’ vulnerability to coffee monoculture, and synthetic fertilization to increase the 
productivity of the coffee plantation. Initially, final outputs exclusively incentivized these uses in 
a very small population: the indigenous smallholding (possession less than one hectare) in 
Riosucio. But it was expanded to include a wider population of indigenous (coffee farmers) 
owners of up to two hectares in the area of influence of the cooperative (three additional 
municipalities).   
 
An additional profile was shaped over the profile sought by the LRA Standard. It provided the 
“Fairtrade” symbolic services demanded by consumers and stakeholders in consumption by 
producing the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service demanded by stakeholders in production. 
Additionally, it maximized the monetary services demanded by all profilers.  
 
It could be considered that over the LRA Standard which regulated uses of Resource constituents 
in the three activities of the trading process (purchasing; threshing, exporting) and one activity 
in the planting (variety), equivalent to 17% of regulated uses417 evenly distributed418 (Annex 7), 
through the FNC’s governance mechanism described in chapter 4 (like municipal and 
departmental Comités and its extension service), the newborn LRA MH was laid down which 
regulates new uses of Resource constituents in three activities (Diversification; nutrition; and 
communication strategy) increasing the extent (36% of evenly-distributed regulated uses, Annex 
7). It aligned new actors (MH; CRIDEC; FNC), which developed new governance mechanism 
(Convenio MH; Junta Administradora; Promoters; Associative groups) that produce new outputs 
(Loans and technical assistance for associative groups), which improved coordination among the 
actors to incentivize the change in behavior of farmers increasing the coherence. It also created 
the “product differentiation” barrier of entry at the producers’ level which excluded owners of 
more than two hectares in the zone and all other farmers from other regions (increasing the 
closure). 
  
6.2. Incumbent LRA MH, Newborn LRA Natural (1997-2003):  
 
                                                     
417 It refers to the first condition of the Extent (chapter 2.2.2): the regulated uses (weighted by process) by the LRA 
from the 26 uses identified in Annex 1.  
418 It refers to the second condition of the Extent (chapter 2.2.2): regulations are evenly distributed between the 
seven processes, in operational terms, regulations are not concentrated in the first three processes.  
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6.2.1. Actors’ coalition: toxicity in the coffee crop for stakeholders in consumption 
 
The perceived risk on health derived from the use of toxic products (in the cultivating process) 
and, on the environment by the destruction of habitats (in the planting process) and the waste 
pollution (in the post-harvesting process) replaced the previously perceived risk to cultural 
diversity. Threats that negatively affected the consumer when drinking a coffee perceived toxic 
to their body and harmful to both the environment and the coffee communities.  
 
Indeed, the mandate of the American Congress to the North American Department of Agriculture 
to define the regulation on organic production in 1990 419 , and the entry into force of the 
European regulation 2092/91 on organic farming in Europe in 1991420, gave prominence to 
organic agriculture at the heart of the Max Havelaar movement. They began to develop the 
demand for the “natural coffee” symbolic service when they request for samples of organic 
coffee during the presentation of the Convenio MH/1993421.  And then, when they actively 
sought it, stating that chemical fertilizers cause alarm in Europe and that in three years only 
orders of organic coffee will be demanded422. 
 
In parallel, some indigenous leaders perceived that the credit program was redirecting the money 
from the Convenio MH to fertilizers423. Given that the sum of the credits did not reach half of the 
almost COP 500 million (USD 678 thousand) accumulated by the Convenio/1992424, more than 
the redirection, it is plausible that this opposition had a deeper ground in the indigenous 
discourse that rejects “the foreign” (as the synthetic fertilizer produced outside the Resguardo) 
just for being antagonist of “the local”. In this order of ideas, the discussions could be 
conceptualized as a redefinition of the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service that could be put at 
risk in case of making use of know-how in the nutrition activity with synthetic fertilization.  
 
The interests of the Comité were compatible with those of the LRA Fairtrade in a context in which 
the strategy of the FNC promoted the farming intensification usually in the big farms425 while 
encouraging the diversification in the less promising such as the small coffee farming in 
                                                     
419 Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-624). 
420 Reglamento Comunitario R(CEE) No 2092/91, del consejo de 24 de junio de 1991, sobre la producción agrícola 
ecológica y su indicación en los productos agrarios y alimenticios. 
421 Acta 19 May/93. 
422 Communication from MH to the Junta Administradora on February 6, 1995. 
423Concerns in this regard can be observed in: Acta 42 January/93, Acta 43 February/93 and, Acta 44 March/93.  
424 Acta 43 February/93. Given the non-existent traceability, the Cooperative sent all the coffee that was demanded 
by the clients of MH, whether or not it had been supplied with the beneficiaries of the agreement. Interview with 
Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, Ibíd.  
425 As mentioned (section 4.1.3), the FNC’s extension service focused on personalized attention on farms larger than 
10 ha and group attention for small coffee farmers. In our interviews, it was highlighted that the incorporation of 
the practices that emphasize the productivity proposed by the FNC in the small coffee farms occurred indirectly. The 
FNC focused its attention on the large coffee plantations where the peasants of Riosucio were day laborers. As day 
laborers, they learned these practices and imported them to their farms. 
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Riosucio426. Either through the fertilizer or the diversification programs, its double strategy of 
intensification or diversification was strengthened at the local level. However, la Resolución 3 de 
1996 del Comité Nacional de Cafeteros sobre el “Programa de Registro y Promoción de Cafés 
Especiales (chapter 4.2.1) put forward the Comité’s demand for taste-related services in Riosucio 
and modified their previously passive role in the actors’ game over the services from the coffee 
Resource in Riosucio. Activating its traditional alliance with the Cooperative, both actors claimed 
their demand for the “citric acid” taste related service produced by the Resource, which after a 
series of samplings, identified it in the highlands of the Resguardo de San Lorenzo (CDCC & 
CCAOC, 2016).  
 
Unlike the profile produced by the LRA Fairtrade that did not oppose the monetary services 
sought by the Cooperative, the “natural coffee” symbolic service threatened them: the 
productivity could be reduced by limiting the use of fertilizers and pesticides. Nevertheless, in 
September 2000, the International Coffee Agreement 2001 was signed in London427, through 
which the “environmentally responsible” symbolic service entered the global coffee agenda. 
Thereafter it was incorporated into the national coffee agenda through the FNC’s División de 
Estrategia y Proyectos Especiales de Comercialización by merging it with the “natural coffee” 
symbolic service, meaning that a conservation strategy should be developed around the organic 
projects already in implementation by the FNC428 (one of which, if not the most important, was 
in Riosucio). It emphasized the investment in the know-to-appreciate so the Resource profile to 
provide the “natural coffee” symbolic service would be perceived by other profilers and 
shareholders in consumption at the international level, as a biodiversity protector in order to 
develop the “environmentally responsible” symbolic service429.  
 
Therefore, a coalition was formed: the MH, the Indigenous Movement, the FNC/Comité and the 
Cooperative agreed to joint action to pursue a common profile featured by the merged “natural 
coffee and environmental responsible” symbolic service that leveraged their individual ones: the 
“Fairtrade” and the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service for MH and the indigenous movement; 
and the “citric acid” taste related service and monetary services for the FNC/Comité and the 
Cooperative.   
 
6.2.2. Selfishly-cooperative mobilization of stakeholders in consumption 
 
                                                     
426 “Programa de sustitución de áreas y diversificación de cultivos que buscaba eliminar los cultivos brocados y de 
baja productividad y, producir café en asocio con otros cultivos rentables y ecológicamente sostenibles” (Bernal 
Vargas, 2016, p. 51) 
427 Mediante la Resolución Número 393, de 28 de septiembre de 2000 del Consejo Internacional del Café. 
428 “se propone un modelo que se apoya en los proyectos existentes (de caficultura orgánica) y que busca desarrollar 
una estrategia de conservación alrededor de ella” (Esguerra Gutierrez, 2001, p. 43) 
429 “Se espera que dicho planteamiento ilustre a la comunidad internacional y al mercado sobre la seriedad y 
responsabilidad con que Colombia trabaja el tema y sobre el papel que jugará el café orgánico colombiano como el 
elemento fundamental de protección de algunas áreas estratégicas desde el punto de vista de la conservación de la 
biodiversidad” Esguerra Gutierrez (2001, p. 43).  
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The action resources were mobilized at four different times to influence different intermediate 
or final outputs. 
 
The first occurred once the indigenous movement strategically failed to mobilize their AR 
consensus: The Convenio MH/1994 had already prioritized the “natural coffee” services sought 
by the MH and the CRIDEC at the expense of the monetary services sought by the Cooperative: 
the scope of operations was reduced exclusively to the territory of the four 430  Resguardos 
Indígenas de Riosucio431; farmers benefited with synthetic fertilizer loans to gradually convert to 
organic fertilization432; premiums were going only to organic coffee farmers433  and solar dryers 
(a guadua-bamboo structure covered in plastic) were granted to coffee farmers that become 
organic434. Furthermore, if the written statement was not clear enough, the MH had obtained 
the arbitration power to ultimately resolve any dispute about the application and interpretation 
of the Convenio MH435. These outputs, at least on paper produced the idea that the “natural 
coffee” had been profiled436 so MH put farmers in contact with the North American roaster Equal 
Exchange437 in early 1996 who was interested in the “natural coffee” symbolic service.  
 
But soon after the same year, a representative of MH unexpectedly arrived in Riosucio and made 
a surprise visit in one aleatory community438. He discovered that there were issues with the 
credits: some of the Governors of the Resguardos used them for personal purposes and having 
the power in the Junta, they did not pay back. Also, some associative groups that were dissolved 
had unpaid loans impossible to recover because promoters were eliminated439. In addition, the 
COP 195 million (USD 197 thousand) in loans were distributed 70% in fertilizers and 30% in 
                                                     
430 Addtitionally to the already mentioned Resguado de la Montaña; Resguardo de San Lorenzo, Resguardo de 
Cañamomo y Lomaprieta; there was a fourth one, the Resguardo de Escopetera Pirza which began its recognition 
process prior to this Convenio MH/1994.  
431 Cláusula segunda “Ámbito” del “Convenio Programa Max Havelaar Riosucio” del 21 de abril de 1994 
432  “es obligación del beneficiario del crédito asociativo para fertilizante químico, comprometerse a sustituir 
gradualmente el abono químico por abono orgánico, de acuerdo a términos fijados por la Junta Administradora. Para 
cumplir lo anterior la Junta Administradora destinará recursos dirigidos a impulsar dicho programa” Parágrafo de la 
Cláusula tercera “beneficiarios”, ibíd. 
433 Since organic certification standards were not known, organic coffee farmers were defined as those who had 
“como mínimo una cama de lombrices” Acta 62 July / 95. This “worm bed” implies that they at least produce organic 
fertilizer using the pulp and other waste from the farm.  
434 Acta 65 September/95 
435 “en casos extremos servir de árbitro en las diferencias surgidas entre las otras partes firmantes del Convenio, en 
razón a la aplicación e interpretación del Convenio cuyo fallo es de obligatorio cumplimiento”. Numeral 5, Apartado 
C “de la fundación”, Cláusula cuarta “obligaciones de las partes”, ibíd. 
436 It was not necessarily the case. The outcomes that were informed to MH had passed through a long chain of 
controls that were pound to misreport. “Y la indiecita no podía hacer informes porque no sabía (se refiere a ella), 
entonces todo eso lo hacia la trabajadora social, tenía que ser aprobado por la otra trabajadora social que era la jefa 
de ella en Centracafi, luego el Gerente de Centracafi, luego se lo pasaban a la Cooperativa”. Interview with Rocio 
Motato, Asprocafé, ibid.  
437 Acta 70 February/96 
438 “Una vez vino Max (Max Leuzinger delegado de MH) casi sin avisar, incluso aquí no había nadie y estaba yo sola 
en la oficina, entonces él me dijo, vámonos pa’ una comunidad, entonces lo lleve a la esperanza pa’ donde mi mamá”. 
Interview with Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, ibid.   
439 Acta 66 October/95 
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diversification440, when two years ago it was signed the gradual conversion to organic farming. 
So, as a representative of MH called for an evaluation441 and the Junta approved a Tripartite 
Evaluating Committee composed of one member selected by the Cooperativa/Expocafé, another 
by the CRIDEC/Resguardos, and the third one by MH. This Evaluating Committee presented their 
final report two months afterward claiming that the Junta Administradora had not fulfilled their 
task 442. The indigenous movement lost its consensus both among the indigenous leaders443 
themselves and between them and MH.  
 
The second movement is the selfish mobilization of MH’s organization to produce the “natural 
coffee” service demanded by this actor no matter the services demanded by the other actors. 
The indigenous movement lost: having squandered their consensus, the provision of the 
“indigenous coffee” symbolic service (to strengthen the indigenous movement444) went to the 
background and, the political support was seriously affected. The Cooperative, on the other hand, 
produced the perception of an impeccable use of their property, meaning faultless in the supply 
of coffee and the money management445. But MH’s organization was powerful enough so the 
Cooperative reluctantly accepted the production of the “Natural coffee” symbolic service at the 
expense of their monetary services446. Nevertheless, they improve their relationship with the MH 
and increased their influence with the bases of the indigenous movement. Hence the poor 
management of the consensus by the CRIDEC in parallel with a superb management of the 
property by the Cooperative, activated again the regulatory system and resulted in a new 
intermediary output the “Convenio Programa Max Havelaar/Transfair/Fairtrade – Riosucio” 
signed in Riosucio el 19 de septiembre de 1997 (with indefinite duration), in which the “Fairtrade 
                                                     
440 COP 135 million in synthetic fertilizers loans owed by 187 associative groups and COP 60 million in diversification 
loans owed by 44 associative groups. Acta 70 February/96  
441 “la cosa no es así” said Max Leuzinger. Interview with Rocío Motato, Asprocafé, ibid. 
442  “La Junta Administradora como máximo organismo del Convenio no ha cumplido con sus tareas y 
responsabilidades por falta de una política y de objetivos claros; por falta de una visión empresarial; por el cambio 
frecuente de sus miembros; por falta de tiempo que sus miembros dedican al Convenio; adicionalmente la Junta no 
está apoyada en una base que le dé legitimidad, control transparencia y participación democrática”. 
Recomendaciones de 1996. “no dejaron títere con cabeza.” Interview with Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, ibid. 
443 “Por los celos entre líderes no se lograron muchas cosas. Habían unos líderes de los otros resguardos que por hacer 
quedar mal a los otros no los apoyaban. Entonces en el CRIDEC se hablaban unas cosas - vamos a apoyar tal 
propuesta, pero resulta que uno de los líderes entonces ya se venían y hablaba con el Gerente y le decía - mire van a 
traer esto. Y cuándo venían aquí, como el otro ya sabía, entonces a la hora de votar ellos tampoco apoyaban”. 
Interview with Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, ibid.     
444 “Que la plata no era para los Resguardos, era para los verdaderos productores de café. Eso creó mucha ampolla 
sobretodo en la organización indígena”. Interview with Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, ibid. 
445 “la Cooperativa las cuentas las tuvo muy claras siempre. Y todo lo manejaba en la cuenta ingresos recibidos para 
terceros y el contador, Fernando era demasiado, muy honesto. La administración de esos recursos por parte de la 
Cooperativa impecable. Yo me atrevo a decir que si esos recursos los coge el CRIDEC se habrían matado por esos 
recursos y no habría nada. Porque uno conoce la misión que tenían unos, por como le decía, porque fue mucho tiempo 
que se trabajó sin nada, llega un recurso entonces ya, bueno yo ya me siento con derecho a esto, a eso, por eso esto 
se habría acabado porque la Cooperativa no les habría seguido el juego, no habría seguido vendiendo café y esto se 
habría acabado hace mucho tiempo”. Interview with Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, ibid. 
446 Speaking of the prohibition of the synthetic fertilizers credits. “Eso a Don Saudiel (El Gerente de la Cooperativa) 
no le gustó mucho porque él quería productividad y pues se suspendían esos créditos y ya la gente estaba 
acostumbrada”. Interview with Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, ibid. 
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coffee” symbolic service was separated from the “indigenous coffee”. In this regard, it 
differentiated three actors that were completely alienated: 1- the indigenous movement; 2- the 
indigenous coffee growers and 3- the non-indigenous coffee growers.  
 
It started changing radically the object: instead of purchasing coffee from the Resguardos447, they 
would buy coffee from the small coffee growers that participated in the program448 within the 
radius of action of the Cooperative449 according to the recommendations of the evaluation450. 
Unlike these recommendations, it defined the beneficiaries, not as smallholders with less than 
375 kilos (usually with less than half a hectare in coffee) but as coffee producers owners of at 
maximum five hectares of land 451 . This seemingly subtle change significantly strips the RA 
consensus from the indigenous movement. The “Fairtrade coffee” symbolic service would be 
produced by the small coffee growers among whom there are indigenous ones. Thus, the 
Resguardos represent a portion of them, and the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service is a 
desirable derivative of the “Fairtrade coffee” symbolic service.  
 
A first effect was the representation of the indigenous and non-indigenous coffee growers. The 
former were no longer considered to be represented by the Governor of the Resguardo, so the 
Evaluating Committee proposed an electoral contest, within each Resguardo, among the small 
indigenous coffee growers452 for choosing delegates to the Asamblea (a recommended new 
institution invested with the highest authority within the Convenio MH).  The latter, on the other 
hand, were considered by this Evaluating Committee to be represented by the Cooperative, 
which can be inferred from the Cooperative’s function to nominate the two small non-indigenous 
coffee farmers to the Junta Administradora453.  
 
A second effect was the creation of a new actor: the small (non) indigenous coffee farmers. They 
had been ignored during the first years of the agreement and his representation was assumed by 
                                                     
447  “desarrollar las operaciones mercantiles, relacionadas con compra de café (…) a los resguardos indígenas” 
Cláusula primera “objeto” del “Convenio para Compra de Café en Resguardos Indígenas” del 14 de febrero de 1992 
en Riosucio. 
448  “el café será comprado a los pequeños caficultores, registrados beneficiarios del programa” Cláusula primera 
“Objeto” del “Convenio Programa Max Havelaar/Transfair/Fairtrade Riosucio” del 19 de septiembre de 1997. 
449 Cláusula segunda “Ámbito”, ibíd. 
450 “En cuanto a la población meta se perfila, además de la población indígena de los 4 territorios nombrados por el 
Convenio, este sector de pequeños caficultores mestizos quienes por su situación de minifundistas extremos (ventas 
anuales de café menores de 3 cargas = 375 kilos) ni califican para ser socios de la Cooperativa y por tanto no se 
benefician de los servicios sociales de la Cooperativa”.   El numeral 2do del punto III “el apoyo en capacitación y 
acompañamiento que se ha dado al programa”, Recomendaciones. Acta 80 October/96. 
451 “los beneficiarios deberán ser pequeños productores de café poseedores de predios no mayores de cinco hectáreas 
de extensión y deberán vender el 90% de su producción a la cooperativa” Cláusula tercera “Beneficiarios”, Convenio 
MH/97, ibíd. 
452 “jornadas electorales en cada uno de los resguardos con los pequeños caficultores indígenas”. El numeral 1 del 
punto I “La organización del Convenio y su Funcionamiento”, Recomendaciones/96, Ibíd.  
453 “2 representantes de los pequeños caficultores no-indígenas (delegados por la cooperativa)” El numeral 4 del 
punto I “La organización del Convenio y su Funcionamiento”, Recomendaciones/96, Ibíd. 
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the Resguardos and the Cooperative454. Nonetheless, once the electoral contest to the Asamblea 
was approved through the new Convenio MH/1997, with potentially 20 from 30 seats455, this 
actor takes prominence. Especially as the Asamblea was responsible for electing the seven 
members of the Junta Administradora456: one representative of each Resguardo, two of the 
Cooperative (that represent coffee growers outside the Resguardo) and one from the CRIDEC457. 
That is to say, the overwhelming majority the CRIDEC and the Resguardos had before to take the 
decisions, was diluted among a population that more than their sympathy for the indigenous 
movement was bound together by the coffee crop.  
 
A third effect was the prominence of the Cooperative at the expense of the CRIDEC: from the 
seven functions the CRIDEC had including the overall management of the Convenio MH458 in 
1992, it went down to merely three functions as a simple articulator in 1997459. Part of their 
previous functions that were not assumed by the Asamblea and the Junta Administradora passed 
to new bodies such as the Junta de Vigilancia460 and the Secretaría Ejecutiva461  that are directed 
by people selected by the Asamblea in the first case, and the Junta Administradora in the second. 
The Cooperative, on the other hand, won control over the proposals. Indeed, the Junta 
Administradora could only decide on proposals prepared by the Secretaría Ejecutiva462, which 
was controlled by the Cooperative through both their power of veto over the nomination of the 
Secretaria Ejecutiva and the role as adviser of it463.  
 
                                                     
454 The indigenous movement had a much broader agenda than just coffee; the Cooperative statutorily excluded 
coffee farmers who sold less than 375 kilos per year. 
455  “La Asamblea es el órgano máximo del Convenio”. Numeral 1 “La Asamblea”, Cláusula quinta “Órganos”, 
Convenio/97, ibíd. It was composed by maximum five delegates from each Resguardo (according to their population) 
five delegates from the CRIDEC and five delegates from the Cooperative.  
456  Sección b, “Atribuciones y Responsabilidades”, numeral 1 “La Asamblea”, Cláusula quinta “Órganos”, 
Convenio/97, ibíd. 
457 Numeral 2 “La Junta Administradora”, Cláusula quinta “Órganos”, Convenio/97, ibíd. 
458 “planear, organizar y controlar el cumplimiento del presente convenio” Numeral d, Cláusula tercera “Obligaciones 
del CRIDEC”, Convenio/92, ibíd. 
459 “1- Servir de eslabón entre las comunidades indígenas beneficiarias del programa y el Convenio; 2- Apoyar el 
trabajo de promoción y ejecución del Convenio entre las comunidades y sus autoridades; 3- Promover cada 2 años 
jornadas electorales entre los resguardos para elegir los miembros de la Asamblea estipulada en este Convenio.” 
Numeral a, Cláusula cuarta “Obligaciones de las partes”, Convenio/97, ibíd. 
460 “tienen la función de ejercer el control social y de participación al interior del convenio. Vigilará especialmente 
sobre el cumplimiento de la Junta Administradora con su mandato y sus obligaciones”. Numeral 3 “La Junta de 
Vigilancia”, Cláusula quinta “Órganos”, Convenio/97, ibíd. 
461 “Tendrá todas las funciones ejecutivas, especialmente la de preparar las reuniones y decisiones de la Junta 
Administradora y de ejecutar las decisiones tomadas por ella”. Numeral 5 “La Secretaría ejecutiva, Cláusula quinta 
“Órganos”, Convenio/97, ibíd. 
462 “propuestas concretas avaladas por el secretario ejecutivo y el promotor del convenio quién asesora el proyecto 
respectivo” El numeral 1 del punto I “La organización del Convenio y su Funcionamiento”, Recomendaciones/96, Ibíd, 
y Numeral 1, Cláusula Séptima “Recursos”, Convenio/97, ibíd. 
463 “El secretario o la secretaria ejecutiva será seleccionado por la Junta Administradora con la aceptación de la 
cooperativa. Desempeñará sus funciones bajo las instrucciones de la Junta Administradora con la asesoría de la 
Cooperativa”. Numeral 5 “La Secretaría ejecutiva”, Cláusula quinta “Órganos”, Convenio/97, ibíd. 
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Finally, the MH offered two years' advice from international experts belonging to their network 
to guide the new actor (the small (non) indigenous coffee farmers) in developing the collective 
capacities to encourage the organic farming: The Swiss Konrad Matter to advise the executive 
bodies of the Convenio MH/1997 with the objective to enhance legitimacy to produce a positive 
impact on small (non) indigenous coffee growers and, the Belgian Bart Powels to advise the 
organic coffee program and develop the training program to transfer this technology and 
incentivize the changes on uses of Resource Constituents by farmers to produce the “natural 
coffee” symbolic service. As a result, the whole population of potential beneficiaries of the 
Convenio MH/1997 (coffee farmers with less than 5 hectares cultivated in coffee, without regard 
its ethnical origin or if they produce less than 375 kilos/year) were aggregated into a collective 
actor: the Asociación de Pequeños Productores de Café Ingrumá (Asprocafé hereafter) featured 
by join action; collective purpose and resources; and a voting system. This endowed the new 
actor with the AR personal464, needed to autonomously operate and execute the final outputs. 
 
The third movement is the strategic mobilization of the Cooperative´s property and the 
FNC/Comité’s personal to concretize the “specialty coffee registration program” of the coffee 
public policy to trigger monetary services by opening new commercial channels.  
 
In 1996, the Cooperative used their property465, the FNC and the Comité used their personal 
(FNC’s quality team; Comité’s extension service and FNC’s commercial division)466 to identify a 
coffee cultivated in the higher elevations of the Resguardo de San Lorenzo that could be offer as 
a more expensive specialty coffee known as Café la Vereda467, successfully exported in 1997468. 
After this commercial validation, the Cooperative, through the deliberative mechanism of the 
Convenio MH/1997, put forward their demand for this taste related service as an opportunity for 
the whole community in this Resguardo469, which implies the support of the Governor of San 
Lorenzo to make coffee farmers change their uses of the Resource constituents in the process of 
cultivation and post-harvesting to enhance the quality (as defined by the FNC) of coffee470. At the 
beginning of 1999, the Café la Vereda was awarded the best coffee of the 11th Specialty Coffee 
Fair of the SCAA in Philadelphia471. The commercial vitrine served to connect with two profilers 
at the end of the value chain: the Canadian roaster Timothy's and the American roaster Bucks 
County, with whom the FNC/Comité and the Cooperative developed the Socios y Amigos del Café 
                                                     
464 The team of Asprocafé started with the Secretaria Técnica, one coordinator and 4 promoters (one for each 
Resguardo). Interview with Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, ibid. 
465 The Cooperative’s purchase points provided the coffee samples collected with the data of their localization.     
466 Comité’s extension service carried out socio-economic studies to evaluate their supply feasibility; these were 
analyzed during several harvests by the FNC’s Quality Office to evaluate their sensory consistency; selected samples 
were offered by the FNC’s commercial division. Interview with Pedro Felipe Gómez, coordinator of the specialty 
coffee program at the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas. 
467 Trademark registered in August 2000 on behalf of the FNC in the United States (section 8.3.3.) 
468 In December 1997, the first export of La Vereda coffee was made, and during 1998 and 1999 an effort was made 
to position this coffee in international markets (CDCC & CCAOC, 2016, p. 6).  
469“oportunidad de café especial en San Lorenzo” Acta 98 January/98 
470 “hay que enfatizar con el Gobernador del Resguardo en calidad del café” Acta 98 January/98  
471 Recognition that gave the honor to the FNC to serve Café la Vereda at the closing ceremony of the fair (CDCC & 
CCAOC, 2016) 
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Especial la Vereda (the SACEV agreement hereafter). The latter increased its negotiating position 
in the eyes of the (non) indigenous coffee growers. 
 
A fourth movement is Asproinca’s cooperative mobilization of their AR information to transfer it 
to the indigenous movement and redefined the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service. Likewise, 
Asprocafé cooperatively mobilized their AR information to transfer it to the Comité-FNC. 
 
The production of the “natural coffee” symbolic service, as defined by Asproinca, was an 
opportunity for recovering ancient memory and with it, the indigenous identity lost by a long 
period of miscegenation: the first meeting of traditional knowledge in organic fertilizers was 
developed in the Ingrumá Indigenous Center in which the eldest indigenes related how they used 
to plant coffee before the synthetic fertilizers arrived, highlighting the use of organic matter in 
farms featured by the diversity of both plants and animal species 472 . This facilitated the 
reorientation of the agreement towards the (non) indigenous small coffee farmers, so the 
indigenous movement accepted not being at the center473. 
 
Asprocafé, mobilizing this AR information enriched their intervention proposal through an 
agroecological approach474 whose center of intervention was the family and its land (not the 
associative group as it had been done before). They considered that the learning process needed 
an additional horizontal element (from producer to producer) in addition to the vertical one 
(from the technician to the producer)475. 
 
Likewise, the organic production of coffee that was despised by a generation of agronomists 
trained under the green revolution mantra of yield/ha, which comprised the bulk of the technical 
team of the FNC, was gradually accepted by the Comité and the extension agents in Riosucio: At 
the beginning of the nineties, the only evidence available was Cenicafé’s publication by Henao 
and A Salazar Arias (1981), which stated that 12 kilos of pulp/year/plant were required to replace 
synthetic fertilizers. It was physically unfeasible in the Colombian mountains when multiplying 
that amount by the more than three thousand coffee trees/ha476. However, Asprocafé mobilized 
                                                     
472 Acta 103 May/98 
473 This did not mean that they did not continue receiving subsidies. In the evaluation of the year 98, of the COP 130 
million (USD 101 thousand) in income, COP 20 million (USD 15 thousand) were allocated to the support of the 
indigenous movement. Acta 113 January/1999 
474 Agro-ecological training involves making agricultural uses that recover the ecological cycle. That is, the nutrients 
that leave the system when selling coffee beans are re-entered into the system, not through synthetic fertilizers but 
through fertilizers. These are made on the farm when recycling organic waste from both the agricultural processes 
and the breeding of livestock and minor species. Also, it promotes biodiversity inside the farm for crops protection. 
To this end, Asprocafé made a training in the manufacture of solid and liquid fertilizers and in biological preparations 
for the control of pests. Acta 117 Mayo/99      
475 Interview with Ángela Gómez, Asproinca, ibid.  
476  Even this experiment is still cited to talk about the impracticality of organic agriculture, see for example 
Khalajabadi (2008). 
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its AR information477 to demonstrate that these studies were inadequate because in the organic 
farming they supported there was a combination of solid and liquid fertilizers derived from other 
agricultural activities in an agroecological productive system with low, medium and high 
coverage478. Asprocafé transferred this AR information to the FNC’s extension service through 
workshops in organic coffee farming in 1997479.  
 
Once the “environmentally responsible” symbolic service was triggered by the ICA 2001, the FNC 
started to seek it in zones with coffee crops featured by the old covered traditional varieties with 
low productivity480. They launched a study to evaluate the potential for the production and 
certification of organic coffee in farms of three municipalities of Caldas whose conclusion was 
that 75% of farmers have potential to produce organic coffee (Salazar & O Farfán Valencia, 2003). 
In Riosucio the Comité had acquired the RA information that was mobilized to validate their 
organic project within the FNC481. 
 
6.2.3. Institutional creativity: produce the “natural coffee” and merge it with the 
“indigenous coffee”, “Fairtrade coffee”, “environmentally responsible” 
symbolic services and the “clean cup” and “citric acid” taste related services 
 
The concretization of the “Specialty coffee registration and promotion program” of the coffee 
public policy produced the demand for a new service that vested as an actor the FNC/Comité and 
sparked a decision of the Junta to informally establish a coordination mechanism that led to a 
deliberative scenario known as the Inter-Institutional Committee482. It was constituted informally 
through which the field days and the training of the various institutions were coordinated (partly 
derived from the recommendations 483 ) in periodic feedback meetings 484  . It had two 
                                                     
477 In addition to the knowledge transferred by Bart Powels, it was also reinforced through horizontal learning with 
farmers in other Departments and countries. Supported by the Convenio, Asprocafé participate in a workshop in the 
Department of Cauca and in the Asamblea de Pequeños Productores in Costa Rica). Acta 103 May/1998  
478 Clearly if they had promoted only the reuse of the pulp and prohibiting the synthetic fertilizer in a conventional 
monoculture production system, they would have only produced low yield affecting the wellbeing of the coffee 
household. Interview with Oscar Daniel Sánchez, coordinator of the extension service at Asprocafé from 1992 to 
2008 when he moved into Cafexport, in which he is currently the technical coordinator for the Nespresso’s Expocafé 
Clúster. 
479  “En 1997 (…) En Riosucio se realizó un primer taller de caficultura orgánica para los técnicos del Comité 
Departamental, conducido por Eugenio Cifuentes y el apoyo de la Facultad de  Agronomía Orgánica de la Universidad 
Santa Rosa de Cabal” (Esguerra Gutierrez, 2001, p. 15) 
480 “la Federación concentrará sus esfuerzos en proyectos que se organicen en zonas con cultivos de typica o de 
caturra con sombrío, con cafetales envejecidos y con productividades muy bajas, entre 2 a 3 cargas por hectárea 
(menos de 375 kilos/ha)” (Esguerra Gutierrez, 2001, p. 34) 
481 “(El Comité Departamental de Caldas) ha adelantado un trabajo de identificación de zonas potenciales para la 
producción de café orgánico” (Esguerra Gutierrez, 2001, p. 15).  
482 Interview with Oscar Daniel Sánchez, Asprocafé, ibid.    
483 “tomando en consideración la presencia de varias instituciones quienes desarrollan un trabajo de promoción y 
asistencia en la misma zona (Cooperativa, Comité, Sena, UMATAS, Asproinca), el convenio debe definir cuál es el 
papel específico en cuanto áreas de intervención y en cuanto a población meta de sus promotores”. El numeral 2 del 
punto III “El apoyo en capacitación y acompañamiento que se ha dado al programa”, Recomendaciones/96, Ibíd.   
484 Interview with Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, Ibíd. 
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consequences: on the one hand, they were progressively finding common places around the 
production of both the “natural coffee” symbolic service and the “citric acid” taste related 
services (in fact, it was considered that only the organic coffee culture could produce the citric 
acid aromatic profile485). On the other, it pushed away actors who radically privileged other 
services from the Resource: at one extreme those demanding the “indigenous coffee” symbolic 
service, at the other extreme, those demanding the “monetary” services.  
 
In fact, the Comité (in particular their extension agent Adriana Vinasco486) decided to develop 
the SACEV agreement supporting the organic production system. Then, la Junta decided to 
articulate the Convenio MH with the SACEV agreement through an extension agent shared 
among the Convenio-Comité-Cooperative487. 
 
As a result, there was a miscegenation of the practices implemented by the SACEV through the 
Comité Asesor Café la Vereda en el Resguardo de San Lorenzo (lead by the Comité and composed 
by leaders of the indigenous coffee farmers which were also beneficiaries of the Convenio MH): 
for example, in the planting process: the practices of having a seedbed on the farm and planting 
in the field the coffee plantlets seven months old to maximize monetary services, evolved 
towards a communal seedbeds (own by the indigenous movement using seeds prioritized by the 
Comité) and the sowings were carried out through the regime of "manos cambiadas" 488 
privileging the cycles of the moon (a practice recommended by the indigenous movement) as 
long as it was during the rainy season (a practice recommended by the Comité)489. 
 
Miscegenation that was also integrated into the rural educational policy: Given the importance 
of coffee cultivation in Caldas, the FNC through the Comité implemented the rural education 
policy by a delegation of the Ministry of Education. The latter, through formal agreements, 
transferred the money to the former to fund the Escuela Nueva rural education model 490, which 
included a mandatory component called Escuela y café 491 . Through the Inter-Institutional 
Committee, actors activated the rural education policy492  in an innovative way by using the 
                                                     
485 “A futuro el Mercado solo será por taza (…) los químicos pueden tener efectos en la tasa (…) el futuro es de los 
cafés especiales y orgánicos”. Acta 109 October/98 
486 “El Comité nunca creyó en el programa orgánico y si se desarrolló, fue porque la extensionista sabía que era la 
única manera de poder trabajar en esta zona indígena”. Interview with Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, Ibíd. 
487 “el Comité va a empezar a trabajar el programa de café orgánico en Riosucio, y se tiene que enlazar con el 
Convenio a través de un promotor que sea del Convenio – Comité – Cooperativa”. Acta 124 Diciembra/99 
488 It implies a shared work derived from the indigenous mingas. The group of coffee farmers sows the farm of one 
member, then the other, and so on until all scheduled sowings are made. 
489 Interview with Diego, the leader of the Café la Vereda project between 1997 and 2008 in the Cooperative. 
490 Model developed in Colombia in the 70s to improve coverage and quality in education, especially in multi-grade 
rural schools: A teacher attends several student cohorts thanks to each grade has its own self-taught guides. 
491 The students had two hours a week to see the coffee lecture: history, varieties, planting, nutrition, diseases, 
phytosanitary management, picking times, weeding, trading. In addition, they were given materials and field training 
to work in their parents' farm a plot cultivated in coffee. Interview with Janeth Motato, former rector of the Instituto 
Educativo la Esperanza, the first Escuela Nueva to develop the Escuela y Café component supporting organic farming.   
492 Acta 113 January/99 
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Escuela Nueva and its Escuela y café component to encourage organic coffee farming493. In spite 
of having been denied permission initially by the FNC-Comité, the deliberative scenario created 
by the Inter-institutional committee allowed to overtake this obstacle thanks to the convergence 
mentioned around the “natural coffee” symbolic service, and it was so successful that eventually 
they won the prize for the best Escuela y café in Colombia in 1998494. 
 
In this way, the process to influence the know-to-appreciate in order to produce the “natural 
coffee” symbolic service could advance with some fluidity. At the end of 1998, the discussion 
about the certification of organic coffee began495 and at the beginning of 1999, the plan for being 
certificated was already in place starting with a baseline of practices implemented by selected 
farmers496. Taking advantage of this baseline, the Junta Administradora decided to start with 109 
coffee growers (out of 181 associates) cultivating coffee in 204 ha (out of 3,700 has in Riosucio 
in 1999497). This baseline also highlighted the deficiencies in the use of the know-how during the 
post-harvesting process to produce both the “clean cup” 498 and the “citric acid” taste related 
services. Hence the Convenio MH decided to subsidized loans for acquiring the equipment 
needed for all the activities in the post-harvesting (pulping machine, fermentation tanks and 
coffee washing, plastic-covered drying installations and water treatment) 499 , as well as the 
implementation of cupping test for 109 selected coffee growers500. A couple of years later, once 
the Internal Control System came into operation with its four components (Coordinador de 
Certificación; Inspectores Internos; Comité de Certificación y Normas Orgánicas), they hired 
Ecocert, who after inspecting 45% of the coffee growers certify the organic production under the 
European legislation501  in June 2001. They made the first export of 45 bags of organic certified 
coffee in January 2002 (Sánchez Arenas, 2005). 
                                                     
493 For example, the seed must be sow in full moon but only once the seed was dry after being immunized in the 
sage juice for 5 minutes; alongside citronella and lemongrass must be crop to control pests and forage peanut to 
control weeds because their “spiritual power”. Interview with Janeth Motato, Instituto Educativo La Esperanza, ibid. 
494 Interview with Janeth Motato, Instituto Educativo La Esperanza, ibid. 
495 In the Acta 110 Nov/98 it is mentioned the need to select some coffee farmers who wanted to be certified organic, 
so Asprocafé could be certified and the inspection started. It is decided to start with those who have never used 
synthetic fertilizers. It is approved that the credits are going to prioritize organic coffee farmers who decides to 
certificate.  
496 The cooperative accepts to adapt its facilities for the purchase, storage and threshing, so they could be certified. 
The associated coffee farmers were classified according to the last time they had applied synthetic fertilizers. 
According to this classification a group is selected, the letters of commitment are drawn, the records of practices 
started (soil analysis, nutrition, pest control, soil conservation and post-harvesting) and the management of other 
crops. Subsequently, the internal control system would be implemented and the certification would be requested.  
Acta 117 May/99 
497 On average, they owned 1.8ha cultivated with 2,107 coffee trees/ha with an annual production of 327 kilos/ha. 
Acta 117 May/99. In the 1997 Encuesta Nacional Cafetera, Riosucio had 3.664 hectares grown in coffee.  Fuente: 
SICA/FNC. 
498 Through the Resolución 5 del Comité Nacional de Cafeteros DE 2002 quality criteria was unified, in practical terms 
it meant that only coffee that was timely hulled, shortly fermented and properly dried could be exported. Chapter 
4.1.2  
499 Acta 121 September/1999. 
500 Acta 124 December/1999. 
501 Reglamento Comunitario R(CEE) No 2092/91 del Consejo del 24 de junio de 1991, sobre producción agrícola 
ecológica y su indicación en los productos agrarios y alimenticios.  
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Through the Asamblea General de Asprocafé as a deliberative mechanism, this new demand for 
services was incorporated through the intermediate output “Plan de Desarrollo Asprocafé 
Ingrumá” that was presented in 2003 with two programs: a first one oriented to influence uses 
of know-how during the planting, cultivating and post-harvesting process to produce the “natural 
coffee” symbolic service. It encouraged the consolidation of an integral and self-sufficient farm 
that would produce food (and organic matter502) for both family consumption and sale to the 
local market503 while privileging young coffee plantations to maximize productivity and, training 
in the correct post-harvesting practices to reduce defective beans and capture the largest 
possible price 504 . A second program sought to influence uses know-how during the post-
harvesting process to produce the “natural coffee” symbolic service in order to minimize the 
negative effects of coffee activity on the environment 505   and protect natural resources, 
especially water, soil, and biodiversity506. Complementary, the SACEV agreement financed the 
technology transfer and the equipment needed to profile both the “natural coffee” and 
“indigenous coffee” symbolic service (through the mentioned mestizo practices), the “citric acid” 
taste related services (through the delivery of hulling machines, fermentation tanks, and plastic 
covered drying facilities) and the “environmentally responsible” symbolic service (through the 
delivery of the water treatment tanks and the materials for the construction of composters and 
vermiculture equipment507). 
 
The inter-institutional committee also agreed on the distribution of social premiums among 
beneficiaries. So, the US $ 0.15 per pound exported as the social premium of the SACEV 
agreement exclusively in the Resguardo de San Lorenzo, while the premiums received by the MH 
agreement were invested in the other areas of its influence excluding this Resguardo (despite 
they were also MH’s beneficiaries). 
 
                                                     
502 “Proyecto 2: Diversificación Pecuaria y aprovechamiento subproductos en la finca (establos, Áreas pastoreo, 
bancos forrajes, sistemas abonamiento líquido, áreas para producción abonos orgánicos, planta abonos orgánicos)”, 
Primer Programa “programa técnico para el mejoramiento de la productividad de las fincas cafeteras”, Plan de 
Desarrollo Asprocafé Ingrumá 2003. 
503 “Proyecto 4: Comercialización Otros Productos Agropecuarios Certificados (Identificar otras líneas productivas, 
fortalecer manejo, postcosecha, cadenas de mercadeo)”, Primer Programa “programa técnico para el mejoramiento 
de la productividad de las fincas cafeteras, Plan de Desarrollo Asprocafé Ingrumá 2003 
504 “Proyecto 1: Aumento de la Productividad y aseguramiento de la calidad café. (Renovación, Capacitación calidad 
café, Perfil Taza café orgánico)”, Primer Programa “programa técnico para el mejoramiento de la productividad de 
las fincas cafeteras”, Plan de Desarrollo Asprocafé Ingrumá 2003. 
505  “Proyecto 1: Mejoramiento condiciones ambientales. (Filtros para la descontaminación de aguas servidas, 
construcción beneficiaderos de café, Capacitación en Reciclaje y optimización recursos naturales, energía Limpia – 
Biodigestores)”, Segundo Programa “programa Ambiental para la Disminución de la Contaminación Ambiental de 
las fincas cafeteras”, Plan de Desarrollo Asprocafé Ingrumá 2003. 
506 “Proyecto 2: Establecimiento de Sombrío y Reforestación. (Reforestar cuencas, nacimientos y corrientes de agua; 
Aportar árboles para sombra, protección, maderables, frutales, forrajeras)”, Segundo Programa “programa 
Ambiental para la Disminución de la Contaminación Ambiental de las  fincas cafeteras”, Plan de Desarrollo Asprocafé 
Ingrumá 2003. 
507 Interview with Diego, Cooperative, Ibid.  
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The final outputs508 that were executed with the annual premiums in some prioritized farms 
show the effort for profiling the combination of the “monetary” services; the “clean cup” taste 
related service509; the “natural coffee” and “environmentally responsible” symbolic services. In 
2005 one-fifth of the 560 hectares cultivated in coffee of the now 525 members510  had been 
progressively renovated (since 2001, a little less than 10% of the program area per year). The 
technology transfer through both group training and individual accompaniment almost doubled 
the annual productivity from the 327 kilos/ha in 1999 to 608 kilos/ha in 2005. As monetary 
services are higher when the coffee sold overtake the minimum quality requirements they 
provided field days with topics like "picking, post-harvesting, and defects of coffee" and 
encourage the effort with quality contest called “apuéstele a la taza limpia de Asprocafé 
Ingrumá” while improving the 20% of all post-harvesting equipment of associates. Likewise, 
training in the management of silvopastoral productive systems included the delivery of both 
plantlets of coffee trees and materials for stables to twenty associates in 2004; as well as training 
in nutrition including the delivery of materials for the construction of biodigesters511  for 35 
associates in 2004, encouraged 309 Producers (to transform) 780 tons of biodegradable by-
products from their farms into 309 tons of organic fertilizer. The 551 farms registered in the 
organic program did not apply agro-toxics. A diagnosis of the environmental problems was made 
for a quarter of the participating families: 10 filters were installed to protect the most affected 
creeks and 20 micro-watersheds were reforested and 1565 trees delivered for their protection. 
Additionally, the farms produced 83 tons of food (bananas, banana-plantain, oranges, tangerines 
and panela (dehydrated juice from sugarcane) that were commercialized by the Asprocafé. 
 
6.2.4. Outcome 
 
Both the international organic-labeling legislation and the ICA 2001 gathered together a coalition 
(between producers, the Indigenous Movement, the FNC/Comité, the Cooperative, roasters and 
MH), around a definition of the problem in terms of the low provision of “natural coffee” symbolic 
service that threatened consumers’ health and, producers’ environment and community.  
 
Unlike the previous LRA MH that targeted the indigenous community, whether or not they were 
coffee farmers, in this LRA Natural the logic of intervention targeted the coffee farmers, whether 
indigenous or not. Thus, the (non) indigenous coffee farmer should transit towards an organic 
productive system through the concretization of both the “Specialty coffee registration and 
                                                     
508 All the information in this paragraph comes from the December 2005 report on the organic coffee program of 
Sánchez Arenas (2005)  
509 Through the Resolución 5 del Comité Nacional de Cafeteros DE 2002 quality criteria was unified, in practical terms 
it meant that only coffee that was timely hulled, shortly fermented and properly dried could be exported. Chapter 
4.1.2  
510  357 ha of 346 certified organic producers, and 204 ha of 182 coffee farmers in the conversion process (3 years 
that must elapse between the last application of chemical products and the start of the certification process as 
organic)  Sánchez Arenas (2005) 
511 The used waters, product of the both the coffee and stables washing, are directed towards this container, which 
through anaerobic fermentation, produces methane gas for the household needs and a by-product that is used as 
liquid fertilizer.    
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promotion program” of the coffee public policy which reoriented the previously created market 
of fair trade, towards an organic market, and the regulatory system through two coffee purchase 
agreements: the Convenio MH and the SACEV agreement.  
 
The intermediate outputs were produced individually (through both the Convenio MH and the 
SACEV agreement) but the final output was shaped by the actors through the Inter-Institutional 
Committee that allowed them to exchange knowledge and experiences: Including ancestral 
practices of indigenous communities, peasant customs of small coffee farmers, the scientific 
recommendations developed by Cenicafé and the healthy practices championed by the MH.  
 
This deliberative scenario allowed the demands for services to be merged in all uses of 
constituents compatible with the “natural coffee” symbolic service. As a result, the Fairtrade 
profile present in Riosucio evolved towards a more complex organic profile which produced 
alongside the “natural coffee” symbolic service, the “Fairtrade coffee”, “environmentally 
responsible” and “indigenous coffee” symbolic services demanded by consumers, stakeholders 
in both consumption and production. Additionally, it produced the “clean cup” and “citric acid” 
taste related services which maximized the monetary services demanded by profilers such as the 
cooperative and trading unit of the FNC. 
 
Hence, on the base-line LRA Standard, the LRA MH evolved towards the much more complex LRA 
Natural: in addition to the previous, it sparked new regulated uses to trigger agroecology 
practices in the planting and cultivation (renovation; shade; soil management, hedgerows, and 
picking); quality-oriented practices in the post-harvesting process (four activities hulling, 
fermentation, drying and waste management); and recognition of the organic label in the 
roasting process (blending and packaging) increasing the extent (69% of evenly-distributed 
regulated uses, Annex 7). At the same time, it spread to align new actors like the FNC/Comité and 
some roasters like Timothies and Equal; new governance mechanisms were integrated like 
Asprocafé with its Internal Control System, and the SACEV agreement with its Comité Asesor 
composed of indigenous leaders, and new outputs like the premium to incentivize practices and 
the Escuela y Café   increase the coherence by coordinating the efforts among the various actors 
with influence over the farmers (including educative institutions) to multiply the effect on the 
change in farmers’ behavior. Also, closure was increased by erecting the “government policy” 
barrier of entry when the obtained the organic certification. So, to the “product differentiation” 
barrier of entry at the producers’ level linked to the origin (which was reinforced with the Café la 
Vereda project specifically in the Resguardo de San Lorenzo), a new differentiation was made by 
linking it to the organic farming.  
 
Nonetheless, two groups of actors felt their services left behind. A minority group in the 
indigenous movement that defined the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service in opposition to the 
coffee culture; a minority group in the FNC (including farmers) who believe the “monetary” 
services could be at risk due to some practices demanded to produce the “natural coffee” 
symbolic service.  
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6.3. Incumbent LRA Natural; newborn LRA Fairtrade; LRA Organic; LRA La Vereda and 
LRA Nespresso (2004-2011)  
 
The profile of the LRA Natural left behind the services demanded by two groups of individuals: 
On the one hand, some indigenous started to redefine the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service 
as a counterfactual of the coffee expansion encouraged by the coffee public policy. For them, 
almost all of the indigenous production system, that implied more than 60 different species of 
plants within the farm, were lost because people were encouraged to the coffee monoculture512. 
On the other, some coffee producers perceived a threat to the “monetary” services they demand 
because the uses of the Resource constituents, shaped by the indigenous cosmovision, to 
produce the “natural coffee” symbolic service, were made of superstitious beliefs that would 
project a chaotic image of Colombian organic coffee farming 513   and could put at risk the 
“Appellation Café de Colombia” symbolic service514. 
 
These actors were individuals or groups of individuals who represented a minority in their 
respective groups (the collective actor): A minority portion of the indigenous movement that 
rejected coffee as a foreign non-nutritive crop responsible of the dispossession, and a minority 
of coffee growers belonging to the Cooperative and the Comité preferred to resume synthetic 
fertilization practices than to continue with the MH process.  
 
The LRA Organic as an agreement among collective actors, allowed each actor to maintain the 
internal cohesion on the shared definition of the problem even if they were some unsatisfied 
individuals. But during the second half of the first decade of the two-thousands, this agreement 
collapsed and with it the internal cohesion. The unsatisfied individuals managed to spread their 
definition of the problem within the collective actor until a point in which an agreement was not 
reachable because the actors’ constellations become one of pure conflict. As a result, rivalries 
were insurmountable and the actors’ games produced three new LRAs.  
 
                                                     
512 “aquí se transformaron y se perdieron los sistemas de producción indígenas en un 80%, porque la gente se fue a 
sembrar café (…) para el 98-99 que nosotros empezamos a hacer reconversión ya había mucha caficultura tradicional, 
monocultivos! Ya había problemas de agua, ya había pérdidas de semillas (antes de esta intervención según los 
relatos de los mayores) la gente tenía su café tradicional (…) encontrabas hasta 60 variedades dentro del cafetal 
entre las coberturas bajitas, medias, altas y eso se perdió” Inteview with Ángela Gómez, Asproinca, ibíd.  
513 “Hay que evitar que el mercado perciba una gran diversidad de proyectos con mensajes y criterios diferentes. 
Colombia aparecería como un país que aborda el tema de los cafés orgánicos de una forma caótica y que, por lo 
tanto, no se encuentra listo para obtener recursos de cooperación y apoyo internacional, ni para trabajar en la 
implantación de este tipo de proyectos” (Esguerra Gutierrez, 2001, p. 43) 
514 “Se tiene la creencia de que los productos orgánicos pueden tener mejor sabor que los convencionales, lo cual es 
una afirmación no comprobada y peligrosa para un país que tiene un gran negocio en la caficultura convencional que 
debe protegerse y que no es conveniente ni desprestigiarla, ni debilitarla. Esta creencia puede llevar a generar la 
falsa impresión de que, en todos los casos, es conveniente cambiar la caficultura convencional por la orgánica.” 
(Esguerra Gutierrez, 2001, p. 5) 
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6.3.1. Newborn LRA Fairtrade and LRA Organic 
• Actors’ coalitions: low provision of the “Fairtrade coffee” symbolic service for 
stakeholders in consumption 
 
The global Fairtrade movement considered that the provision of the “Fairtrade” symbolic service 
was still too low because it had not reached the critical mass needed to cause a big impact. So, 
they decided to join efforts in the use of know-to-appreciate of consumers by investing 
collectively in the positioning of a brand that transmits the feeling of altruism and responsibility 
that would materialize the “Fairtrade coffee” symbolic service. 
 
In 1997 different organizations of the Fairtrade movement were associated around the Fairtrade 
Labeling Organizations International (FLO hereafter) with the aim of agreeing on common 
standards and harmonizing the message they wanted to transmit to consumers. In practice, 
enriching the network in quantity and quality, given that before, the provision of the “Fairtrade 
coffee” symbolic service could be produced only through MH’s commercial network composed 
of several (but a relatively small group of) specialized roasters. However, a group of actors within 
FLO considered this network approach as a limitation to the Fairtrade growth. They demanded 
the establishment of a certification mark that would allow them to irrupt into the standard coffee 
market so they could make a significant transformation515. The objective was to increase the 
demand by selling outside this network and capture the attention of the large roasters. 
 
The International Coffee Agreement of 2001, especially its consensus around the market 
mechanisms to align consumer socio-environmental preferences that, through better prices, 
would encourage the adoption of socio-environmental practices by the profilers, gave 
momentum to this idea and in 2002 the Fairtrade certification mark was launched, which 
materialized in the different legislations the article 7bis on collective trademarks of the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to register and protect this collective 
trademark. 
 
MH, a member of the FLO, unilaterally introduced this certification mark into the LRA Natural at 
the expense of both internal cohesion, in which some members resigned516 and an external one, 
in which some partners moved partially away like some producers, the indigenous movement 
and the FNC/Comité. So, a coalition composed mainly of Asprocafé and its associated farmers; 
the Cooperative and MH agreed on joint action to be certified on the Fairtrade mark in order to 
provide the “fair trade coffee” symbolic service.   
 
• Selfishly mobilization of stakeholders in consumption 
 
                                                     
515 “‘If it is only in the specialized world shops, you will never sell a lot. . . If you really want to make a big impact, we 
have to work with the commercial market” Said a participant in the Fairtrade certification mark process, quoted by 
Levy et al. (2015, p. 380) 
516 “By 1997, none of the major firms – Kraft, Nestle, Proctor & Gamble, and Sara Lee – had adopted a standard nor 
publicly acknowledged any responsibility for coffee farmers or growing conditions” (Levy et al., 2015, p. 380). 
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The registration of the trademark annulled the MH’s RA organization since its in-depth 
knowledge of producers and roasters that allowed it to link them for mutual benefit, became 
unnecessary when the certification united them impersonally 517 . As a result, the logic of 
cooperative transfer of action resources to produce the “Fairtrade coffee” symbolic service was 
inverted, to a logic where FLO selfishly mobilized their RA property on the Fairtrade label over 
other actors, who had to pay for the access through a certification process, to produce the 
“fairtrade coffee” symbolic service.  
 
This imposition became evident when Asprocafé concretized the regulatory system by obtaining 
the right to use the certification mark: They firstly comply with the standard and then paid for 
the audit (which took place in 2003) in order to be FLO certified (they were certified in 2004) and 
access to the Fairtrade market that they previously freely accessed. Through this, they obtained 
the social premium with which they could incentivize, via better prices and access to services 
(equipment, technical assistance, training, etc.), the change in the behavior of small (non) 
indigenous coffee farmers. 
 
Two measures required by the audit report in order to obtain the FLO certification changed the 
allocation of action resources: The formalization and democratic organization of Asprocafé and, 
the traceability of the coffee of its members. 
 
The first measure demanded that all members would be democratically elected. Hence the 
indigenous movement completely lost their representativeness518 and without it, the subsidies, 
that they had been received since the program began, vanished 519 . That is to say, the AR 
consensus possessed by the indigenous movement was completely erased and with it, they lost 
the access to the transfer of the money resource to improve their action resources endowment. 
The CRIDEC perceived this change as a deception of Asprocafé to deprive them access to the 
Convenio520, destroying the previous trust between them521.  
 
The second measure demanded that only the associates' coffee is traded: previously the MH’s 
organization allow the Cooperative to sell as Fairtrade coffee the production of their associates 
regardless whether they were associates of Asprocafé (even though the social premium was 
invested only in associated farmers committed to the organic program). This measure implied 
                                                     
517 Max Leuzinger, who had accompanied the process in Riosucio from the beginning and knew by name the coffee 
growers and roasters, resigned in 2004 for considering the new scheme contrary to his convictions. Interview with 
Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, ibíd. 
518 Since the Convenio MH/1997, the CRIDEC delegated 5 representatives (of the 30 participants) to the Asamblea 
General, and one of the seven participants of the Junta Administradora    
519 “Hasta que empezaron la disminución de los recursos, les dijimos ya no hay (subsidios para los Resguardos)”. 
Interview with Rocio Motato, Asprocafé, Ibíd. Without representation in the decision-making bodies, the CRIDEC 
could not oppose.   
520 “Débiles nosotros que nos lo dejamos arrebatar” Interview with José David Bueno, representative of the CRIDEC 
during this period.  
521 “Lo que más daño les ha hecho son los intermediarios como Asprocafé. Como productores no les llegan los 
beneficios” Interview with Abel David Jaramillo. Gobernador del Resguardo de San Lorenzo 2005-2011 y alcalde de 
Riosucio 2012-2015. 
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that only Asprocafé’s members could be beneficiaries of the Convenio MH/1997, excluding 
farmers non-associated to former but associated to the latter, in other words, excluding a portion 
of owners of the Cooperative’s property.  
 
• Absence of Institutional Creativity to shape the LRA Fairtrade 
 
The Fairtrade standard demanded a non-negotiable profile. So, either profiling actors used (or at 
least try to use) the Resource constituents as it was written down, or they were unauthorized to 
profile the combination of services sought by the LRA Fairtrade 522 . If the profile was not 
negotiable, the deliberative scenario among actors with different demands from the Resource 
was unnecessary and the Fairtrade coalition prioritized their efforts in fulfilling the Fairtrade 
standard.  
 
One first effect was that it was put into question the decision to benefit with the social premium 
only the organic coffee farmers: if the sales to the Convenio MH/1997 were mainly conventional 
coffee, it did not make much sense to exclude from the benefits the conventional coffee farmers 
who did not envision the organic farming523. In addition, since only partners could sell, it was 
imperative to increase the number of partners so it was counterproductive to limit the benefits 
to the smaller group of farmers committed with organic farming. Thus, the “natural coffee” 
symbolic service came off the “Fairtrade coffee” symbolic service: it was no longer mandatory to 
refrain from the use of synthetic fertilizers during the cultivation process (nutrition activity) to 
produce both services. A small coffee grower could make use of them and produce the “Fairtrade 
coffee” symbolic service while another that abstained would produce the “natural coffee” 
symbolic service. The former would sell its coffee Fairtrade certificated, the latter as Organic 
certified. It was considered that by allowing synthetic fertilization small conventional farmers 
who had not joined by the insistence on organic coffee would join but it also encouraged the 
migration of some organic farmers towards the conventional coffee farming524.  
 
• Presence of Institutional Creativity to create the newborn LRA Organic   
 
Hence, even though there was not a deliberative scenario not to profile sought by the LRA 
Fairtrade, which was completely imposed, there was a scenario to profile other compatible 
services alongside the Fairtrade profile, in which only coffee producers participated. Namely the 
                                                     
522 “Ya los grupos tienen que pagar para poder estar en el movimiento. Antes nos compraban bastante café, muchos 
recursos y la asesoría no la pagaban (…) A nosotros nos aplicaron la auditoria FLO, es un cambio muy brusco porque 
Max venía cada año, revisaba, ya ahorita, que cumpla estándares.” Interview with Rocio Motato. Asprocafé, ibid. 
523  Speaking of the arguments of the Manager of the Cooperative: “Sí son los convencionales los que están 
produciendo el recurso, ¿porque no es para los convencionales? Entonces ya, a no, hay que entregarle a los 
convencionales también (…) que recibieran convencionales y que también recibieran beneficios” Interview with Rocio 
Motato, Asprocafé, ibid.  
524 For 2007, Asprocafé had 1,682 members, almost three times more than the 550 registered in 2005. However, all 
the partners in 2005 were organic coffee farmers and by 2007 it had been reduced to 398 and 255 in 2011. Informe 
de administración, presentado en la Asamblea General de delegados de la asociación de pequeños productores de 
café Ingrumá “Asprocafé Ingruma” 2007 y 2011.  
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Asprocafé’s governance mechanisms (chapter 5.2.2). Indeed, Asprocafé had a major stake 
profiling firstly services demanded by the LRA Fairtrade but then, it could profile other 
compatible services like the “Natural coffee” symbolic service. Thus, they shaped the final 
outputs to impact differently participant farmers in both groups: organic and conventional525. 
For the LRA Fairtrade the final output was shaped to increase the monetary services: improve 
the quality by subsidizing post-harvest equipment526; increase the quantity through a subsidy for 
renovation527 and both through a subsidized loans program in which farmers could choose either 
organic or conventional coffee farming funded in the Fairtrade social premium.  
 
But then, with the reduced group of actors that shared the previous definition of the problem in 
term on the risk on health caused by the conventional coffee farming, a coalition was 
consolidated to maintaining the provision of the “Natural coffee” symbolic service: Asprocafé’s 
group of organic farmers; Asprocafé; the Cooperative (which made money by volume through 
the conventional farming and by add value through the organic farming) and the North American 
Roaster Equal Exchange528.  
 
The latter strategically mobilized their AR organization to concretize an institution of the private 
regulation “the Small Farmer Fund” of the Lutheran World Relief, and produce as a final output 
the project to support productivity improvement in the organic farms of Asprocafé. With an 
investment of USD 66 thousand they supported both the soil analysis for all participants and the 
elements to compensate deficiencies; including the equipment needed to produce solid and 
liquid organic fertilizers529; it offered loans to women and young people to acquire pigs or cows 
for manure to use as a fertilizer and additional support for the adaptation of stables and pigsties; 
and exchange programs with organic farmers in Nicaragua (T. Caspersen, 2008, p. 2). They 
developed a new governance mechanism between Asprocafé and Equal for monitoring the 
development of the project that eventually would be informally known as the annual visit of 
Equal (chapter 5.2.2) that trigger the evolution of the LRA Natural into the LRA Organic 
 
• Outcome 
 
The Fairtrade certification mark was registered by the FLO to make a significant transformation 
of the global coffee market but its non-negotiable profile broke apart the previous “natural 
                                                     
525Of the 1,682 associated families, 398 families produced 160 tons of organic coffee and 1,284 families produced 
2,070 tons of conventional coffee. Informe de Asprocafé 2007, ibíd. Pag. 2 y 3.  
526 In 2007 the adaptation of 53 post-harvesting facilities, 73 plastic-covered drying facilities and the maintenance of 
296 hulling machines. Informe de Asprocafé 2007, ibíd.   
527 COP 50 million (USD 27 thousand) were invested in the renovation incentive for 230 conventional coffee growers. 
Informe Asprocafé 2007. Ibíd. 
528 USD 60 million in sales in 2014. It has 117 “workers-owners” of the 145 employees, this North American roaster 
is one of the main purchasers of organic coffee in the USA, self-proclaims “one of the largest worker co-operatives 
in the United States, and the world’s largest worker-owned coffee roaster”. Equal Exchange. 
http://equalexchange.coop/fast-facts.  Última visita 04-20-2017. 
529“análisis de suelo completos para todos los productores orgánicos, entregas de enmiendas de suelo como cal 
dolomita y fosforita, entrega de techos para construcciones de aboneras y canecas para abonos líquidos”. Informe 
de Asprocafé 2007, ibíd. Pág. 3. 
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coffee” coalition in Riosucio and created a smaller one around a problematic defined in terms of 
the low provision of the “Fairtrade coffee” symbolic service understood as Fairtrade certified 
coffee. The selfishly mobilization of the MH’s AR property resulted in the concretization of the 
specialty coffee program that allowed the VSS market which would incentivize, via better prices 
and access to services (equipment, technical assistance, training, etc.), the change in the behavior 
of small (non) indigenous coffee farmers as demanded by the Fairtrade standard. 
 
Hence, from the incumbent LRA Natural, the newborn LRA Fairtrade maintain the previous 
regulated uses but discarded the regulations on organic practices during the planting and 
cultivation (deregulating four activities diversification, shade, soil management, and nutrition). 
In this sense, it reduced the extent (57% of almost concentrated regulated uses, Annex 7). In the 
same line, the “Fairtrade symbolic service” produced through the certification mark disbanded 
the previous alignment, only Asprocafé, the Cooperative, and MH (as an abstract identity) 
remained. They used Asprocafé governance mechanism to fulfill the certification trademark, 
losing coordination among actors given that, although traceability for farmers improved and 
outputs funded in the social premium remained, coffee traceability was lost vanishing control 
over the taste related services and the two-way relationships were diluted between producers 
and roasters (reducing the coherence). In parallel, by standardizing FLO certified coffee the 
certification trademarks allowed millions of farms around the world to join the Fairtrade market 
hence the “product differentiation” barrier of entry went down (reducing closure). 
 
In the case of the LRA Organic, regulated uses did not change maintaining the same extent a (67% 
of evenly-distributed regulated uses, Annex 7). The “Natural coffee” symbolic service aligned 
Asprocafé, the Cooperative and the Roaster Equal Exchange which created a new governance 
mechanism (the annual visits of Equal Exchange) that, equally concretizing the specialty coffee 
program, resulted in a new output (the project fund by the Small Farmers Fund) that improved 
farmers’ incentives to implement the recommended practices, increasing coherence. And there 
were not strategies to erect new barriers at any level, maintaining the closure.  
 
6.3.2. LRA Café la Vereda  
• Actors’ coalitions: low provision of the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service for 
stakeholders in production.  
 
Once the trust was destroyed between the indigenous movement and the previous allies in the 
LRA organic, the “indigenous coffee” symbolic services was completely detached from the 
“natural coffee” symbolic service. It took its most radical form advocated by the minority group: 
the cultivation of coffee was a necessary evil that threatened the indigenous culture530.  
 
                                                     
530 “(Asproinca) no trabajaba nada que tuviera que ver con café, ósea se complementaba la finca, pero con otras 
propuestas: con las propuestas de producción de alimentos; de recuperación de semillas; del manejo de las 
microcuencas (…) pero nunca le decíamos que lo tumbaran (…) porque también sabíamos que esa era su única opción 
de ingreso”. Interview with Ángela Gómez. Asproinca, ibid.  
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Some indigenous leaders who had positioned themselves in the minority group when all the 
actors had converged around the “natural coffee” symbolic service, could have won political 
advantage of their exclusion from the Convenio MH/1997 by spreading their definition of the 
problem in terms of the low provision of the “indigenous coffee” symbolic services (re-defined 
as the threat to the indigenous culture by the cultivation of coffee) that should be confronted 
not with a coalition of actors, but with taking control of a resourceful collective actor: the local 
government of Riosucio.  
 
• Selfishly mobilization of stakeholders in production  
 
The indigenous movement strategically mobilized the AR consensus531 against the coffee crop 
and the "imposition" of the certification practices contrary to their culture532 to obtain the AR 
political support when they won the electoral contest for the Alcaldía de Riosucio for the period 
2004-2007. Darío Edgardo Tapasco Bueno (who had previously been Gobernador Indígena del 
Resguardo de San Lorenzo) won with a proposal533 that omitted the word coffee and pointed the 
"Agrarian Question" by privileging the access to land534 in order to produce organic535 food536 to 
the domestic market537 and to trade538 finished products539. 
 
The indigenous movement selfishly mobilized their political support and the law to circumvent 
the coffee public policy (namely to oppose the concretization of the coffee public policy by the 
FNC in the Resguardo de San Lorenzo) by innovatively activating both the education and the 
cultural public policies.  
                                                     
531 They united a population that was not yet fully convinced of their condition as indigenes by blaming the FNC and 
its promotion of the monoculture that endangered both the indigenous culture (by losing their ancestral practices 
hence their spiritual relation with the pachamama) and the indigenes themselves (by cropping commercial food they 
were prone to starvation when selling prices were inferior to production cost) that gained momentum with the 
progressive deterioration of coffee prices. In addition, a common enemy make them reinforce their community ties 
for survival: the escalation of violence triggered by drug trafficking. Their lands were seen by guerrillas, 
paramilitaries, and others as strategic corridors on the Western Cordillera to communicate the Pacific Ocean with 
their military and commercial operations in the Central Cordillera.  “These actions had a clear goal: to exterminate 
the Resguardo, destroy the organization of the Cabildo, and appropriate the better parts of its lands” (Appelbaum, 
2003, p. 201). 
532 The narrative of the indigenous movement against VSS and certifications is to assimilate them to a kind of second 
“Reconquista”. Interview with José David Bueno, CRIDEC, ibid. 
533  Programa de Gobierno 2004-2007 del candidato Darío Edgardo Tapasco Bueno, en Representación del 
Movimiento Unidad Indígena Popular por Caldas. Municipio de Riosucio. Agosto 2003. 
534 “Tramitar ante los entes competentes la adquisición de tierra para la población necesitada”. Numeral f del punto 
G sobre “Cuestión Agraria”, Programa de Gobierno 2004-2007. Ibíd.  
535 “Establecimiento de programas de erradicación de productos agroquímicos y apoyo al desarrollo de la agricultura 
orgánica”. Numeral a. Programa de Gobierno 2004-2007. Ibíd.   
536 “Fomentar la seguridad alimentaria a través del apoyo a los cultivos de pan coger y diversificación de cultivos”. 
Numeral b. Programa de Gobierno 2004-2007. Ibíd.   
537 “Reactivación de la producción agropecuaria con el fin de reabastecer el consumo local y comercialización de 
excedentes”. Numeral e. Programa de Gobierno 2004-2007. Ibíd. 
538 “Planificación de la producción y el mercadeo”. Numeral c. Programa de Gobierno 2004-2007. Ibíd. 
539 “Promover procesos tecnológicos eficientes para la transformación de materias primas en productos acabados”. 
Numeral d. Programa de Gobierno 2004-2007. Ibíd. 
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In the first case, the new municipal administration activated the constitutional right to ethnic and 
cultural diversity (Art. 7, 8, 10, 68, 70 and 72 of the Political Constitution of Colombia) and its 
recognition in the Ley General de Educación540. They supported their educational institutions to 
develop a self-education model known by the Ministry of Agriculture as proyectos educativos 
comunitarios541, so they could teach children according to their indigenous cosmovision542. On 
this legal basis Janeth Motato as Rector of Institución Educativa La Esperanza, sent a letter 
removing the 11 rural schools under their charge of the Escuela Nueva program in 2004 to turn 
towards the Self-Education543.  
 
In the process, they firstly identified with the community the more traditional varieties of beans, 
corn, and vegetables; its form of cultivation, preparation and consumption544. Secondly, the 
curriculum of both primary and secondary schools was built throughout the academic curriculum 
around the seeds545. Finally, four projects were developed that simultaneously develop their 
vision of Self-Education: The Seed custody project through which children save, sow and 
reproduce traditional seeds placed under their protection546; the literary project to write down 
the narratives of the community; the spiritual project to connect them with mother nature547 
and the tissue project to transmit ancient craftsmanship. 
 
In the second case, the activated the same constitutional protection of ethnic and cultural 
diversity, the local authority implemented various projects with the objective of strengthening 
                                                     
540 El artículo 7 de la Constitución Política del 91 que reconoce la diversidad étnica y cultural, y la Ley 115 de febrero 
8 de 1994 "Por la cual se expide la Ley General de Educación". 
541  “Es la concepción integral de vida y gestión de saberes propios de los pueblos indígenas, comunidades 
afrocolombianas, raizales y rom, que les permite recrear diferentes manifestaciones culturales y opciones de vida 
mediante la reafirmación de una identidad orientada a definir un perfil de sociedad autónoma, creativa, recreativa, 
reflexiva y comunitaria cimentada en sus raíces e historia de origen en permanente interacción con el mundo global”. 
(Mineducación, 2018) 
542 “apoyo a los procesos de educación propia a partir de los PEC (Proyectos Educativos Comunitarios) y los planes de 
vida de los resguardos indígenas” Proyecto 2; programa “promoción evaluación y mantenimiento de la calidad 
educativa”; sector “educación”, plan de acción 2005 del Plan de Desarrollo “Compromiso Social para Todos 2004-
2007”. Alcaldía de Riosucio. 26 de junio de 2004.  
543 In 2015, of the 14 rural institutions (each institution consists of about ten schools) in Riosucio, there are three 
self-education Schools (in the Resguardos de la Montaña and San Lorenzo), two Escuela Nueva and the remaining 
nine are traditional schools (that is, there is no differentiated methodology).      
544  “Para que haya diversidad cultural es condición que haya diversidad biológica. Entonces se aniquilan las 
comunidades indígenas (…) al aniquilar la diversidad biólogica”. Palabras de Oscar Salazar del Movimiento de 
Comunidades del Macizo Colombiano en el “Gran Trueque” de Semillas promovida por Asproinca en 2012.  
545 In math, the accounts are made with the seeds; in literature, seed narratives become texts; in arts, the ritual of 
the seed through which the preparation of the land for sowing is transformed into a traditional dance; etc. Interview 
with Janeth Motato, Instituto Educativo La Esperanza, ibid. 
546  “Porque conservar una semilla es conservar la vida”. Interview with Janeth Motato, Instituto Educativo La 
Esperanza, ibid. 
547 “armonía con la naturaleza que implica pedir permiso a las plantas para utilizarlas”. Interview with Janeth 
Motato, Instituto Educativo La Esperanza, ibid. 
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the ethnocultural dimension548. For some, it was an importation of cultural manifestations of 
other indigenous peoples (in particular of the Cauca in Colombian) given that the local ones 
vanished long ago so they did not know which ones to support549. The result was that recreated 
“local” cultural manifestations brought to Riosucio the message of resistance of the Colombian 
indigenous people in the south Colombia with messages about the protection of seeds and the 
environment550.  
 
• Absence of institutional creativity  
 
The profile sought was no negotiable so the deliberative scenario with other actors was pointless. 
Coffee should be restricted to a minimum in which it could produce cash once the households’ 
food demands would be satisfied. If the previous incentives were not sufficient to profile the 
Resource, the Resguardos through their governance mechanisms: the Cabildo as an 
administrative body prohibited to plant coffee on lands belonging to the Resguardo but worked 
by the indigenous people551. Law enforcement by the autonomous indigenous justice included 
as a penalization the uprooting of the coffee trees552. 
 
It generated a strong rivalry within the process of Café la Vereda because of its localization inside 
the Resguardo de San Lorenzo, among the coffee growers’ leaders of the SACEV Agreement and 
the indigenous leaders. The former considered coffee as an instrument to improve the material 
life of indigenous coffee growers and communities via the investments produced by the SACEV 
Agreement553, while the latter saw it as a threat to the consolidation of their political project of 
                                                     
548 “afianzar la riqueza étnica y cultural”. Los proyectos 6,7 y 8; programa “Reconocimiento de la multiculturalidad 
riosuceña”; sector “cultura”, plan de acción 2005 del Plan de Desarrollo “Compromiso Social para Todos 2004-2007”. 
Alcaldía de Riosucio. 26 de junio de 2004. 
549 Interview with Alba Nancy Santos Taborda, Coordinadora de Cultura y Turismo de la Alcaldía de Riosucio 2016-
2019,  
550 The Saquezipa group originated in the schools of ethnocultural training of the secretary of culture of Riosucio. 
This group strongly influenced by the Andean indigenous music (in an environment characterized by the 
predominance of mestizo music such as the pasillo or the bambuco) mixed lyrics from the anthem of the Colombian 
indigenous guard like "forward, comrades willing to resist, defend our rights so we have to die" (“pa’ adelante 
compañeros dispuestos a resistir, defender nuestros derechos así nos toque morir”). The author heard them at the 
Cuesta Theater in Riosucio in June 2015. 
551 “ellos hicieron una adjudicación de resguardo (tierra cuyo propietario es el Resguardo, pero se cede el derecho de 
uso para que una familia indígena la trabaje) en Yarumal (una vereda en el Resguardo de San Lorenzo), pero 
prohibieron oralmente sembrar café”. Interview with Juan Pablo Pineda, extension agent of the Comité in the 
Resguardo de San Lorenzo.       
552 “El cabildo si ha hecho eso (prohibir oralmente la siembra de café), el Fiscal (autoridad judicial al interior del 
Resguardo) decía que había que arrancarlo porque esa no era la idea (sembrar sólo café)”. Interview with Abel David 
Jaramillo, Indigenous Movement, Ibíd.   
553 As described in section 8.2.2, both the coffee farmers received a Premium and the community receive public 
services like health posts, schools and office buildings for the Resguardo. 
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self-determination and self-sufficiency of the indigenous people of San Lorenzo 554 , even 
producing victims555 in a context of the escalation of the national conflict. 
 
Hence, the SACEV Agreement as a governance model (chapter 5.2.2) began to falter. Not only 
the consensus on the message to be delivered towards farmers vanished, which probably slowed 
the coordination to produce the “citric acid” symbolic service consistently556, but also at the 
international level the interest for that combination of services was lost. In the case of Bucks 
County Co., they stopped buying because the demand was no longer sufficient557. In the case of 
Timothy's a new administration 558  continued the purchases without paying premiums or 
additional investment, so there was no need of meetings559 and the governance built around the 
SACEV agreement dissolved.  
 
• Outcome 
 
Once the “natural coffee” coalition was dismembered, the leaders that perceived coffee farming 
as a necessary evil that threatened the survival of the indigenous culture succeeded in spreading 
this narrative within the indigenous movement. They selfishly mobilized their AR consensus and 
the AR political support to circumvent the coffee public policy by innovatively activating both the 
education and the cultural public policies to influence the behavior of the indigenous farmers 
and discourage the over-cultivation of coffee. 
 
The effects intended at the municipall level were much intense at the level of the Resguardo de 
San Lorenzo. Here the previous LRA Natural was locally transformed into the newborn LRA la 
Vereda, which did not change regulation on uses in the first four processes but without neither 
the organic/Fairtrade certification nor the commercial alliance with any roaster, the regulations 
on the roasting and communication strategy disappeared, reducing the extent (43% of highly-
                                                     
554 “Este es un resguardo que más ha odiado el café (…) Se nos fue más encima esta gente (se refiere a integrantes 
del movimiento indígena), fue cuando llegó lo del café la Vereda, a nosotros ya nos vieron fue como unos enemigos 
de aquí del mismo Resguardo (…) porque nos dijeron (…) por culpa de ustedes, los líderes cafeteros, San Lorenzo se 
está llenando de foráneos, de gente de otras partes y aquí no queremos eso. Aquí no necesitamos eso porque San 
Lorenzo es de Indígenas y el café a nosotros no nos interesa (…) Y eso fue en las mismas oficinas de acá (del cabildo) 
a nosotros nos tildaron de gente no grata al Resguardo”.  Interview with a leading coffee grower of SACEV 
555 “Por motivo de este contrato que se hizo con ellos vendiendo ese café (El Acuerdo SACEV), nos mataron a Angel 
María Motato, el líder cafetero que hubo de café la vereda, y nos mataron a otro muchacho del mismo Comité Asesor 
Café la Vereda que se llamaba Rubén Tapasco (…) Razones, no las sé. En esa época esto aquí era zona roja, y eso aquí 
cualquiera le decía vea, mate a ese que ese no me gusta, y ahí mismo tenga, le iban dando”.  Interview with a leading 
coffee grower of SACEV 
556 “A ellos (Café la Vereda) les rechazaron café por pérdida de perfil hasta que se perdió la comercialización” 
Interview with Oscar Daniel Sánchez. “Las características se perdían por temporadas. No llegaba por el perfil y había 
rechazos. Pero eventualmente el perfil regresaba”. Interview with Diego from la Cooperative.  
557 "We had not had that coffee in some time as the demand was not in place to hold the product in house”. Email 
from Michael Weinberg, (Bucks County Coffee Co Account Executive) April 17, 2017. 
558  In 2008 Sun Capital Partners bought Timothy’s and in 2009, Keurig Green Mountain absorbed Sun Capital 
Partners. 
559 “ya para que se iban a volver a reunir”. Interview with Pedro Felipe González. Coordinator of the specialty coffees 
program at the Comité. 
197 
 
concentrated regulated uses, Annex 7). But more relevant, without aligned actors around any 
agreed services, it reduced its chances to motivate farmers’ change in behavior due to both the 
dismemberment of the actor’ alignment that fractured the main governance mechanism, the 
SACEV agreement and, the clashes with the indigenous movement and their outputs like the self-
education and the “local” cultural manifestation. So, coherence was severely reduced. Finally, 
without customers, the “product differentiation” barrier of entry simply disappeared reducing 
closure.  
 
6.3.3. LRA Nespresso  
• Actors’ coalitions: low provision of “monetary” services because of the low provision of 
“environmentally responsible” symbolic service for producers and stakeholders in 
consumption.  
 
The second measure demanded by the FLO audit (which excluded members of the Cooperative 
non-associated to Asprocafé) left behind a significant portion of coffee farmers which were 
excluded from both the LRA Fairtrade and LRA organic because either they owned more than 5 
hectares or they did not want to join Asprocafé. It opened a window of opportunity to the 
minority group that privileged the “monetary” services within the Cooperative but had accepted 
the convergence around the “natural coffee” symbolic services because of the internal coherence 
produced by the strength of the MH coalition. Once this coalition cracked, they gain momentum 
to spread their definition of the problem in terms of the low provision of “monetary” services 
because of both the unmanageable low coffee prices and the manageable low productivity. 
 
The Convenio MH had empowered the Cooperative560 and gave them the tools to enhance their 
governance mechanisms to influence their associates’ behavior with final outputs funded in the 
social premium. It makes them an ideal partner, especially when the production of sustainable 
coffee was integrated into the agenda after the International Coffee Agreement in 2001 and the 
Voluntary Sustainable Standards it proposed. In fact, inspired by the ICA 2001, the Swiss Roaster 
Nespresso 561  was looking since 2003 a reliable partner to profile simultaneously the 
“environmentally responsible” symbolic service and the “monetary” services in an ecotope that 
could produce the “winy” taste related service.   
 
Thus, a coalition composed of the Cooperative, the FNC/Comité and Nespresso agreed on joint 
action to be verified on the Nespresso AAA program in order to improve the quality (defined in 
terms of achieving the winy taste related service); maximize the productivity (increase the 
                                                     
560 In fact, they took advantage by guaranteeing other services than the provided by the standard coffee to eliminate 
all competition in the coffee purchases in Riosucio. Today there are two purchasing agencies (one in the urban area 
and the other in San Lorenzo) that acquire a minimum portion of the coffee (usually of low quality) that the coffee 
growers do not sell in the cooperative mainly because of the waiting time to sale the coffee. The concentration of 
coffee and coffee growers at harvest time makes those who carry low quantities of low quality prefer the low prices 
of the agencies 
561 USD 4 billion in sales in 2014 (Nespresso., INCAE, & CIMS, 2017, p. 4), Nespresso belonging to the Nestle group, 
is the leader in the coffee segment in personal doses in Europe.  
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monetary services) while reducing at maximum the negative impacts in the environment 
(produce the “environmental responsible” symbolic service).  
 
• Strategic mobilization of profilers and stakeholders in production.  
 
The Cooperative strategically mobilized its AR property as a shareholder of Expocafe562, when, 
through Cafexport, they knew that the Swiss Roaster Nespresso demanded to Expocafé for a 
terroir that produced a winy aromatic profile563. The Comité strategically mobilized their AR 
personal to concretize a first step of the specialty coffee public policy in Caldas since 2002 
“proyecto de extensión y gestión para la producción y comercialización de cafés especiales en el 
Departamento de Caldas”: in 2004 they conducted an aromatic profile identification tests and 
identified this “winy” taste related in a higher altitudinal fringe of the neighboring municipality 
of Supía and, later in the similar fringe in the Resguardo de la Montaña in the municipality of 
Riosucio, both zones bordering at each size the Resguardo de San Lorenzo564. 
 
Then the Cooperative strategically mobilized their AR property by using its purchase points to 
enroll coffee farmers through a self-assessment booklet that only required to have the crop in 
the selected zones, without additional requirements of ownership nor agronomic practices565; 
the Comité strategically mobilized their AR personal to promote among coffee farmers their 
enrollment; and Nespresso strategically mobilized their AR money566 to innovatively activated 
the specialty coffee public policy in Caldas in 2006 through a public-private alliance between the 
Cooperative; FNC/Comité; Technoserve and Fundanatura (NGOs), Cafexport, Expocafé and 
Nespresso so farmers would implement the TASQ®567 and therefore, would improve their quality 
and productivity thus their monetary services. 
 
• Presence of institutional creativity:  
 
The TASQ® produced a partially non-negotiable profile but contrary to FLO certification 
trademark, the Nespresso AAA program built through a two-year project supported by the 
international NGO, Technoserve until 2008, evolved beyond the specific quality demands through 
objective setting sessions, structured annual review meeting and field visits (Alvarez et al., 2010, 
pp. 177-178) that produced the Expocafé cluster coordinated by the local operator Cafexport. 
This cluster provided a deliberative scenario through the Encuentro bianual del Clúster Expocafé, 
in which participant profilers including stakeholders in production and consumption, could 
profile other compatible services.    
                                                     
562 The coffee export company of the Cooperativas de Caficultores, in which La Cooperativa had 7% of shares in 2002. 
World Basc Organization, 2002.  
563 Interview with Juan Carlos Ardila, founder and CEO of Cafexport.  
564 Informe de Administración y Gestión. Asamblea de delegados de la Cooperativa de Caficultores del Alto Occidente 
de Caldas 2005. 
565 Interview with Oscar Daniel Sanchez. Cafexport, ibid.  
566 This alliance was funded with CHF 847 thousand for three years (CHF 472 thousand funded by Technoserve and 
Nespresso (Wendelspiess, 2010, p. 130)).  
567 Tool for the Assessment of Sustainable Quality (Section 8.2.2). 
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It started through a first baseline survey identified significant challenges to effectively implement 
the TASQ® and guarantee the preservation of the “winy” taste related service568. Then, through 
this governance mechanism, they implemented the project “implementación AAA” to influence 
the use of know-how so integrated farm management that enhances productivity and quality 
while reducing pollution during the cultivation and post-harvesting (Cafexport, 2012a, p. 4). In 
this sense, the objectives sought by the TASQ® were operationalized through the practices 
identified by Cenicafé and transferred through the Comité extension service to the participant 
farmers, and in terms of management and quality, technologies in IT services for improving the 
traceability were transferred to the Cooperative569. As a result, almost 20% of the Cooperative's 
supply was purchased in 2005 as Nespresso coffee (more than twice the coffee purchased as Café 
la Vereda and almost eight times coffee purchased as organic)570. 
 
• Outcome  
 
Once the “natural coffee” coalition broke down, leaders that privileged “monetary services” 
found in Nespresso an ally that shared the problematic moved forward by the ICA 2001: coffee 
culture threats coffee communities’ wellbeing and their environment causing consumers anxiety. 
So, they redefined the problem in terms of the low provision of “monetary services” due to the 
low provision of both the “environmentally responsible” symbolic services and the “winy” taste 
related service. This coalition (Cooperative, Comité-FNC and Nespresso) strategically mobilized 
their AR property, personal and money to concretize the “specialty coffee program” that allowed 
the VSS market which by aligning the preferences for a sustainable coffee, the higher prices paid 
by consumers would incentivize the change in the behavior of (non) indigenous coffee farmers 
no matter the size of the ownership as long as was higher than 0.5 ha, as agreed within the 
Clúster.  
 
As a result, the Nespresso LRA developed in crescendo attracting coffee growers from the LRA 
Standard, Fairtrade and Organic. Similar to the LRA Fairtrade, it maintained the previous 
regulated uses but discarded the regulations on organic practices during the planting and 
cultivation (deregulating four activities diversification, shade, soil management, and nutrition) 
but including a new use during the cultivation (farm management). Due to the partnership with 
Nespresso, other uses in the last process were added: one in the roasting (roasting) and two 
during brewing (grinding, brewing). It increased the extent (78% of evenly-distributed regulated 
uses, Annex 7). To profile higher monetary service through provision of both environmental 
responsible symbolic service and winy taste related service, producers, the Cooperative, the 
FNC/Comité and Nespresso aligned and developed a public-private governance mechanism (the 
two-way Clúster Expocafé) to implement the TASQ® tool through the output “implementación 
                                                     
568 Interview with Oscar Daniel Sanchez. Cafexport, ibid.  
569 IT improvements increased both the “timely” deliveries (from 59% to 69% between 2010 and 2011)  and reduced 
rejections from 4% in 2006 and 2007 to 1% in 2010 and 2011 (Cafexport, 2012b, pp. 8-10) 
570 In thousand kilos of coffee: 807 Nespresso; 301 Vereda; 112 Orgánico. Informe de Administración y Gestión. 
Asamblea de delegados de la Cooperativa de Caficultores del Alto Occidente de Caldas 2005.  
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AAA” project, strengthening its influence over farmers’ behavior, increasing the coherence. 
Nevertheless, the “product differentiation” at the local level disappeared because the coffee 
from Riosucio joined the Nespresso AAA coffee from all others Nespresso clusters around the 
world, reducing its uniqueness while transferring barriers of entry from the local level to the 
roaster level reducing the closure. 
 
6.4. A newborn LRA Standard Climate-Smart shared by all the incumbent LRAs and a 
newborn LRA Starbucks (2012-2016) 
 
Two Niña phenomena (2008-2009 and 2011-2012) in which rain was on average 40% above the 
historical averages in Caldas, decreasing the solar brightness by almost 20% and the temperature 
by 0.8 degrees Celsius, reduced production in the area of influence of the cooperative by 40% 
between 2007 and 2011571. Afterward, two El Niño phenomena (2013/2014 and 2015/2016) 
affected quality increasing the percentage of coffee that could not be exported572.   
 
6.4.1. Actors’ coalitions: high vulnerability to climate change for stakeholders in 
production and profilers  
 
The Niña phenomenon showed up the disadvantages of the different production systems 
championed by the different coalitions and brought to light some changes to improve them: For 
the indigenous movement, the need for cash crops to improve the material well-being was 
highlighted; for the Fairtrade-Organic coalition it became clear the need to maximize productivity 
to maintain an acceptable income to the coffee grower; for the FNC-Nespresso coalition the need 
to protect the coffee farmer and his land, diversifying the sources of income and food, and 
conserving the natural resources got evident. Thus, they all gather together a new system, which 
we could describe as diversified coffee cultivation adapted to climate change, from which they 
could profile their demanded services. 
 
The LRA Organic suffered a double negative impact: not only in production like all the other LRAs 
but also in their own ideology. It was assumed that the uses of the Resource constituents 
encouraged to produce a “natural coffee” sought to reproduce an autonomous system that 
protected itself from external factors such as climate change or pests, but the truth is that 
although the plants could have been protected and probably landslide losses were prevented, 
the coffee grower's need for coffee cherries was clearly insufficient: At the end of the first Niña 
the average production of organic coffee farmer was 379 kilos in 2009, 38% lower than the 610 
                                                     
571 The greater cloudiness that increases the rainfall, weakened the plants because of both the lack of energy due to 
lower solar radiation and the filtration of nutrients deep enough that the tree cannot reach them (the coffee plant 
concentrates 96% of the absorbent roots in the first 50 centimeters from the soil surface) (Arcila et al., 2007, p. 26). 
As a result, the Cooperative purchased 6.2 million kilos of coffee in 2007, 3.75 million in 2009 and 3.3 million in 2011 
in its entire area of influence. Informes de administración y gestión de la Cooperativa en 2007 y 2009.   
572 Its effect in Riosucio is the lower cloudiness that decreases rainfall and increases the evapotranspiration of the 
soil, depriving the tree of the water necessary to fill the fruits of coffee and, in the extreme, for its own survival. As 
a result, proportion of low quality coffee purchases by the Cooperative almost double from the 6.25% in 2014 to 
11.11% in 2015. Informes de administración y gestión de la Cooperativa en 2014 y 2015.     
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kilos produced by in 2007. The second Niña pushed further to 297 kilos per organic coffee grower 
in 2011. It is not surprising that by 2012 there were only 231 organic coffee growers, 42% less 
than in 2007573 
 
In the case of the LRA La Vereda, La Niña had two effects: First, this phenomenon could have 
produced a redefinition of the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service for the indigenous 
movement. In fact, they recognized the importance of coffee in the indigenous household to 
provide with the cash needed to meet material needs 574 . Secondly, it demonstrated the 
vulnerability of coffee-dependent farmers with high planting densities and poor coverage, which 
not only put the “monetary” services at risk by decreasing both the following harvest and the 
future ones, due to landslides but also it highlighted the risk of malnutrition. In fact, the Comité 
activated an emergency Food Security program during this period (delivering chickens, hens, 
tilapia and mojarras fingerlings and, corn and bean seeds) to counteract the foreseeable 
nutritional decrease as a result of the lower income of coffee growers575. 
 
The indigenous movement and its allies (stakeholders in production such as Asproinca) redefined 
again their “indigenous coffee” symbolic service: neither in terms of the support for the 
indigenous movement, nor in terms of the organic production, nor in the counterfactual of coffee 
production as previously but in terms of the Buen Vivir. That is, coffee must serve a dual purpose 
to generate income and to protect the indigenous cultural identity whose main element is the 
land576. 
 
In the case of the LRA Nespresso, the coalition Cooperative-FNC-Nespresso had to rethink the 
“monetary” services in terms of what was called “Caficultura climáticamente inteligente” in the 
LXXVI Congreso Nacional de Cafeteros del 2011 (FNC, 2011) but adapted to the particularities of 
Riosucio. That is, at the national level the agenda focused on cultivation practices to adapt to the 
climate variability that emphasized the planting of resistant varieties 577  with a spatial 
arrangement that adequately provided both shade and coverings. The idea was to reach an 
equilibrium among plant species in which the protection to climate variability compensated the 
                                                     
573 Resulting figures when dividing: the 242 thousand kilos of organic coffee bought by the Cooperative in 2007 
(Informe de Administración y Gestión Cooperativa 2007) among the 398 organic coffee farmers in 2007 (Informe de 
Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2007);  the 128 thousand kilos of organic coffee bought by the Cooperative in 
2009 (Informe de Administración y Gestión Cooperativa 2009) among the 340 organic coffee farmers in 2009 
(Informe de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2009); the 75 thousand kilos of organic coffee bought by the 
Cooperative in 2011 (Informe de Administración y Gestión Cooperativa 2011) among the 255 organic coffee farmers 
in 2011 (Informe de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2011).   
574 “Llegó un momento en que también, esa fue la única opción económica (…) la gente necesitaba pesos (…) 
Asproinca se demoró mucho en entender que vivían de eso (...) es que no podían ir en contra de la corriente”. 
Interview with Ángela Gómez, Asproinca, ibid.  
575Interview with Nicolas Bañol, coordinator of the extension service in Riosucio since 2012.  
576 “(El Cabildo promueve una) concepción de la tierra y el territorio, la tierra también se desgasta, la tierra también 
hay que dejarla descansar, que no se le puede poner sólo un cultivo como monopolio”. Interview with Abel David 
Jaramillo Largo, Indigenous movement, ibid.   
577 Given that coffee trees weakened by rainfall are particularly vulnerable to the fungus Hemileia vastatrix that 
causes rust in the leaves of the coffee, defoliating the coffee tree and depriving it of the necessary plant material to 
carry out the photosynthesis and produce the coffee cherries 
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competition for sunlight and nutrients. At the local level, this coalition had to redefine the 
monetary services in terms of the household stable and long-term wellbeing. It implied crop 
diversification that provided food, shade, and coverage in order to improve resilience for both 
the coffee crop and the family. 
  
6.4.2. Cooperative mobilization of action resources among stakeholders in 
production 
 
This actors’ game began with two cooperative mobilizations: firstly, the Indigenous movement 
strategically mobilized their AR political support (they won the municipal government) to 
concretize the citizen participation public policy through their intermediary output 
“gobernabilidad pluricultural” program in its municipal development plan. It empowered the 
Comité with the AR consensus by allowing them to present their intervention plans for a climate-
smart coffee farming; Secondly, the FNC strategically mobilized their AR organization to 
concretize the cultural public policy producing as an intermediary output the dossier for 
inscribing in the world heritage list the coffee cultural landscape of Colombia (CCLC onward). 
Unlooked-for, this mobilization transferred the AR information to the indigenous movement by 
highlighting their contribution to the exceptionality of the CCLC.  
 
A division between the leaders of the traditional political parties (mestizos) allowed the victory 
of Abel David Jaramillo from the indigenous movement for the Alcaldía de Riosucio 2012-2015. 
Plausibly as Gobernador del Resguardo de San Lorenzo in the period 2005-2011, he experienced 
the rather negative consequences of the use of power to impose the indigenous movement vision 
that made them became isolated once out of office578: the political support of the indigenous 
movement that was diluted when trying to impose their agenda on the other political actors of 
Riosucio. Therefore, when campaigning he proposed a plan whose pillar was citizen participation 
in the decision-making process 579 . A notable element was its proposal to transfer the AR 
information in a timely manner to integrate the demands of citizens into public intervention580. 
 
                                                     
578 The indigenous movement were defeated in the 2007 elections, and the new government isolated the Resguardos 
by eliminating the figure of the "indigenous link" in an administrative restructuring. “En anteriores administraciones 
municipales se tenía creado el cargo de enlace indígena, con el fin de que fuese esa oficina o funcionario el encargado 
de la articulación entre la administración municipal y los resguardos indígenas, sin embargo, durante la 
reestructuración administrativa adelantada por la anterior administración municipal fue suprimido este cargo, el cual 
quedo en manos de la Secretaría de Gobierno.” Documento Diagnostico Plan de Desarrollo Municipio de Riosucio 
Caldas 2012-2015. 
579  “concertar previamente la toma de decisiones y establecer consensos comunitarios y transparentes”. Apartado 
sobre Marco Ideológico del Programa de Gobierno para el Municipio de Riosucio Caldas 2012-2015, Candidato Abel 
David Jaramillo Largo. Movimiento Unidad Indígena y Popular por Caldas. 
580 “Fortaleceremos la participación ciudadana y comunitaria en el sentido de integrar la ciudadanía en el proceso de 
adopción de decisiones comunitarias y de gobierno, en pro de mejorar servicios y oportunidades (…) Nuestro interés 
es lograr que toda la población riosuceña aporte puntos de vista, inquietudes y soluciones, para lo cual es necesario 
entregarle la información necesaria y oportuna en cada uno de los campos donde se quiere propiciar la 
participación”. Apartado sobre Participación Ciudadana del Programa de Gobierno para el Municipio de Riosucio 
Caldas 2012-2015, Ibíd.  
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Unlike the previous municipal administration 2008-2011, whose final Plan de Desarrollo 581 
promoted the mestizo demands despite having proposed a conciliatory one with the indigenous 
cosmovision 582, the new municipal administration’s Plan was consistent with its conciliatory 
proposal583. Priority was given to the creation of deliberative scenarios known as “mesas de 
concertación” between mestizos, Afro-descendant and indigenous population 584  and the 
implementation of a system of citizen participation585  that empowered different groups586 so 
their demands could be integrated through popular assemblies to define the allocation of public 
resources587. This coherence was also reflected in the conciliatory tone of the agricultural588, 
educational589 and cultural590 policy. 
                                                     
581 Plan de Desarrollo Municipal 2008-2011 “Riosucio con todos y para todos”, Alcaldía de Riosucio.  
582 Three examples: only 12% of money allocated for Agriculture went to a subprogram to support agroecological 
farming while 87% went to two subprograms for faming intensification; only one of the 6 programs in the education 
sector refers to the indigenous component but just as one of the elements of multiculturalism; only one of the four 
programs of the culture sector is related to the indigenous question. And in this program, only one of the five 
subprograms, with a participation of 16% on the budget, was in partnership with the Resguardos. Plan de Desarrollo 
2008-2011, ibíd.  
583 The Plan with a Budget of COP 80 thousand million (USD 45 million) was divided into six axes (1- Pluricultural 
Governance, 2- Populations with Special Protection, 3- Riosucio Equitativo y Solidario (which consumes 85% of 
resources by concentrating the health, education, culture and sports sectors) 4- Collective rights 5- Risoucio with 
Sustainable Economic Development, 6- Public Management). 
584 “Escenarios de concertación entre población mestiza, afrodescendiente e indígena: Un consenso sobre los 
fundamental”. Único subprograma del Programa nueve “Riosucio pluricultural –hacia un consenso sobre lo 
fundamental para el desarrollo humano local” del primer eje “Gobernabilidad Pluricultural” (nueve programas 
presupuestados en $ 802 millones de pesos para “Generar condiciones de seguridad, justicia  y convivencia ciudadana 
en un marco de respeto por los derechos humanos y el derecho internacional humanitario”), Plan de Desarrollo de 
Riosucio Caldas, 2012-2015.                                                                                                                                                                                
585“sistema municipal de participación ciudadana comunitaria”. Programa “desarrollo comunitario y participación” 
en el tercer eje “Riosucio Equitativo y Solidario” del Plan de Desarrollo de Riosucio Caldas, 2012-2015.                                                                                                                                                                                
586 Subprograma 1.2 “fortalecer las juntas de acción comunal (…)”; subprograma 1.3 “acompañar a las comunidades 
indígenas en su proceso de fortalecimiento (…); subprograma 1.4 “realizar intercambios entre comunidades rurales 
y urbanas (…); subprograma 1.5 “apoyar a grupos asociativos (…); subprograma 1.8 “garantizar la participación de 
los niños, niñas y adolescentes (…).  
587 “realizar 4 asambleas ciudadanas y comunitarias para la definición en la asignación de los recursos”. Indicador de 
resultado del subprograma 1.6 “presupuestos participativos” del programa “desarrollo comunitario y participación”, 
ibíd.  
588 El primer programa orientado a la seguridad alimentaria “derecho a la alimentación sana y saludable” del servicio 
café indígena, se complementa con los otros dos programas “asociatividad para potenciar la producción” y 
“emprendimiento y productividad” que buscan fortalecer las asociaciones de productores y sus encadenamientos 
productivos (el café es una de las 6 alianzas productivas priorizadas) para mejorar los servicios monetarios. Junto con 
los otros cuatro programas que componen el Eje 2 “Riosucio con Desarrollo Económico Sustentable” presupuestado 
en $ 927 millones de pesos.  
589 Por un lado crea escenarios de deliberación para que los ciudadanos planteen sus demandas sobre la educación 
en Riosucio (Subprograma 3.1 “construcción colectiva del diagnóstico para el Plan Municipal de Educación con énfasis 
en la interculturalidad”  y subprograma 4.1 “espacio de construcción y ejecución colectiva de políticas educativas”), 
por el otro refuerza tanto los procesos de calidad en términos nacionales como indígenas (subprograma 1.2 “calidad 
educativa” (evaluado a través de las pruebas SABER del Mineducación) y subprograma 3.2 “apoyo a los procesos de 
educación propia”). 
590 El primer programa “reconociendo la pluralidad y diversidad cultural” con su objetivo “Respetar, fortalecer y 
reconocer las diferentes creaciones, manifestaciones, tradiciones y enfoques en los contextos de diversidad 
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Derived from this conciliatory spirit, the indigenous movement led by Jaramillo did not use their 
AR political support to impose their anti-coffee vision but, on the contrary, to create deliberative 
scenarios that allowed the Comité to transmit their message to the Cabildos591: a mesa de 
concertación was provided to motivate discussions on coffee culture among the interested 
parties, in which the Comité was invited to expose all their projects before the Alcalde and all the 
Gobernadores de los Resguardos Indigenas592. As a result, the doors were opened again to initiate 
a joint collaboration. 
 
In parallel, the FNC alongside the Ministry of Culture, mobilized the AR information to inscribe 
the Colombian Coffee Cultural Landscape (CCCL) in the list of World Heritage593: Contrary to 
omitting the indigenes in the history of coffee growing in the region 594  or to victimize the 
indigenous because of coffee 595 , the document presented to the UNESCO highlighted the 
contribution of indigenes to the exceptionality of CCCL that makes it worthy to be a World 
Heritage596. 
 
This vector of identity for local communities, in a slow but widespread process among a large 
number of institutions in the area of influence of the CCCL597, built a new problematic in terms 
                                                     
etnocultural y multicultural” define la promesa conciliatoria que se concretiza al realizar el inventario cultural 
(programa 2) y proponer la construcción participativa del Plan Decenal de Cultura (programa 3).  
591 “y como él había sido gobernador del resguardo de San Lorenzo, entonces él sirvió de enlace entre la Federación 
y todos los cabildos”. Interview with Nicolas Bañol, Comité, ibid.     
592 “(No se les había presentado porque) antes existían esos choquesitos, que ustedes sí, que ustedes no, que es que 
ustedes dicen esto, que ustedes dicen lo otro, y los acercamientos empezaron con este Gobierno de Abel David 
Jaramillo”. Interview with Nicolas Bañol, Comité, ibid.    
593 Decisión 35 COM 8B.43 del 25 de junio de 2011 en la 35va sesión del Comité de Patrimonio Mundial de la UNESCO 
en Paris. 
594 The mainstream narrative in Colombia that consider that Antioqueños white men conquered the mountain to 
crop coffee and produce wealth for the nation, as it can be seen the picture “Horizontes” in the Museo de Antioquia, 
painted by Francisco Antonio Cano in 1913.  
595 The narrative of the dispossession claimed by some in the indigenous movement as it was presented in section 
6.2. 
596 “The presence of an indigenous population with its own traditions is reflected in the presence of reservations in 
Riosucio and Quinchía, not just in the tradition of the cultivation of bamboo, indigenous cultural traits adopted in 
the constructive techniques in many towns and rural dwellings of the Coffee-Growing Cultural Landscape. Without 
doubt, this was a dynamic and intense colonization process whose integration with the landscape and use of 
ancestral knowledge generated a new productive landscape in an exceptionally short period of time” (Mincultura & 
FNC, 2010, p. 154). 
597 “En el proceso de conformación de la CAPCE que hoy presentamos se ha contado con la participación del Ministerio 
de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, de funcionarios de Comités de Cafeteros, de voceros de asociaciones de productores 
de cafés especiales, de directivos de cooperativas de caficultores, de empresarios de trilladoras de café, tostadores, 
baristas, catadores, empresarios de tiendas de cafés especiales, exportadores, empresarios de turismo rural. 
Adicionalmente hemos contado con instituciones de investigación, con las Corporaciones Autónomas Regionales, con 
el ICA y con la academia regional representada en varias universidades y en el SENA. También han intervenido Incubar 
Eje Cafetero, las Secretarías de Agricultura, Proexport, la Asociación de Cámaras de Comercio del Eje Cafetero, el 
Departamento para la Prosperidad Social, las Secretarías de Turismo y de Competitividad, y el PNUD.” Arango 
Gaviria, Oscar (Secretario Técnico de la Cadena Productiva de Cafés Especiales del PCCC) Intervención en el acto 
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of the low monetary services for the poor reputation of the origin because it was disconnected 
from the exceptional cultural identity in the Department of Caldas. Actors, including the FNC-
Comité-Cooperative and the Alcaldía de Riosucio among others, considered that they could 
generate income through the cultural value of coffee598. They concretized in an innovative way 
an instrument of the agricultural public policy: “el acuerdo de Competitividad para la Cadena 
Productiva de Cafés Especiales del Paisaje Cultural Cafetero” signed among several actors 
including the Ministerio de Agricultura in 2014 599 , in order to gain legitimacy and being 
incorporated into the government's agenda and its budgets600. 
 
Jaramillo as leader of both the indigenous movement and the local administration identified 
himself with a CCCL built on the contribution of the indigenous to the coffee landscape. He used 
this vector of identity to counteract the dispossession narrative, in order to appease the radical 
wing against coffee within the indigenous movement. In practice, endowing the Comité-FNC with 
the RA consensus. 
 
In a strategic mobilization, the AR political support of the indigenous movement (which allowed 
them to won again the Alcaldía de Riosucio), was interchanged for the AR consensus of the 
Comité-FNC (which allowed them to lead an economic development with cultural identity agenda 
backed by the entities of the public, academic sector, and business) so a trust-recovery process 
could start. Then, given that services demanded from the Resource between the Comité-FNC and 
the indigenous movement remained antagonistic (“monetary” services against “indigenous 
coffee” symbolic services), the actors made a second strategic mobilization of action resources: 
the AR personal of the Comité and the AR money of the Alcaldía, to jointly carry out infrastructure 
projects (recovery and maintenance of roads601, housing602, electrical grid603, etc., affected by 
                                                     
público de firma del Acuerdo de Competitividad para la cadena productiva de Cafés Especiales del Paisaje Cultural 
Cafetero. Mayo 14 de 2014, Manizales.  
598 “desde 2012 se viene realizando un proceso de concertación interinstitucional entre diferentes actores públicos, 
privados y académicos alrededor del desarrollo del sector de los cafés especiales “. Numeral o. de las consideraciones 
del Acuerdo de voluntades para la construcción del acuerdo de competitividad y la organización de cadena productiva 
de Cafés Especiales. Firmado por un centenar de participantes en la reunión de septiembre 25 de 2013 en Armenia.  
599 Art. 1 de la Ley 811 del 26 de junio de 2003 que incorpora a la Ley 101 de 1993 (Ley General de Desarrollo 
Agropecuaria y Pesquero) un nuevo capítulo XIV de las organizaciones de cadena en el sector agropecuario, forestal, 
acuícola y pesquero.  
600 “Artículo 106. Refrendación de los acuerdos de competitividad. Los acuerdos de competitividad refrendados por 
el Gobierno, se incorporarán a las políticas y presupuestos gubernamentales, con el fin de adelantar las acciones 
acordadas como compromiso del sector público. De la misma manera, el Gobierno dará prioridad en el acceso a los 
incentivos establecidos a los miembros de las organizaciones de cadena inscritas.” Ley 811 del 26 de junio de 2003, 
601 Proyecto “vías para el desarrollo y calidad de vida rural” por $500 millones de pesos para el mantenimiento de 
180 km de vías departamentales y municipales en Riosucio en conjunto entre la Gobernación de Caldas, la Alcaldía 
de Riosucio, los Resguardos Indígenas y el Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas. Informe de Gestión, 
segunda Rendición de Cuentas de la Alcaldía Municipal de Riosucio, diciembre de 2012. Pág. 53 
602 Proyecto “mejoramiento de vivienda para afectados por la ola invernal” con la Gobernación de Caldas, la Alcaldía 
de Riosucio, el Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas y el Programa Presidencial “Colombia Humanitaria”. 
Informe de gestión, ibíd. Pág. 52 
603 Proyecto “servicios públicos domiciliarios” por $100 millones de pesos para la electrificación de 100 viviendas 
rurales en conjunto entre la Gobernación de Caldas, la Alcaldía de Riosucio, los Resguardos Indígenas, el Comité 
Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas y la CHEC (Central Hidroeléctrica de Caldas). Informe de gestión, ibíd. Pág. 52 
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the harsh Niña) that influenced the daily life of the coffee grower but without influencing a 
particular profile of the Resource. 
 
These mesas de concertación allowed the two previously opposite actors (Comité-FNC and the 
indigenous movement) agreed on an intervention in the coffee grower but neutral on the profile 
of the Resource that demonstrated the mobilization of the AR time that was not been previously 
used. The objective was not to influence some uses in the present that would satisfy all the actors 
but was rather to create trust604 in order to reach some agreed uses in the future. That is to say, 
given the pure conflict constellation between the services sought by both actors, if they had 
produce one specific profile it would have necessarily meant ceasing to produce the profile 
demanded by one actor. They strategically mobilized they AR time not to try to solve the rivalry, 
simply to improve the relationship to prepare the ground for a future negotiation which higher 
chances of succeed.  
 
6.4.3. Inclusive institutional creativity: produce a profile that guarantees a 
minimum provision of “monetary services”; “environmentally responsible” and 
“indigenous coffee” symbolic services and; “clean cup” taste related service.  
 
The mesas de concertación developed by the Alcaldía allowed to initiate the discussions on the 
impact of the climatic change in the coffee cultures: In a process of "take and give" actors found 
common places around the use of the Resource Constituents to better adapt to climate change. 
The Resguardos accepted the proposal to maintain young and healthy trees with the greatest 
possible density to maximize production during the period of climatic stress; and the Comité-FNC 
agreed to maintain a regulated shade, coverage, and protection of watersheds605 to reduce 
vulnerability to climate change606  and, leaving enough land to guarantee food security of the 
coffee household607. 
 
As a result, two instruments of the public coffee policy were concretized in an innovative way in 
all the LRAs: the renovation programs (chapter 4.2.2) and the diversification program. The PSF 
Program was concretized in order to access credit with the aim of uprooting aged trees and 
planting new resistant varieties, at higher density but maintaining shady areas and food security, 
                                                     
604 “Me toco a mi acabar de moldear eso. Hacerme mucho más amigo de los cabildos, acompañarlos en todo, y 
hacerlo sentir más seguro, que la Federación (FNC) no era una institución de afuera, sino que era una institución de 
acá. Y que los que estábamos aquí eramos riosuceños y que el interés era sacar adelante nuestras comunidades 
rurales”. Interview with Nicolás Bañol, Comité, ibid.   
605 Not only to avoid contamination of the creeks but also to encourage natural barriers with native trees between 
bodies of water and coffee crops. Interview with Ángela Gómez, Asproinca, Ibid.  
606 “Según CENICAFÉ la zona de nosotros no es de sombrío, es de cultivo a libre exposición solar (…)  Estamos otra vez 
volviendo a mantener un sombrío regulado en los cafetales, pero debido a la presión del cambio climático” Interview 
with Nicolas Bañol, Comité, ibid.   
607 “Se ha cambiado la política del Comité. Hay que volver a sembrar comida. Recuerde que nuestros cafetales no 
sólo dan café, también pueden dar comida (…) nosotros como extensionistas les recomendamos eso, asegure la 
alimentación de su familia, asegure su comida”. Interview with Nicolas Bañol, Comité, ibid.  
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the latter that was encouraged through the “Programa Café y Maíz” (PCM onwards)608  to plant 
the temporary crops of corn and beans in the first two years of the coffee tree to ensure food 
and additional income to the coffee home with native seeds purchased from the Riosucio 
Resguardos609. 
 
The agreement reached in these mesas de concertación did not seek to standardize a profile that 
would satisfy all stakeholders, such as the convergence towards the “Natural coffee” symbolic 
service at the end of the nineties, but rather on a baseline profile that would guarantee the 
provision of services in spite of climate change. Over this profile, each LRA would shape their 
particular combination of services. 
 
• Outcome LRA Standard CS newborn LRA Regional/Starbucks 
 
Las mesas de concertación, as a deliberative scenario between the FNC/Comité and the Alcaldía 
de Riosucio, allowed both actors to agree on a common profile adapted to climate change in 
order to sum efforts (the public coffee policy lead by the FNC and the agricultural public policy 
headed by the municipal authority) to influence the whole population of coffee farmers in 
Riosucio, meaning both coffee farmers that sold through the baseline LRA Standard or through 
any other LRA present in Riosucio.   
 
This intervention for the whole harvest in Riosucio opened a window of opportunity for the 
Cooperative. Indeed, as farmers in Riosucio were in the process of implementing practices to 
improve the shade and protect the natural ecosystems, it was possible to create a commercial 
alliance with Starbucks. The Cooperative considered that the explicitly uses of Resource 
constituents demanded by the CAFE Practices were in the process of being implemented in 
Riosucio610.  So, in 2014 they strategically mobilized their AR personal to concretize the specialty 
coffee program of the coffee public policy by opening a new VSS market channel and started the 
process to verify farmers associated to the Cooperative in this profiling institution611. In 2015 the 
Cooperative created the newborn LRA Regional/Starbucks when selling coffee that fulfilled the 
three commercial conditions: quality; economic audit and external audit612. So, coffee bought 
through the LRA Standard that had better quality (factor 92 or lower and maximum of 2.5% of 
broca and 2% pasilla that guarantee the terroir’s full aromatic profile) would be fully trace 
(documentary traceability of both coffee and coffee farmer that transparently show the money 
effectively paid to the producer) and would be included in the external audit.  
 
It is a young LRA that had not yet produced any output to change farmers’ behavior, but the fact 
that the whole population of farmers associated to the Cooperative can sell through this LRA 
                                                     
608 With the support of FENALCE (La Federación Nacional de Cultivadores de Cereales) corn and bean seeds were 
distributed free of charge to coffee growers who renovated. 
609 Interview with Nicolas Bañol, Comité, ibid.  
610 Uses described in chapter 5.1.2 
611 They certified 981 farms in the CAFE practices profiling institution in 2015 in chapter 5.2.2. 
612 See chapter 5.2.2 
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plausibly means that the Asamblea General Ordinaria could escalate their demands to the 
meetings with representatives of the Starbucks’s Farmer Support Center in Manizales aiming to 
shape the final output “improvement plans”.  
 
As a result, through both the PSF and the PCM the LRA Standard Climate-Smart regulated new 
uses of Resource constituents in the five activities of the planting process (diversification, variety, 
renovation, density, shade) increasing the extent (37% of concentrated regulated uses, Annex 7) 
while increasing coordination by aligning more actors (Alcaldía and the FNC-Comité) to produce 
the PSF and PCM outputs increasing the coherence. On the other hand, barriers of entry at the 
local level did not change (equal closure)613.  
 
Additionally, the LRA regional/Starbucks was developed as an extension of the LRA Standard CS 
(Standard coffee with higher quality). Hence, there was no additional regulation of uses of the 
constituents maintaining the extent (37% of concentrated regulated uses, Annex 7). But it was a 
significant increase in coordination given the new alignment among profilers (the Cooperative, 
Expocafé, Starbucks) to produce the “ethical traded” and “environmentally responsible” 
symbolic services, and the “terroir expression” taste related service through the commercial 
conditions to fulfill the CAFÉ Practices profiling institutions through the output “improvement 
plans” to change farmers behavior, increasing the coherence while producing barriers of entry at 
the roasters level, decreasing closure.  
 
• Outcome LRA Standard CS (within the LRA La Vereda) 
 
The dissolution of the SACEV agreement left only the local profilers and stakeholders in 
production (the Cooperative and the Comité/FNC) interested on the profile sought by the LRA La 
Vereda because they knew it had an extraordinary aromatic profile that could be paid better. 
Indeed, the FNC never gave up on their intention to attract new customers614, and in 2011 they 
managed to sell coffee La Vereda to the American roaster Keurig615 (the new owner of Timothy's) 
in 2011. 
 
The mesas de concertación allowed the Alcaldía de Riosucio and the Resguardo de San Lorenzo 
to partner again with the Cooperative and the Comité/FNC around the climate-smart coffee 
production when they concretized the final outputs of the Coffee Renovation Program in this 
Resguardo616. Subsequently, they could include a profiler at the end of the coffee value chain in 
                                                     
613 For the whole set of LRAs the evaluation of the three conditions are extensively developed in the chapter 5.2  
614 In October 2009, Torino Express, a personal blog, described the “Colombian la Vereda Cupped at Stockfleths. 
Roasted by Solberg & Hansen” in Norway (Eirik, 2009) 
615 USD 4.5 billion in sales in 2015 (Keurig, 2015, p. 8), Keurig Green Mountain Inc. belongs to the JAB Holding 
Company, it is the leader in the segment of coffee in personal doses in the USA.  
616 Systematically since Nicolas Bañol is Coordinator of the Committee, the extension agent who has worked in the 
Resguardo de San Lorenzo, has outperformed his colleagues in the other districts of the municipality of Riosucio, in 
compliance with the goals of renovated hectares. Interview with Nicolas Bañol, Comité, ibid.  
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the LRA La Vereda when they reactivated a kind of SACEV agreement with Keurig in 2013617, 
when  they concretized the Proyecto de Alianzas Productivas618 from the agricultural public policy 
for the implementation of the Sustainable Agriculture according to the Rainforest Alliance 
Standard (FNC, 2013, pp. 224-235). Its main objective was to increase the shade and protect the 
watersheds while developing integrated (weed, pests, soil, nutrition) management plans for 
increasing production. Furthermore, in 2015, Stakeholders in consumption (in Canada619) got 
involved when the actors concretized the International Cooperation fund of the Canadian non-
profit Socodevi (société de coopération pour le développement international) to produce an 
intermediary output known as “the Procompite Project”. It was approved to strengthen the 
Proyecto de Alianzas productivas in order to fully implement the Rainforest Alliance standard 
through both training and the equipment delivery.  
 
As a consequence, in 2015 the LRA CS improved the three conditions of the incumbent LRA La 
Vereda. Through both the PSF and the PCM it regulated new uses of Resource constituents in the 
five activities of the planting process (diversification, variety, renovation, density, shade), and 
through both Alianza Productiva and Procompite four activities in the cultivation process (soil 
management; coffee borer beetle management; pest and disease management and farm 
management) and four activities during the post-harvesting (hulling, fermentation, drying and 
waste management). Due to the partnership with Keurig, the whole set of activities in the 
roasting, communication strategy and brewing were also regulated increasing considerably the 
extent (93% of evenly-distributed regulated uses, Annex 7). Indigenous farmers, the FNC/Comité, 
the Cooperative, Keurig, and Socodevi were aligned to increase the monetary services by 
providing the “indigenous coffee” and “environmentally responsible” symbolic services and, the 
“citric acid” taste related service. Guided by RSSSG/Rainforest Alliance Standard profiling 
institution620, they created a renovated version of the SACEV agreement that produced different 
outputs (PSF, PCM, Allianza Productiva, Procompite) which increased influence on farmers’ 
behavior but at the expense of the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service, reducing its coherence. 
Also, it recovered the “product differentiation” at both the origin and the indigenous production, 
at the producer level that had been lost, increasing its closure.  
 
• Outcome LRA Standard CS (within the LRA Fairtrade) 
 
                                                     
617 In which they were involved stakeholders in pro Alcaldía de Riosucio y Alcaldía de Supía como autoridades locales; 
la Secretaria de Agricultura de la Gobernación de Caldas como autoridad departamental; el Ministerio de Agricultura 
y el Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario como autoridades nacionales; Corpocaldas como autoridad ambiental y la 
Fundación Ecológica Cafetera como Stakeholder en la producción; y el Comité, la Cooperativa y Keurig.  (FNC, 2013, 
p. 235) 
618  Its objective was to strengthen a commercial alliance between small farmers and their private buyers, by 
improving the small farmers’ weaknesses identified by the alliance (Minagricultura, 2012, p. 3). 
619 Despite having been acquired by the US Company Keurig, Timothy's continued to sell Café la Vereda to its 
customers in Canada. 
620 Keurig’s “responsible Sourcing Supplier Guidelines" that was declared "fully acceptable" with the Rainforest 
Alliance standards (Keurig, 2015, pp. 72-75).   
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The LRA Fairtrade developed the “Normas y sanciones que rigen a los asociados de Asprocafé 
Ingruma, 2011”. It looks it was inspired in the climate-smart coffee culture when it merged the 
agroecology philosophy to enhance resilience with the use of synthetic inputs to trigger 
productivity. Indeed, the Asamblea General de Delegados de Asprocafé prioritized one-third of 
the Fairtrade premium in the technical assistance that focused in supporting integrated (weed, 
pests, soil, nutrition) management and another third in the investment of a couple of 
components of climate-smart coffee farming: the renovation 621  and the protection of 
watersheds622.  
 
As a consequence, in 2015 the LRA CS improved one condition of the incumbent LRA Fairtrade. 
Through both the PSF and the PCM it regulated new uses of Resource constituents in the five 
activities of the planting process (diversification, variety, renovation, density, shade) and four in 
the cultivation process (soil management; coffee borer beetle management; pest and disease 
management and farm management) increasing the extent (74% of evenly-distributed regulated 
uses, Annex 7). But it, neither affected coherence (same alignment between Asprocafé, the 
Cooperativa and FLO with the same governance mechanism and outputs) nor the closure 
(barriers of entry remained at the retailing level).  
 
• Outcome LRA Standard CS (within the LRA Organic) 
 
The LRA Organic through its deliberative scenario, the annual visit of Equal Exchange in 2008, 
identified the vulnerability of coffee to La Niña623 and problematized as the lack of adequate 
organic fertilization. Consequently, the final outputs emphasized encouraging organic nutrition 
in both quality and quantity to obtain good productions624. However, the 75 thousand kilos of 
                                                     
621 For renovations by sowing (new plantation) or zoca (cutting the tree to 15 centimeters of soil) of up to 3 thousand 
coffee trees per associated, an incentive of COP 200 pesos was given, half in fertilizer, half in cash (In 2011 it 
increased to COP 250 per tree and the percentage in cash increased to 60% benefiting almost a third of the members 
that year). The relevance of this particular instrument is evident in its prioritization: In 2011, it consumed more than 
one third of the premium, and in 2012 forty percent. Informes de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé (2009-2015)   
622 Construction of wastewater treatment through the FAFA system for twenty coffee growers on an annual average 
(equivalent to 10% of the premium value). Informes de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé (2009-2015)   
623 Annual Equal Exchange visit in December 2008. “The 2008 harvest began with the flowering of the coffee trees 
in February which would have provided a bountiful harvest eight months later but then the rain started and has not 
stopped since (…) This has resulted in extremely low harvest and lots of damage to the coffee farms” (T. Caspersen, 
2008, p. 1). 
624 In 2009 “Equal Exchange había apoyado con parte del recurso para el montaje de una planta procesadora de 
abonos orgánicos” (Informe de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2009, pág. 10.); In 2010 “El comprador Equal 
Exchange está apoyando con 26.000 dólares, programa de abonamiento a un grupo piloto de productores orgánicos 
con el fin de costear el valor del abonamiento” (Informe de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2010, pág. 11); In 
2011 “Se identificó un grupo de 30 productores con los cuales se desarrolló un programa de asistencia técnica y 
abonamiento en cantidad y calidad requerida para que la producción orgánica llegue a ser óptima, llevando costos 
de producción.  Este programa fue financiado por la ONG MIGROSS por recomendación del comprador de café Equal 
Exchange” (Informe de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2011, pág. 9).   
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organic coffee produced in 2011 (less than one-third of the 240 thousand kilos in 2007) led to 
questioning of the long-term provision of this service during the 2012 annual visit625.  
 
As a consequence, through this deliberative scenario they joined the local consensus on 
adaptation to climate change: additionally, to the changes mentioned in the LRA Fairtrade, they 
agreed on the use of infrastructures and know-how to increase the number of young trees per 
unit area. For this, in 2013 a first output financed directly by Equal Exchange, incentivized 35 
organic coffee farmers to renovate 39,422 coffee trees by planting626. In 2014 la Asamblea de 
Delegados de Asprocafé joined the effort to approve an incentive of COP 150 (USD 0.07) per 
renovated tree (up to two thousand plants) over which Equal Exchange added to reach COP 250 
(USD 0.125) per renovated tree (up to three thousand plants) for organic coffee growers627. 
 
Secondly, given the climate vulnerability, during the annual visit, participant actors decided to 
profile the “exceptional coffee” taste related service through a final output the “Cooperation in 
the Quality project”.  Equal would offer this coffee by its cupping score according to the Q system, 
so it could reach a higher price that would be translated into higher monetary services for 
farmers628. As a result, an agreement was signed among participants in the LRA organic to trade 
coffee depending on the cupping score629. To this end, some uses of infrastructures and know-
how were implemented in the trading process so the Cooperative could conduct a cupping test 
for each participant farmer’s lot of organic coffee630. Similarly, the uses of the know-to-appreciate 
of consumers were influenced through the promotional piece "Los Cuernos del Diablo", a 
Riosucio single-origin organic coffee, for summer 2013 (Exchange, 2013)  and spring 2015  
(Exchange, 2015). This communication strategy reinforced the production of the “Fairtrade 
coffee” symbolic services when valuing the coffee brewing proposed by the locals producers and 
the exceptional coffee taste related service when saying: “Angelica from Asprocafe Ingruma in 
Colombia: chose the Chemex to bring out the lush grapefruit notes” (B. A. Caspersen, 2013). In 
2013, once the program was implemented, coffee growers who obtained cups above 83 points 
                                                     
625 “se recibió visita del comprador Equal Exchange quien se encuentra inquieto sobre la continuidad del programa 
de producción orgánica en Riosucio” (Informe de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2012, pág. 13).   
626 Informe de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2013, pág. 15. 
627 Informe de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2014, pág. 16. 
628 Equal Exchange invited Angelica Arroyave (taster at the Cooperative) with six other tasters from the Cooperatives 
of Peru and Uganda, so that with the baristas of local stores in Massachusetts they could identify the best methods 
to filter the coffee of their regions and offer it to the public free of charge in the streets of Plymouth. “On a very 
chilly and rainy morning, together we set up tents, hooked up water boilers, and gave away cups of manually brewed 
coffee. All of the cuppers got to engage the visitors to the tent, prepare their coffee and make the connection 
firsthand” (B. A. Caspersen, 2013). 
629 “se firmó un convenio para un programa piloto para comprar el café orgánico según el puntaje en taza, participan 
los productores cuyo puntaje sea igual o mayor a 83 puntos”. Informe de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2012, 
pág. 13 
630 “el café que califique en este rango fue comprado y empacado en bolsas grainpo facilitadas por el comprador, 
debe ser trillado aparte, empacado y enviado separado del café orgánico común y tendrá un precio mayor”. Informe 
de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2012, pág. 13 
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received a premium-after-buying between COP 400 and COP 1000 (USD 0.21 - 0.54)631. In 2015 
premiums ranged between COP 800 and COP 1500632 (USD 0.29-0.55) for the 46% that scored 
higher than 83 points of the total organic coffee harvested this year633. 
 
As a consequence, in 2015 the LRA CS improved the whole set of conditions of the incumbent 
LRA Organic. It regulated a new use of Resource constituents in one activity of the planting 
process (density); and through the investment of the Fairtrade premium, in three activities in the 
cultivation process (coffee borer beetle management; pest and disease management and farm 
management). Thanks to the Cooperation in the Quality project, one new activity was regulated 
in the roasting process (roasting) increasing the extent (83% of evenly-distributed regulated uses, 
Annex 7). Some incumbent regulations changed qualitatively for profiling a more complex 
combination of services to increase the monetary services, namely the “natural” and the 
“exceptional coffee” taste related service. This qualitative change allowed a higher premium that, 
without changing actors’ alignment or any governance mechanism, produce the output 
“cooperation in quality project” that increased the influence of this LRA over farmers’ behavior, 
increasing the coherence. And clearly, by adding both the origin and the exceptional aromatic 
profile to the incumbent organic production, produced a significant “product differentiation” 
barrier of entry at the producers’ level, increasing closure.  
 
• Outcome LRA Standard CS (within the LRA La Nespresso) 
 
Built over a public-private partnership with the FNC, the LRA CS was incorporated softly within 
the LRA Nespresso through its deliberative scenario the Encuentro bianual del Clúster Expocafé 
in 2011. They agreed on the coffee farming vulnerability to the extreme water events so decided 
to implemented climate-smart coffee production projects to enhance resilience.   
 
In addition to the mentioned PSF and PCM, the cluster activated the Specialty Coffee public policy 
instruments to fund four projects: the “árbol de vida” project to influence the use of 
infrastructures to enhance productivity through young, dense, pest-resistant coffee trees during 
the planting process. With the same goal of enhancing productivity, the “fertilización” project to 
influence the use of know-how during nutrition. The “Rainforest Alliance certificación” project to 
influence the use of know-how so integrated farm management to enhance conservation during 
the cultivation and post-harvesting. It involved delivery of equipment to improve the quality of 
coffee (its “winy” taste related service) and to reduce pollution of the watersheds634. Also, the 
                                                     
631“bonificaciones de $400 (pesos adicionales por kilo de café orgánico vendido) para puntajes de 83 a 83,9; $600 por 
puntajes de 84 a 84,9 y $1.000 para puntajes superior a 85”. Informe de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2013, 
pág. 16. 
632 “el premio por calidad de taza osciló entre $ 800 y $ 1500 (pesos) por kilo (de café orgánico)” Informe de 
Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2015, pág. 15. 
633 Of the 168 thousand kilos purchased as organic coffee in 2015, 77 thousand kilos achieved a score higher than 83 
points. Informe de Administración y Gestión Asprocafé 2015, pág. 16. 
634 “sistemas sépticos, tanques tina, despulpadoras, fosas para pulpas, bodegas, paseras para secado del café, 
equipos de protección”. Informe de administración y gestión, Cooperativa de caficultores del Alto Occidente de 
Caldas, 2011. Pág. 10.  
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training activities emphasized on the integrated farm management, shade regulation, 
maintenance of coverages and protected areas around the creeks (its “environmentally 
responsible” symbolic service). And, to trigger quality the SCP field level project in order to 
influence the use of know-how during the trading process to enhance capabilities of the 
Cooperative to assess the aromatic profile of coffee sold by participant farmers.  
 
As a consequence, in 2015 the LRA CS improved one condition of the incumbent LRA Nespresso. 
It regulated new uses of Resource constituents in three activities of planting (Diversification; 
density and shade); in four activities during the cultivation (soil management; coffee borer beetle 
management; pest and disease management and nutrition). It increased the extent (95% of 
evenly-distributed regulated uses, Annex 7). Additionally, maintaining the same alignment and 
governance mechanism for profiling the same services, they produced additional outputs (árbol 
de vida, fertilización, and certificación projects) to trigger the change in farmers’ behavior and 
the SPC field project to change the Cooperative’s. In the end, increasing the coordination to 
guarantee provision of the demanded services increasing the coherence. And barriers of entry 
remain exactly the same (equal closure).  
 
6.4.4. Outcome LRA Standard CS 
 
The Niña phenomenon showed the limits of individual action to guarantee the demanded 
services of the Resource and allowed a shared definition of the problem in terms of diversified 
and productive coffee cultivation to increase the resilience of both the coffee crop and the 
household to climate change.  
 
The mesas de concertación, originally conceived as an instrument of citizen participation, 
produced the deliberative scenario among actors demanding services from the Resource. At the 
beginning, it was illusory to try to reach a common profile due to the two completely antagonistic 
positions. Actors privileged a series of cooperative mobilizations that firstly avoided an 
agreement on uses of Resource constituents (therefore a common profile) and prioritized a joint 
effort to benefit the rural population (with roads, housing, and electricity) which would improve 
the material wellbeing of the coffee household. An agreement of the kind "working together on 
what unites us and avoiding what separates us" with a result relevant to the collective action on 
the Coffee Resource of Riosucio: trust. In fact, the bonds of trust built between the actors explain 
the actor constellation change from a pure conflict (featured by the sum-zero game) to one 
featured by the collective action problem with a possible win-win scenario.  
 
In this sense, afterward actors reached an agreement of the kind "working together that which 
separates us", so they could initiate an implicit agreement on the uses of the Resource 
constituents that would produce a satisfactory profile for the actors. An extensive coalition 
(coffee farmers; Asprocafé; Asproinca; Indigenous Movement; Local authority; Cooperative, 
FNC/Comité; Roasters (Equal, Nespresso, Keurig, Starbucks); Socodevi) agreed on a set of 
minimum uses of Resource constituents on the entire Resource to produce a profile resilient to 
climate change, thus they innovatively activated the two instruments of the coffee public policy:  
the renovation and the diversification programs (already mentioned in the previous subsections), 
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over which other compatible uses could be exclusively encouraged within each LRA to profile 
other services (service provision that is detailed in chapter 5.1).  
 
As a result, the whole set of LRAs in Riosucio converged in a profile featured by a combination of 
“monetary” services; the “environmentally responsible” and the “indigenous coffee” symbolic 
services; and the “clean cup” taste related service: a coffee crop that coexists with the production 
of food (occupying two thirds of the farm area635), the maintenance of coverage (averages close 
to 30% of shade636) and the protection of the watersheds (43% of coffee farmers treat the waters 
before pouring them 637 ). At the same time, with increasing densities, decreasing age and 
increasing the production of coffee cherries per hectare638  and the income for more than two-
thirds of coffee growers in Riosucio639. Additionally, it retains enough flexibility for actors who 
want to produce a more complex profile by combining other symbolic and taste related services. 
 
6.5. Intermediary synthesis: Inputs to test our second hypothesis 
 
Throughout the four actors’ games in which we divided this chapter, and whose systematization 
is presented in annex 8.1. We identified nine different LRAs since the breakdown of the 
International Coffee Agreement that are presented in table 14 and whose detailed development 
is presented in Annex 9.1.     
  
Our diachronic analysis implies that we observed the change caused by the actor’s games, by 
comparing the final configuration of the LRA(s) against the initial configuration of the incumbent 
LRA. In some cases, actor’s games affected one, two or the three conditions of the incumbent 
LRA, in other cases, actor’s game produced newborn LRAs.  
 
The extent is measured in terms of the change in the percentage of regulated activities from the 
26 activities (in percentage points); the coherence in terms of a failed/successful coordination 
among profilers to provide the services sought by the LRA; and the closure in terms of the 
placement of the barriers of entry. This exercise is presented in Annex 7.1.  
 
Table 14 Variation of the LRA’s conditions explained by the three analytical dimensions in Riosucio: Source: The author. 
LRA Coalition 
Mobilization 
of AR 
Institutional 
Creativity Extent Coherence Closure 
                                                     
635 Table 6 of observed uses in Riosucio, chapter 5.1.3 
636 Table 6 of observed uses in Riosucio, chapter 5.1.3 
637 Applying the averages presented in Table 6 of observed uses in chapter 5.1.3, with the number of coffee farmers 
distributed by LRA of table 1 in chapter 3.1.3. 
638 Comparing the general results for coffee growing in Riosucio with data from the Committee in 2005 presented by 
Sánchez Arenas (2005): 4,273 trees / ha; 17 years of average age; production of 890 kilos of coffee / ha. With data 
from coffee farming in Riosucio from the Committee in 2015: 5,133 trees / ha, average 7.7 years of age and 1,391 
kilos of coffee / ha (Using the Coop / SICA database, this is the result of dividing the 3,789 thousand kilos of coffee 
bought by the Cooperative in 2015, among the 2723 ha of coffee in Riosucio).   
639 72% of the 3056 coffee growers who participate in an LRA different from the LRA Standard, increased their 
monetary services by at least 26% with respect to the latter (Section 8.1.5) 
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LRA Standard NA NA  NA  Baseline: 17 pp evenly distributed 
Baseline: Failed: 
two-way 
coordination 
among producers  
Baseline: Barriers at 
the traders’ level 
LRA MH PT+SHP+SHC Cooperative Presence 
Plus 19 pp evenly 
distributed (over the 
incumbent LRA Standard)  
Successful two-way 
coordination 
among all profilers 
Product differentiation 
(origin) 
LRA Natural PF+PT+PR+SHP+SHC Selfishly / Cooperative Presence 
Plus 33 pp evenly 
distributed (over the 
incumbent LRA MH) 
Successful two-way 
coordination 
among all profilers 
Product differentiation 
(origin and organic) 
LRA Fairtrade PF+PT+SHC Selfishly Absence 
Less 12 pp evenly 
distributed (over the 
incumbent LRA Natural) 
Failed one-way 
coordination 
among all profilers 
Barriers at the traders’ 
level 
LRA Organic PF+PT+PR+SHC Strategically Presence 
Plus 12 pp evenly 
distributed (over the 
incumbent LRA Natural) 
Successful two-way 
coordination 
among all profilers 
Product differentiation 
(origin and organic) 
LRA La Vereda SHP Selfishly Absence 
Less 26 pp concentrated 
(over the incumbent LRA 
Natural) 
Failed, any 
coordination. Any barrier 
LRA 
Nespresso PT+PR+SHP+SHC Strategically Presence 
Plus 37 pp evenly 
distributed (over the 
incumbent LRA Natural) 
Successful two-way 
coordination 
among all profilers 
Barriers at the roaster 
level 
LRA CS 
Standard640  PF+PT+PR+SHP+SHC Cooperative Presence 
Plus 20 pp concentrated 
(over the incumbent LRA 
Standard for the whole set 
of LRAs)  
Successful two-way 
coordination 
among all profilers 
Barriers at the traders’ 
level 
LRA 
Reg/Starbucks PT+PR Strategically Presence 
Plus 20 pp concentrated 
(over the incumbent LRA 
Standard) 
Successful two-way 
coordination 
among all profilers 
Barriers at the roaster 
level 
*SHP = Stakeholders in production; SHC = Stakeholders in consumption; PF = Profilers farmers; PT = Profilers traders; PR = Profilers roasters 
  
                                                     
640 It has to be said, that we take into account only the LRA CS Standard as the basic profile and not the whole set of 
the LRAS built over it (LRA CS Fairtrade, CS Organic, CS Vereda, CS Nespresso) to maintain a parsimonious analysis 
because it captures the whole add value of the diachronic analysis.  
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Third Part: Buesaco (Nariño) 
 
This third part contains two chapters: chapter seven produces the inputs to tests our first 
hypothesis, and chapter eight produces the inputs to tests our second hypothesis. 
 
Chapter 7. LRAs that enhance the sustainable management of Coffee. 
 
We divide this chapter into three subchapters to produce the inputs to test our first hypothesis 
in the conclusive chapter.  
 
The first one tries to disentangle the collective action problem in a five-step process through an 
analytical tool from the IRR, the Local Regulatory Arrangement (LRA): firstly, it identifies a closed 
list of services demanded from the Resource by spotting the LRAs presented in the territory 
during the 2015-2016 coffee harvest. Secondly, it describes how these services are expected to 
be produced by analyzing how each LRA regulates a particular use of resource constituents. 
Thirdly, it summarizes observed uses of resource constituents by each LRA. Fourth it puts on 
evidence the services provided by the Resource because of the observed uses of constituents by 
each LRA. Fifth it compares and ranks the LRAs by its provision of services. 
 
The second subchapter analyses each LRA from the three conditions. So, it is divided into three 
subsections (namely extent, coherence, and closure), which in time, are subdivided by LRAs. 
 
We conclude with the input to test our first hypothesis, namely the results of our synchronic 
analysis, in which we assess the level of service provision depending on the LRA configuration.  
 
7.1. Coffee, a collective action problem 
 
Coffee can be understood as a resource because humans use it to produce different kinds of 
symbolic, taste related and monetary services. The objective of the collective action is to 
guarantee the provision of this panoply of services. In this subchapter, we use the LRA as an 
analytical tool to light that panoply of services demanded by the Resource in the first place, and 
then, the services actually provided by the Resource.    
 
We start this section by categorizing exhaustively coffee and coffee farmers from the vereda 
Veracruz (a rural subdivision of the municipality of Buesaco) in different LRAs. Once the LRAs are 
shown, from an operational point of view, we elaborate a closed list of services demanded from 
the Resource.  
 
In the following section, we identify the main institutions that were mobilized within each LRA to 
regulate uses by profilers. We divide the section into the three categories of services (monetary, 
symbolic and taste related) and then, we describe the uses that are regulated (by the institutions 
mobilized) to produce each one of the services previously identified.  
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Finally, we assess the services provision by comparing the uses regulated to produce them with 
the uses observed on average by each LRA in the first four processes641. So, if coffee farmers in a 
particular LRA used, on average, resource constituent in a different way it was regulated, services 
demanded by this LRA are not provided.  
 
7.1.1. Services demanded by actors  
 
Our criteria to classify exhaustively the 70 coffee farmers in different LRAs, from whom we have 
data on coffee sales in Veracruz, is that a minimum of 50% their production was sold through a 
particular trader using a particular institution to produce a particular combination of services.  
 
It can be seen as a closed portfolio of different options that a coffee farmer had for selling their 
coffee (and obtain different monetary services) that will be explained next. For now, it is to know 
that the farmer can choose a particular trader depending on their belonging to a particular LRA, 
but then, the farmer has to implement some regulated uses by a particular institution in order 
that the Resource can actually produce that particular combination of services. So, in the end, 
both the farmer and the coffee bean can be placed in one LRA only if they both fulfill the LRA 
requirements.   
  
For the coffee harvest 2015-2016 in Veracruz, both the 70 coffee farmers and their 89 thousand 
kilos of coffee, was distributed in six different LRA presented in table 15, with an average of 11 
farmers (a range from 7-18) per LRA.  
 
Table 15 Farmers classification by LRA in Buesaco. Source: the author. 
LRA by profiling 
institution 
Coffee 
farmers 
Purchases Quality Premium 
Kilos Percentage 
Factor  Premium 
when buying  
Premium after 
buying 
LRA Nespresso  12 31,000 35% 94 $ 420/k $ 80/k RF  
LRA CNilson 
7 
15,000 17% 
94 $ 200/k Between $ 
2000/k - $ 
7500/k 
LRA CAltura  
18 
17,810 20% 
94 $ 100/k Between $ 500/k 
- $ 1600/k 
LRA CCEspeciales / 
Starbucks 
14 
20,000 22% 
94 0 Between $ 500/k 
- $ 1000/k 
LRA Standard 
9 
 2,870 3% 
94 0 NA 
LRA Discount  
10 
2,660 3%  
More 
than 94 
 (-) discount  NA 
Total 70 89,340 100%    
                                                     
641 The full potential of a coffee bean to produce services is reached just before it is blended and roasted. From here 
onwards, there is an inevitable tradeoff between taste related services (As an example, roasting curves can highlight 
body at the expense of acidity, or on the contrary. It can also produce a balance between both in which neither is 
predominant) 
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As a test, this purchasing transaction is a probe that the expected uses were implemented and, 
it is a threshold that determines the following uses that are going to be implemented to produce 
the expected combination of services. From a negative point of view, the uses that were not 
implemented before this transaction makes impossible for the resource afterward, to produce 
those uses’ dependent services.  
 
Uses that can only be assessed through a double check on both the farmer and the coffee bean: 
By clearly distinguishing the farmer, the uses to produce symbolic services can be controlled 
through various forms like routinely visits of surprising audits. And by assessing the quality of the 
bean (that clearly depends on the measuring instrument that was planned in advance), the uses 
to produce taste related services can be controlled.      
      
• Coffee and farmer inclusion in a particular LRA 
 
The evolution that will be narrated in the next chapter had produced a complex system of 
farmers’ inclusion-exclusion to different LRAs, so it cannot be properly said that one farmer 
belongs to one LRA, but that a farmer can choose between those LRAs to which he has the right 
to belong. In this order of ideas, we can use a model of two overlapping layers642 featured by 
rivalry, at the same layer, a coffee farmer that belongs to one LRA cannot belong to another one; 
complementarity, a coffee farmer that belong to an upper layer, also belongs to the lower one, 
but not on the contrary.   
 
• The first layer covers the whole area of the municipality (2.950 farmers) including 
Veracruz and its 70 coffee farmers. It is composed by the LRA Discount and the LRA 
Standard  
• The second layer also covers the whole municipality but it is distributed between:   
o The LRA Nespresso covers all coffee farmers in the municipality that are included 
in the SICA (the 2.950 farmers in Buesaco and 12 in Veracruz).  
o The LRA CCEsp/Starbucks covers all coffee farmers included in EdNbaseline 
survey, more than 2 thousand in the municipality, from which 14 coffee farmers 
in Veracruz.   
o The LRA CAltura with one thousand members in the municipality and 18 in 
Veracruz. 
o The LRA CNilson has 160 affiliates in the municipality and 7 in Veracruz.  
 
The inclusion of the coffee farmer to the first layer is derived from the SICA database updated 
routinely by the technical assistance service provided by the FNC. When saying routinely, we 
meant that on a daily basis, each time the technical assistant goes to the field and identify a new 
crop of coffee, he will inquire who the owner is and eventually the coffee farmer will be contacted 
and would be added to the SICA database. It could be also the way-round in which the new coffee 
                                                     
642 We used it in our first context of study in Riosucio.  
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farmer will contact the technical assistant to be included, aiming to benefit from public policies 
implemented through the FNC.  
 
On the second layer, the LRA Nespresso is built on the SICA database but it includes only 
federated coffee farmers (it excludes coffee farmers with less than 0.5 ha cultivated in coffee) 
with its farms located in the altitudinal fringe in which the aromatic profile (Nespresso is looking 
for) can be obtained. In Buesaco it goes from 1700 to 2.100. 
 
The LRA CCEsp/Starbucks use the EdN’s database, it was a one-time baseline survey conducted 
by EdN as a component of the implementation of the C.A.F.E. Practices program (that will be 
explained throughout this chapter), in which forty interviewers and three people to digitalize the 
information were contracted in the whole department643 after 2004. It was partially updated by 
a dozen of technical assistants that were contracted through two different projects in the period 
2004-2010.        
 
The LRA CAltura is built on their own base-line survey that had increased progressively since 2013 
in which Grupo Empresarial started its work in Buesaco with their technical assistance team. And 
the LRA CNilson, which created his own database by picking the farmers he thought were able to 
produce high cupping score coffee, based on his previous knowledge as Cooperativa de 
Occidente’s coffee buyer for one decade.   
   
The first layer is divided between the LRA discount and all the others according to the Resolución 
5 del 6 de junio de 2002 del Comité Nacional del Caféteros (see chapter 4.1.2). If coffee did not 
meet the minimum quality to be classified as Excelso, no matter in which LRA the coffee farmer 
belongs to, automatically the coffee goes to the LRA Discount.  
 
Coffee growers know in advance that their coffee does not fulfill the minimum requirements to 
be categorized as Excelso644, so they go directly to sell their coffee with discount, usually to Jairo 
Romero because, as he is specialized in this market, he pays the best prices for low quality coffee 
in Buesaco, that in any case is lower than the price paid for Excelso quality coffee. Other reasons 
like the need for money or the lack of equipment to process coffee cherries, among others make 
farmers sold their production with a discount645. It has to be said that all coffee farmers had a 
portion of their coffee, usually at the very beginning and at the very end of the harvest, in which 
quality is low in terms of the norm 646 . Nevertheless, in Veracruz, only for 10 farmers this 
proportion was more than half of the total harvest. They sold 2.6 thousand kilos of coffee, or 3% 
of the total Veracruz coffee harvests 2015/2016. Small quantity because it happened to be that 
                                                     
643 Interview with Gerardo Sarasti, technical coordinator of EdN.  
644 Even if the normative looks very technical and difficult to grasp, experience allows farmers to easy distinguish 
between coffee that can be exported (excelso quality) or not (domestic consumption).    
645 In occasion farmers are selling their coffee “en el árbol” (coffee cherries still on the tree). The buyer has to assume 
the cost of picking, processing and transporting to the purchasing point.  
646 The farmer has to pick up all coffee cherries to avoid the coffee borer beetle, which prospers inside overripe fruits 
that had felt down. If measures are not taken, the population grows and affects the well develop beans. Fathers 
usually motivate their children to pick up all this low-quality coffee and keep the money once sold.   
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they were also the smallest ones: on average the ten farmers classified in this LRA have 0.43 ha 
cultivated in coffee (1.3 ha the total size of the farm), whereas the average in Veracruz is 1.30 ha 
cultivated in coffee (3 ha the total size of the farm).  
 
In Buesaco, a coffee sample that reaches a factor lower than 94647 is considered to fulfill the 
quality requirement of the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC, so it can be exported as Café de Colombia, 
according to the Reglamento de Uso de la Indicación Geográfica Protegida Café de Colombia (IGP 
Café de Colombia) and sold through the LRA Standard. Even though different traders could 
acquire it, it will be sold as Colombian Excelso after being blended with coffee from other regions. 
In the case of Veracruz, two traders participated in this LRA: Coffee that was purchased by both 
cooperatives (which used funds from the FoNC so they have to sell their coffee to Almacafé, the 
logistics operator of the FNC) from coffee farmers that are not included in Nespresso’s list. It 
included six farmers of the ten in Veracruz, three of them that are outside the altitudinal fringe 
and three which insufficient area (0.1ha, 0.3ha, and 0.4ha) to sell through LRA Nespresso648. The 
other three farmers sold to Rodrigo Viveros, which in turn sold all his standard coffee, through 
the CCEspeciales, to the fifth main exporter of Colombia Coffee, the trader La Meseta.      
 
In the second layer, all coffee had already overtaken the factor 94, but depending on the trader 
coffee will follow at least four different LRA.  
 
1- In the LRA Nespresso, farmers sold to both cooperatives because they participate in the 
“Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality™ Coffee Program” (AAA Program hereafter). This 
program tries to enhance farmers’ capability to produce the profile demanded by the 
Swiss roasters Nespresso. Thus, they work only with those farmers who want (they must 
prove their willingness and must assist to the group meetings) and potentially can 
produce it because of both, they are in the proper ecotope and, looking for efficiency in 
the technology transfer of the proper agronomic practices, they have more than 0.5 ha. 
In Veracruz 13 farmers with 1.81ha cultivated in coffee (in farms with 4.18ha in total size) 
on average, on an altitudinal fringe ranging from 1.932 to 2.086 m.a.s.l., sold through this 
LRA 31 thousand kilos of coffee.   
 
2- In the LRA CCEsp/Starbucks, the relation between farmers and the CCEspeciales is a 
heritage of the projects to implement the “Coffee and Farm Equity Practices” – (CAFE 
Practices hereafter) conducted by EdN to produce alongside coffee farmers in Buesaco 
the profile demanded by the American Roaster Starbucks, which in turn sells a portion of 
the coffee bought in Nariño following the Reglamento de Uso de la Denominación de 
Origen Protegida Café de Nariño (DO Café de Colombia). So, the trader can sell their 
coffee just as factor 93; or coffee labeled as CAFE Practices-Café de Nariño to add value, 
or they can as a Specialty Coffee. Indeed, when they became independent from EdN in 
                                                     
647 In section 4.1.3 it was explained that factor is the number of kilos that, depending on the sample, it would be 
needed to produce a 70 kilos bag of Excelso coffee to export, 94 is considered the threshold in which coffee will be 
paid with a discount.   
648 Almost all the Excelso bought by Almacafé in Nariño goes through the LRA Nespresso. 
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2012, they were able to create a strategic partnership with Caravela, in which the latter 
equipped the former with a lab and a Q graded cupper to classify coffee depending on 
the “SCAA cupping protocol”. In Veracruz, 14 farmers with 1.61ha cultivated in coffee (in 
farms with 4.52ha in total size) on average, sold through this LRA 20 thousand kilos of 
coffee, from which, four farmers sold 3.080 kilos classified and sold as specialty coffee.  
 
3- In the LRA CAltura, the whole relationship between the trader Café de Altura and the 
coffee farmers is built around the Q system, for each farmer that delivers a coffee factor 
93 and, if he is included in their database, a sample will be taken to be cupped through 
the SCAA cupping protocol. Higher scores will be offered in the specialty coffee market, 
low scores would be analyzed to identify the agronomic practices that should be 
improved by the farmer in order to improve coffee score. In the first case, coffee will be 
sold as specialty, in the second, if it goes through CCEspeciales (as it was the case for the 
harvest 2015-2016) it can be sold as Excelso, or as CAFE Practices. In Veracruz, 18 coffee 
farmers with 1.14ha cultivated in coffee (in farms 2.3ha in total size) sold slightly less than 
18 thousand kilos through this LRA but only two of them were able to sell a portion of 
their coffee, 510 kilos in total, as specialty coffee.  
 
4- In the LRA CNilson, the relationship between Café de Nilsón and the 160 farmers in 
Buesaco is built over the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC because the payment is made on the 
factor basis. As they paid COP$ 200 (USD$ 0.07) per kilo additional to the price offered by 
the cooperatives, this relation is also built on the confidence that a good proportion of 
coffee is going to score high through the SCAA cupping protocol. In addition, coffee that 
both scores high and reaches a roaster that pays more, will produce an after-sale price 
reassessment and the producer will receive an additional premium. In Veracruz, 7 farmers 
with 1.74ha cultivated in coffee (in farms 4.47ha) on average, sold 15 thousand kilos. Two 
of them sold 2.5 thousand kilos as specialty coffee.      
 
• A closed list of services demanded by actors in Veracruz/Buesaco in 2015/2016 
 
This exhaustive categorization of coffee bought in la vereda Veracruz for the harvest 2015/2016, 
allowed us to identify the institutions concretized by the actors to profile the Resource, namely 
the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC; the IGP Café de Colombia; DO Café de Nariño; the AAA Program; 
the CAFE Practices and the Q System.    
 
In Annex 4, we analyzed each one of these institutions as were activated in each LRA so we could 
identify the symbolic, taste related and monetary services. In the end, we produced a closed list 
of services that were demanded from the Resource in Veracruz in the harvest 2015/2016 
summarized in table 16  
 
Table 16 Services demanded from the Resource in Veracruz in the harvest 2015-2016. Source: the author. 
Monetary services Description 
Household income  Kilos of coffee produced in one year by price per kilo.  
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Symbolic services Description 
Energy dose A ready-like feeling   
Reputation of the appellation Café 
Colombia Positive feelings attached to the appellation Café de Colombia 
Reputation of the appellation Café 
Nariño Positive feelings attached to the appellation Café de Nariño 
Brand reputation Positive feelings attached to the private brand 
Environmentally responsible 
A feeling of responsibility for investing in the conservation and 
protection of natural resources.   
Transparent coffee A confident feeling on the path followed by the coffee. 
Ethically traded A feeling that coffee is paid as fair markets signaled.  
Shared value 
A feeling of co-responsibility in the wellbeing of the coffee farmers’ 
community.  
Poverty reduction A feeling of solidarity towards poor coffee farmers.  
Taste-related services Description 
Baked coffee An uninteresting coffee with tinny body, flat and grain-like flavor.  
Clean cup 
A coffee flavor free of taints and defects. In Colombia, it implies a mild 
coffee, with a medium to high acidity and body, and a pronounced and 
complete aroma 
Terroir expression  
A coffee that represents the aromatic profile developed in a particular 
region due to its climate and soils. In Nariño, it implies a coffee 
with high acidity, medium bodied, sweet notes, and a clean, mild cup 
with a very pronounced aroma 
Sweet flavor and citric acid aroma 
A flavor produced by sugars in the bean and an intense and pleasant 
flavor that adds vivacity to the coffee with a retro-olfaction sensation 
of ripe citrus aromas such as orange or lemon 
Exceptional coffee A rare and highly pleasant aromatic profile. 
 
We propose to understand it as the closed list of 14 symbolic and taste related services in addition 
to the monetary ones demanded in Veracruz in 2015/2016. Regarding the monetary services, it 
has to be said that in Veracruz that these are not dependent on the productivity but rather on 
the production of the exceptional coffee taste related service. So, we will distinguish between 
two groups of monetary services. The first one refers exclusively to uses oriented to increase 
productivity, the second one refers to uses to trigger the “exceptional coffee taste related 
service”. In any case, when we measure the “monetary services” at the end of this section, we 
refer to the income of the coffee farmer that are the result of all uses including those oriented 
towards the productivity and/or those oriented towards the production of the “exceptional 
coffee” service.  
 
7.1.2. Regulated uses to produce the demanded services  
 
Profiling institutions, namely the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC; the IGP Café de Colombia; DO Café 
de Nariño; the AAA Program; the CAFE Practices and the Q System, produce a combination of 
services because they regulate the uses that profiling actors made of the resource constituents, 
namely infrastructure, know-how, and know-to-appreciate in 26 activities detailed in Annex 1. 
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In Annex 4, we had described how these profiling institutions regulated these uses in order to 
produce the services demanded in Veracruz in 2015/2016. Results are summarized in Annex 4.4.  
 
The first analysis of these observations is that there are more complementarities than rivalries 
between profiling institutions in almost all activities during the first three processes. Uses in 
fourteen (from sixteen) activities are regulated in such a complementary way that they would 
produce the fifteen services demanded in Veracruz in 2015/2016, so it could be expected that all 
coffee farmers are using their resources constituents as it is roughly described in the white boxes 
of table 17. Nevertheless, in two activities (during the planting process: diversification and 
variety), regulated uses by profiling institutions produce a service at the expense of another, 
creating a rivalry (signaled in red) that make us expect observable uses that are heterogeneous.    
 
Nevertheless, a rivalry is put forward in all the three activities of the trading process (purchasing, 
threshing and exporting) that places in opposed corners some profiling actors (traders) claiming 
for a different coffee profile dependent on the profiling institutions: namely the physical 
assessment using the Resolución 02/2002 or the cupping test demanded by the Q System. It can 
be anticipated that the opposed LRA are (dis)incentivizing different uses of Resource constituents 
in this process so we can expect that the observed uses are going to be heterogeneous.   
 
Table 17 Rivalries and complementarities analysis. Source: The author using tables in Annex 4.4. 
Processes Uses Rivalries Expected result 
Planting 
Diversification  3 Specialization vs. 3 diversification  Heterogeneous 
Variety  4 pest resistant vs. 3 non-pest resistant Heterogeneous 
Renovation of Coffee trees    1 younger  Younger coffee trees 
Planting density  1 higher density Higher density 
Shade 5 canopy vs.  1 less canopy  Canopy  
Cultivation 
Soil management  3 integrated plan Integrated plan for soil management 
Pest and disease management 3 integrated plan Integrated plan for pest management 
Nutrition  3 compensation Synthetic nutrition 
Hedge rowing  2 hedge rowing Hedge rowing 
Picking   11 ripe fruits plus timely  Ripe fruit  
Farm management 8 planning  Planning 
Post-Harvesting 
Hulling   8 immediately  Immediately  
Fermentation   5 only short plus 3 including short Short 
Drying    4 any method vs 4 controlled sundry  Any method preferring sundry  
Waste management 2 integrated plan  Integrated plan for waste management 
Reselection  3 reselection Reselection 
Trading 
Purchasing 9 sorted by "bean" quality vs 3 sorted by cupping.  Heterogeneous 
Threshing and sorting 8 milled in Excelso coffee vs 3 milled in specialty coffee. Heterogeneous 
Bulking and export  8 documentary traceability vs 3 physical traceability Heterogeneous 
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7.1.3. Observed uses to provide the demanded services by each LRA 
 
In the previous section, we were interested in regulations to identify how the services demanded 
from the resource are produced. In this section, we document our observations on how are 
profiling actors using resource constituents by each LRA. In other words, we assess the actual 
behavior over the Resource in Veracruz in 2015/2016 with the regulated behavior needed to 
produce services, in order to credibly claim service provision. 
 
The observations of the uses for each LRA, which is presented in table 18, were documented 
based on quantitative data collected by Viviana Ramos with all coffee farmers in Veracruz 
(described previously). We evaluated how farmers were using resource constituents in each one 
of the sixteen activities during the first three processes by comparing the average uses depending 
on the LRA. As differences among farmers could explain the use of resource constituents, we 
wanted to compare the most similar farmers so the difference can be convincingly explained by 
the LRA they belong to. This is the reason we conducted a statistical analysis known as analysis 
of covariance (ANCOVA)649, which allow us to compare the average uses per LRA by controlling 
for a series of covariances, for example, the number of coffee trees per farm. We will use it as a 
descriptive statistic more precise than a regular mean because we are interested in describing 
how farmers are using their resource constituents on average, in each LRA, so we can assess 
service provision. Why are they using them in that particular way would be a matter of the next 
chapter.   
 
In the specific case of Veracruz, our census has information on how farmers performed each one 
of the sixteen activities of the first three processes. So, we conducted an ANCOVA for each 
activity (independent variable) depending on the LRA to which the farmer was placed (dependent 
variable) controlling by the number of coffee trees (covariate that resulted in the most robust in 
our model). For each activity, there is an indicator (in a few cases there are two or three) and its 
measurement is shown for each LRA, meaning that on average, farmers belonging to that LRA 
are using resource constituents in that particular way. The whole statistical support is presented 
in Annex 5.2. 
 
The data for the other processes were obtained through qualitative information gathered by the 
author in interviews conducted in Buesaco, Pasto, and Bogotá with the profiling actors who were 
participating in each LRA identified in Veracruz.   
 
Table 18 Observed uses by LRA. Source: The author. 
Processes Uses LRA Discount LRA Standard 
LRA 
CCEsp/Starb
ucks 
LRA Caltura LRA CNilson LRA Nespresso 
                                                     
649 We used the SPSS statistical software. For conducting the series of Ancovas, we relied on Field (2005), specially 
chapter 9.  
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Planting 
Diversification   
(- Coffee area/total 
area**  
- Percentage of the 
household income 
derived from 
coffee* ) 
46% of the total 
area is cultivated 
in coffee. 
 
49%  of income 
comes from 
coffee 
47% of the total 
area is cultivated 
in coffee. 
 
54% of income 
comes from 
coffee 
73% of the total 
area is cultivated 
in coffee. 
 
48% of income 
comes from 
coffee 
69% of the total 
area is cultivated 
in coffee. 
 
38% of income 
comes from 
coffee 
56% of the total 
area is cultivated 
in coffee. 
 
60% of income 
comes from 
coffee 
70% of the total 
area is cultivated 
in coffee. 
 
52% of income 
comes from 
coffee 
Variety (pest 
resistant coffee 
trees planted/total 
coffee trees 
planted in the farm 
)* 
 84% are pest 
resistant 
96% are pest 
resistant 
80% are pest 
resistant 
80% are pest 
resistant 
64% are pest 
resistant 
74% are pest 
resistant 
Cycles of 
renovation of 
Coffee trees 
(Average age of the 
coffee crop)* 
4.29 years old 4.71 years old 5.53 years old 3.81 years old 3.86 years old 4.85 years old 
Density (average 
density of the 
coffee crop)** 
6.009 coffee 
trees per hectare 
7.109 coffee 
trees per hectare 
6.103 coffee 
trees per hectare 
6.432 coffee 
trees per hectare 
5.769 coffee 
trees per hectare 
6.335 coffee 
trees per hectare 
Shade (average 
shade in the coffee 
crop)* 
85% of the crop 
grows under the 
shade  
74% of the crop 
grows under the 
shade 
86% of the crop 
grows under the 
shade 
75% of the crop 
grows under the 
shade 
68% of the crop 
grows under the 
shade 
79% of the crop 
grows under the 
shade 
Cultivation 
Weed/soil 
management 
(percentage of 
respondents who 
are using 
integrated soil 
management)* 
31% are using 
integrated soil 
management. 
35% are using 
integrated soil 
management. 
35% are using 
integrated soil 
management. 
33% are using 
integrated soil 
management. 
85% are using 
integrated soil 
management. 
24% are using 
integrated soil 
management. 
Pest and disease 
management 
(Percentage of 
respondents who 
are implementing 
the RERE, a cultural 
practice to control 
the coffee borer 
beetle)* 
20% are using 
RERE. 
0% are using 
RERE 
0% are using 
RERE 
6% are using 
RERE. 
14% are using 
RERE. 
0% are using 
RERE 
Pest and disease 
management (1- 
the percentage of 
respondents who 
are using the 
integrated pest 
management ** 
2- the percentage 
of respondents 
who are using 
pesticides*) 
0% used 
integrated pest 
management. 
 
17% used 
pesticides.  
0% used 
integrated pest 
management. 
 
0% used any 
pesticide.   
0% used 
integrated pest 
management. 
 
38% used 
pesticide  
0% used the 
integrated pest 
management. 
 
28% used 
pesticide  
0% used the 
integrated pest 
management. 
 
58% used 
pesticide  
0% used the 
integrated pest 
management. 
 
43% used 
pesticide  
Nutrition* (1- 
doses of fertilizer 
per coffee tree* 
2- the percentage 
of respondents 
who are using 
organic fertilization 
3- the percentage 
of respondents 
who are using the 
pulp as organic 
fertilizer*) 
123 grams per 
coffee tree (49% 
of the 
recommended 
doses).  
 
20% use organic 
fertilization.   
 
53% composted 
the pulp and 
used it as 
fertilizer.    
119 grams per 
coffee tree (48% 
of the 
recommended 
doses)  
 
0% use organic 
fertilization.   
 
59% composted 
the pulp and 
used it as 
fertilizer. 
96 grams per 
coffee tree (38% 
of the 
recommended 
doses).  
 
14% use organic 
fertilization.   
 
62% composted 
the pulp and 
used it as 
fertilizer. 
94 grams per 
coffee tree (38% 
of the 
recommended 
doses).  
 
16% use organic 
fertilization.   
 
50% composted 
the pulp and 
used it as 
fertilizer.      
104 grams per 
coffee tree (42% 
of the 
recommended 
doses). 
 
0% use organic 
fertilization.   
 
70% composted 
the pulp and 
used it as 
fertilizer.   
121 grams per 
coffee tree (48% 
of the 
recommended 
doses).  
 
8% use organic 
fertilization.   
 
65% composted 
the pulp and 
used it as 
fertilizer.  
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Hedge rowing 
(percentage of 
respondents who 
are using hedge 
rowing)* 
0% are using 
hedge rowing 
0% are using 
hedge rowing 
0% are using 
hedge rowing 
0% are using 
hedge rowing 
0% are using 
hedge rowing 
0% are using 
hedge rowing 
Picking (1- the 
percentage of 
respondents who 
are using selective 
picking* 
2- the percentage 
of respondents 
who are manually 
selecting defective 
beans before 
hulling*)  
100% selective 
picking in the 
field. 
 
21% and 
additional 
selection before 
hulling 
100% selective 
picking in the 
field. 
 
35% and 
additional 
selection before 
hulling 
100% selective 
picking in the 
field. 
 
13% and 
additional 
selection before 
hulling 
100% selective 
picking in the 
field. 
 
22% and 
additional 
selection before 
hulling 
100% selective 
picking in the 
field. 
 
14% and 
additional 
selection before 
hulling 
100% selective 
picking in the 
field. 
 
16% and 
additional 
selection before 
hulling 
Farm management 
(percentage of 
respondents who 
are using 
accounting 
records**) 
2% are using 
accounting 
records. 
25% are using 
accounting 
records. 
13% are using 
accounting 
records. 
44% are using 
accounting 
records. 
0% are using 
accounting 
records. 
7% are using 
accounting 
records. 
 
Post-
Harvesting 
Hulling (percentage 
of respondents 
who have 
appropriate 
equipment**) 
53% have clean 
and in good 
condition hulling 
machines. 
59% have clean 
and in good 
condition hulling 
machines. 
69% have clean 
and in good 
condition hulling 
machines. 
89% have clean 
and in good 
condition hulling 
machines. 
99% have clean 
and in good 
condition hulling 
machines. 
90% have clean 
and in good 
condition hulling 
machines. 
Fermentation 
(percentage of 
respondents who 
have appropriate 
equipment**) 
45% have proper 
fermentation 
facilities. 
38% have proper 
fermentation 
facilities. 
61% have proper 
fermentation 
facilities. 
83% have proper 
fermentation 
facilities. 
98% have proper 
fermentation 
facilities. 
72% have proper 
fermentation 
facilities. 
Drying (percentage 
of respondents 
who have 
appropriate 
equipment*) 
55% have proper 
drying facilities. 
49% have proper 
drying facilities. 
61% have proper 
drying facilities. 
66% have proper 
drying facilities. 
84% have proper 
drying facilities. 
72% have proper 
drying facilities. 
Waste 
management (1- 
the percentage of 
respondents who 
have water 
treatment 
equipment* 
2- the percentage 
of respondents 
who recycle water 
used to wash the 
coffee* 
3- the percentage 
of respondents 
who have compost 
equipment*) 
0% have proper 
water treatment 
facilities. 
 
0% are reusing 
water after 
coffee is washed.  
 
53% have 
composting 
facilities.  
0% have proper 
water treatment 
facilities. 
 
0% are reusing 
water after 
coffee is washed.  
 
70% have 
composting 
facilities. 
0% have proper 
water treatment 
facilities. 
 
0% are reusing 
water after 
coffee is washed.  
 
62% have 
composting 
facilities. 
0% have proper 
water treatment 
facilities. 
 
0% are reusing 
water after 
coffee is washed.  
 
50% have 
composting 
facilities. 
0% have proper 
water treatment 
facilities. 
 
0% are reusing 
water after 
coffee is washed.  
 
70% have 
composting 
facilities. 
0% have proper 
water treatment 
facilities. 
 
0% are reusing 
water after 
coffee is washed.  
 
73% have 
composting 
facilities. 
Reselection  
(percentage of 
respondents who 
reselected during 
the previous 
harvest*) 
80% manually 
select dry 
parchment 
coffee. 
79% manually 
select dry 
parchment 
coffee. 
92% manually 
select dry 
parchment 
coffee. 
100% manually 
select dry 
parchment 
coffee. 
100% manually 
select dry 
parchment 
coffee. 
91% manually 
select dry 
parchment 
coffee. 
 
Trading 
Purchasing*** 
Quality sorted 
“al ojo” (A simple 
sorting based on 
the buyer’s 
experience to 
Quality sorted by 
Res 02/05. 
Quality sorted by 
Res 02/05. The 
best quality 
coffee is selected 
Quality sorted by 
Res 02/05. All 
coffee from 
associates with 
Quality sorted by 
Res 02/05. All 
coffee from 
associates is 
cupped.   
Quality sorted by 
Res 02/05.  
 
Documentary 
traceability  
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assess a price to 
the eye) 
for a cupping 
test. 
 
Documentary 
traceability for 
the first, physical 
traceability for 
the second. 
good factor is 
cupped.   
 
Documentary 
traceability for 
the first, physical 
traceability for 
the second. 
 
Physical 
traceability 
Threshing and 
sorting*** 
Blended with low 
quality coffee for 
local 
consumption, it 
lost its 
traceability.  
Blended with 
other standard 
coffee to 
produce Excelso 
Coffee for 
export. It lost its 
traceability.    
One portion 
continues 
documentary 
traceability to 
produce Excelso 
Coffee for CAFE 
Practices. 
 
Another portion 
continue the 
physical 
traceability as 
Specialty coffee 
for Caravela 
One portion sold 
as Excelso 
coffee, losing its 
traceability.   
 
Another portion 
continues the 
physical 
traceability as 
Specialty coffee 
for Loha Beans. 
It continues the 
physical 
traceability to 
produce 
Specialty coffee 
for Inconexus. 
It continues the 
documentary 
traceability to 
produce Excelso 
Coffee for 
Nespresso 
Bulking and 
export***  NA NA 
One portion is 
exported and 
imported by 
Carcafé which 
deliver the 
coffee in 
Starbucks 
warehouses 
 
The Specialty 
Coffee portion is 
exported, 
imported and 
sold to roasters 
by Caravela.  
The Specialty 
Coffee is 
exported by Loha 
Beans and 
imported by 
local partners 
before selling to 
the roaster. 
The Specialty 
Coffee is 
exported by 
Inconexus and 
imported by 
local partners 
before selling to 
the roaster. 
Exported and 
imported by the 
FNC, which 
deliver the 
coffee in 
Nespresso 
warehouses.    
 
Roasting 
Blending***   NA NA 
Starbucks blend 
the coffee to 
guarantee 
consistency and 
replicability in 
the flavor.  
 
Specialty coffee 
is prepared by 
roasters 
depending on 
their signature. 
They could or not 
blend it. 
Specialty coffee 
is prepared by 
roasters 
depending on 
their signature. 
They could or not 
blend it.  
Specialty coffee 
is prepared by 
roasters 
depending on 
their signature. 
They could or not 
blend it. 
Nespresso 
blends the coffee 
to guarantee 
consistency and 
replicability in 
the flavor. 
Roasting *** NA NA 
Starbucks uses S-
Curves to 
guarantee a 
consistent and 
replicable flavor.  
 
S-curves are 
used depending 
on the coffee 
and the roasters 
signature.   
S-curves are 
used depending 
on the coffee 
and the roasters 
signature.   
S-curves are 
used depending 
on the coffee 
and the roasters 
signature.   
Nespresso uses 
S-Curves to 
guarantee a 
consistent and 
replicable flavor. 
Packaging and 
retailing***  NA NA 
Starbucks uses 
the DO Café de 
Nariño. 
Different 
Specialty 
Roasters are 
Different 
Specialty 
Roasters are 
Nespresso uses 
the DO Café de 
Colombia.  
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Different 
Specialty 
Roasters are 
using Buesaco 
reputation to 
add value to 
their packed 
coffee. 
using Buesaco 
reputation to 
add value to 
their packed 
coffee. 
using Buesaco 
reputation to 
add value to 
their packed 
coffee. 
Communic
ation  
Communication**
* NA NA 
Private 
investment in 
Starbucks Brand. 
Different 
Specialty 
Roasters are 
using Buesaco 
reputation to 
add value to 
their packed 
coffee. 
Different 
Specialty 
Roasters are 
using Buesaco 
reputation to 
add value to 
their packed 
coffee. 
Private 
investment in 
Nespresso 
Brand. 
Brewing 
Grinding*** NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Brewing*** NA NA NA NA NA NA 
* At a significant value of 12.5%, there are not statistically different.   
** At a significant value of 12.5% there are statistically different.   
*** Qualitative information collected through interviews with traders and exporters.  
 
Even though “average numbers” look different in almost all activities fooling us to believe that 
farmers are using resource constituents differently depending on the LRA the belong, the 
variation within each LRA generates a 90% confidence interval wide enough that overlaps 
between them. In other words, it is plausible to assume that “averages numbers” for the first two 
processes (planting and cultivation) are exactly the same in all the cases as it can be seen in our 
statistical annex 5.2, with the sole exception of the activity “farm management” that is 
statistically significant with a 97% confidence interval.  
 
If we reduce the confidence interval to 87.5% two activities in the planting process (diversification 
and density), and another one in the cultivation process (pest/disease management) can be 
considered statistically different.  
 
One plausible explanation to this similarity in uses is related to the fact that farmers in Veracruz 
are mainly exposed to all LRA, thus, as an insurance, they try to incorporate practices that allow 
them to sell their beans to any LRA or at least, to reduce at maximum the chances to be excluded. 
For example, farmers are following regulated practices to produce apparently incompatible 
services like “appellation Café de Colombia” and “exceptional coffee” by planting pest-resistant 
varieties in one portion of the farm and non-resistant ones in another.  
 
Only those farmers that feel completely sure to continue selling on the one LRA they belong, 
would be willing to adopt some practices that are going to exclude them of others LRA. These 
farmers are the ones who explain the few differences between the LRAs (we transparently accept 
the 87.5% confidence interval) which happens to be those at the opposite extreme in terms of 
altitude.  
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Indeed, in table 19 we can see that with a 95% confidence interval the average altitude for those 
farmers who are selling in the LRA Standard, ranges from 1.944 – 2.043 m.a.s.l whereas, for 
farmers selling through the LRA CNilson, the interval goes from 2.027 to 2.137 m.a.s.l. Even 
though there is a small portion that overlaps, it is clear that the former tends to be placed in 
lower lands than the latter.   
 
Table 19 Average altitude of coffee farms by LRA. Source: The author. 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Altitude   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2057.841a 23.371 2011.124 2104.558 
2 1993.887a 24.652 1944.608 2043.167 
3 2028.675a 20.116 1988.464 2068.886 
4 2050.534a 17.129 2016.294 2084.774 
5 2082.968a 27.529 2027.938 2137.998 
6 2040.870a 21.339 1998.214 2083.526 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 5645.94. 
 
Altitude plausibly plays a role in the decision of the farmer to remain in a particular LRA: In lower 
lands, the higher temperature excites the plants prompting cherry production but it reduces the 
chances to score high on cupping tests. The exact opposite happens in higher lands. So, farmers 
placed lower would prefer remaining in the LRA Standard, thus maintaining uses that trigger 
monetary services, “appellation Café de Colombia” symbolic service, and “clean cup” taste 
related service. The second would rather prefer to remain in the LRA CNilson by prioritizing uses 
to increase the chances of obtaining the “exceptional coffee” taste related services. That is why 
we can see that in the LRA Standard 96% farmers are planting pest-resistant varieties with the 
highest density (7.109 coffee trees per hectare) to maximize coffee production, as a result, 0% 
are using pesticide. Whereas in the LRA CNilson only 64% are planting pest-resistant varieties 
with the lowest density (5.769 coffee trees per hectare) because it is the quality of each bean 
that is important, but to protect those more vulnerable plants 58% are using pesticides.  
 
The tradeoff between the two groups to produce the “monetary services” (the first one to 
increase productivity the second one to trigger the “exceptional coffee” service) is the main 
feature of the coffee culture in Veracruz. The LRA Standard and the LRA CNilson show the two 
extremes in which farmers tend to be more into one profile than the other plausibly because on 
the altitudinal localization, but as it can be proven through the wide confidence intervals that are 
shown in the Statistical Annex, this tradeoff is present between farmers within each LRA. Indeed, 
if we compare the confidence interval for the activity “variety”, the upper bound is placed in all 
cases higher than 89% of the area planted with pest-resistant varieties whereas the lower bound 
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reaches 40% and in five of six cases is lower than 64%: if all coffee farmers belonging to a 
particular LRA had behaved similarly to produce uniquely the profile sought by it, confidence 
intervals would have been smaller.       
 
Another evidence of farmers’ adaptation to this tradeoff is the fact that no matter the LRA, in 
some activities almost without exception, they are using resource constituent to produce the 
“monetary services” profile, but in another activity, uses sought the “exceptional coffee” profile. 
For example, in the activity “nutrition”, the probability that the average dose of fertilizer is equal 
for all LRAs is 95%, showing that is preferred the “monetary services” over the “exceptional 
coffee” produced by the organic nutrition in all coffee units in Veracruz. Whereas in the activity 
“picking” there is an 88% probability that the average of farmers manually selecting defective 
beans before hulling is equal in all the cases, illustrating how uses to produce an “exceptional 
coffee” are prioritized over the “monetary services” in all farms of the vereda.     
 
But what really shows a difference between LRAs is the use of the know-how in the third process 
of post-harvesting. Indeed, the probability that the average of farmers who have appropriate 
equipment for hulling and fermentation is equal in all LRAs is low: 8% in the former and 4% in the 
latter. In fact, less than 60% and 45% of farmers have the proper equipment for hulling and 
fermentation respectively in both the LRA Discount and the LRA Standard, whereas this figure is 
higher than 89% and 72% respectively in the LRA Caltura, LRA CNilson, and the LRA Nespresso. 
This difference in equipment possession that plausibly is dependent on previous capital 
accumulation or cooperation projects due to the fact of being placed in a particular LRA, has a 
huge influence in the following processes because both physical quality and cupping quality that 
is the basis of purchasing depends heavily on the post-harvesting activities. And as it is described, 
after purchasing all uses in the following processes (trading, roasting and communication 
strategy) are different depending on the LRA 
 
In the post-harvesting activity, it is to highlight two opposite situations. On the one hand, the 
more important use to produce the “environmental responsibly” service activity is widely absent. 
Indeed, water treatment systems that guarantee the minimum water quality requirements for 
wastewater disposal do not exist in any of the farms surveyed. On the other, in all LRA more than 
79% of respondents are implementing the most labor-intense activity to increase the chances for 
producing the “exceptional coffee” service even though the lack of post-harvesting equipment 
makes impossible to obtain high cupping scores. 
 
To conclude this analysis, we can say that farmers prefer “monetary services” by prioritizing 
production of “exceptional coffee” but they are not going too far to risk their productivity, so 
uses are almost the same without regards of LRA membership. Nevertheless, the members of 
LRAs that explicitly sought for taste-related services, are located in highlands and have the post-
harvesting equipment needed to increase the chances of producing these services. So, even 
though the majority of farmers strive to develop the “exceptional coffee”, only farmers who had 
already produced this service, are the ones who will obtain higher cupping scores. Moreover, as 
farmers prioritize uses of “exceptional coffee”, other uses whose production is not 
complementary are completely ignored, as the case of uses to generate “environmentally 
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responsible coffee” which demands an additional effort without any clear effect on taste related 
services.   
 
7.1.4. Services provided because of uses observed 
 
Once we have identified how services are produced by the regulated uses and systematized the 
observed uses on average by LRA, we can now proceed to assess the services provision by each 
LRA.  
 
We will start with the observed monetary services received on average by farmers who had the 
same number of coffee trees (area cultivated is integrated into this covariate) but sold their 
2015/2016 coffee production through different LRAs. These observations are based on farmers’ 
responses to the survey conducted by Viviana Ramos which could not be completely accurate 
but memories are not correlated with the LRAs, especially because farmers are selling through 
various LRAs. The “lack of memory” have a similar impact in all LRAs so we can confidently 
compare between them.   
 
Secondly, we will use the results of table 18 about observed uses, to assess symbolic and taste 
related services depending on the average observed use in each activity by each LRA. If all the 
regulated uses to produce a service were observed in an LRA, our assumption is that the LRA 
produced that service.    
 
• Monetary services provision  
 
When conducting an ANCOVA to test if there is a difference on the average income between 
groups (LRAs), the null hypothesis (average income is equal) is rejected using the number of 
coffee trees as a Covariate.   
 
The ANCOVA in table 20 shows us that both the number of productive coffee trees and the LRA 
are significant (with a significance level of 0.05). Furthermore, the R squared of 0.6 explain that 
60% of the variance in income within our sample is explained by our model. So, we can 
confidently say that once controlled by the number of coffee trees (that reflects the area of coffee 
each grower possesses), the average income a coffee farmer differs by LRA.  
 
Table 20 Ancova Test. Source: the author using SPSS. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Ingresos   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected 
Model 
589837692000
0000.000a 
6 983062820000
000.000 
15.861 .000 95.167 1.000 
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Intercept 328169762500
000.000 
1 328169762500
000.000 
5.295 .025 5.295 .620 
NplantasPro 382129664400
0000.000 
1 382129664400
0000.000 
61.655 .000 61.655 1.000 
ARL 949186812600
000.000 
5 189837362500
000.000 
3.063 .015 15.315 .840 
Error 390468543100
0000.000 
63 619791338300
00.000 
    
Total 145745412700
00000.000 
70      
Corrected Total 980306235100
0000.000 
69      
a. R Squared = .602 (Adjusted R Squared = .564) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
As it can be seen in table 21, a coffee farmer that possess 6.552 productive coffee trees, obtained, 
on average, on the harvest 2015-2016 (Oct 2015 – Sep 2016) the following monetary services. 
• COP 5.143.180 (USD 1.686650), equivalent to 8 legal monthly minimum wages (l.m.m.w)651 
if they are selling their coffee through the LRA Discount (11% lower than LRA Standard). 
• COP 5.798.882 (USD 1.901), equivalent to 9 l.m.m.w., if they are selling their coffee 
through the LRA Standard. 
• COP 6.516.319 (USD 2.136), equivalent to 10 l.m.m.w., if they are selling their coffee 
through the LRA CCEsp/Starbucks (12% higher than LRA Standard).  
• COP 6.180.098 (USD 2,026), equivalent to 10 l.m.m.w., if they are selling their coffee 
through the LRA Caltura (7% higher than LRA Standard). 
• COP 13.313.358 (USD 4.365), equivalent to 21 l.m.m.w., if they are selling their coffee 
through the LRA CNilson (130% higher than LRA Standard). 
• COP 14.887.076 (USD 4,881), equivalent to 23 l.m.m.w., if they are selling their coffee 
through the LRA Nespresso (157% higher than LRA Standard). 
 
Table 21 Estimates. Source: the author using SPSS. 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Ingresos   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 5143180.251a 2530985.867 85408.581 10200951.920 
2 5798882.346a 2668599.035 466112.703 11131651.990 
                                                     
650 The exchange rate on average in 2016 was USD 1 = COP$ 3.050  
651 In Colombia in 2015, the Salario Mínimo Mensual Legal Vigente was COP 644.355.  
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3 6516318.887a 2125107.805 2269629.803 10763007.970 
4 6180097.888a 1855721.060 2471735.257 9888460.518 
5 13313357.570a 2979097.518 7360106.222 19266608.920 
6 14887075.580a 2289907.047 10311061.490 19463089.670 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: 
NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
• Symbolic and taste related services provision 
 
Table 22 shows all services produced by each LRA after we conducted a test in which a service 
was produced if all uses observed in table 18 were conducted as they were regulated in Annex 
4.4 to produce that particular service. It presents in the columns each one of the LRAs and in the 
rows, each one of the services demanded from the Resource.     
 
Table 22 Services provision by LRA. Source: The author. 
  
LRA 
Discount 
LRA 
Standard 
LRA CCEsp 
/Starbucks LRA Caltura 
LRA 
CNilson 
LRA 
Nespresso 
Energy dose X X X X X X 
Appellation Café de 
Colombia   X X X X X 
Appellation Café de 
Nariño    X X X  
Brand reputation     X X X X 
Environmentally 
responsible             
Ethically traded     X X X X 
Shared value           
Transparent coffee     X X X   
Poverty reduction            
Baked coffee X           
Clean cup   X X X X X 
Terroir expression     X X X  
Sweet flavor and 
citric acid aroma           X 
Exceptional coffee     X X X   
 
As observed uses in the first two processes were similar for all LRAs, it is not surprising that 
services provision is quite similar between LRAs, the major difference is placed on the activities 
after the post-harvesting process.  
 
Indeed, the LRA Discount and the LRA Standard can produce only those services which are poorly 
regulated, so it does not really matter how the post-harvesting is conducted: The former 
produced barely 2 services whereas the latter 3.  
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The other four LRAs regulated in detail how this process must be conducted or at least, a 
threshold that must be reached. The main difference hereafter relies in how the trading is 
conducted, whereas the LRA Nespresso utilizes a documentary traceability that allows to follow 
a lot of coffee for roasting purposes (the need of an aromatic profile as a recipe: the taste related 
service “sweet flavor and citric acid aroma”) and not for the communication strategy (the final 
costumer hardly can identify Buesaco origin in his cup), the other three use a physical traceability 
that in some cases would allow the final customer to identify the origin not only in Buesaco but 
also in a farm in Veracruz. This practice triggers the production of four services: two symbolic 
“appellation café de Nariño” and “transparent coffee”, which are linked to the social construction 
of the territory in consumers’ minds; and two taste related “terroir expression” and “exceptional 
coffee”, which are linked to the integrality of the product in the final beverage in order to squeeze 
out the full aromatic profile of the terroir. These four services lack in the LRA Nespresso, which 
produced the six services noted in table 22, whereas are present in the other three LRA which 
produced the same nine services.    
 
On the other hand, services that are sought by some LRAs are not produced. Particularly the 
“environmentally responsible” symbolic service claimed by the LRA Nespresso and the LRA 
CCEsp/Starbucks, there is no way to protect the water resource if farmers are conducting a short 
fermentation (Coffee is washed and water leaves the fermentation tank highly polluted) but do 
not have any water treatment system that credibly diminishes its toxicity before being disposed 
of, as it was observed in the field. In the same path, the “shared value” symbolic service 
demanded by the LRA CNilson and the LRA Nespresso cannot be fulfilled because if clean water 
is polluted, it cannot be said that the economic activity is creating value for communities: it could 
create value for profiling actors like farmers, but not for local inhabitants who are losing their 
natural Resources without any compensation.      
  
7.1.5. In short, which are the LRAs that optimize the provision of the services 
demanded from the Resource in Veracruz in 2016?  
 
To conclude this first subchapter, we present the services produced by each one of the LRAs in 
Veracruz in 2015/2016. Monetary services are presented in COP and its equivalent in legal 
monthly minimum wages of 2015, and symbolic and taste related services are presented in the 
number of this kind of services produced from the total of fourteen identified.  
 
• LRA Discount: COP 5.143.180 (8 l.m.m.w.) and 2(14) symbolic and taste related services.   
• LRA Standard: COP 5.798.882 (9 l.m.m.w.) and 3(14) symbolic and taste related services.   
• LRA CCEsp/Starbucks: COP 6.516.319 (10 l.m.m.w.) and 9(14) symbolic and taste related 
services.   
• LRA Caltura: COP 6.180.098 (10 l.m.m.w.) and 9(14) symbolic and taste related services.   
• LRA CNilson: COP 13.313.358 (21 l.m.m.w.) and 9(14) symbolic and taste related services.   
• LRA Nespresso: COP 14.887.076 (23 l.m.m.w.) and 6(14) symbolic and taste related 
services.   
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7.2. LRA, what does explain the collective action solution  
 
We ended the first subchapter with a screenshot of the results of the collective action in terms 
of the services provided by the Resource from the ensemble of services demanded. And we 
showed that services provision was different in each one of the LRAs that were identified in 
Veracruz in 2015/2016. 
 
In this second subchapter, we pretend to analyze each one of the LRA in terms of the three 
conditions: the extent or the amount of observable uses regulated by the LRA; the coherence or 
the governance mechanism to both coordinate actors by the LRA and coordinate the LRA by the 
actor; and the closure or the market power to profile the Resource.  
 
7.2.1. Extent  
    
The previous subchapter developed extensively this condition by describing for each LRA both 
regulated and observed uses. So, we are not going to describe it again. Nevertheless, it focused 
on the services provision no matter the actual intention of the LRA. Here the focus is the 
combination of services sought by the LRA, so we compare observed uses against the regulated 
uses to produce those services intentionally looking for.    
 
As it is the same information previously presented but rearranged in terms of the combination 
of services by LRA, we explain transparently the procedure as it was conducted so we avoid a 
redundant presentation of new tables. Thus, we evaluated the extent by conducting an additional 
exercise in which firstly, we used the combination of services sought for by each LRA presented 
in Annex 3, and then, comparing with our data on observed uses (table 18), we evaluated among 
three possible options: the observed use was conducted as it was regulated; it was conducted 
differently, or it was not regulated (annex 7.2). 
 
A clarification is necessary. In Veracruz in 2015/2016 the main service actors sought for was 
“monetary services”. However, there were two tendencies: those who prioritized uses oriented 
towards productivity and those who prioritized uses towards “exceptional coffee”. Thus, we can 
categorize three groups: the productivity group (LRAs Discount, Standard, and Nespresso), the 
exceptional coffee group (LRAs Caltura, CNilson). And a third one that prioritizes monetary 
services through both productivity and “exceptional coffee” (LRA CCEsp/Starbucks). Therefore, 
we conducted the evaluation, we assessed the observed uses of the first group against the 
regulated uses to enhance productivity; the observed uses of the second group against the 
regulated uses to enhance “exceptional coffee”; and the observed uses of the third group against 
both (In all cases, we took into account the regulated uses of the other services demanded in 
each LRA). 
 
As a result, Table 23 shows that both the LRA Discount and the LRA Standard did not meet the 
two conditions because less than half of the activities observed are conducted as it was regulated. 
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In the case of Standard coffee, regulations to produce the “appellation Café de Colombia” (that 
are completely absent in the case of the LRA Discount) especially in the roasting and 
communication strategy process are not observed.   
  
On the other hand, for four of the six LRAs presented in Veracruz, the two conditions were 
fulfilled: LRA CCEsp/Starbucks; LRA Caltura; LRA CNilson and the LRA Nespresso. In these cases, 
more than fifty percent of the total number of uses were observed as they were regulated by the 
LRA. In the latter, for example, uses observed/regulated were equivalent to 87% of the total. In 
addition, all were below 37% of the concentration in the first three processes so, they can be 
considered evenly distributed among all profiling actors.       
 
Table 23 Extent assessment by each LRA. Source: The author. 
  LRA Discount 
LRA 
Standard LRA CCEsp/Starbucks 
LRA 
Caltura 
LRA 
CNilson 
LRA 
Nespresso 
Average of 
observed/regulated 
uses (weighted  by 
process)  
20% 32% 60% 52% 62% 88% 
Concentration in 
the first three 
processes.  
53% 42% 37% 27% 8% 33% 
Extent assessment  Low Low High High High High 
 
7.2.2. Coherence  
 
As mentioned in the conceptual component, coherence refers to the governance mechanisms 
that incentive profiling actors to behave as expected in order to match regulated uses with the 
observed ones.  
 
Unlike the extension attribute that is synthetically presented because data was presented in 
Annex 4 and 5, this section evaluates the presence (or absence) of coherence depending on the 
capacity of the LRA to align actors around a commonly agreed profile. Capacity that is 
systematized in the five elements previously described: Services; actors; institutions; governance 
and output.  
 
• LRA Discount  
 
The LRA Discount can be seen from a negative point of view: coffee that cannot produce other 
services is profiled to produce the “energy dose” symbolic service and the “baked coffee” taste 
related services.  
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It cannot be said that actors are aligned to produce these services, rather, on the contrary, actors 
produced these services because they were misaligned. It is not necessarily voluntary, in many 
cases, exogenous variables like a drought or a pest outbreak strongly hit the crop and diminish 
the quality of the coffee bean. From this perspective, the LRA Discount can be seen from a 
positive point of view: it allows profiling actors, especially farmers, to obtain monetary services 
from a low-quality agricultural product. In other agricultural markets, weather-related losses in 
quality may end up in farmers being unable to sell. In the coffee market, both immature and 
overripe beans are going to be bought (discounts could be significant, though) precisely, because 
it can be profiled afterward to produce the “energy dose/baked coffee” services.          
 
Other than prices, one institution that plays a major role in this alignment is the Resolución 
5/2002 del CNC: coffee that does not fulfill the requirements to be exported will be profiled 
differently by profiling actors. E.g. traders will sort it apart from Excelso to be sold locally to 
roasters, which in turn could use it for producing soluble coffee for consumers interested in a 
not-unpleasant shot of energy.  
 
This LRA is completely governed by markets and governance mechanisms are completely absent. 
As consumer tries to minimize the payment to obtain this profile, cost reduction is a must. Thus, 
Profilers roasters are encouraged by prices to innovate for the least bad product at the lowest 
price: enhancing blending and roasting techniques; developing economies of scale; ameliorating 
capital management; improving logistics; etc. In the end, as long as there is coffee in the beverage 
to boost the energy and it is drinkable, roasters can go as low as they can in the final price to earn 
market share. In the case of farmers, no matter the uses of constituents, the parchment coffee 
needed for his profile will be produced. As production costs for low quality and standard quality 
coffee are very similar for farmers, prices for discount coffee hardly will incentivize them to 
change behavior in order to produce it. But it is true that low prices for standard coffee could 
discourage farmers and make them produce discount coffee (or abandon the farm). 
 
To conclude, coherence is low (if not inexistent) in this LRA because markets forces alone easily 
provide this profile. There is no need for governance mechanism, and even though there is an 
institution coming from the public policy that facilitates coffee alignment, this works mainly to 
give the chance to higher quality coffee to produce other services, but it does not influence the 
provision of the “energy dose” and “baked coffee” services.   
    
• LRA Standard 
 
The assessment of coherence for the LRA Standard in Buesaco is exactly the same that the LRA 
Standard in Riosucio that can be consulted in chapter 5.2: both the non-inclusive governance 
mechanism and the powerlessness to maintain align all profiling actors around the same profile 
are characteristic of a low coherent LRA.  
 
• LRA Nespresso 
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The LRA Nespresso was developed at the beginning of two thousand by the initiative of the Swiss 
roaster Nespresso. In the ecotope 220A (Gómez et al., 1991, p. 75), to which Buesaco / Veracruz 
are part from, this LRA sought for a profile featured by the “citric acid aroma and sweet flavor” 
taste related service; the “shared value”, “environmentally responsible” and “brand reputation” 
symbolic services and the monetary services in the form of productivity. 
 
Producers, traders, and consumers are aligned by the roaster Nespresso: all farmers in Veracruz 
with more than 0.5ha cultivated in coffee and located between 1.932 to 2.086 m.a.s.l; both coffee 
cooperatives in Buesaco that use money from the FoNC (La Cooperativa del Norte and La 
Cooperativa de Occidente); The FNC through its logistics company, Almacafé, which threshes, 
storages, transports, exports, ships and imports the coffee bags from Colombia directly to 
Nespresso facilities in Switzerland; Nespresso which roasts and packages coffee in single-doses 
capsules to be directly delivered to ten million consumers around the globe (members of the 
Nespresso Club). In addition, stakeholders in both production and consumption: Fundanatura an 
NGO in Colombia and Rainforest Alliance an international NGO.  
 
 The central institutional piece that aligns actors is the “Tool for the Assessment of Sustainable 
Quality” and the governance mechanism to translate these regulated uses into observed uses is 
the “Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality™ Coffee Program” implemented through the “clusters” 
(see chapter 5.2). One of these clusters is operated by the FNC in nearly fifty municipalities 
(including Buesaco/Veracruz) of Cauca and Nariño, 29.574 coffee growers cultivating 35.517 ha 
in coffee (FNC, 2014, pp. 34, 76 ). This cluster was formalized through a public-private partnership 
(FNC and Nespresso) in 2008652 renovated in 2012 to encourage farmers and traders to fulfill the 
Tasq™ through monetary incentives, technical assistance and equipment delivery653. 
 
This LRA operates on quarterly negotiations between Nespresso and the FNC654, in which both 
quantities and prices are agreed and deliveries are synchronized to manage the risk 655 and 
maintain a profitable business for both parties.  It provides information that nourishes the FNC’s 
sales plan with its procurement network: los comités de comercialización656.  
 
                                                     
652  It focused on training and technical assistance oriented towards the achievement of the performance indicators 
related to the Tasq™ implementation. (Nespresso, 2014, p. 3)   
653 USD 17 million per year during five years divided in USD 7.5 million would be paid by Nespresso through premiums 
to coffee farmer and, USD 9.5 million to deliver the technical assistance and the equipment needed: USD 2.5 million 
paid by Nespresso and USD 7 million paid by the FNC. (FNC, 2012b) 
654 All information in this paragraph comes from the interview with José Felipe Jaramillo Mejía, logistics director of 
the FNC.  
655 The FNC purchases must be fine-tuned because there are some harvests that a smaller than usual portion of the 
costly FNC’s AAA purchases were bought by Nespresso because either aromatic profile deficiencies or too much 
production. Or the other way around, in which the FNC had not satisfied Nespresso demands for AAA coffee.   
656 It is composed of the FNC who has both the capital and Nespresso remarks about previous shipments; the 
municipal/departmental Comités de cafeteros who have the technical information to predict coffee production and 
are informed of uses that must prioritized by extension agents and, the coffee cooperatives which prepare to acquire 
the harvest.    
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It is through these comités de comercialización that traders and producers are integrated into the 
LRA as target groups that have to change their behavior but cannot influence the LRA. Traders 
are simply informed 657 and producers only have a one-direction relation through which the 
extension agent says what have to be done, producers cannot escalate their demands658 but they 
have to make the effort if they want to continue in the program659. The consequence is that 
neither traders660 nor farmers have real engagement with the AAA program661, farmers, for 
example, sell to the Cooperative only the minimum amount needed to continue in the 
program662.  
   
The mechanism for encouraging coffee producers to use infrastructures and know-how as 
regulated in the first three processes is through a combination of three instruments. The first one 
is the price: In 2015, the premium was COP$ 420 per kilo of parchment coffee (USD$ 0.18), an 
addition of 7% over the FNC’s coffee price663. The second is the strengthened “knowledge circuit” 
with more specific training in the Tasq® and more extension agents664, even though their efficacy 
is questioned because of the still small group and their multiple functions665. The third one is the 
direct investment in farmers’ equipment for conducting as regulated the post-harvesting 
                                                     
657 “El programa Nespresso no tiene posibilidad de hacer una retroalimentación. Eso es lo malo con Nespresso, ellos 
hacen las cosas directamente con la FNC. A la larga es hágase y cúmplase”. Interview with Robert Barco, CEO of the 
Cooperativa de caficultores del Occidente de Nariño.  
658 “Nespresso nunca ha hecho una reunión” Interview with Carlos Pantoja, president of Asoveracruz, the association 
of coffee farmers in Buesaco.   
659 This one-direction relation can be clearly seen once read El Libro de Actas de Asoveracruz (the minute book of the 
Association of coffee growers in Veracruz), in which it describes each intervention of the extension agents as a 
lecture in which farmers are pupils. There is not a single Acta in which it can be read a “recommendation” from 
farmers to the extension agent.   
660 “Ese ha sido uno de los errores de la cooperativa… ser un mandadero de Nespreso”. Interview with James Botina, 
purchaser of the Cooperativa de Occidente.   
661 “No hay mucho empoderamiento hacia el programa. Lo que buscan ellos (coffee farmers) es precio”. Interview 
with Oscar Ordoñez, Director of the Specialty Coffee Program at the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño.  
662 “Ellos son café Nespresso, pero le venden un cupo a la Cooperativa y el resto al que pague más”. Interview with 
Arturo Pascuaza, coordinator of the municipal agriculture office.     
663 In 2003 with premiums of COP 800 (USD 0.29) equivalent to the 30% of the annual average of the internal coffee 
price, its maximum value was reached in 2008 to COP 1.200 (USD 0.73) but remained at the same 30% of the internal 
coffee price. Calculated by the author using the daily FNC’s prices since 2003.  
664 Expansion that was possible because Nespresso paid almost COP 3.000 million (USD 1.3 million) in 2015 to engage 
47 additional extension agents. Interview with Hernando Delgado, Executive Director of the Comité Departamental 
de Cafeteros de Nariño. In Buesaco there was two extension agents before the Nespresso program, in 2015 there 
were seven FNC’s extension agents. Interview with Oscar Ordoñez, Director of the Specialty Coffee Program at the 
Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño.  
665 With almost three thousand coffee farmers in Buesaco, 7 extension agents imply an average of more than four 
hundred producers per each one. It puts in question its personalized attention. In fact, as the main performance 
indicator for them is the percentage of the area renovated, they invest a very important portion of their time in the 
paper work needed to deliver the two program mentioned before to incentivize renovation: Competitividad (direct 
benefit transfer) and PSF (subsidized loan), so it is a feeling that they spent more time in the office than in the field 
working with producers “Los técnicos ya tienen un oficio como más administrativo. Ya no es ese técnico extensionista 
donde iba a la finca y hacía las recomendaciones. Por lo general permanece en la oficina rindiendo informes. Que 
uno se los encuentre por el campo prestando el servicio de extensión es bien complicado”. Interview with Arturo 
Pascuaza, coordinator of the municipal agriculture office.   
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activities666. The AAA program had little impact because it initially focused on an altitudinal fringe 
below Veracruz667, and when arrived668, it stopped this delivery.  
 
This LRA also influences traders’ use of know-how during the purchasing activity through a very 
powerful mechanism: the FoNC. Indeed, both cooperatives buy coffee funded by the FoNC thus 
they have to exclusively sell to Almacafé (FNC logistics branch). So, the FNC, in its role of manager 
of both the FoNC (giving the money) and Almacafé (controlling the quality of purchased coffee), 
can strongly influence traders’ know-how to buy coffee. Both cooperatives have to implement 
the documentary traceability of coffee sold by AAA farmers669 with the qualities demanded670. 
Almacafé also was encouraged to use its infrastructures and know-how to guarantee the aromatic 
profile. Indeed, through an international development fund671, Almacafé acquired the labs and 
the training needed for cupping all lots of AAA coffee, in order to ship to Nespresso only the lots 
that fulfill the aromatic profile. Lots that have a different profile will be exported through the LRA 
Standard either by selling to high-quality buyers of Colombian coffee or by blending with low 
quality coffee from other regions to reach the Excelso quality as a whole.  
 
Also, this LRA goes upstream to influence the very end of the value chain, the consumers as 
described in chapter 5.2.  
 
To conclude, this LRA looks very well design to align the whole value chain, from farmers to 
consumers, around the profile characterized by: “citric acid aroma and sweet flavor” taste related 
service; the “shared value”, “environmentally responsible” and “brand reputation” symbolic 
services and the monetary services. Nevertheless, governance mechanisms work in one direction 
in which decisions made between the FNC and Nespresso must be obeyed by the other profilers 
like farmers and traders. As these actors cannot participate in the decision process, their loyalty 
                                                     
666 “By 2010, over 7,700 fermentation tanks, 15,000 solar dryers, 6,700 waste handling equipment and 2,600 waste 
water treatment systems are installed” (Nespresso, 2014, p. 3) 
667 “ellos no lo recuerdan mucho porque de Veracruz en ese momento no debieron haber habido muchos caficultores 
que estaban en Nespresso… el programa empezó a extenderse como en esa franja entre los 1700 a 1900 m.a.s.n.m 
que es lo más óptimo que se tiene para café, y sobre todo ahí en Buesaco. Veracruz está por encima entonces habían 
menos caficultores para entrar a Nespresso” Interview with Oscar Ordoñez, Director of the Specialty Coffee Program 
at the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño. 
668 Farmers in Veracruz started to join the program in 2012 as can be read in the minutes of Asoveracruz (the 
association of coffee farmers from Veracruz): In the Acta 38 (31th March 2012) the FNC’s extension agent mentioned 
the AAA Program and its intention to invite the associates of Asoveracruz to join it. Additionally, in the Acta 39 (27th 
April 2012), the same extension agent said it was worried because it needed more affiliates from Veracruz.     
669  An initial list of AAA farmers in 2005 have suffered several updates related to the demand’s 
expansion/contraction and the (absence/presence) of the aromatic profile.   
670 Cooperatives do not answer for the aromatic profile; their commitment is to deliver AAA coffee with a factor 
lower than 93. The Cooperativa de Occidente has their own facilities in Buesaco and the person who buys is their 
employee. Whereas the Cooperativa del Norte does not own a purchasing point there, so they supply through a local 
partner who use the Cooperative’s capital to buy coffee and then, he is paid by each kilo of coffee bought (in 2016 
he received COP 82 (USD 0.03)). Interview with Lucas Chavez, purchase agent of la Cooperativa del Norte in Buesaco.     
671 Through the Sustainable Coffee Program annual call for “field level projects - 2014” (today known as the Global 
Coffee Platform) funded by state donors (the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland). Source: Sustainable Coffee 
Program, “ficha informativa”, February 2016. 
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is low reducing the portion of the Resource profiled by this LRA672. So, due to the lack of this 
second way in which all actors can influence the LRA, we categorize coherence as low.      
 
• LRA CCEsp/Starbucks  
 
This LRA has two layers. The first one was developed since 2004 by the initiative of the North 
American roaster Starbucks to guarantee its supply of high-quality coffee while enhancing 
economic accountability, social responsibility and environmental protection (CI, 2011, p. 4). 
Starbucks with their supplier Empresas de Nariño - EdN conducted a census from 2004 to 2010 
to consolidate a database of 25 thousand coffee farms in Nariño673, then they decentralized they 
supply network through purchasing agents in the main coffee municipalities to buy the coffee 
from these farmers. In Buesaco, they were supplied by Pastor Gómez. In 2013, EdN was absorbed 
by the exporter Carcafé674 (owned by one of the main global traders ED&F Man675) and the Pastor 
Gómez’s purchase point was absorbed by the “Cooperativa de Cafés Especiales de Buesaco”676 
(CCEsp onward). Thus, since 2013 Starbucks, Carcafé and CCEsp are aligned to profile the 
combination of the taste related services “terroir expression”, “citric acid aroma” and “clean 
cup”; the symbolic services “ethically traded”, “environmentally responsible” and “brand 
reputation”; and the monetary services (in terms of productivity). 
  
Similarly to the case of Riosucio, this alignment was built around the C.A.F.E. Practices profiling 
institution 677. Differently, it was built on a succession of projects with different partners to 
implement the CAFE Practices program 678. As a result, governance mechanisms varied depending 
on each project in turn (chapter 8.2) but there were always subject of the commercial agreement 
between Starbucks and their suppliers. This agreement gave an ample leeway for suppliers which 
were responsible for formulating, implementing and evaluating the projects. However, suppliers 
have had to answer for the same three conditions described in the case of Riosucio: 1- Quality; 
2- Economic accountability; 3- External audit. 
                                                     
672 From having bought almost the entire harvest in Buesaco in 2012 (Chapter 8.4), this LRA bought only 14% of 
Buesaco Harvest in 2015 (table 2). 
673It is highly probably that almost all farmers that were cropping coffee in Buesaco/Veracruz in that period were 
include in this database known as “base del caficultor fiel”, thus were aligned in this LRA. Interview with Gerardo 
Sarasti, technical manager at Carcafe.   
674 “The Carcafe group was established in Colombia in 1983. Today the group comprises three distinct entities: 
Carcafe Ltda, with commercial presence in the entire coffee landscape; Empresas de Nariño, specializing in high-end 
coffees from the country’s far South; The Carcafe Foundation (Volcafé, 2012, p. 4). 
675 ED&F Man coffee business provides “beans for 50 billion cups each year”. Their strategy in Latin America was to 
“set up partnerships that later became fully owned subsidiaries (Volcafé, 2012, p. 2). 
676 Jairo Gómez (Pastor Gómez’s son) took the reins of the company and joined others 25 coffee growers from 
Buesaco to raise the capital needed to buy the harvest. Taking advantage of the nascent specialty coffee market, 
they founded on the 30th June 2012 the CCEsp.  
677 To avoid redundancies, we invite the reader to see chapter 5.2. 
678 The Dutch Government funded the first project 2004-2008. One year and a half afterwards, a second project built 
over the previous one was funded by the USA Government trough USAID from 2009 to 2012. “Near the close of the 
second project, in January 2012, the partners agreed to extend a new pilot project with farmers in the Samaniego 
region (Nariño’s central zone) involving implementation of FairTrade certification. This pilot project incorporated 
additional resources from the Catholic Relief Services” (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014, p. 21).  
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Through the various projects, three main instruments to incentivize a change in behavior were 
financed. Firstly, a 40-people team was put in place to conduct the surveys of the caficultor fiel 
database, it provided an initial individual technical assistance when surveying farmers and 
noticing the non-compliance criteria 679 . Secondly, training workshops 680  in which neighbor 
farmers gathered together to receive practical knowledge in order to comply with the CAFE 
Practices norm681, including extra benefits to incentive its appropriation682. The third one was 
the delivery of infrastructure as drying patios683 to improve coffee facilities; water tanks and 
kitchens to improve household living conditions684; schools’ computers to enhance community 
engagement685; three plantlets686 and water treatment systems687 to improve soil and water 
conservation. At the end in 2011, 238 farms fulfill 100% the C.A.F.E. Practices (Pfisterer & 
Payandeh, 2014, p. 24), equivalent to less than 1% of the participants in the CAFE Practices 
program.  
    
The second layer was developed since 2013 by CCEsp to increase “monetary services” by profiling 
the “exceptional coffee” taste related services and the “transparent coffee” symbolic service. 
They partnered with the specialty coffee trader Caravela, who had commercial relation with 134 
specialty roasters in 31 countries688. Both encouraged coffee farmers by offering better prices.  
 
The profiling institution around which all profilers gathered is the Q system developed by the 
SCAA and the cupping score it produces, from 0 to 100 higher than 80 is considered Specialty 
Coffee689. If previous institutions produced a minimum quality to obtain a maximum price, this 
                                                     
679 This number changed in time and with each project a new team was launched, on average it could be said there 
was a 10/15-people team until 2012. Interview with Gerardo Sarasti, technical manager at Carcafe.   
680 1.211 capacity building training workshops were conducted until 2012 (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014, p. 24) 
681 “The project started with training, through which we gained experience on how to better process our coffee, how 
to better sell it and how to identify good quality… they taught us to better work on our individual farms and we 
learned about recycling and garbage collection”. Reflection from the Duarte Coffee Association quoted in annex I of 
(Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014). 
682 “We were involved in the Carrera Cafetera: a series of training session and capacity-building in an effort to get 
Sustainable Coffee certification (Rainforest Alliance). The Carrera Cafetera awarded benefits to associations who 
successfully accomplished stated objectives (…) with processing infrastructure parabolic dryers and drying patios for 
the individual farms, and tools for the association as a whole” Reflection from the Nueva Esperanza Coffee 
Association quoted in annex I of (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014).  
683 Farmers received the material to build a concrete slab in which they could dry their coffee.   
684 1.160 farms benefit from infrastructure projects until 2012 (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014, p. 24), less than 5% of 
CAFE Practices farms. 
685 450 computers donated to education centers (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014, p. 24),. 
686 10.000 trees planted (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014, p. 24).   
687 111 farms received water treatment system (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014, p. 24).   
688 Interview with Alejandro Cadena, CEO of Caravela Coffee.  
689 To put it on perspective, a Colombian Excelso could score 80-82 and would be paid roughly USD 1.50 per pound 
whereas the winning farm of the Cup of Excellence in Colombia in 2017 (Rodrigo Diaz from Buesaco) scored 91.28 
and was paid USD 37.30 per pound. (ACE, 2017) 
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institution allocates a price depending on the cupping score690. So, each score-point is money691. 
This institution operates alongside the trading procedure: after coffee is purchased by CCEsp 
depending on the factor, el fiel de báscula (the buyer at the purchase point) decides which coffee 
would be scored692.  
 
Through an informal agreement, Caravela installed a quality lab693 and one of its quality advisors 
in the CCEsp purchase point, with the condition to have the priority over all coffee bought by 
CCEsp694. Caravela’s advisor sorted coffee in five categories depending on the SCAA score: Under 
83 qualify as no-specialty; 84-85 s A; 86-87 as AA; 88-89 as AAA; 90 or more as microlot. For the 
last four were accompanied by completely physical traceability. Afterward, Caravela will offer 
them through its network of specialty traders/roasters and once the coffee is sold, a premium 
will be paid to the farmer695. In exchange, CCEsp earns a portion of the premium paid back by 
Caravela to farmers696 and is allowed to use the lab even to sell to other specialty clients697. 
Indeed, Caravela had a goal to supply 250 thousand kilos of specialty coffee in Buesaco, so if the 
goal was overcome or the high-score coffee was discarded for other reasons, CCEsp was free to 
offer it. 
 
The Q system alongside prices are the mechanisms that govern this second layer, there are 
neither meetings nor regular communication because there is nothing different than prices to 
                                                     
690 “Precios dependientes de la calidad en taza: A mayor calidad, mejor precio” (A. Cadena, 2016, p. 33).    
691 If the trader sells a coffee and says it scores 87 and the roaster considers it scores 85, the trader lost a client. Or 
if the trader sells a 87 coffee and the roaster considers it scores 90, the trader is losing money. Examples provided 
by Alejandro Cadena CEO of Caravela Coffee. 
692 It is not feasible to make a cupping test for each farmer, so fieles de báscula have to take a practical decision 
based on their knowledge on farmers and farms: choosing those with “potential” to produce a high-score coffee.  
693 Caravela’s quality team is divided by geographical zones. In of them, two Q graders people (People certificated to 
score coffee under the SCAA protocol) are quality advisors for four purchasing points (Buesaco, Tablón de Gómez, 
Sandoná and Pasto) and two quality labs (Buesaco and Sandoná) (Cadena, 2017, p. 41). 
694 CCEsp reputation is a heritage of almost one decade of a commercial relation between Pastor Gómez and coffee 
farmers, continued by his son, featured by paternalism in which they gave money in advancement for the cultivation 
that would be paid in coffee during the harvest. This reputation among farmers is a valuable asset for an exporter 
who does not know anyone in the territory. Interview with Jairo Gómez, CEO of CCEsp.  
695 In 2015, 88% of coffee sold by Caravela was either A (with premiums equivalents to the 16% of the FNC’s price) 
or AA (a premium equivalent to 28% of the FNC’s price); 7% was AAA (a premium equivalent to 40% of the FNC’s 
price) and, 5% was sold as microlot (a premium equivalent to 40% of the FNC’s price)(A. Cadena, 2016, p. 48).      
696 For example, a coffee farmer received COP 7.000 per kilo for a lot of coffee. This lot had a high score and was sold 
to a roaster. Caravela paid back a premium of COP 3.000. CCEsp decided to take COP 600. So, the farmer received in 
total COP 9.400. Premium prices are revealed to farmers by text messages, so if CCEsp wants to continue procuring 
from high-score farms, it has to charge reasonable charges. Interview with Flor Valenzuela, the quality advisor from 
Caravela in Buesaco.   
697 Usually in the lab they were both the advisor from Caravela and a cupper from CCEsp. If a specialty coffee was 
discarded by Caravela’s advisor, the CCEsp’s one would score it to sell to another client. Interview with Flor 
Valenzuela, the quality advisor from Caravela in Buesaco.  
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motivate a change in behavior by farmers698. In fact, communication with them is done through 
a text message in which they will receive their cupping report for each lot of coffee analyzed699.  
 
To conclude, since 2013 the first layer of this LRA was misaligned and the profile reduced at the 
expense of the second layer. But both coexist. Coffee that cannot be profiled through the second 
layer built on the Q system could go through the first one built on the C.A.F.E Practices. The 
strength of the Q system to synchronize the “exceptional coffee” taste related service, the 
“transparent coffee” symbolic service and the attractive “monetary services” between profilers 
permits market prices to co-govern it. However, it contrasts with the weakness to fulfill its 
proposal for farmers. In Buesaco, only 13% of them fully fulfill this profile, especially the higher 
monetary services, even though they could have performed the practices as recommended. 
 
So, we conclude that it is a low coherent LRA because it could not coordinate actors to produce 
all services demanded on the first layer, and on the second, it manages to coordinate just a few 
portions of actors to profile the resource as expected.     
 
• LRA CAltura  
 
The genesis of this LRA is the pastoral mission of the Society of Jesus, which through their 
Fundación Social (FS hereafter)700, decided to enhance social justice in the very impoverished 
northern region (the ancient Pasto-Popayan corridor). As their mission is to tackle down the 
structural causes of poverty701, they identified that the most attractive option to increase income 
in the region was to capture more value in coffee production, specifically through higher prices 
scaling through both upgrading within the value chain and moving towards an upper-end quality 
segment702. So, in order to produce the “poverty reduction” symbolic service, the FS led an 
alignment to profile both the “terroir expression” and the “exceptional coffee” taste related 
services; the “transparent coffee” symbolic service; and the “monetary services” (in terms of 
exceptional coffee)   
 
How can you upgrade your competitive position when you own less than one hectare of land? 
The answer for the FS was through the consolidation of a coffee producers’ association that can 
                                                     
698 Flor Valenzuela, the quality advisor, said that Caravela developed meetings with groups of farmers and even 
individual engagement, to help them improve their practices. However, the cupping test in those four municipalities 
must be already too much work for two employees, it is hard to believe they can make also technical advice.    
699 Caravela analyzed 15.395 lots of coffee in Colombia in 2015 from 3.965 farmers, 84.5% of these lots were 
accepted, and 18 thousand text messages were sent (A. Cadena, 2016, p. 46).  
700As it was said before, the Fundación Social was founded by Jesuits in 1911 to capitalize workers saving in order to 
increase their wellbeing in La Caja de Ahorros del Círculos de Obreros (today among the biggest financial groups in 
Colombia). Indeed, from the very beginning they participated in the economic live in banking, real state, insurances, 
etc., because they considered that it was a plausibly strategy to increase common wellbeing. “El enfoque estratégico 
(…) basado en las experiencias reales de esa forma de organización económica orientada a la solidaridad, el bien 
común y la preocupación por los más débiles”. Fundación Social. Official webpage.   
701 "Contribuir a superar las causas estructurales de la Pobreza para construir una sociedad justa, solidaria, productiva 
y en paz". Fundación Social. Official webpage.    
702 Interview with Guillermo Torres, regional director in Nariño of the Fundación Social.   
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produce, process, and sell their coffee703. Thus, the FS played a “hinge” role by helping farmers 
to organize themselves on the one hand, and to attract upper-end buyers interested in the coffee 
offered, on the other. They started this alignment in 2007 in which an association of 65 coffee 
farmers in Cartago and San Lorenzo (two Buesaco neighbor municipalities) was aligned with 
Caravela704 (Davila, 2008, p. 18), from which it was escalated to the Departmental level (next 
chapter) but in the end, it was consolidated in Buesaco705. At the beginning in 2012, the FNC 
supported a producers’ organization of seventeen farmers (Grupo Empresarial Buesaco SAS), but 
as financial resources were insufficient to make any real change, they engaged directly as 
capitalist partners with the incumbent associates in 2015706 creating a new company known as 
Café con Altura Buesaco SAS (Caltura hereafter) 707 . One year after, the FS bought the 
participation of the other partners in order to monopolize control708.  
 
So, this LRA is constructed around the profiler trader Caltura. Similar to the previous LRA, Caltura 
avoided the FNC to build their direct supply network with farmers, thus they started their own 
baseline survey in Buesaco with a seven-person team at the beginning of 2015. From these 
surveys, farmers were invited to join and, once agreed, farmers start receiving technical 
assistance and cupping tests to score their coffee lots under the Q system. In 2016, they had 
already one thousand farmers in Buesaco participant in this LRA. On the other extreme of the 
value chain, they aligned one specialty exporter (plausibly the Colombian exporter Lohas Beans 
which had a network of ten specialty roasters709).       
 
This LRA is built on the Q system profiling institution and in its local application the Café con 
Altura’s handbook for technical assistance in specialty coffee710. Indeed, for increasing farmers’ 
probability of a high score, Caltura developed in 2014 the uses of infrastructures and know-how 
that should be performed by farmers in Buesaco.     
 
This local application of the Q system is a direct consequence of the particular governance 
mechanism in this LRA. Differently, from other LRAs govern by profilers through formal or 
informal mechanisms agreed between partners, this LRA is unilaterally governed by the 
stakeholder in production. The FS acquired the property rights on the purchase point to join the 
value chain in the very middle, creating a commercial relationship with both producers and 
                                                     
703 Interview with Guillermo Torres, regional director in Nariño of the Fundación Social.   
704 As it was said before, the first and main exporter of Colombian Specialty Coffee.  
705 In the Cup of Excellence in 2012, three of the ten finalists from the whole country came from Buesaco (including 
the winner), therefore the FS established in Buesaco because of the high potential for specialty coffee. Interview 
with Luz Dary Chicaiza, CEO Caltura. 
706 The FS capitalized it in 2015 with COP 2.5 thousand million (USD 1.35 million). Interview with Luz Dary Chicaiza, 
CEO Caltura.  
707 Interview with Luz Dary Chicaiza, Manager at Café con Altura Buesaco SAS.  
708 Interview with Luz Dary Chicaiza, Manager at Café con Altura Buesaco SAS. 
709 During the interview with Luz Dary Chicaiza, she did not want to mention it, but she clearly said it was neither 
Caravela nor Banexport. So, I searched for roasters selling coffee from Buesaco and trying to follow back their 
partners, I found one of them procured from the Colombian specialty exporter C.I. Kyoto Lohas Beans SAS (with 
almost 30 thousand coffee bags exported in 2015 is among the five biggest)  
710 Café con Altura, “Cosecha y beneficio del café especial,” 2014.    
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specialty coffee buyers. Interestingly, from this powerful position, the FS does not try to take 
advantage in terms of increasing their share of the generated value, but on behalf of coffee 
farmers. However, coffee farmers must behave accordingly. Indeed, the FS use this leading 
position to decide which the uses of constituents that must be followed are711 and, how to 
incentivize them. It is easier to understand by analogy with the pastoral activity of the Catholic 
Church, in which a pastor intends to change their followers’ behavior for their own wellbeing.   
 
Regarding this, there were five strategies decided by the FS to incentivize the regulated uses712:  
 
• The best base price for coffee: Caltura paid the highest price in Buesaco in 2015/2016, 
they offered COP 100 (USD 0.04) in addition to the FNC’s price at the same factor713.  
• A premium for quality depending on cupping score: After a farmer registered in their 
database sells a good factor coffee, cupping will be performed. If it scores higher than 83 
it will be offered to potential clients. If it is sold as a specialty, 60% of the premium will be 
paid back to the farmer, and 40% will be for funding Caltura’s own operations714.      
• Agro-inputs: FS uses their economies of scale to negotiate lower prices for fertilizers, 
pesticides, herbicides, etc., aiming to resell them at the cost of purchase to participant 
farmers.   
• Technical assistance: They had seven extension agents among whom they distributed a 
certain number of veredas (and the farmers within) to conduct the baseline survey; 
alongside they did some initial group training (with so low attendance that were 
discontinued). Once the database was consolidated, they divided it again in order that 
each one had more or less 150 farmers to work with, and from then, they work on a daily 
basis exclusively through individual assistance715.  
• Organizational support: The goal of the FS is that coffee farmers could autonomously 
operate a profitable company. 
 
Their value proposal was to sell specialty coffee, but they realized it was not so evident. Firstly, 
more than half of coffee farmers did not reach the factor demanded, only 458 had the minimum 
quality to produce the “clean cup” taste related service. After cupping these lots, they tried to 
sell them as specialty coffee but in the end, they were able to sell only 150 thousand kilos from 
the 870 thousand kilos bought as a good factor716. As debutant in the business, they focused all 
the energy in the specialty market. However, when they realized they cannot storage longer the 
coffee without losing money, they plausibly had to sell it through other LRAs at market prices.   
 
                                                     
711 The Café con Altura’s handbook for technical assistance was a document produced entirely by an employee of 
the FS at request of the directives. Interview with Viviana Ramos, extension agent of Café con Altura Buesaco SAS. 
712 Interview with Guillermo Torres, regional director in Nariño of the Fundación Social.   
713 Interview with Luz Dary Chicaiza, Manager at Café con Altura Buesaco SAS. 
714 Interview with Elizabeth Montaño, extension agent of Café con Altura Buesaco SAS. 
715 Interview with Viviana Ramos, extension agent of Café con Altura Buesaco SAS. 
716 Caltura bought two-thirds of coffee from Buesaco and one-third from other municipalities. They accepted coffee 
from all farmers who wanted to sell to them, but premiums and benefits were only for participant farmers. Interview 
with Luz Dary Chicaiza, Manager at Café con Altura Buesaco SAS. 
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To conclude, this is a young LRA in process of development. Their governance mechanisms do 
not have the power to align profiling actors after the trading process (for more than 80% of the 
coffee), and still, there are not powerful enough to really coordinate half of the coffee farmers, 
which in addition does neither have voice nor vote in the decision-making process. If the majority 
of farmers do not improve their practices and do not obtain the minimum price because of low 
quality, and premiums are just for a small portion of privileges, there is no alignment to produce 
the “poverty reduction” symbolic service, the most important service in this LRA. That is why we 
consider it has low coherence. 
 
• LRA CNilson 
 
This LRA was developed as a consequence of Buesaco’s amazing participation in the 2012 version 
of the Cup of Excellence. The winner, Maria Etelvina Diaz obtained a cupping score of 90.85 and 
sold its coffee at USD 22.10 per pound. The fourth position, Franco Hector López had a score of 
89.58 and sold at USD 8.8 per pound. Mother and the father in law of Nilson López, in 2012, the 
fiel de báscula (coffee buyer) at the purchase point of the Cooperativa de Occidente since they 
started their operation in Buesaco in the year 2000 and, three times since 2001, member of the 
municipal council, because of his charisma and popularity among buesaqueños. In other words, 
Nilson had familial ties with a 90-score coffee, he knew coffee farmers and, much more 
important, he had farmers trust. These features made him a perfect partner to join forces with: 
he had the access to the best coffee, in one of the municipalities with the best coffee; in one of 
the countries with the best coffee in the world.   
 
Strategically enough, Inconexus a nascent exporter of specialty coffee with huge potential717, 
take advantage of the Cup of Excellence not to buy the coffee lots auctioned but to meet the 
producers (as much others should have done) and eventually, they meet Nilson and decided to 
buy at a higher price the eight thousand kilos of coffee produced by him (in his mother’s farm) 
and by his father in law718. After this initial negotiation, Nilson and Inconexus decided to create 
the LRA CNilson and invite other coffee producers to profile the resource in order to produce the 
“terroir expression and” “exceptional coffee” taste related services; the “transparent coffee” and 
“shared value” symbolic services; and the “monetary services” (in terms of exceptional coffee).  
 
They aligned other coffee farmers to the extent that Inconexus’ exports increased. This LRA 
evolved from eight thousand kilos in 2012 procured from two farmers in Buesaco and 5.8 
thousand coffee bags (each bag has 70 kilos Excelso coffee) exported by Inconexus in 2012, to 
240 thousand kilos procured from 160 coffee farmers in Buesaco and 15 thousand coffee bags 
                                                     
717 They started in 2009 with a registered export of 600 coffee bags and in 2011, the exported 2.900 coffee bags, 
almost five times more (FNC, 2017b).  
718 Interview with Nilson López, owner of Café de Nilson.  
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exported by Inconexus in 2015719. It evolved progressively720. When Inconexus had more orders, 
they demanded more high-score potential coffee and Nilson, who knew farmers and their coffee, 
just invited them to join this LRA. On the other hand, Inconexus as exporter closely works with 
its imports ally in the USA, Royal Coffee Inc., which have a network of roasters who demand the 
profile offered by this LRA. Also, Inconexus as a roaster sells this coffee in his coffee shop in 
Bogotá known as Café Cultor.   
  
All of them are aligned through the Q system profiling institutions. It operates differently than in 
the other LRAs. Firstly, there is not a purchase point. Instead, farmers call Nilson when they have 
a coffee lot ready to sell. Then, Nilson goes, takes a sample, evaluates the factor (he does not buy 
higher factor than 94), and makes an offer (in 2015 he offered COP 200 per kilo (USD 0.08) higher 
than the FNC’s price). Afterward, Nilson sends the sample to Bogotá where Inconexus conducts 
the cupping, scores the coffee and make a final offer, which through Nilson is communicated to 
the farmer six days after the sample is taken. Finally, the farmer decides to sell or not. In 2015, 
from the 240 thousand kilos bought, 30% scored higher than 85 and was paid with a premium721.      
  
The governance structure is built on the relation Nilson – Inconexus governed by a formal 
contract. Inconexus demands in advance the amount of coffee to be purchased during the whole 
year722 and gives Nilson the financial resources to procure it, including a fixed amount for kilo 
procured (independently of the base price and the premium) as a payment for its procurement 
services. This contract would be risky to Inconexus if they were playing exclusively in the “85 plus 
market”. However, cleverly, Inconexus participates in different market segments: It sells 
regionals (coffee because of the region it was produced), single lots (coffee because of the size 
of the lot coming from a single farm), blends (in which the client fulfill a form provided in their 
webpage723), and the coffee beverage in their Café Cultor coffee shop in Bogotá724.  
 
There is an additional governance mechanism: the trust nourished by encouraging 
communication among profilers. Indeed, the exporter (Inconexus) and the importer (Royal 
Coffee) invested COP 60 million (USD 21 thousand) in the logistics needed to bring roasters’ 
                                                     
719 Data on coffee from Buesaco coming from the interview with Nilson López, data of exports coming from (FNC, 
2017b) 
720 60 thousand kilos of coffee purchased in 2013 and 120 thousand kilos of coffee in 2014. Exports of 70 kilos excelso 
coffee bags increased from seven thousand coffee bags in 2013 to nine thousand in 2014. Interview with Nilson 
López, owner of Café de Nilson. 
721 Interview with Nilson López, owner of Café de Nilson.  
722 During their first year in 2013, Inconexus demanded 60 thousand kilos of coffee, the year after they doubled the 
procurement to 120 thousand, and the following they doubled again to 240 thousand. Interview with Nilson López, 
owner of Café de Nilson.   
723 “Let us know what characteristics you would like to find in a coffee, from the fragrance to the aftertaste. We want 
to know everything! Then, we will analyze all the information you gave us and try to find a coffee that suits you 
perfectly”. Inconexus, official webpage.  
724 Of course, there is also the worst of the cases, in which they will sell it as a Nariño coffee, losing the COP 200 they 
had paid extra. 
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representatives725 from the USA and East Asia (the two markets Royal is present) to auction the 
best 30 lots of coffee from Buesaco preselected by Inconexus quality team in August 2016, after 
the whole harvest 2015/2016 was collected. Alongside this commercial activity, this LRA created 
an opportunity to trigger trust through communication between farmers and roasters, organizing 
visits to the farms and meals with coffee farmers726. Communication that allows profilers to talk 
about prices received by farmers and prices paid by roasters, unmasking myths of abusing trading 
charges that contributes to enhancing the trust between roasters and the importer, and also 
between Nilson and participant farmers. Additionally, communication allows feedback to be 
provided in any direction: roasters can advise farmers in better practices727 or farmers can advise 
Nilson in order to better perform his activity. 
 
Trust and communication, accompanied by higher prices, is enough to encourage farmers and 
the other profilers to adapt their behavior in order to produce the demanded services. There is 
not any additional instrument like technical assistance, training or subsidized loans to make 
profilers change their uses of constituents.  
 
Nonetheless, it is inaccurate to say that farmers were using their constituents to profile the 
“exceptional coffee” exclusively because of this LRA. It could be said, that participant farmers 
were not only influenced by all previous LRAs, but they were also among the early adopters of 
practices recommended by each of the new LRA arriving in the territory. It is highly probable that 
they were farmers benefited from technical assistance and subsidized loans provided by the LRA 
Standard/Nespresso, and/or infrastructures provided by the LRA CCEsp and/or the technical 
assistance provided by Caltura. Precisely it was because of their effort to improve their practices 
that Nilson, after knowing them for years as fiel de báscula, invited them to join this LRA.    
 
To conclude. All profilers are fully coordinated to profile the Resource because 70% produce the 
“terroir expression” and 30% the “exceptional coffee” taste related services, all of them produce 
the “transparent coffee” symbolic services and in both cases, the “monetary services” increased 
for the whole set of profilers. There is a fourth service demanded by this LRA, the “share value” 
symbolic service, which is partially produced. Indeed, this LRA creates economic value for farmers 
but it does not create environmental value (previous chapter)728. So, even though there is not a 
complete fulfillment of the fourth service demanded, we considered that the governance 
                                                     
725 “Counter Culture Coffee, Anderson Coffee, Iconik Coffee, Bakcporch Coffee Roasters, Volta Coffee, Mitsubishi 
Corp., Litlle Owl Coffe, Willoughby’s coffee & tea, La Cabra coffee, Mr. Espresso and Caffè Fantastico” (Inconexus, 
2016, p. 2)   
726 “El objetivo de estas visitas era facilitar un espacio en donde los clientes y los caficultores se pudieran conocer y, 
compartir tiempo con ellos en sus hogares. Los caficultores se sintieron importantes y especiales, lo cual era también 
un objetivo: principalmente hacerles saber cuan importantes son para el negocio y empoderarlos para que sigan 
mejorando, teniendo en cuenta que la posibilidad de poder disfrutar de cafés tan increíbles alrededor del mundo, 
depende de ellos!” (Inconexus, 2016, p. 3)  
727 “Los clientes podían (…) no sólo hablarles (a los caficultores) sino también asesorarlos en las cosas en las que 
pueden mejorar con el fin de hacer su café mejor y su actividad más productiva.” (Inconexus, 2016, p. 4) 
728 Even though participant farmers in this LRA had better practices than their neighbors: e.g. 85% implemented 
integrated soil management when there is no other LRA in which more than 35% are implementing it.  
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mechanisms align profiling actors and allow a two-way coordination that could eventually trigger 
this service if it became a priority. So, we consider that this LRA has high coherence.  
 
7.2.3. Closure 
 
As mentioned in the conceptual component, closure refers to the market position of actors that 
allow them to profile the Resource in their advantage.  
 
This section evaluates the presence (or absence) of closure in each LRA 729 , by analyzing 
throughout the coffee value chain the barriers of entry established by profiling actors. Namely:   
economies of scale; product differentiation; capital requirements; cost disadvantages 
independent of scale; access to distribution channels; government policy. 
 
• LRA Discount  
 
The barriers imposed to enhance the attractiveness of the LRA Standard, in practice eliminated 
all barriers of entry to the LRA Discount. If government policy tries to differentiate standard 
coffee, forcibly, discount coffee is left as undifferentiated as possible. In fact, when farmers are 
selling discount coffee, they do not ask for factor evaluation and rather prefer to sell it “to the 
eye” to avoid losing time. They know there is no significant price difference between a “near 
Excelso quality” but still discount coffee and a very low-quality coffee. 
 
This LRA is so open that even farmers from other countries can sell through this LRA, as it 
happened during the Niña 2009-2012: due to 40% decrease in production, Colombian coffee 
prices rocketed, and 80% of the local consumption was supplied with coffee from Ecuador, Peru, 
and Brazil730.  
 
To conclude, this LRA has a low closure because it has no barriers of entry to counter competition 
forces at the production shackle of the coffee value chain. On the contrary, these forces are well 
present increasing the competitive intensity and reducing the possibility to produce other 
services demanded by actors.    
 
• LRA Standard731 
 
Since the call to do politics by the President of the FNC in 1930 to its federates732, la política del 
café, has he said, started to be implemented in order to create a complex system of instruments 
                                                     
729 For the cases of the LRA Standard, LRA Nespresso, and the LRA Starbucks, information is the same that the one 
presented for the LRAs (with the same names) when analyzing closure in Riosucio.   
730 Garrido, Miguel. “¿Por qué Colombia está importando café? Autoridades responden”. In El País. 24th of March 
2013.  
731 It is exactly the same when evaluating the LRA Standard in Riosucio. 
732 “Porque para que haya política del café, necesario es que el café haga política” (FNC, 1930, p. 6). 
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to enhance product differentiation, namely Café de Colombia as the best washed mild coffee in 
the world.  
 
Explained in detail in chapter 4, this coffee policy has used a combination of incentives, 
regulations and marketing campaigns to encourage both the first profiling actors (producers and 
traders) to use their infrastructures and know-how in order to reproduce consistently the taste 
related services, and the last ones (consumers) to influence their know-to-appreciate so they 
could trigger the symbolic services. In order to create a reputation that increases the monetary 
services received by coffee farmers.          
 
The FNC protected this reputation by obtaining the property rights over the Denomination of 
Origin “Café de Colombia” 733  through the activation of the “geographical indications” legal 
framework734 in the Andean Countries in 2005735 and, the European Union in 2007736. Also, they 
obtained the property rights over several brands and icons (including Juan Valdez®, Juan Valdez® 
coffee stores, and Buendia® soluble packed coffee among others) through the activation of the 
“trademarks” legislation737 in the markets they are present. 
 
Afterward, the Intellectual Property team of the FNC manages this wide portfolio of brands and 
Geographical Indications (not only “Café de Colombia” but also other regionals ones like “Café 
de Nariño”). It coordinates teams in different divisions within the FNC related with the reputation 
to develop concerted actions (from Cenicafé to the legal team). Also, it operates brands agents 
in different countries to develop marketing campaigns and, it monitors and controls the 
appropriate use of their brand portfolio738. 
 
                                                     
733 Resolución No. 4819 de marzo de 2005 de la Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio de Colombia. 
734 “Indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that 
territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin”. Section three on “geographical indications” of “The agreement on Trade-Related aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994”.  
735 Título XII de la Decisión 486 de la Comunidad Andina that regulates the procedure for obtaining the registro 
administrativo as a prerequisite to constitute ownership of the geographical indication before the Superintendencia 
de Industria y Comercio de Colombia – SIC as the administrative authority.  
736 The FNC demanded legal protection in Europe by activating the Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92 of 14 July 
1992 “on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and 
foodstuffs”, which was obtained when the Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) for “Café de Colombia” was 
granted through the Commission regulation (EC) No 1050/2007 of 12 September 2007 
737 “Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from 
those of other undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a trademark”. Section two on “trademarks” of “The 
agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994”. 
738 “As an example of the success of the FNC’s efforts in protecting the origin of Colombian coffees, the European 
Union’s Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) recently banned the abuse of the reputation of 
Colombian coffee in restaurants and coffee shops that sought to improperly use the name COLOMBUENO” 
(Comunicaffee, 2015).  
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Hence, the FNC produces the barrier “product differentiation” for 12.7 million of Colombian 
coffee bags exported in 2015, from roughly 130 million coffee bags produced in other countries. 
A profile characterized by the symbolic service “reputation of the appellation café de Colombia”, 
that has to produce higher monetary services for coffee producers. Indeed, prices for Colombia 
coffee have been almost one third more than the average composite indicator price since 1990 
(annex 6).       
 
Nevertheless, within the Colombian border, there is no product differentiation. All coffee that 
fulfills the Excelso quality produced in roughly one million hectares in the 86 ecotopes identified 
in Colombia is equally paid by this LRA. It does not matter if coffee comes from a ten thousand 
resistant trees/ha, sun grown, low altitude, full fertilized production system, or three thousand 
exotic trees/ha, canopy, high altitude, organic production system. Both are paid exactly equal, so 
in the end, whereas the Excelso quality is reached, it will encourage uses to increase monetary 
services in terms of productivity at the expense of other services provision.  
 
To conclude, we consider that this LRA has a low closure because of the lack of barriers within 
national frontiers.  
  
• LRA Nespresso739 
 
This LRA lead by the Swiss Roaster Nespresso is built over two main barriers of entry “product 
differentiation” and “access to distribution channels” which in part are a result of a clever 
strategy to use timely two other barriers “cost disadvantages independent of scale” and “capital 
requirements”: Firstly, Nespresso activated section five on “patents” of the TRIPS Agreement to 
interdict other to replicate their capsule machines (cost disadvantages independent of scale). 
Secondly, they use this period to activating section two on “trademarks” of the TRIPS agreement, 
to invest heavily on a marketing campaign (capital requirement) that created loyalty and 
produced the former two barriers.     
 
In the eighties, Eric Favre, an engineer from Nestlé’s packaging department, identified an 
opportunity by creating a machine that “could brew a good espresso from the comfort of 
home”740. As a result, Nestlé created the single-dose coffee market inventing and patenting the 
coffee capsule system in 1986741 that gave a functional benefit for consumers: a good homemade 
espresso. Even though third companies assembled machines, contracts and legal protection 
allowed Nestlé to effectively impede access to other competitors. But, as patents were going to 
expire 25 years later, Nespresso used this time to position their brand “we wanted to shift our 
consumers’ attitude from ‘I’m buying Nespresso because it delivers functional benefits’ to ‘I’m 
buying this specific brand simply because I love it”742.     
                                                     
739 It is exactly the same when evaluating the LRA Nespresso in Riosucio. 
740 Simon, Ben. “The Nespresso story you never knew”. In Business Report 27th august 2016. (Simon, 2016) 
741 “Initial patent on capsule: patent number CH605293, source: Espacenet. Patent number US4,136,202, source: 
USPTO” (Conley, Bican, & Ernst, 2013, p. 6) 
742 Gerhard Berssenbrügge, Former CEO of Nespresso, quoted by Conley et al. (2013, p. 3) 
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So, they switch from patents to trademark protection743 “A plethora of rival capsules will come 
out … (but) … the Nespresso brand is more important than the patents”744. Being part of Nestle745, 
Nespresso had access to the capital needed to fund both an aggressive marketing campaign to 
position the brand Nespresso, and the consolidation of an extensive retail service: from placing 
an order (using the webpage, the call center or the boutiques) to the hand delivery of 10 million 
members of the Nespresso Club. This strategy had allowed Nespresso to capture one-fourth of 
the single-dose coffee market, selling USD 4 billion in 2014 (Nespresso. et al., 2017). 
 
Also, being part of the main green coffee buyer in the market746 gave Nespresso access to the 
benefits of Nestlé’s economies of scales, particularly the access to its supplier’s network, not only 
for obtaining better prices but also a higher commitment from powerful local actors. As said, 
through the cluster system they are working with the most powerful traders: Volcafé, Neumann 
Group, Expocafé and the FNC in Colombia747, so they can encourage change in farmers’ behavior 
to profile their demanded services. 
 
On the other hand, this cluster system is clever enough to motivate competition between traders 
in order to reduce its dependency to both them and their supply zones. So, Nespresso has full 
control to decide whether to increase or reduce orders to a particular cluster, which in turn, has 
to increase or reduce its supply area by including new farmers or excluding old ones (as an 
example, at the beginning of 2016, the cluster of Expocafé had to reduce its zones in six 
municipalities because Nespresso reduced its orders748).  
 
There are barriers of entry between participant farmers and non- participant ones, but it is not a 
barrier that they can control: the cluster decides, depending on Nespresso orders, to modify it. 
Even something unique to the coffee farms as the regional origin that could produce barriers of 
entry farmers could control, is very well controlled by Nespresso. The example is Nespresso’s 
limited edition: coffee is sold with the region’s name during a period long enough to make a profit 
but short enough to avoid regional loyalty. So, Nespresso invests in the reputation of that origin 
for a short period of time to increase symbolic services and through them, monetary services. 
                                                     
743  “The following Nespresso trademarks are registered in the USA: TM Serial Number: 73620470, 74696199, 
73742734, 78431975 (Nespresso Essenza), 77842854, 76204673 (Nespresso Professional), 85307536, source: 
USPTO”. (Conley et al., 2013, p. 6) 
744 Eric Favre, inventor del sistema Nespresso, citado por (Conley et al., 2013, p. 6) 
745 With total sales of USD 92 billones in 2016. Forbes, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/companies/nestle/ Última 
visita 05-02-2017   
746 Panhuysen and Pierrot (2014, p. 20) calculated Nestlé purchases in 860 thousand metric tons in 2012/2013, a 
slightly more than 10% of the world coffee harvest equivalent to 12.3 million coffee bags of 70 kilos. 
747 In the world, in 2012 Nespresso had already 25 clusters in 8 different countries, working with almost 53 thousand 
coffee farmers (Nespresso, 2014, p. 5) 
748 A local newspaper presented the perspective from coffee farmers, who did everithing they were told to do, and 
in the end, they were just left behind. “José Eliécer Sierra, caficultor del Suroeste, cuestionó el anuncio y dijo que esa 
decisión unilateral demuestra que las multinacionales entran y salen del mercado cuando quieren. “Hicimos grandes 
esfuerzos para mejorar la infraestructura y cumplir los requerimientos y, ahora, nos salen con esto”, agregó.” El 
Colombiano, "Nestlé frena compras de café a 3 pueblos antioqueños”, 5th January 2016.   
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Eventually, they get “out of stock” and replace it with another origin and another marketing 
campaign. For example, they used a narrative of hidden terroirs discovered by Nespresso 
specialists749 to offer during fall 2017 the Colombia Aguadas as part of the Explorations collection 
(Aguadas is a municipality of the Department of Caldas, in Colombia) alongside “Ethiopia 
Yirgacheffe”. They were replaced for the winter season with another regionals with other 
narratives, one of them the Grand Cru Limited Edition Aurora de la Paz, from Caquetá (a region 
that used to be controlled by the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia-FARC for decades) to 
associate Nespresso brand with the peace consolidation process 750 after an agreement was 
signed between this rebel group and the Colombian Government. On February 2018, this coffee 
was sold out and a new narrative was put in place around the birthplace of the two main 
commercial species of coffee, offering one Arabica coffee from Ethiopia and one Robusta coffee 
from Uganda751. 
 
In the end, 53 thousand participant farmers are in “pure competition” among them, and with 
potential substitutes, i.e. neighbors that could produce similar taste related services but are not 
integrated, still. So, even though their membership reduces the competition, it cannot be said it 
is controlled by farmers. Barriers are developed at the roaster level, so this LRA has low closure. 
 
•  LRA CCEsp/Starbucks752 
 
This LRA lead by the American Roaster Starbucks firstly used the “product differentiation” barrier 
of entry to overtake competition, and being attractive enough to raise funds to create the second 
barrier of entry “capital requirements” in order to build the third one “access to distribution 
channels”. 
 
According to Marshall (2007) in the postwar period, consumers in the USA continued drinking 
ration coffee that came out of a can. Alfred Peet, a Dutchman that had worked in a coffee 
company in London, imported the European food culture paying attention to flavors and aromas. 
Peet opened a retail shop in 1966 and trained his buyers in the essentials of coffee quality, among 
them, owners of Starbucks753, a coffee shop funded in 1971. As a result, Starbucks mastered 
selection, blending and roasting of high-quality beans that were bought by Peet directly from 
growers to be sold to fine restaurants and espresso bars, creating a “product differentiation” that 
                                                     
749 “The Explorations collection is comprised of rare coffees from incredible terroirs that are all considered ‘hidden 
gems’ by the Nespresso coffee experts due to their remarkable taste notes” (Nespresso, 2017). 
750 “Following the peace agreement in Colombia, Nespresso will launch a coffee from Caquetá, a region heavily 
affected by the conflict, as a first step in its commitment to working in areas where 50 years of internal conflict has 
taken place. The company’s ambition is to encourage the reintegration into society of those who were impacted by 
the conflict and facilitate the return of those farmers who were displaced in order to support their transition into a 
sustainable means of income and improved livelihoods” (Nespresso, 2018a). 
751 On february 2018, coffee aurora de paz was sold out and a new narrative was put in place around the “birthplace 
of coffee”, offering one Arabica coffee from Ethiopia and one Robusta coffee from Uganda (Nespresso, 2018b).   
752 For the component Starbucks, it is exactly the same when evaluating the LRA Regional/Starbucks in Riosucio. 
753 One of Starbucks’ founders, quoted by Marshall (2007), said “he (Alfred Peet) generously shared with us how to 
cup, to roast and to blend, and instilled his uncompromising standards”. 
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Starbucks protected through the trademarks legal framework754. But it was only when a former 
manager bought Starbucks in 1987, that they integrated also the brewing process to provide a 
high-quality coffee brew for the final consumer. This strategy triggered their expansion from 6 
stores in 1986 and to 116 three years after. This proposal was attractive enough to raise USD 25 
million in an initial public offering on the stock market in June 1992.  
 
Capital that gave them the financial muscle to multiply its presence in the American market, and 
to expand worldwide from 1996 onwards producing the third barrier of “access to distribution 
channels” and investing in the second one of “product differentiation”. Indeed, they used the 
capital to both acquire established coffee chains and sustain price wars with locals. One example 
is its entry in the UK market in 1998 by paying USD 83 for the Seattle Coffee Company “its 49 
outlets were soon swallowed up by Starbucks (…) As the competition struggled to compete, 
Starbucks kept running its expensive sites at a loss, prompting accusations that they were using 
their muscle to unfairly squeeze out the opposition” (BBC, 2004). Two decades afterward they are 
present in 72 countries with 27.872 stores (Geomatics, 2018). On parallel, they developed a 
powerful marketing campaign investing more than USD 300 million annually on average since 
2011 (Statista, 2018), to position a 14.9 billion brand, the 35th most valuable brand in the world 
(Forbes, 2018).  
 
Additionally, 180 thousand metric tons purchased by Starbucks in 2012/2013, equivalent to 2.6 
million coffee bags of 70 kilos (Panhuysen & Pierrot, 2014, p. 20) provided the economies of scale 
to negotiate prices and conditions, like the implementation of their C.A.F.E. Practices code of 
conduct, explained before. In Colombia, they bought approximately 700 thousand coffee bags in 
2015755 for 60 thousand coffee farmers in twelve departments with a portfolio of suppliers to 
avoid mutual dependency 756 . As Starbucks is looking for three different flavor baskets in 
Colombia, including the “clean cup” produced by the Colombian Excelso, the only practical barrier 
for including farmers is being working with a trader that has an information system to guarantee 
the documentary traceability and the account records demanded by the C.A.F.E. Practices 
program (see the previous coherence section).  
 
So, in the end, both farmers and traders are easily interchangeable by Starbucks producing an 
LRA with low closure.  
 
• LRA CAltura 
 
This LRA lead by the Fundación Social tries to use “capital requirements”, to consolidate both the 
“product differentiation” and the “access to distribution channels”. But none of these barriers 
have been erected so far.  
                                                     
754 The brand Starbucks Coffee – Tea – Spices was firstly registered on august 8, 1978 before the United Stated Patent 
and Trademark Office (TESS, 2018). 
755 Interview with a FNC’s official from the commercial department.  
756 “Compras en un abanico de proveedores (…) no se busca que alguien se sobreextienda” Interview with Alfredo 
Nuño, general manager of Colombia’s Starbucks Farmer Support Center in Manizales. 
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FS focused on Buesaco farmers because of their remarkable participation in the Cup of Excellence 
contest. As the owners of one of the biggest financial groups in Colombia, FS used COP 2.5 
thousand million (USD 1.35 million) to paid slightly more for coffee purchased in Buesaco, in 
addition to the technical advice they were offering to coffee farmers (as explained in the previous 
section). There was plausible to imagine a scenario in which if not all, the majority of Buesaco 
producers had preferred to sell to them. In this situation, Caltura (FS’s trading company) would 
have been able to protect their reputation activating the geographical indications legal 
framework. Once the ownership was settled, they could have invested in the “product 
differentiation” and its distribution channel, including a network of importers and roasters of 
green coffee, and another one of retailers of packaged roasted coffee.   
 
But it did not happen. Even though Caltura did pay more than the market price for all coffee 
bought in Buesaco, and invested in a technical team to work alongside farmers, they only 
acquired one-fifth of the Buesaco harvest in 2015-2016. An important amount, but it was not 
enough to legitimately capitalize the reputation to create the “product differentiation” barrier of 
entry because it was shared with the other LRAs in the municipality. It made it difficult to Calura 
investing in “product differentiation”. The other traders, with the exception of Café de Nilson, 
had no incentives to empower farmers with a reputation that eventually, would imply a more 
expensive supply activity in Buesaco.  
 
A possible failure to reach that critical mass was that Caltura invested more backward in the value 
chain than forwards, helping farmers to improve the value of their coffee while forgetting those 
who would pay for it. Other traders in Buesaco, on the contrary, strengthened upwards relations 
with importers and buyers of high-scored coffee, thus they could attract farmers through higher 
prices. Caltura fought back claiming loyalty and promising better prices instead of looking for 
clients757, an ill-advised strategy which, in addition to mismanagement758, profoundly affected 
trust759. In the end, as not all the one thousand participant farmers were selling coffee through 
this LRA, Caltura bought coffee from non-participant ones, even from other neighboring 
municipalities.  
 
To conclude, even though this LRA could have had the barriers at the municipal level to profile 
the Resource prioritizing local demands for services, there are absent today. There are no barriers 
at the producers’ level because both participants and non-participants farmers can sell through 
                                                     
757 A real example was given to me by Elizabeth Montaño, an extension agent of Café con Altura. A farmer produced 
4 thousand kilos of a wonderful coffee. Café con Altura convinced him to sell the coffee to them by COP 7.100 per 
kilo because they were going to find a client that will paid much more, even though there was another trader that 
had a client and was willing to pay 7.500 per kilo. A few months later, the farmer received tree fertilizer bags as a 
“premium”, equivalent to COP 200 thousand instead of COP 1.6 million if he had sold to the other trader.    
758 Luis Fernando Benavides, the former manager of Caltura, had a traditional short-term trading vision in which 
farmers were providers from whom added value should be squeezed. Farmers were not seeing as beneficiaries, thus 
it did not existent the long-term strategy to build a reputation for the benefit of farmers. Interview with Luz Dary 
Chicaiza, Manager at Café con Altura Buesaco SAS. 
759 In interviews with coffee farmers, Caltura was seen just like another trader who was pursuing their own interests 
at the expense of farmers’ ones.   
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it. There are not at the trader level because with seven purchase points the competence for 
suppliers is intense. And there are not at the other segments because Caltura had not the product 
differentiation needed to control the upward value chain. Therefore, this LRA has a low closure.    
 
• LRA CNilson 
 
This LRA led by the Colombian exporter Inconexus is built over “cost disadvantages independent 
of scale”, which creates a certain “product differentiation” that allows the consolidation of 
“access to distribution channels”. 
 
Indeed, in 2012 Inconexus allied with Nilsón López, the charismatic coffee buyer of the 
Cooperativa de Occidente, to have privileged access to those farmers that could consistently 
produce a high score coffee. Even though Inconexus had not the amount of capital that FS had, 
they used theirs strategically to allow Nilson paid twice the Caltura premiums to the few farmers 
Nilson believed could reach high scores. Farmers were attracted avoiding false promises because 
they had a baseline offer that paid a slightly more than market prices for the whole lot, and six 
days afterward they received a final offer depending on their coffee score. Farmers have an offer, 
not a promise when selling their coffee. In addition to the trust produced by this LRA among 
profilers, farmers’ loyalty was triggered guaranteeing favorable access to the best coffee in 
Buesaco. Hence, this LRA to impose the “cost disadvantages independent of scale” barrier of 
entry: It would be difficult for new entrants to attract this set of loyal high-score coffee farmers.  
 
In parallel, the handpicked 160 coffee farmers enjoyed a privileged position because by 
maintaining their well-known practices (at least for Nilson), they did not face any competition by 
neighbors, neither in Buesaco nor in nearby municipalities. In fact, since the LRA started to spread 
in 2012, each year the amount of capital has increased allowing more coffee and more farmers 
to join the LRA without diminishing the competitive position of the incumbent participants.     
 
The small scale of this LRA allowed personalized feedback that resulted in widespread consistent 
uses of constituents to profile the “terroir expression” taste related service, and for 30% of it, the 
“exceptional coffee” taste related service. Accompanied by the physical traceability that 
produced the “transparency coffee” symbolic service, they created a “product differentiation” 
that cannot be qualified as a proper barrier of entry. Neither Inconexus nor Nilson have 
ownership on Buesaco’s reputation captured by a geographical indication nor a private brand. 
So, there are other exporters of high-score coffee from Buesaco.  
 
However, this profile was different enough for Royal, the American importer of high-score coffee, 
which decided to partner with Inconexus to sell coffee in the Asian and American market (where 
Royal was present). This alliance provided access to the distribution channels to roasters in the 
two markets, creating a barrier of entry for other traders in Buesaco. Indeed, as explained in the 
previous section, this LRA managed to bring into Buesaco a dozen of American and Asian roasters 
to make them compete for the best lots, encouraging their willingness to pay, and the higher 
monetary services for both farmers and traders.  
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Furthermore, Inconexus is vertically integrated through its retail service in both physical and 
virtual platforms: First, the Café Cultor boutique, with four stores in Bogotá, offers roasted 
packaged coffee, and brewed coffee, for the final consumer. They use their own brand “Inga 
Mystique” alongside the name of the coffee farmer and the farm, its altitude, the variety and 
some relevant practices like fermentation.  Second, the Inconexus web page offers mainly green 
coffee for roasters and exporters depending on different profiles they supply in seven Colombian 
Departments760.     
 
To conclude, there is a barrier of entry for non-participant farmers, which depends on Nilson’s 
personal criteria. Criteria over which is built the main barrier of entry of this LRA, the “cost 
disadvantages independent of scale” that allows Inconexus to have privileged access to farmers. 
In turn, this access was an important asset to bring about the partnership with Royal that gave 
Inconexus the second main barrier of entry “access to distribution channels”. These barriers 
counter competition at allowing the profiling of the symbolic and taste related services sought 
by this LRA, thus, it has high closure.   
 
7.3. Intermediary synthesis: Inputs to test our first hypothesis 
 
After analyzing each one of the LRAs in the light of the three conditions proposed in an 
independent manner, we can take a step forward to assemble together the combined variation 
of these dimensions by each LRA. Thus, we cluster them in three configurations.  
 
1-  “Invisible hand”: In both the LRA Discount and the LRA Standard, uses of resource 
constituents are poorly regulated and coordination to enhance the provision of 
demanded services by all profiling actors is mainly absent, the strong competition 
incentivized profilers to prioritize the maximization of monetary services, boosting 
production while reducing costs.       
2- “Ambitious”: In the case of the LRAs CCEsp/Starbucks, Caltura and Nespresso, uses of 
constituents are regulated but are not coordinated enough to profile the Resource as it is 
demanded by all profilers, because either there is one powerful enough to impose its 
demands over others, or competition is intense and orientates the profile towards the 
markets’ preferred one.     
3- “Integral”:  The LRA CNilson regulates uses of resource constituents in a coherent way, in 
order to profile the Resource as it was desired by participant actors.     
   
Furthermore, we merged this LRA categorization with results from chapter 7.1 in figure 11. 
 
                                                     
760 As detailed in the precedent section, they sell five products: Sustainable and certified coffees (not in the case of 
Buesaco); coffee scored more than 85 points; Single lots coffee; Regional coffee; and personalized coffee.    
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Figure 11 Services provision by LRA according to the combined variation of the three conditions. Source: the author 
 
 
Both LRAs Discount and Standard, clustered in the “invisible hand” configuration, have a profile 
featured by both the lowest provision of monetary services and the lowest number of symbolic 
and taste related services provided. On the other way around, the “integral” LRA CNilson 
optimized services provision 761  by providing the second highest monetary services and the 
highest number of symbolic and taste related services. In the middle, we have three “ambitious” 
configurations. Both LRAs CCEsp/Starbucks and Caltura with almost identical service provision, 
and the LRA Nespresso with higher monetary services but lower symbolic and taste related ones.    
 
In Veracruz/Buesaco with few exceptions, all farmers can participate in all LRAs with the 
exception of the LRA CNilson. Farmers have been similarly exposed to the different outputs 
produced by the different LRAs. That is why farmers use constituents in the firsts two processes 
(planting and cultivating) almost equally. Differences came during the fourth process because of 
possession of post-harvesting equipment (hulling machines, fermentation tanks, drying facilities). 
However, LRAs get differentiate after the trading process.  
 
The purchase transaction reflects the tradeoff to enhancing monetary services through either 
“productivity” or “exceptional coffee”. In the first case, all farmers participant in the LRA 
Nespresso receives a higher “premium when buying” sacrificing a potentially “premium after 
buying”. In the second cases, farmers are willing to accept a lower “premium when buying” 
because, among other reasons, they bet they would obtain a higher “premium after selling”. In 
the end, while the 100% of farmers in the LRA Nespresso obtained a COP 400 premium over the 
base price, only 14% of farmers in Caltura, 17% in CCesp/Starbucks and 30% in CNilson obtained 
a higher “premium after buying”. On the other hand, the three later LRAs developed two 
practices during the trading process (cupping of individual lots and physical traceability) that 
allowed them to profile 33% more symbolic and taste related services than the LRA Nespresso in 
which are inexistent.  
                                                     
761 Compared with the LRA Nespresso, it produced 11% less monetary services but 33% more monetary and taste 
related services.  
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Chapter 8. Actors’ games  
 
The variation of the extent, coherence and closure in each of the six LRAs that were identified in 
Veracruz/Buesaco, was a result of the activation of different institutions steaming from both the 
coffee public policy (described in chapter 4) and the regulatory system (described in Annex 2.1) 
in a complex process that could be traced to the Spanish arrival (described in Annex 2.3). In this 
chapter, we would explain the strategies to activate institutions followed by the actors in 
Buesaco, from the breakdown of the coffee quota agreement in 1989 to 2015/2016.  
 
Having say the above, we divide this chapter in four consecutive actor’s games (1989-1996; 1997-
2003; 2004-2011; 2012-2015) composed of three actions (actors’ coalition; mobilization of 
resources of action and institutional creativity) that explain the change of the LRA’s conditions 
both within the incumbent LRAs and the newborn LRAs.   
 
8.1. Incumbent LRA Standard, newborn LRA EdN (1989-2000) 
8.1.1. Actors’ coalitions: low monetary services for producers and low taste related 
services for traders  
 
The International Coffee Agreement and its local application by the FNC, shaped the Resource at 
the national level through the LRA Standard/LRA Discount 762 producing one combination of 
services for the whole Resource in Colombia that was perceived (in)sufficient by different actors: 
Sufficient for a coalition of entrepreneur farmers (which were mainly absent in Nariño), the FNC 
and, the Government who wanted to maximize monetary services. On the other hand, it was 
insufficient for farmers in Nariño whose ecotope was not suited enough for high production per 
hectare and for some coffee buyers who wanted the “terroir expression” taste related services 
from Nariño.  
 
In regards to the first claim, the LRA Standard was governed by coffee representatives of the 
main producer's regions763, producing a bias in favor or those departments at the expense of 
others less productive like Nariño. The bias that could have influenced Cenicafé’s research on 
agronomic practices: the main experiments were conducted under the environmental conditions 
of the main production zones like Caldas and Antioquia (even though Cenicafé had research farms 
in various departments). It could explain why the technology transfer did not have the same 
effect in production per hectare in Nariño as it had in other regions764.  
 
In fact, it is considered that coffee grows properly in organic soils with soft slopes that allow the 
evacuation of water excess; short luminous days equivalent to 1500 hours of solar irradiation per 
                                                     
762 As the LRA Discount is the other face of the LRA Standard for coffee that did not fulfill the minimum requirements, 
from hereafter when we talk about the LRA Standard, implicitly we are talking about the LRA Discount.   
763 The number of delegates by Department to the Congreso Cafetero depended on coffee produced the previous 
year according to the article 3 of the Estatutos de la Federación Nacional de Cafeteros del 14 de diciembre de 1930.   
764 “Yo hago todo lo contrario a lo que diga la FNC”. Interview with Javier Gómez, one of the more ancient coffee 
farmers in Veracruz, precisely because he felt that the recommended practices did not agree with his farm.  
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year; temperatures between 18 and 22 degrees Celsius; and 1500 to 3000 mm of rainfall per year 
in a bimodal climate (Herrón Ortíz, 2013, p. 6). Nariño, due to its localization close to the 
equatorial line, has 1620 hours of solar irradiation and due to its monomodal climate has 1612 
mm of rainfall per year (Oberthür et al., 2011, p. 787), at the extreme top in the first case and the 
bottom in the second. Buesaco is less fit with 2010 hours of solar irradiation and 1140 mm of 
rainfall per year (AlcaldiaBuesaco, 2018). Conditions were acceptable for cropping coffee but 
were not ideal to trigger productivity765. In this line of arguments, it can be understood the claim 
of some coffee farmers in Nariño that monetary services were insufficient766. 
 
In regards to the second, the LRA Standard blended coffee from all coffee zones to produce a 
consistent Colombian aromatic profile. Indeed, the FNC used money from the FoNC to buy the 
coffee through Almacafé (FNC’s logistic operator) to be threshed in their facilities (one of them 
in Pasto) through a supply network widespread in the country composed of cooperatives and 
private agents. Once coffee was milled, the FNC had the data needed to decide which lots from 
which regions should be blended in order to maximize the amount of Excelso. In the end, the 
“clean cup” taste related service was consistently reproduced, but the particular aromatic 
profiles from some terroirs vanished. It affected some actors who demanded the “terroir 
expression” taste related services from Nariño.   
 
Since the sixties in the United States according to Roseberry (1996), there was a growing 
tendency to move from the standardized coffee as a “proletarian hunger killer”767 based on price 
towards a coffee based on taste related services768. It accelerated in 1975 a cause of the Brazilian 
frost that rocketed tasteless coffee prices and attracted consumers into the high-quality market 
because the latter, which once was regarded three times more expensive, was just a slight bit 
more than the former. This upper-end segment was attractive enough to motivate new entrants 
like gourmet shops, restaurants, espresso bars, and coffee shops. They supplied their roasted 
coffee from specialty roasters, which mastered buying of green coffee, blending and roasting 
techniques. To satisfy this increasing gourmet industry, which saw sales multiplied from less than 
USD 30 million in 1980 to USD 500 million in 1986 (Roseberry, 1996, p. 766), roasters had to 
establish a regular supply of high-quality green coffee, that cannot be guaranteed by the major 
importers. These roasters gather together in the Specialty Coffee Association of America (SCAA 
onwards) in august 1982, in which 40 members decided to work together to discuss common 
issues for their industry, set quality standards for the specialty coffee trade, and promote the 
specialty coffee (SCAA, 2009).     
                                                     
765 This could explain why Cenicafé did not conduct more experiments to produce recommendations in these areas. 
In fact, the recommendation should have been to prioritize other crops that could trigger in the local environmental 
offer.  
766 Interview with Jairo Rebolledo, a former: extension agent, technical manager, executive director and President 
of the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño during the eighties and nineties, and advisor of the Governor 
of Nariño 2008-2012.   
767 Term coined by Sidney Mintzs quoted in Roseberry (1996, p. 770) 
768 “Coffee is a wonderful product. I believe, however, that we have got to stop selling the product on price. We must 
sell coffee on quality, value and image”. Said Kenneth Roman, an strategist, in an interview with the editors of an 
influential coffee magazine, quoted by Roseberry (1996, p. 765) 
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Among them was Starbucks, one of many small roasters that joined the movement in the 
seventies, purchasing green coffee to sell it roasted to restaurants and espresso bars. In the 
second half of the eighties, they decided to integrate the brewing process expanding 
exponentially their presence through coffee shops to the final costumer in the USA. It implied 
firstly the exploration of high-quality coffee, and secondly, and more important, the assurance of 
its permanently and consistently supply769. They discovered what they called “the best coffee 
from Colombia” in Nariño770 in this period and established a coffee purchase agreement with a 
private company called Empresas de Nariño –EdN (Levine, 2005), and instantaneously, they 
became an actor who demanded the “terroir expression” taste related service 771  from the 
Resource coffee in Nariño: they decided to take a very rare decision: to buy all the harvest in that 
year and the following four772.   
 
Once the negotiation for a new quota agreement, the main chapter of the International Coffee 
Agreement broke down in July 1989, an institutional earthquake disintegrated the pillars over 
which the FNC had built its apparatus to fulfill the ICA commitments. Although the FNC retained 
its legal competences in the Colombian legal framework, its purpose (for guarantee an acceptable 
purchase price for coffee growers) was seriously threatened by free access for all other market 
players. Indeed, as expected, International prices plunged after the ICA breakdown from USD 1.4 
per pound in May 1989 to a record low of USD 0.37 in August 1992. 
 
The fall of international prices disincentivized farmers investing in their crop and it was plausible 
to assume that the taste related service sought by Starbucks in Nariño could have been at risk. 
So, Starbucks participated in the LVIII Asamblea de la Asociación de Exportadores de Café de 
Colombia (Asoexport onwards) in 1995 in which they detailed their successful operational 
strategies 773  emphasizing on their tailor-made roasting process that was dependent on the 
quality of the green coffee. Subsequently, they detailed how uses of resource constituents must 
be done to trigger that high quality they are looking for, prioritizing post harvesting and trading 
                                                     
769 “Una última preocupación que, quizás a la que yo le dedico más tiempo, es tratar de garantizar que haya un 
suministro permanente de cafés de óptima calidad”. Said Dave Olsen, Vicepresident of Starbucks. (Olsen, 1995, p. 
89) 
770  “Starbucks (…) descubrió en Colombia el que consideramos el rey de los arábigos colombianos, el Nariño Supremo, 
que crece en las laderas del volcán Galeras a más de 2000 m.s.n.m; cuándo lo probamos se convirtió en una 
revelación” (Olsen, 1995, p. 84). 
771 “ese café, espeso, ácido, aromático, denso y oscuro” (Olsen, 1995, p. 84).  
772 “Tal fue el amor al primer sorbo de ese café, espeso, ácido, aromático, denso y oscuro, que Starbucks tomó la 
decisión, poco común entre compradores, de adquirir la cosecha de ese año y la de los cuatro siguientes” (Olsen, 
1995, p. 84).  
773 “La primera estrategia es la búsqueda de la calidad del producto que empieza con la compra de café verde (…) 
Una vez que tenemos el café en nuestra planta, se tuesta en pequeños lotes por artesanos. En Starbucks se piensa 
que cada café es único y por lo tanto, debe tostarse a la temperatura más apropiada durante el tiempo correcto para 
poder extraer sus sabores especiales. Se empaca inmediatamente para que llegue fresco al cliente.” (Olsen, 1995, p. 
87). 
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activities774. They concluded asking for collaboration to trigger quality-oriented practices in the 
Colombian coffee lands775.  
 
As a result, a coalition of producers, stakeholders in production (Comité/FNC and Asoexport), 
traders (EdN), roasters (Starbucks), and stakeholders in consumption (SCAA) shared a definition 
of the problem in terms of the low monetary services due to the low provision of the “terroir 
expression” taste related service so with their individual purposes and resources they implicitly 
agreed on a joint action.  
 
8.1.2. Selfishly mobilization of action resources of stakeholders in production over 
profiling actors 
 
For the FNC, after three decades of standardization, quality was defined in terms of the size and 
appearance of the coffee bean: it was assumed that coffee would taste well enough if sorted by 
its physical characteristics. Moreno Gonzales (2015) showed that as recently as in 1988, the FNC 
started cupping aleatory samples of coffee lots but only to discard lots with unpleasant flavors 
(fermented, phenolic, musty, etc.). It was believed that coffee could not express the terroir as it 
happened in the wine industry, at least not at the consumer’s palates776. Nevertheless, an iconic 
publication on the different combination of soils and climates in the Colombian coffeelands, 
known as “Ecotopos cafeteros” by Gómez et al. (1991) commissioned by the FNC to adapt 
Cenicafé recommendations to the local particularities, showed 86 different Ecotopes.  
 
This evidence could have produced, at least, the curiosity to move forward into the relationship 
between the Ecotope and the aromatic profile that was claimed by the SCAA/Starbucks. So, the 
FNC strategically mobilized its AR personal to produce the AR information: a multidisciplinary 
team of FNC’s employees777 conducted a study on the “physical and sensorial characteristics778 
of coffee in different regions in Colombia and its relation with the agro-ecological conditions” in 
1994 (Moreno et al., 1994). As expected, the study showed that both the physical and sensorial 
characteristics of the coffee bean had a relation with the ecotope from which it was harvested.  
 
Moreno et al. (1994) study had one part devoted to Nariño. It showed that all coffee samples 
from Nariño had a better performance than the average Colombian coffee. Using the stratified 
                                                     
774 “Si yo estoy vendiendo cafés especiales, los de más alta calidad son aquellos muy bien tratados, muy bien lavados; 
donde se utiliza mucha agua en su beneficio, numerosa mano de obra, gran cantidad de trabajo en la trilla, no se 
utilizan máquinas de secado y consideramos el resultante de alta calidad” (Olsen, 1995, p. 89). 
775 “Pero en lo que ustedes nos pueden ayudar es en que el café sea siempre el mejor, y continuar buscando fórmulas 
y formas para que sea cada vez mejor” (Olsen, 1995, p. 89). 
776 Interview with Emilio Echeverri, FNC, ibid.   
777 A team composed of five employees of the FNC with the help of the Comité de Nariño that came from the program 
of scientific research; national consumption division and social development division (Moreno, Rodriguey, & 
Caballero, 1994, p. 2).   
778 Physical characteristics were defined as a product of the threshing: Excelso throughput (how many kilos of 
parchment coffee were needed to produce 70 kilos of Excelso coffee bag). Sensorial characteristic were define in 
four variables when cupping: aroma, acidity, body, overall impression (Moreno et al., 1994, pp. 4-5).   
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conglomerate sampling method, samples were taken in the four seccionales (one of them, San 
José, encompassed Buesaco) in which the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño 
(hereafter the Comité de Nariño) divided the coffee zones of Nariño, and also from the 
Cooperativa del Norte, the Cooperativa de Occidente and Almacafé. Their study showed that in 
the seven groups, weight loss when threshing was between 18% and 17.5% (better than the 
19.5% national average); the percentage of pasilla (a coffee quality that cannot be exported) was 
lower than 4% in all groups (in six was lower than 3%) when the national average was 5.9%; the 
factor (kilos of parchment coffee to produce a 70 kilos of Excelso coffee) was lower than 90 kilos 
in all groups (in six was lower than 88 kilos) when the national average was 94.8 kilos779. In 
addition, there were statistically significant differences in the sensorial characteristics between 
the seven samples but they all are characterized for having a good cupping test, highlighting its 
acidity and body780.  
  
Jorge Rebolledo, as technical manager of the Comité de Nariño, participated in the elaboration 
of this study. Once results were presented in February 1994, he appropriated them as if they 
were the property of the Comité de Nariño781 to strategically mobilize this AR information to 
produce the AR consensus around the “terroir expression” taste related services specifically from 
coffee from Nariño with other influential actors as the SCAA. Indeed, one month later, on the 
15th of March 1994 Rebolledo in the name of the Comité de Nariño, did a “Presentation on Nariño 
Coffee” at the FNC’s headquarters in Bogotá to the participants in a trade mission organized by 
both the SCAA and the FNC (SCAA. & FNC., 1994), and afterward, he participated in the SCAA 
Coffee Expo in Houston782.   
 
In parallel Starbucks strategically mobilized their AR information to influence other profiling 
actors and stakeholders in production to gain the resource consensus towards the “terroir 
expression” taste related service through the mentioned Asoexport assembly in 1995. 
 
The Comité de Nariño and Starbucks, plausibly intended to produce the AR consensus to 
strategically mobilized it in order to innovatively activate the internal-external commercialization 
policy of the FNC to produce an output in which the coffee from Nariño will not be blended before 
reaching the final roasters, in order to profile the “terroir expression” taste related service, and 
increase the monetary services of farmers from Nariño.  
 
                                                     
779 Results are shown in Moreno et al. (1994, pp. 16-18) 
780  “En general las muestras de café de Nariño se caracterizan por tener una buena prueba de taza, siendo 
especialmente notoria su acidez y cuerpo” (Moreno et al., 1994, p. 14) 
781 “Sale el estudio (de características físicas y sensoriales en Nariño), (el autor) me pone el estudio sobre el escritorio, 
lo cojo y me dice - Jairo, eso no es tuyo. Y le dije - es mío. Y cogí el estudio y me fui para donde Emilio Echeverri 
(Gerente administrativo de la FNC) y se lo puse encima”. Interview with Jairo Rebolledo, Comité de Nariño, ibid.   
782 “Nos fuimos dos personajes (…) nos vamos no teníamos ni idea de inglés, no sabíamos cómo exponer esta mierda, 
llegamos allá como locos”. Interview with Jairo Rebolledo, Comité de Nariño, ibid.    
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But the FNC selfishly mobilized their AR information and political support783 to take advantage 
of the AR consensus around the “terroir expression” taste related service by innovatively 
activating the coffee public policy and producing an intermediary output el “Programa de 
Registro y Promoción de Cafés Especiales through the Resolución 3 de 1996” centralized in Bogotá 
in which samples were chosen from all coffee regions, not only from a particular one.   
 
8.1.3. Absence of Institutional creativity leaving behind demanded services by 
producers 
 
When el Comité Nacional de Cafeteros launched the Programa de Registro y Promoción de Cafés 
Especiales through the Resolución 3 de 1996 (Moreno Gonzales, 2015) centralized in the newly 
created “coffee quality office” and operated by the commercial department of the FNC: they 
concentrated the definition of the “terroir expression” taste related service. Indeed, the coffee 
quality office had the power to decide which coffee could produce this service, and the 
commercial office to decide through which channel the selected coffee was going to reach 
costumers.  
 
This intermediary output wanted to reshape a certain portion of the LRA Standard, by producing 
additionally to its profile, the “terroir expression” taste related service. Inspired by both the study 
that identified several different ecotopes and, the study on the physical and sensorial 
characteristics linked to the ecotope, the LRA did not incentivize any change in uses of resource 
constituents by farmers. Instead, it focused on influencing the know-how in the trading activity 
and the know-to-appreciate in the communication strategy.   
 
Through this “Specialty coffee registration and promotion program”, the FNC played the trader’s 
role demanding “the best” coffees samples through its decentralized structure: the Comités 
Departamentales de Cafeteros, and its supply network of Cooperativas de Caficultores 784. It 
                                                     
783 The FNC as representative of the Colombian government, tried to push up international prices (and the monetary 
services produced by the LRA Standard) strategically mobilizing their resource organization to activate the 
international public law to create the Association of Coffee Producing Countries the 24th September of 1993 in Brazil, 
in which 28 coffee producers accounting for 85% of the world coffee harvest. An intermediary output in which actors 
decided to behave as a cartel fixing production quotas per country per year in order to produce the monetary 
services demanded by producers. The final output was the quota itself, for its implementation the FNC purchased 
and storage the difference between the national production and the quota (the Colombian coffee harvest 94/95 was 
13 million coffee bags whereas the quotas was 9.3 million. In addition to the previous retention the FNC had six 
million coffee bags at the cost of USD 300 million in 1995 (ElTiempo, 1995). The international coffee price overtook 
the USD 1 per pound in May 1994 and it remained stable over this threshold for the rest of the decade (until another 
crisis disbanded the association in 2002), allowing the FNC to maintain its AR political support throughout the 
decade.  
784 The best coffee should have selected on a subjective basis, because each trader has his own cupping protocols 
and there was nothing like a shared definition of the best coffee. As an examples, as recently as 1992, the quality 
coffee criteria was harmonized between the FNC and Almacafé, FNC’s logistics operator (Moreno Gonzales, 2015, p. 
22). 
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implied that extension agents collected coffee samples directly in the coffee farm785 in those 
regions from were a Cooperativa was supplying. In an iterative process, the coffee quality office 
in Bogotá analyzed these samples throughout various harvests to assess its sensorial consistency: 
by repeating the sampling and tasting they were delineating the perimeter of the coffee land that 
produced the “terroir expression” taste related service. In parallel, the Comites Departamentales, 
either with his employees or by contracting experts, conducted a few studies to assess the socio-
economic feasibility of this coffee production in the long run. The samples would be registered if 
both assessments guarantee the supply of this coffee in the long term, subsequently, it would be 
offered by the commercial division786.  
 
The farmer himself did not have to change its uses of resource constituents, he continued his 
activities as usual. Nonetheless, the Cooperative had to change their behavior because they had 
to use their infrastructures and know-how in order to guarantee that this registered coffee would 
be kept apart from other purchases, starting the documentary traceability needed to effectively 
deliver these lots to the clients. Documentary traceability that, of course, had to continue along 
the value chain: once arrived in Almacafe’s threshing mills, then when transported to ports and, 
afterward when shipping and delivery to the final client, either an importer or a roaster.    
 
In parallel, the FNC had to change roasters and consumers know-to-appreciate through its 
communication strategy in order to align themselves with the growing demand for the “terroir 
expression” taste related services. Thus, the commercial division of the FNC offered the whole 
set of registered coffees to those potential clients who were demanding this service from the 
Resource by targeting their meeting points, namely the specialized traded fairs. In fact, the first 
partnership to supply in the long term specialty coffee was made by the FNC in the SCAA Coffee 
Expo in Philadelphia in 1999 (FNC, 2012d, p. 6).  
 
Therefore, the FNC created over the “LRA Standard” this “LRA Standard-Plus”, thus the 
opportunity to access was in principle available to all coffee regions from Colombia. But in 
practice, it privileged regions in which the extension service was stronger and where cooperatives 
had a room of improvement, not less those departments that had stronger ties with the central 
structure of the FNC in Bogotá. It is not surprising that the coffee sold was from Caldas, the 
historical main producer of coffee in Colombia (approximately 20% during the nineties) with 
strong ties with Bogotá787, not from a peripheral coffee producer as Nariño with more or less one 
or two percent of the total harvest. In fact, samples from Nariño were neither registered nor 
offered as specialty coffee until 2002788. So, this newborn LRA never saw the light in Nariño.  
 
                                                     
785 Usually farmers are cooperative to this kind of procedures in which an extension agent takes a coffee sample 
directly from his coffee trees. It is often used by the FNC to produce data on the coffee production system, from a 
pest outbreak in a region, to the florescence in order to predict the potential harvest.  
786 Interview with Pedro Felipe Gonzalez, specialty coffee coordinator in the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de 
Caldas. 
787 For example, Emilio Echeverri, the Administrative Manager of the FNC was from Caldas. He was sufficiently 
engaged in the local politics that a few years after he leaved the FNC, he was elected Governor or Caldas.   
788 Interview with Jairo Rebolledo, Comité de Nariño, Ibid.  
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Independently of what were the causes789, what is relevant for this study is the fact that local 
demands for the “taste related” service exclusively from Nariño coffee were completely 
unrecognized.   
 
Institutional creativity was absent because, even though there was a shared definition of the 
problem in terms of the low monetary services due to the low provision of the “terroir 
expression” taste related service, there was not any deliberative scenario to agree on the uses of 
Resource constituents by profilers: the higher monetary services demanded by producers implied 
uses of infrastructures, know-how, and know-to-appreciate by the FNC entities (Almacafé as 
trader, the FNC as an exporter and sales office) to open an exclusive commercialization channel 
for coffee coming from Nariño; and the “terroir expression” taste related service demanded by 
Starbucks/SCAA implied uses of infrastructures and know-how by farmers to guarantee both 
consistency and exceptionality. Nevertheless, these uses were never implemented because the 
FNC unilaterally decided on the uses or Resource constituents to be encouraged. Indeed, once 
the “specialty coffee registration and promotion program” was activated, the FNC developed the 
newborn LRA Standard-plus over the incumbent LRA Standard incorporating new regulations 
(using the same governance mechanisms) on compatible uses of infrastructures and know-how 
in the trading process (it targeted their purchasing network of Cooperatives and local agents to 
make them integrate the documentary traceability in order to take commercial advantages as an 
exporter 790 ) and know-to-appreciate in the communication strategy to profile the “terroir 
expression” taste related service without affecting the “clean cup” taste related service and the 
“appellation Café de Colombia” symbolic services.   
 
Consequently, both the Comité de Nariño and Starbucks considered insufficient the provision of 
their demanded services. In the first case, creating an unsatisfying demand that would produce 
internal fractures within the FNC, the Comité de Nariño and coffee growers in Nariño. In the 
second, it would encourage the newborn LRA EdN.  
 
For some producers in Nariño represented by Rebolledo, the fact that they did not obtain the 
privileged channel to commercialize 100% Nariño coffee was explained by the necessity of the 
FNC to blend it to produce the Colombian coffee reputation791: According to Rebolledo, its 
physical characteristics allowed its blending with lower quality coffee from other regions to 
maximize production of Excelso, and its sensorial characteristics would trigger the “clean cup” 
taste related service that was essential to the “reputation of the appellation” symbolic service, 
like a secret ingredient in a famous recipe. In other words, if Nariño coffee had been sold as a 
single origin, Colombian coffee would have either decreased their exports or affected their 
                                                     
789 it could have been that the amount of coffee was not attractive enough, or that it was against the goal of the 
diversification programs to reduce the area in marginal zones like Nariño (After the ICA was agreed, the FNC started 
in 1963 the promotion of diversification of agricultural activities in coffee zones to tackle overproduction by targeting 
the small coffee farmers (Palacios, 2009)) or from a commercial perspective it was not worthy because Starbucks 
had already the monopoly of the purchases with its own supplier, etc. 
790 The logic is that the commercial activity of the FNC as an exporter, would produce profits that increase the FoNC, 
which is the money used by the FNC to provide public services to coffee farmers.   
791 Interview with Jairo Rebolledo, Comité de Nariño, ibid.   
268 
 
reputation792. This narrative gave him political positions at the Comité de Nariño as both, firstly 
executive director and afterward President, but diminished his position in regards to the central 
structure that ended with him sacked793. It was the perfect excuse to spread his narrative that 
the FNC was cheating on Nariño’s farmers, paying lower than they would obtain if selling their 
coffee through other channels. In addition, the FNC used their power to impede this fact went 
public. So, it was needed a new LRA that profile higher monetary services for producers avoiding 
the FNC, that would be sought in the local electoral arena. 
 
• Newborn LRA EdN 
 
• Actors’ constellations 
 
Consumer’ palates appreciated the aromatic profile coming from Nariño but traders were used 
to blending coffee from all Colombian regions. Therefore, the low provision of the “terroir 
expression” taste related service shared by the actors, was defined by Starbucks in terms of the 
use of Resource constituents by both traders and farmers: In the first case, traders had to 
guarantee the documentary traceability so coffee from Nariño reaches Starbucks’ roasting 
facilities without being blended with coffee from any other region. In the second, farmers had to 
implement the recommended practices to improve quality.  
 
A coalition was then consolidated between interested producers, EdN (as a trader and exporter) 
and Starbucks to profile the Resource to provide the “terroir expression” taste related services, 
without producing the monetary services demanded by producers.  
 
• Strategic mobilization of profilers (roaster) 
 
As described before, in coalition with the SCAA they strategically mobilized the AR information 
to produce the AR consensus in order to activate the coffee public policy aiming to incentivize 
both Nariño producers to increase quality and FNC’s trading departments to improve traceability. 
An unsuccessful effort that encouraged Starbucks to strategically mobilized their AR law to non-
activate the “specialty coffee registration and promotion program” and rather, activating the civil 
code and have access to the Resource concretizing the art. 1495 del Código Civil Colombiano794 
                                                     
792 It has to be said that Colombia exported during the nineties between 10 and 14 million coffee bags, with some 
peaks at 16 million. With a maximum production of two hundred thousand coffee bags from Nariño in the nineties, 
the relation 50 (Colombian coffee bags) to 1 (Nariño coffee bag) make this assumption infeasible.   
793 From Rebolledo’s perspective, the FNC realized he could put at risk the actual profile of the resource (by limiting 
the access to the “secret ingredient”) so, to guarantee the LRA Standard it was better to get rid of him, thus through 
an internal disciplinary process he was sacked out from the Comité de Nariño. Interview with Jairo Rebolledo. Ibid.  
From FNC’s perspective, it was never a process against Rebolledo’s ideas, it was only he was performing political 
activities prohibited by the FNC’s disciplinary code. Interview with Emilio Echeverri, former administrative manager 
of the FNC in the nineties, ibid.  
794 “Contrato o convención es un acto por el cual una parte se obliga para con otra a dar, hacer o no hacer alguna 
cosa. Cada parte puede ser de una o de muchas personas”.  Art. 1495, Colombian Civil Code approved by Law No. 84 
of 1873.  
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to influence traders’ behavior by making them compel with traceability practices through a final 
output: a contract to supply coffee from Nariño with EdN. 
 
• Institutional Creativity  
 
More than a contractual discussion between the partners, there was not any deliberative 
scenario with other actors, so institutional creativity was absent and Starbucks and EdN profiled 
the Resource to provide the “terroir expression” taste related services, without producing the 
monetary services demanded by producers or any other demand for other actors.  
 
In this way, they created the newborn LRA EdN that profiled the entire Nariño coffee harvest 
(equivalent to 100 hundred thousand coffee bags produced in 13 thousand ha795) for several 
years796.  
 
Neither the LRA Standard-plus nor the LRA EdN implied a change with respect to the LRA 
Standard, in terms of extent and coherence in the first three processes conducted by farmers. 
So, for producers in Nariño monetary services remain completely attached to the international 
coffee price: neither productivity increased because they continued to receive a diminished 
version of the knowledge circuit detailed in chapter 4.1.3, nor “terroir expression” taste related 
service would do it because they were paid exactly the same as any other coffee farmer in 
Colombia.  
 
In fact, as Starbucks growth exponentially from the second half of the nineties to a level in which 
there was not a terroir that could have produced all coffee they demanded. According to 
Roseberry (1996, p. 769) Starbucks, alongside with other roasters/brewers, migrated from the 
“terroir” towards the styles and flavors in order to diminish their dependency to a particular 
coffee zone: Styles like “Italian blend” for stronger coffees or “Colombian blend” for mild ones, 
or the “house blend” to highlight a particular roast; flavors like “coffee with buttery caramel” or 
“coffee with rich, creamy vanilla” mainly to attract youngers. In both cases, volume was more 
important than origin. So, Starbucks reduced significantly their dependency towards Nariño’s 
supply and started a commercial relationship with the FNC to supply from the LRA Standard the 
“clean cup” taste related service (from the whole country), while continuing supplying from the 
LRA EdN their “terroir expression” taste related service (from Nariño). Plausibly as Starbucks was 
the main buyer of coffee from Nariño (during the nineties Starbucks bought on average two-
thirds of the Nariño’s Excelso (Levine, 2005, p. 2)), buy Colombian coffee from the FNC was a 
strategic movement to diminished competition for purchases in Nariño, removing these market 
forces that would have increase purchase prices and possibly, monetary services for farmers.   
 
To profile the Resource Starbucks concentrated uses of resource constituents in the house: Uses 
of infrastructures and know-how in their roasting and brewing facilities by replacing farmers’ 
                                                     
795 Interview with Jorge Rebolledo, Comité de Nariño, ibid.  
796 “Starbucks tomó la decisión, poco común entre compradores, de adquirir la cosecha de ese año y la de los cuatro 
siguientes” (Olsen, 1995, p. 84). 
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efforts (to produce a well-developed bean) with sorting technology, sophisticated labs (that 
would sort that well-developed bean from the bulked coffee), roasting techniques and brewing 
equipment, and uses of know-to-appreciate in their marketing and sales team. They bought 
Nariño coffee from EdN and in their facilities, they separated coffee lots to roast them alone and 
bring about the “terroir expression” taste related service from other coffee lots that would be 
blended into their style and flavor coffee. In parallel they invested 4% of their sales in positioning 
their brand: doing TV advertising (it had never been done before in the specialty coffee industry) 
and communicating directly to two million consumers in their coffee shops through images, 
information, and chatting with Starbucks employees (Olsen, 1995, pp. 88, 90). 
 
As the new regulated uses of Resource constituents by LRAs in place in Nariño (Therefore in 
Buesaco and in Veracruz) only affected processes after trading, farmers were neither included 
nor excluded. The Resource in Nariño then was profiled from the fourth process onwards to 
produce the “terroir expression” and the “clean cup” taste related services; the “brand 
reputation” and the “appellation Café de Colombia” symbolic services; and the same monetary 
services for farmers. 
 
8.1.4. Outcome 
 
The low monetary services for producers due to the low provision of the “terroir expression” 
taste related service produced by the LRA Standard, was the problematic defined by a coalition 
of producers, profilers, and stakeholders in production in Nariño/Buesaco once the international 
coffee agreement was disbanded.  
   
The FNC selfishly mobilized their AR information and political support to innovatively activate the 
coffee public policy to produce the intermediary output “Specialty coffee registration and 
promotion program” that targeted their supply network of traders (meaning they used FoNC’s 
capital to fund their operations), which had to change their trading practices to implement 
documentary traceability.  
 
The incumbent LRA Standard regulated uses of Resource constituents in the three activities of 
the trading process (purchasing; threshing, exporting) and one activity in the planting (variety) 
(equivalent to the baseline extent 17% of regulated uses797 evenly distributed798 (Annex 7)). This 
LRA intended to provide monetary services through the Appellation Café de Colombia symbolic 
service, federated coffee growers of the FNC using the governance mechanism (like Comités at 
the municipal, departmental and national level) to produce the outcomes of the coffee public 
policy described in chapter 4 (equivalent to the baseline coherence). It created the “product 
differentiation” Café de Colombia at the traders’ level (equivalent to the baseline closure). From 
this incumbent LRA Standard, the newborn LRA Standard-plus was developed. It regulated new 
                                                     
797 It refers to the first condition of the Extent (chapter 2.2.2): the regulated uses (weighted by process) by the LRA 
from the 26 uses identified in Annex 1.  
798 It refers to the second condition of the Extent (chapter 2.2.2): regulations are evenly distributed between the 
seven processes, in operational terms, regulations are not concentrated in the first three processes.  
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uses of Resource constituents in one activity (communication strategy) potentially increasing the 
extent (31% of evenly-distributed regulated uses, Annex 7). It maintained the same aligned actors 
and governance mechanisms but it produced a new output, the “Special Coffee Registration, and 
Promotion Program” aiming to coordinate profiling actors from trading to roasting potentially 
increasing the coherence. Also, it intended to create “product differentiation” based on the 
origin, erecting barriers of entry at the producers’ level potentially increasing the closure. But this 
potential was not realized in Nariño during the nineties, so in practical terms, the conditions of 
this LRA remained unchanged.   
 
Nonetheless, its non-activation created a “non-deliberative scenario” that gave legitimacy to 
Starbucks to sough individually their demanding services while leaving behind monetary services 
demanded by producers (who started to envision a new LRA avoiding the FNC). So, alongside 
their local commercial partner through a purchase agreement as a governance mechanism, they 
developed the tailor-made LRA EdN which, prior to intending influencing farmers behavior, relied 
on technology to trigger the “terroir expression” taste related service. It reached one-way 
coordination from the purchase to the brewing but as monetary service sought by farmers were 
not produced, coherence decreased. It regulated new uses of Resource constituents in the whole 
activities of the last three processes roasting, communications strategy and brewing increasing 
the extent (60% of completely non-concentrated regulated uses, Annex 7). Also, it created the 
“product differentiation” at the roaster level, decreasing closure. It was the only LRA present in 
Nariño for several years, and on average, 75% of the coffee produced in Nariño during the 
nineties went through this LRA.  
 
8.2. Newborn LRA ACDI/VOCA Nespresso and Starbucks (2001-2007)  
 
8.2.1. Actors’ coalitions: low symbolic services for stakeholders in production and 
consumption 
 
As detailed in chapter 4.1 the coffee crisis sparked a change of the Institutional Regime at the 
international level through the ICA 2001 and, at the national level, through set of 
recommendations provided by la Comisión de ajuste: Both conceptualized the low provision of 
socio-environmental symbolic services by coffee farmers as a problem that must be solved 
through a public-private-partnership and project-based approach.  
 
At the local level, coffee farmers in Nariño were neither able to capture added value from their 
reputation nor became indispensable for Starbucks, so their purchasing prices were completely 
attached to international prices fluctuation which started a progressive low trend at the 
beginning of 1998 from USD 1.5 per pound of coffee to a historical minimum of USD 0.37 in 
October 2001 and remained below of USD 0.5 from 2001 to 2004. Making it an unprofitable crop 
in the whole country but particularly in the low productive lands of Buesaco. Hence, as explained, 
from the second half of the nineties and especially at the beginning of the two-thousands, the 
only profitable crops in Nariño were the illegal ones. The department was the main producer of 
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coca in 2003 with 17.628 ha from the 86.340 ha nationwide (UNODC, 2005, p. 15) and the main 
producer of poppy in 2002 with 1.230 ha from the 4.153 ha nationwide (UNODC, 2005, p. 50).  
 
This fact attracted new stakeholders in consumption (the United States Government) and 
stakeholders in production (the Colombian Government), which demanded the “drugs 
substitution” symbolic service799, to the problem of collective action of the Resource in Buesaco.  
 
Indeed, the Plan Colombia800 encompassed the Fondo Nacional para la Paz: with USD 500 million 
spent in “alternative development” programs. One of which was the Familias Guardabosques 
program, a subsidy scheme in which a monthly payment of a monthly minimum wage (US$ 170) 
was agreed with a peasant family in return of the eradication of illegal crops and the recuperation 
of natural ecosystem for three years. It had two components: the technical one to protect natural 
resource while starting a new sustainable crop and, the social one to enhance family relationships 
and strengthen community organizations. Beneficiaries from this program could transit to the 
following phase that was supported through a second program known as Proyectos Productivos. 
It sought to reinforce the sustainable crop chosen to make them effectively alternatives to illicit 
crops (Giraldo & Lozada, 2008, p. 64). Clearly, the main challenge was to find such alternatives801 
and in Buesaco, in the middle of the area prioritized the alternative was coffee.  
 
Momentum was in place (featured by the new ICA 2001 and the change in the FNC’s focus 
towards the small farmers see chapter 4.2) and at the beginning of the two-thousands, a coalition 
composed by stakeholders in production and consumption (governmental and non-
governmental organizations) defined the problem as the failures of information that produced 
an oversupply of an undesirable coffee that endangered ecosystems, causing anxiety in 
consumers reducing their willingness to pay. It reduced monetary services for farmers so they 
had no other option than to cultivate illegal crops to make ends meet.  
 
                                                     
799 “Developed countries should help us to implement some sort of 'Marshall Plan' for Colombia, which will allow us 
to develop great investments in the social field, in order to offer our peasants different alternatives to the illicit 
crops” (Pastrana Arango & Gómez, 2005, p. 48) said Andres Pastrana when unveiling his plans to counterbalance 
drug production days after he was elected President of Colombia.  
800 This plan was afterwards launched as the Plan Colombia by the Colombian Government in September 2009, it 
was funded mainly by the US Government with USD 6.13 billion in the period 2000 – 2008 distributed between USD 
4.86 billion in military support and USD 1.27 billion in socio-economic aid through its International Cooperation 
Public Policy (Biden & Ford, 2008, p. 15). It was hardly a revolutionary idea. From 1991-1995 the UNDCP engaged in 
a crop substitution program in Nariño, which provided the bases for the PLANTE (the national plan for alternative 
development) developed by the Government of Ernesto Samper from 1994-1998. 
801 “USAID’s goal for alternative development focuses on reducing the production of illicit narcotics by creating 
sustainable projects that can function without additional U.S. support after the start-up phase is implemented. In 
recent years, USAID modified its alternative development strategy to emphasize sustainability. With regard to its 
strategic goal, alternative development projects face two key challenges—USAID currently has almost no alternative 
development projects in areas where the majority of coca is grown, and a government of Colombia policy prohibits 
alternative development assistance projects in communities where any illicit crops are being cultivated” (Biden & 
Ford, 2008, p. 48). 
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One coalition was formed expanding the group that belonged to the LRA Standard/Standard plus: 
producers (Asoveracruz), traders (The Cooperativa de Caficutores de Occidentes) and 
stakeholders in production (the Comité de Nariño/FNC and the Corporación Autonoma Regional 
de Nariño) that eventually attracted a roaster (Nespresso). They shared the definition of the 
problem in terms of the low “monetary services” due to the low “environmentally responsible” 
symbolic service that encouraged illegal crops and agreed on joint action to profile these services 
in order to produce the “drugs substitution” symbolic service.   
 
Another coalition was developed enlarging the group of actors belonging to the LRA EdN. 
Producers, Traders (EdN), Roaster (Starbucks) and stakeholders in consumption (Conservation 
International and the International Organization for Migration). In this case, big roasters were 
seen by some consumers as responsible for bringing “poverty in your coffee cup” (see chapter 
4.2). Starbucks not only needed to tackle down potential damage to its brand that could decrease 
monetary services, but also the vulnerability of high-quality coffee supply 802  that the crisis 
highlighted (McFall, Rodehau, & Wofford, 2017).  
 
They defined the problem in terms of the consumers’ anxiety due to the low “environmentally 
responsible” and “ethical traded” symbolic services that reduced their willingness to pay, and 
therefore monetary services that encouraged illegal crops. So, they joined action to profile the 
“terroir expression” taste related services demanded by Starbucks and the “environmentally 
responsible” and “ethical traded” symbolic services demanded by Conservation International on 
behalf of anxious consumers. 
 
8.2.2. Strategically-Cooperative mobilization of action resources between 
stakeholders in production and profiling actors  
 
There were two groups of mobilizations of action resources. Firstly, a strategical mobilization 
within the LRA Standard by the FNC and within the LRA EdN by Starbucks, and secondly, a 
cooperative mobilization by the ACDI/VOCA to transfer resources of action to farmers, so they 
could put forward their demands for services from the Resource. 
 
• LRA Nespresso  
 
Due to the loss of FNC’s stock of their AR money and property, they strategically mobilized in 
coalition with Corponariño their AR personal and law to concretize the International Cooperation 
Policy of the US and obtain the AR money to fund their own operations to profile the Resource.  
 
The FNC managed to continue the provision of services profiled by the LRA Standard at the 
expense of their stock of their money and property803 putting in doubt its continuity in time (in 
                                                     
802 Additionally, the relationship with the FNC suffered a setback when they opened its first Juan Valdez coffee store 
in New York in 2004. Interview with the project manager from the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño.  
803  As described in chapter 4.2 the FNC had exchanged their AR property for the AR money (by selling the FoNC 
assets) to maintain their AR political support (by supporting the internal coffee price) in order to survive as an 
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practical terms losing their AR political support). Therefore, they had to partner with other well-
endowed actors to guarantee provision of the monetary services even if it implied profiling other 
kinds of services they were not necessarily looking forward to.  
 
In 2001 the Comité de Nariño/FNC in coalition with the Corporación Autonoma Regional de 
Nariño (Corponariño onwards) strategically mobilized their AR personal804  and AR law (as the 
environmental authority at the local level 805), in order to concretize the program Familias en 
Acción (the International Cooperation Public Policy of the US) in the poppy cropping northeastern 
corner of the Department, in order to obtain the AR money to fund their own operation.  
 
As the focus of this program was to protect natural ecosystems from illegal crops, each partner 
produced one complementary output: Corponariño lead the intervention that focused on 
“training, technical assistance and advises to establish productive activities that permits the 
recovery, protection and sustainable management of strategic ecosystems while producing an 
income in the long term to trigger trust between participants and enhance the social tissue by 
strengthening the culture of legality and empowerment” (Corponariño, 2009, p. 3) and; the 
Comité de Nariño provided the “training, technical assistance and advise” related to coffee 
culture in those regions in which the agro-environmental conditions were optimal for this crop 
(it is plausible that the second extension agent that was placed in Buesaco at the beginning of 
the two-thousands was funded through this program).  
 
But if training and technical assistance could have been enough for entrepreneurial coffee farms 
that were able to invest in the equipment (like hulling machines or fertilizers) needed to change 
their use of resource constituents, it was not the case when targeting small coffee farmers. Thus, 
to achieve long-term impact, the FNC strategically mobilized their AR personal to concretize the 
Proyectos Productivos program (of the same International Cooperation Public Policy of the US). 
They produced a final output known as Proyecto del Macizo Colombiano, which supported nine 
producers’ organizations in Buesaco. One of them in la vereda Veracruz, the Asociación de 
Gestión de Cafeteros de la Vereda Veracruz Buesaco (Asoveracruz onwards) was formally created 
in 2002 (as the other groups dissolved after the end of the Macizo project in 2004, Asoveracruz 
was the hinge between the Comité de Nariño and the farmers near Veracruz). The first meeting 
was recorded on the 25th of October 2002806 as Acta 1 in the Libro de Actas de Asoveracruz 
(Onwards when we quoted an Acta we are referring to this book).  
 
                                                     
organization during the worst of the crisis. In the end, the FNC managed to survive but the stock of these three 
resources were severely diminished.  
804 Supported by FNC’s central office, employees at the Comité de Nariño formulated the projects to be presented 
to this fund. Interview with the project manager of the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño. 
805 “El Sistema Nacional Ambiental -SINA- es el conjunto de orientaciones, normas, actividades, recursos, programas 
e instituciones que permiten la puesta en marcha de los principios generales ambientales contenidos en esta ley (…). 
Para todos los efectos la jerarquía en el Sistema Nacional Ambiental -SINA- seguirá el siguiente orden descendente: 
MINISTERIO DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE, Corporaciones Autónomas Regionales, departamentos y distritos o municipios”. 
Art. 4 de la Ley 99 del 22 de diciembre de 1993 “por la cual se crea el Ministerio del Medio Ambiente”.    
806 Asoveracruz was founded in 1999 and legalized it in 2000, with sixteen coffee growers in the Vereda Veracruz. 
Interview with Carlos Pantoja, a coffee farmers in Veracruz, cofounder and currently President of Asoveracruz. 
275 
 
This output targeted small coffee growers807 associated808 to increase the profitability of the 
coffee culture by decreasing some fixed cost of the coffee farm and the family material wellbeing. 
It delivered technical assistance (replicated by the associations 809) to the participant coffee 
farmers: some of them were benefited with post-harvesting equipment: hulling machines, 
fermentation tanks, and concrete to build the drying patio, and the sanitary batteries to improve 
household conditions. Also, it delivered food-seeds and minor species to improve family 
nutrition. In the case of Asoveracruz, 13 of the 20 members were beneficiated with the concrete 
to build the drying patios from 2002 to 2003810.    
 
By participating in these two programs811 (Familias Guardabosques and Proyectos Productivos) 
coffee farmers in Veracruz obtain the AR organization. Then, Asoveracruz strategically mobilized 
it in coalition with the AR personal of the FNC to concretize the “Strategic Specialty Coffee Plan” 
of the Coffee public policy (Chapter 4.2.1) and produced an intermediary output: the registration 
of the brand Familias Guardabosques as a “Specialty Coffee” because of its sustainable 
production812  aiming to produce the “drugs substitution” symbolic service813.  
                                                     
807 But no too small, the project demanded at least 0.75 ha cultivated in coffee as it said in the Acta 3 July/2002 
808 An example of associative synergies could be read in the Acta 3 July/2002. “El técnico Hesner dijo que siendo 
revisada el área de café cultivado (…) dos beneficiados no cumplían con el área cultivada de café (…) Tomó la palabra 
el señor Antonio Gualguan y dijo que todo el grupo nos comprometamos a colaborarle a sembrar 2000 árboles de 
café”.  
809 The associations were a powerful tool to replicate the “knowledge circuit” as it can be seen in Acta 5, in which 
three delegates that went to a training, explained to the others what they have learnt. “Coger el café maduro y 
despulparlo el mismo día. Para sacar un café Bueno dejarlo fermentar doce horas, así sacar un café excelente. Para 
los que no tienen tanque, dejarlo en costales que no hay problema, para los que tienen secadora, la temperatura es 
de 12 horas para secar el café. Tiene que estar cerrado para que no entren animales y lo pisen”.     
810 In the discussions of Asoveracruz, it is clear that they received the material needed to build fermentation tanks 
and drying patios. (Particulary “tenermos que aportar el 60%” (it meant in labor)”Acta 3 December/2002; “que alisten 
el material todos los beneficiados de la primera etapa” Acta 4 January/2003; “los que salieron beneficiados de la 
primera etapa que hayan terminado las obras, por favor devolver el material que haya sobrado” Acta 5 Feruary/2003; 
“los 11 beneficiados de la primera etapa, si no les llegaba el material completo que no lo reciban” Acta 6 March/2003; 
“también nos informó que sobró dos tanques y dos patios (concrete), entonces dijo que se les diera a los que no 
tengan" Acta 9 May/2002. “habló del programa Macizo colombiano y dijo que en el mes de febrero tenía que seguir 
la segunda etapa. Por lo tanto, ahí entraban a participar el resto que no salieron beneficiados en la primera etapa” 
Acta 14 October/2002. In the end, there was not a second phase because of changes at the national level. Interview 
with the Projects Coordinator of the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño. 
811 At the beginning there were not associated, but as the Comité participated in both, eventually by monitoring the 
implementation and making some adjustments, these projects became closer so I would rather present them as a 
continuum. Felbab-Brown et al. (2009) presented a synthesis of the alternative development programs in Nariño 
from the Fondo Nacional para la Paz (2001-2003) that evolved into Familias en Acción (2003-2007) and Proyectos 
Productivos 2006-2007.  
812 In fact, in 2003 the "Strategic Specialty Coffee Plan" had “already helped to register 54 brands and launch 72 
production projects of specialty coffees with an annual export potential of 500,000, 60-kilogram bags” (Giugale, 
Lafourcade, & Luff, 2003, p. 536).  
813 “El café de Familias Guardabosques es el fruto de algunos programas de  sustitución de cultivos ilícitos promovidos 
y apoyados por la Presidencia de la Republica a través del programa del gobierno colombiano conocido como Acción 
Social. Este programa busca promover el desarrollo social y el mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida de las familias 
cafeteras de los departamentos del Cauca, Nariño, Tolima y Huila”. FNC. “Programas de Cafés Especiales” (FNC, 
2018). 
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From the broad brand of Familias Guardabosques that benefited four Departments, the FNC’s 
coffee quality office produced another output by identifying and registering two terroirs in 
Nariño to be offered through two different brands: Café la Esperanza de Nariño (from the North) 
and Café Sindamanoy (from the West) 814. Consequently, the Cooperativa de Occidente delivered 
to Almacafé 120 thousand kilos of green coffee from various municipalities in 2002 that were 
bought by Nespresso815. The client was so pleased that from 2003 onwards, this coffee was paid 
with a premium-when-buying of COP 800 (USD 0.28) and the next year they bought 800 thousand 
kilos of green coffee816. 
 
As a result, both the incumbent LRA Standard and the never implemented LRA Standard-plus 
evolved towards the newborn LRA Nespresso in Veracruz.  
 
• LRA Starbucks 
 
Starbucks, which had lost their AR consensus and was considered responsible of the 
unsustainable of the coffee culture, strategically mobilized in coalition with Conservation 
International and the International Organization for Migration their AR money, consensus, 
infrastructure, and organization to concretize the International Cooperation Public Policy of the 
Dutch Government to produce the AR consensus. 
 
Firstly, Starbucks strategically mobilized their AR money in exchange of the AR consensus held by 
the environmental NGO Conservation International817, when the former contracted the latter to 
produce the Coffee and Farmer Equity - CAFE Practices code of conduct in 2004 (see chapter 
7.2.2) 
 
                                                     
814 Interview with Oscar Emilio Ordoñez, coordinator of the specialty coffee program in the Comité Departamental 
de Cafeteros de Nariño. 
815 Interview with Rober Barco, general manager of the Cooperativa de Caficultores del Occidente de Nariño, 
816 Interview with Oscar Emilio Ordoñez, Comité de Nariño, ibid.  
817 “Starbucks Coffee Co. and Conservation International have announced a $2.5 million direct loan by Starbucks to 
help capitalize CI's newly launched Verde Ventures fund (…) This new agreement extends Starbucks and CI's five-
year partnership with an additional three-year, $1.5 million grant to support CI's Conservation Coffee program to 
conserve the environment while providing economic opportunities for coffee farmers (…) In another significant 
move, Starbucks has renewed its partnership with CI with a total cash contribution of $1.5 million over the next 
three years. Starbucks and CI will continue to promote environmentally sound coffee cultivation in the manner that 
improves the livelihood of coffee farmers, work to expand Starbucks green coffee sourcing guidelines program, and 
communicate the partnership to Starbucks customers and CI audiences” (Greenbiz, 2004). 
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Secondly, Starbucks with the EdN strategically mobilized their AR money818 and property819 to 
obtain the AR organization of the International Organization for Migration820. Indeed, the latter 
allowed them to cleverly involved into the project, national and local authorities, and academia, 
demanding abstract and effortless support that was not going to be denied821. Through this 
project, they postulated their private commercial relation as a public-private partnership to the 
“call of ideas” offered by the DGIS (Dutch Directorate-General for International Cooperation). As 
a result, they concretized the International Cooperation Public Policy of the Dutch Government 
in their efforts to achieve the global development goals (OIM, 2004, p. 54). The coalition 
envisioned this activation to obtain both the AR money822 and the AR consensus (possessed by 
the Government of the Netherlands) in order to motivate farmers to engage in the project823 and 
to change their behavior824 according to the CAFE practices recommendation. As a result, this 
LRA EdN evolved towards the more complex newborn LRA Starbucks.  
 
Indeed, this coalition produced as an output the project “sustainable development program for 
Nariño’s coffee growing families”. From 2004 to 2010 a 40-people team conducted a cumulative 
survey in Nariño’s coffee areas (including Veracruz) that eventually gathered a database of 
22.000 coffee growers participant in the CAFE practices program in 2010 (CI, 2011, p. 6). It also 
encouraged 442 farmers to establish 25 producer associations with the goal to purchase coffee 
on behalf of EdN (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014, p. 24). Both results helped to reduce Starbucks 
exposure to brand deterioration and supply shortages and, to profile the Resource with the 
“ethically traded” and “environmentally responsible” symbolic services through this LRA.   
 
Nonetheless this approach to categorizing “CAFÉ Practices farmers” through a survey and not 
through an audit was considered controversial (Timmerman, 2014): On the one hand, it is 
                                                     
818 EUR 1 million was invested by Starbucks either directly by paying a premium, or indirectly through EdN 
purchases. Their role in the project was describe as “Starbucks Co. paid 5 cents (USD) more per kilo of coffee 
purchased from ENA to fund the project; participate in 50% donation together with EdN(…) With a total budget of 
€2m” (DGIS, 2008, pp. 2, 7.). 
819 EdN reoriented its business model to the project, which implied the use of their infrastructures (like purchases 
points) and their administrative structure in order to achieve the project goals. Their role in the project was 
describe as “Identify, design, implement and finance the project; commitment to purchasing the coffee produces 
by 1080 families for the next five years” (DGIS, 2008, p. 2). 
820 “la OIM identificó la oportunidad en asociación con Empresas de Nariño, de formular un programa de impacto 
masivo dirigido a comunidades vulnerables en alto riesgo de desplazamiento y migración forzada” (OIM, 2004, p. 54) 
821 “(Colombian Ministry of Agriculture, National Planning Department and Nariño Government Office as well as 
Colombian universities) are involved to provide development synergies, access to beneficiaries and information to 
facilitate implementation according to plans and goals” (DGIS, 2008, p. 2). 
822 The other half EUR 1 million “Contribute 50% of the project financing; advisory and monitoring” (DGIS, 2008, p. 
3). 
823 “RNEs (Royal Netherlands Embassy) participation also bolstered the legitimacy of the project vis-àvis local 
communities and government bodies as its participation somehow diluted the strong commercial drive of the 
activities” (DGIS, 2008, p. 3). 
824 “A critical contribution from RNE to the project design consisted of placing greater emphasis on the social 
development activities to transfer capacity and tools to the beneficiaries in administration of personal finances, 
coffee growers association building, psycho-social training and land registration” (DGIS, 2008, p. 3). 
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justified because it avoids a poverty trap825, on the other, as there is no need of material support 
to produce the symbolic service, incentives to publicize are higher than to produce actual change. 
In Veracruz for example, even that the project funded a slightly more than one thousand farms 
with post-harvesting equipment and water treatment tanks, during the authors’ fieldwork, 
farmers who had the plaques with the Starbucks logo stuck to the wall of their houses as a 
memory of this survey, were never beneficiaries of the infrastructures component826. In fact, the 
probability to find a beneficiary (a farmer that take care of the water)827 among all CAFE Practices 
farmers in Nariño is lower than 5%828, but for Starbucks, the symbolic services were produced 
just by sourcing from them829.    
 
• LRA ACDI/VOCA Nespresso and Starbucks 
 
A third actor arrived in Nariño at the beginning of the two-thousands: ACDI/VOCA 830 
cooperatively mobilized their AR organization to combine it with the AR information and 
personal possessed by the FNC and the AR information and personal possessed by the SCAA in 
order to activate the International Cooperation Public Policy in the hands of the United States 
Agency for International Development – USAID, with the final goal to empower coffee growers 
with the AR information so they would be able to understand the potential services their coffee 
could produce and potential demanders of them, which could produce higher monetary services.  
 
USAID needed a viable alternative for illegal crops831 and had the money to fund initiatives in this 
direction832; ACDI/VOCA had a global network833 that could provide one viable alternative: selling 
                                                     
825 “If C.A.F.E. practices were enforced through a more conventional third-party certification process, farmers that 
did not meet the standard would not be certified, and Starbucks would not be able to purchase coffee from that 
farmer. The loss of Starbucks’ business would harm small farmers who may be working hard, but falling short, to 
meet standards that allow their coffee to be labelled as ethically- or sustainably-sourced” (McFall et al., 2017, pp. 2-
3). 
826 The same plaques and farmers who did not remember any support by Starbucks in Nariño was widely exposed 
by Timmerman (2014), but his intentions were never to understand how the CAFÉ Practices program worked but 
only to support his thesis of the greenwashing Starbucks was doing.     
827 In practice, among the population of small coffee growers, only the beneficiaries of a project would have the 
equipment needed to treat water, the main environmental risk of the coffee production. In Veracruz is particularly 
the case, in which no one of the 93 farmers had water treatment.         
828 1191 coffee farmers beneficiated with water treatment equipment (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014, p. 24) among 
“22.000 farms identified as active participants” (CI, 2011, p. 6) in the CAFE Practices in Nariño  
829 “Starbucks is proud to have reached the milestone of 99% ethically sourced coffee”. Starbucks official webpage.  
830 With 1270 employees worldwide and USD 143 million of total revenues, ACDI/VOCA is an American Economic 
Development Organization which has worked in 146 countries since 1963. The name comes from a merger in 1997 
between Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance. 
ACDI/VOCA official website.  
831 “USAID will continue to play a pivotal role in support of the U.S. efforts to reduce the entry of illegal drugs into 
the United States. USAID will help governments of key drug source countries (…) provide environmentally and 
economically sustainable alternatives to farmers” (USAID, 2001, p. 13). 
832 “For Fiscal Year 2002, the President is requesting appropriations of $7,716,500,000 in discretionary funds for 
USAID-administered programs” (USAID, 2001, p. 15). 
833  An extensive list of the global network ACDI/VOCA had built since its foundation can be read in their 
commemorative 45th anniversary annual report 2008. Actors were categorized in four categories: Public Sector & 
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coffee to the newly US specialty coffee market by linking local farmers with members of the SCAA. 
To do so, they had to upgrade Colombian coffee from the commodity to the specialty coffee 
market: firstly they need the knowledge to crop coffee in Colombia that the FNC had produced 
since Cenicafé was founded in 1938834. Secondly, they had to reach the farmers through FNC’s 
employees 835 . Thirdly, they needed the know-how to enter into the specialty market that 
possessed the SCAA836.  
 
This escalated process was developed through the output known as the “Specialty Coffee 
Program” (SCP1 onwards)837 whose main goal was to “facilitate the development of the high-
quality coffees to be offered to the specialty coffee market as a development alternative to illicit 
activities in coffee-growing communities” (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 4). This program had seven 
pillars: 1- renovation providing seeds and fertilizer; 2- post-harvesting equipment (supporting the 
construction of facilities); 3- food security (providing seeds and small-animal breeding stock); 4- 
quality improvement (providing training in both the SCAA cupping protocol and practices to 
enhance the quality of the coffee); 5- marketing and commercialization (linking farmers with 
potential clients in the US Specialty market); 6- technical assistance and the environment 
(providing environmental workshops) and; 7- institutional strengthening (supporting producers 
organizations) (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, pp. 1,2), which arrived in Veracruz at the beginning of 2004: 
after the first phase of the Proyecto del Macizo Colombiano finished and hopes for the second 
phase were fading, news from this program arrived in Veracruz838.  
 
In one particular Acta, it can be seen the mechanism through which actors empowered with the 
AR information the coffee farmers: Before the implementation, it could be said that for farmers, 
the “Specialty coffee” was believed to be a particular seed delivered by the FNC839 (like the 
variety Castillo or the variety Colombia). Farmers did not know they were different segments in 
the coffee market that could be access to, by modifying their usual uses of resource constituents.    
 
                                                     
multilateral organizations; Ngo’s Institutions, Cooperatives & Associations; Private sector firms; Local Financial 
Institutions (ACDI/VOCA, 2008b, pp. 34-35). 
834 Affirmations like “in agreement with the parameters of Fedecafé, as indicated by their technicians” (ACDI/VOCA, 
2008a, p. 1) in their official reports, indicated the extent to which they were using knowledge gathered by the FNC.  
835 “With the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia, through its Departmental Committees in the five 
assigned departments, thirteen projects were executed in the following manner: ten projects (two for each 
department), called Phase I and Phase II and three Phase Ill projects”. (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 5) 
836 Affirmations like “in evaluation of coffee through standardized methods of cupping established by the Technical 
Standards Committee of the SCAA” (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 19) in their official reports, indicated the extent to which 
they were using the know-how developed by the SCAA. 
837 “A five-year Cooperative Agreement No. 514-A-00-02-00227-0 for the implementation of the "Colombia 
Specialty Coffee and USAID/GOC Public-Private Partnership Program", was signed on June 28, 2002 between 
USAID/Colombia and ACDI/VOCA”  (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 1). 
838 “El señor técnico mencionó en este año hay proyectos de trabajar con la Federación. Sobre estos proyectos 
Seguridad Alimentaria. Estas ayudas no vienen del Plan Colombia (…) También mencionó que para este año sobre el 
programa de soca, para una hectárea de soca la Federación ayuda con 10 bultos de abono” Acta 16. February/2004, 
839 “También informó los que estén interesados en sacar café especial pueden hacerse anotar porque el Comité de 
Cafeteros está haciendo un proyecto de entrega de café especial”. Acta 21 July/2004. 
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The first phase of the SCP1 started with the first three components, the basis to move forward 
towards quality. 1- renovation840: Members of Asoveracruz decided to buy a piece of land to build 
a nursery841, and once the seeds delivered by the program were big enough, they would share 
the labor 842  to plant the plantlets in the various farms using the fertilizer delivered by the 
program; 2- post-harvesting equipment843: similar to the previous Macizo project it delivered 
materials to build fermentation tanks and drying patios, in Buesaco there were 50 beneficiaries844 
(among probably two thousand coffee farmers in Buesaco in that year); 3- food security845: it 
promoted the family’s food production in the farm, ensuring a balanced diet with animal and 
vegetable origins846.   
 
During the second phase, SCP1 continued the investment in the component of renovation847 and 
post-harvesting equipment848, but it focused on the other components: 4- quality849: it utilized 
the Cascade Training System in which 88 cuppers were trained in cup testing by the Coffee Quality 
Institute at the SCAA headquarters in Long Beach, California (87 cuppers were certified as Q-
graders850). When they returned, they transfer this knowledge to 85 technicians of committees 
and cooperatives, and with all them, 1442 small producers were trained in basic knowledge of 
cupping. Afterwards, they received also an additional transfer of knowledge in order of how this 
taste related services could be produced through “workshops covering the production of high-
quality coffee (…) consisted basically in harvest training on farms to groups of producers, 
ecological wet processing and drying, using appropriate handling indicators” (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, 
p. 20). 5- Marketing851: the SCP1 funded the participation of coffee growers in the SCAA Expo 
from 2003 onwards, and commercial mission to Colombia of the some of the main actors in the 
                                                     
840 A total investment in Nariño phase 1 of USD 20.825 (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 37) 
841 “Habló de comprar un lote en sociedad para el invernadero y también sembrar café entre todos los socios que se 
asocien” Acta 21 July/2004. “Quienes estaban de acuerdo en comprarlo? A todos les gustó el lote, 16 socios estaban 
de acuerdo” Acta 22 August/2004.  
842 They had decided previously to share the work on Saturdays: the owner of the farm has to provide the lunch, and 
associates would work until 15h. If an associate cannot go, he has either to send another person to fulfill his 
commitment or pay for a worker; if an associate fails three times, he would be expelled from the group. Acta 7 April 
/2003.  
843 A total investment in Nariño phase 1 of USD 71 thousand (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 37) 
844 Interview with the Projects Coordinator of the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño. 
845 A total investment in Nariño phase 1 of USD 33 thousand (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 37) 
846 Carlos Pantoja, the President of Asoveracruz, remembered he received 10 cuyes (guinea pigs), 10 chickens, one 
bags of animal food and mesh for animal pens.   
847 A total investment in Nariño phase 2 of USD 23 thousand (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 37) 
848 A total investment in Nariño phase 2 of USD 134 thousand (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 37) 
849 The total budget for the collaboration with Coffee Quality Institute of the SCAA was USD 900 thousand, the 
specific investment for Nariño phase 2 was USD 8 thousand (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 37). Plausibly it was invested in 
the workshops. 
850  “The Q Grader™ Program is a rigorous testing and certification process. This is the first comprehensive 
professional accreditation for coffee graders and cuppers, recognizing the best talent at work in the industry. The Q 
Grading System, developed by the Coffee Quality Institute (CQI), defines standards for quality, both cup and grade. 
The result is a grading certificate that offers potential buyers a "picture" or tangible measure of the individual flavor 
profile for a specific lot of coffee” (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 19). 
851 A global investment for the whole project including the five departments of USD 119 thousand (ACDI/VOCA, 
2008a, p. 37) 
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specialty coffee industry 852 . 6- Technical assistance and environment 853 : they developed 
environmental workshops in the five departments in order to “identify, throughout the activities 
of cultivation and coffee processing and that of other associated crops, the possible 
environmental impacts and recommended prevention, mitigation, and control measures. The 
analysis that was carried out and the commitments of applying the measures that are to be 
applied during the time the project is in effect were duly documented” (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 
27). Even though they were supposed to be one Environmental Card by each Department, the 
FNC considered that only one card that followed their recommendation must be used in the 
whole project854.  
 
In the end, this training transferred the resource information to farmers in the sense they were 
able to understand the potential services their crop could produce. In other regions, this project 
encouraged other services (like the symbolic services “organic coffee” and “Fairtrade coffee”855) 
but in Nariño they focused on profiling the resource in order to produce the “terroir expression” 
taste related services alongside the “environmentally responsible” symbolic service. Its main goal 
was to increase “monetary services” received by farmers by linking them with actors who 
demand those symbolic and taste related services. As a positive effect, it also empowered 
farmers to have a saying in how to profile its Resource coffee in Veracruz.  
 
8.2.3. Institutional creativity to align interventions and profile the “terroir 
expression” taste related service; the “environmentally responsible” and 
“ethical trade” symbolic services; and higher monetary services for producers  
 
Communication bridges produced by the mobilization of the AR organization by ACDI/VOCA 
created an indirect deliberative scenario that transmitted information related to the uses of 
resource constituents needed to reshape the profile of the Resource sought individually by both 
LRA Nespresso and LRA Starbucks. Indeed, by activating the International Cooperation Public 
Policy of the US856 it encouraged different actors to put forward their demands for services, 
including the “environmentally responsible” and the “ethical traded” symbolic services and the 
“terroir expression” taste related service, in order to enhance monetary services for farmers as 
a shared basis profile for both LRAs that we will denominate the LRA ACDI/VOCA, from which 
                                                     
852 SCAA; CQI; Coffee Corps; Peet’s Coffee&Tea; Oren’s daily Roast; WBC; Caribou Coffee; Tim Hortons; Sustainable 
Harvest; Allegro Coffee; Ecologic Finance; Green Mountain Coffee Roasters; Alterra Coffee Roasters; Artisan 
Coffee&Tea; Intelligentsia; Coffee Lab International; Atlas Coffee Importers; Cafes Vita; Coffee Selections; Tailor 
maid farms; Counter Culture Coffee (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 24). 
853 A total investment in Nariño phase 2 of USD 28 thousand (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 37) 
854 “It was agreed that it should be only one card with which all projects executed with the Departmental Coffee 
Growers' Committees in the five departments assigned to the Program are covered, given the business unit and 
also sole guidelines issued by the Central Office of the Federation for the Committees” (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 28). 
855 The Project “The production and commercialization of certified organic Coffee” was developed in the Cauca 
Department, and “the Corpoagro project” developed in the Department of Tolima achieved the FLO-Fairtrade 
certification. (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, pp. 8-10)  
856 Eventually USAID replace the Dutch funding “after the exist of the Dutch Embassy, USAID entered the partnership 
as co-funder” (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014, p. 20) 
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they profile their own complementary services through the LRA ACDI/VOCA Nespresso and the 
LRA ACDI/VOCA Starbucks.  
 
Firstly, at the end of the implementation of the SCP1, communication between ACDI/VOCA and 
the other big players in Nariño: Nespresso and Starbucks, allowed them to work together in 
Nariño to separately implement their VSS (the Nespresso AAA and the CAFÉ Practices). In the first 
case, Nariño phase 3 supported 400 farmers with the training needed to be part of the AAA 
program857, in the second, they partnered with the National Training Service (Servicio Nacional 
de Aprendizaje - SENA) to train their instructors so they would train producers leaders, which in 
turn would multiply in their communities. In 2007, “in Nariño 105 producers participated (…) the 
focus was on production for markets with the CAFÉ Practices verification” (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, 
p. 16). 
 
Secondly, once ACDI/VOCA realized that a “value chain approach” would produce the indirect 
deliberative scenario that they needed to profile the Resource as divers actors demanded, they 
obtain a second USD 7.8 million funding from the USAID to implement a second “Specialty Coffee 
Program” (SCP2 onwards) from 2007 to 2012858 which leveraged additional US 23 million from 
the other partners (ACDI/VOCA, 2012, p. 8).  
 
The value chain approach meant that a differential strategy would be adopted depending on the 
link in the coffee value chain (they identified six links: coffee production; Post-harvesting; Coffee 
grading and selection; Coffee roasting; preparing a perfect cup; specialty coffee buyers). So, it 
was decided with key partners and co-investors which interventions should be produced by the 
SCP2 to strengthen each link, starting with associations859.     
 
Through this approach, both the Nespresso AAA program developed through a public-private 
partnership between the FNC and Nespresso and, the CAFÉ Practices program implemented 
initially through a project funded by the IDGIS (from 2002 to 2006)860 and then by USAID (from 
2009 onwards) were strengthened with their common needs: productive farmers that harvest 
high quality coffee while reducing the environmental negative impact. In fact, according to 
ACDI/VOCA (2012, pp. 8,9,10), farmers were assisted to use their infrastructures and know-how 
in the planting: “to renew their coffee plantations, replacing old plants with newer more 
productive and pest resistant varieties”; the cultivation: “trained producers in sustainable 
                                                     
857 “The technicians carried out the following activities: Socialization of the program; Farm-to-farm visits; Self- 
diagnosis; Action plan; Training in the production and beneficio of high quality coffee; Training in environmental 
topics and the defense of natural resources; Training in management of the coffee farm; Quantification of 
commercialization per farm and per region; Constitution of an organization of Nespresso producers” (ACDI/VOCA, 
2008a, p. 18) Nespresso did arrive in Veracruz in 2007: the first meeting of Asoveracruz in which AAA Program was 
mentioned by the FNC’s extension agent is recorded in the Acta 25 on the 2th of March 2007. 
858 USAID – ACDI/VOCA Cooperative Agreement No. 514-A-00-08-00300    
859 “Formation of associations was not a goal during the first project but it surfaces as a mechanism to stimulate 
farmers to seek a direct relationship with the exporter; the development of associations became a main activity 
during the second project”. (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014, p. 19) 
860 “However, the Dutch Embassy did not provide any further financial assistance because of their policy of not 
funding replications of strategies that had already been implemented” (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014, p. 19) 
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agricultural practices that minimize or eliminate dependence upon chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides”; post-harvesting: “purchase depulping machines, build solar dryers to accelerate the 
drying process, build simple water treatment systems”; trading: “training sessions for the 
association included developing commercialization capacity for the association as a collective”861 
and “establishment of coffee laboratories, coffee producers were also introduced to the art and 
science of coffee tasting with help from CQI, farmers were educated as to the reasons coffee 
beans became damaged or produced poor quality”; roasting “trained SENA instructors on good 
coffee roasting practices”; communication strategy: “organized numerous local, national and 
international championships in an effort to contribute to an increased demand for specialty 
coffee in Colombia”; brewing “trained Colombian baristas in how to prepare a cup of espresso, 
cappuccino, or latte that both tastes good and looks good”.  
 
Progressively, by concretizing the AAA code of conduct the Standard plus and Standard LRAs 
evolved towards the new LRA ACDI/VOCA Nespresso: the LRA Standard-plus was in a few years 
completely absorbed by it862 and eventually, the LRA Standard was merged with it. In a lustrum, 
it could be said that almost all coffee bought by the FNC in Nariño which had a factor lower than 
94, was bought through the LRA Nespresso863. Similarly, by concretizing the CAFE Practices code 
of conduct, the LRA EdN evolved into the LRA ACDI/VOCA Starbucks.  
 
As farmers in Buesaco could participate in both LRAs at the same time by selling either to the EdN 
or to the Cooperativa de Occidente, each intervention to enhance productivity, quality, and good 
environmental practices, was in fact increasing the extent and the coherence of both the LRA 
ACDI/VOCA N&S to profile the “terroir expression” taste related service; the “environmental 
responsibility” and the “ethical traded” symbolic service; and higher monetary services for 
farmers. It was in line with the ACDI/VOCA objective to profile the Resource depending on clients’ 
demands, in order to enhance the monetary services for farmers and make coffee a real 
alternative from illicit crops, providing the “drugs substitution” symbolic services demanded by 
the USAID864.   
 
8.2.4. Outcome 
 
                                                     
861 (Pfisterer & Payandeh, 2014, p. 21) 
862 Indeed, it is understandable that both brands Esperanza de Nariño and Sindamanoy vanished because the FNC’s 
commercial division should have focused their attention in other deals: Nespresso was a reliable client that was 
increasing their orders and was paying an attractive premium.     
863 A factor lower than 94 from farmers excluded from the LRA Nespresso would be bought through the LRA 
Standard, and coffee with a factor higher than 94 from included or excluded farmers would be bought through the 
LRA discount.  
864 This complementarity could been read between lines in the few meetings Asoveracruz had from 2006 to 2012, 
only 12 Actas were written between July 2005 and February 2012. Indeed, the association itself was not needed 
because intervention was directly between the programs and the beneficiaries, whose number increased faster than 
the support provided by the programs, reducing the probability of being a beneficiary of not only equipment, but 
also technical assistance: for example, it was considered to eliminate the group because neither the associates nor 
the extension agent from the FNC were participating in the meetings. Acta 34 November/2008.  
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The coffee crisis in Buesaco spark out poppy crops, bringing attention of new actors that 
consolidated a coalition of profilers (producers, traders, roasters) and stakeholders in production 
and consumption who defined the problem as the failures of information that produced an 
oversupply of an undesirable coffee that endangered ecosystems, causing anxiety in consumers 
reducing their willingness to pay. It reduced monetary services for farmers so they had no other 
option than to cultivate illegal crops to make ends meet. 
 
A strategic mobilization by the FNC and Starbucks, and a cooperative mobilization by the 
ACDI/VOCA to transfer resources of action to farmers, so they could put forward their demands 
for services from the Resource, concretized Specialty Coffee Program of the Coffee Public Policy; 
the International Cooperation Public Policy of the US and the Dutch Government that target small 
(potentially coffee) farmers that had (or were potentially attracted to) illegal crops, in order to 
encourage substitution through technical assistance, equipment delivery and networking with 
buyers in the “VSS market” in order to implement practices in the farm that would profile the 
Resource demanded by VSS buyers (Nespresso and Starbucks): enhancing productivity, quality 
and reducing environmental impact. 
 
ACDI/VOCA created and indirect deliberative scenario through its value chain approach, in which 
depending on the link of the chain it partnered with different actors. Thus, through ACDI/VOCA, 
a stakeholder in production like the FNC, profiling actors (supported farmers’ associations- 
among them Asoveracruz, to roasters- among them Starbucks and Nespresso) and stakeholders 
in consumption like USAID were able to put forward their services demanded. As a result, for the 
LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S, actors agreed on the uses of Resource Constituents to enhance 
productivity, quality and good environmental practices in two new activities during the planting 
(diversification and renovation), four activities during the cultivation (soil management; coffee 
borer beetle management, pest and disease management and picking), four activities during the 
post-harvesting (hulling; fermentation; drying; waste management) and the whole set of 
activities during the last four processes, increasing the extent in both cases (85% of evenly-
distributed regulated uses, Annex 7).  They intended to produce the “drug substitution” symbolic 
service by profiling the “terroir expression” taste related service; the “environmentally 
responsible” and the “ethical traded” to enhance the “brand reputation” symbolic service; and 
monetary services for farmers. But each one (The LRA ACDI/VOCA Nespresso and The LRA 
ACDI/VOCA Starbucks) with their own group of aligned actors, profiling institutions, governance 
mechanism and outputs increasing the coordination. In the first case Asoveracruz; Cooperatives; 
FNC/Comité and Nespresso aligned around the TASQ® to implement through the cluster FNC an 
extensive series of outputs (Familias en Acción; Proyectos Productivos; Strategic Specialty Coffee 
Plan; SCP 1; AAA Implementation project; SCP 2) to coordinate profiling actors in a two-way (by 
supporting and empowering farmers’ associations, both them and the roasters could influence 
the resulting outputs). Similarly, in the second case, Farmers’ associations, Starbucks and EdN 
aligned around the CAFE Practices to be implement through their commercial agreement that 
activate four complementary outputs (DGIS' call of ideas; SCP 1; SCP 2; SENA's technical 
assistance project) in order to control the change in behavior in two-way direction. Finally, in 
both cases the “brand reputation” symbolic service was sought to enhance the trademarks 
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Nespresso and Starbucks owned by the roasters of the same name, hence, the “product 
differentiation” was erected at the roaster level, decreasing closure.   
 
8.3. Newborn LRA Specialty (2008-2011)  
 
8.3.1. Actors’ coalition: Low provision of an “exceptional coffee” taste related 
service that produces the “poverty reduction” symbolic service for 
stakeholders in production and some profiling actors (farmers)  
 
Alongside a recuperation of international coffee prices to levels between USD 1 and USD 1.5 per 
pound of coffee from 2005 to 2010 (Macrotrends, 2018), both Nespresso and Starbucks sales 
growth exponentially865 pushing up demand for Nariño coffee to levels they had never seen. Soon 
enough both former and new farmers cultivated in coffee one and a half thousand hectares each 
year on average from 2004 to 2012866.  
 
Alongside the mentioned actors in the previous sequence who were demanding services from 
the Resource coffee in Nariño, one actor timidly started its demanding of the “exceptional coffee” 
taste related services. Timidly in the sense, it did not intend to create a stable LRA which could 
maintain this profile in the long run.  
 
This service goes deeper than the “terroir expression” of a particular ecotope to dig down into 
the coffee farm. “Exceptional coffee” taste related service is a farmer’ masterpiece dependent 
on farmer’ agronomic practices that bring about the full potential of the environmental offer in 
his plot of land.  
 
From the actors demanding this service in Nariño, probably the first one was the Italian main 
roaster, Illy Café. Their CEO (from 1964-2004) Ernesto Illy, led the creation of the Promotion 
Committee (from which he was the first chairman) of the International Coffee Organization 
during the ICA 2001 negotiations, with a clear mission: to fight the fear of coffee consumption by 
promoting the pleasure of drinking it (Illy, 2015). Inspired in the Illy Prize  for Quality Coffee in 
Brazil in 1991, they developed in 2002 the contest “Colombian Award to Coffee Quality for the 
Preparation of espresso, whose main goal has been to encourage and reward coffee producers 
whose product surpassed strict quality standards” (Colcoffeeinsights, 2012), which was held in 
Nariño in 2003. It encouraged coffee farmers in Veracruz to focus on quality through attractive 
prizes867.  
                                                     
865 In the case of Nespresso, since 2006 they increased their sales in CHF 500 each year until 2013 (Cornu, 2014, p. 
6). In the case of Starbucks, the almost doubled their ten thousand coffee stores in 2005 to 17 thousand at the end 
of 2010 (Telegraph, 2011).   
866 Increasing from 25 thousand in 2005 to 37 thousand in 2012, equivalent to an additional 6% each year. Calculus 
made by the author using the official annual reports of the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño from 2004 
to 2013. 
867 “Y tomó la palabra el doctor Libardo (FNC Extension agent) y nos informó sobre la calidad del café que había unos 
premios de COP 15 millones (USD 5.200) y COP 30 millones (USD 10.430) para los grupos que mejor café saquen”. 
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Following this idea of encouraging quality through contests, the ICO launched jointly with the 
SCAA an auction platform in Brazil868 in 1999 that spread in Latin-American coffee countries and 
then in Ruanda and Burundi (Dubois, 2002, pp. 121-131). In Colombia, it arrived as the Cup of 
excellence in its 2005 edition: An international jury composed by representatives of roasters from 
Europe, Japan, and USA, cupped the preselected samples from hundreds of 2 thousand kilo lots 
from different Colombian regions 869  gathered by the FNC 870  and score it through the SCAA 
Cupping Protocol871. Samples with the higher score won a predetermined prize872, but the real 
reward was that the whole lot of two thousand kilos would be sold through an internet auction 
(where it could reach from 5 to 40 times the standard price) 873. Progressively, the term “specialty 
coffee” was captured by the SCAA, and other actors started label as Specialty Coffee only those 
lots that scored higher than 85 in the SCAA cupping protocol, which in turn were the lots that 
produce the “exceptional coffee” taste related services (from here onwards, “specialty coffee” 
mean coffee that score higher than 85 in the SCAA)   
 
In 2005 a farmer from Buesaco obtained the 14th position; in 2006 three Buesaco farmers were 
finalists, including the second position. In combination with this higher visibility, this group of 
actors arrived in larger numbers thanks to the marketing component of the SCP1, which in 
partnership with the SCAA gather together the high-quality producers with the high-quality 
buyers874.  
 
                                                     
Acta 9 May/2003. In Nariño, it was won by a group of farmers from la Vereda Matitui in the Municipality of La Florida, 
60 kilometers away from Buesaco.    
868 It had been developed by the International Trade Centre with funds from the Common Fund for Commodities in 
the second half of the nineties. 
869 Until 2017, two contests were held to synchronize with harvesting seasons, the north and the south (from which 
Buesaco is part). The assumption that coffee from the south is more accepted was confirmed when one national Cup 
of Excellence was held in 2017 in which with one solely exception, the other 29 finalists were from the south, 
including 10 farms from Buesaco.  
870 Farmers registered their lot with a sample in any purchase point of the FNC’s supply chain. If the sample is selected 
to the second round they will have to deliver them the whole two-thousand lot that will be paid once the coffee is 
sold either as Specialty Coffee through the auction or as standard coffee through the FNC.  
871 By grading the fragrance, acidity, flavor, body, aftertaste and balance, they obtain and overall score from 50 to 
100. Colombian Excelso is graded usually at 80, samples over 85 are labeled as Specialty. Winners of the Excellence 
Cup are usually a few points over 90.   
872 “The rules of this competition are tough, but clear. In the top 10 rounds, 3 coffees were removed, lots that had 
been cupped and approved by tens of coffee experts, re-cupped at least 6 times, brewed to make 100 individual 
cups, and that 1 bad one is enough to toss it out.” Said Owen (2005), representative from Sweet Maria (Roaster from 
USA).  
873 When the international prices were near US 1 per pound, winners reached more than US 40 per pound and the 
lower price paid to finalist was US 5. Cup of Excellence official webpage.   
874 “Aleco Chigounis started sourcing coffee from Nariño in 2007 for Stumptown, then continued buying there for 
Coffee Shrub before buying Nariños for his own company, Red Fox. George Howell was part of the earliest 
exploration of Nariño microlots. There were others, including Gimme! and La Minita. Geoff Watts was buying Amigos 
de Buesaco for Intelligentsia. Maritza and Jeff Taylor were buying coffee from the COE-winning Finca Villa Loyola for 
PT’s Coffee, as well as a few other small lots” (Sheridan, 2015). 
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This kind of unstable LRA could work acceptably for profiling actors who demand the “exceptional 
coffee” taste related services because, in the end, they would always find it through these kinds 
of contests. But for some stakeholders in production, the instability was undesirable. More 
accurately, they considered that by stabilizing an LRA that produced the “exceptional coffee” 
consistently, it would also produce the “poverty reduction” symbolic service. 
 
Indeed, according to Preti (2010)  in 2005, 64.4% of the population in Nariño lived under the 
poverty line and 43.8% of the population had basic needs unsatisfied. Even though the situation 
was better at the National level, it was also critical: 50% of Colombians lived under the poverty 
line and 27,6 had basic need unsatisfied (Preti, 2010, p. 14).  
 
Coffee prices stabilized over US 1 per pound in 2005, better than before but still, it did not make 
a great difference for small coffee farmers and the premiums paid by Nespresso (In its highest 
the premium was US 0.6 in 2008) were perceived small in comparison with premium paid to 
winners in the contests. Nothing to say about Starbucks which did not pay premiums.   
 
So, a group of actors started to perceive that both LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S which were buying 
almost the entire harvest in Nariño, were actually defrauding coffee farmers. For a moderate 
group that included the Fundación Social (FS onwards), both LRAs limited farmers’ possibilities 
for moving forward by chain them to produce a coffee cherry to be sold in a purchase point as 
parchment coffee875. For other more radical, in which Jairo Rebolledo was included, they paid 
too low because roasters wanted to increase their profits and had the market power to do it. 
Eventually, both groups gather together under a shared definition of the problem in terms of the 
lower add value captured by producers that stuck them in poverty, so they agreed on the joint 
action (with their individual purposes and resources) to trigger the maximum value by producing 
the “exceptional coffee” taste related service and capture it through the vertical integration, 
namely a company owned by coffee farmers that sold directly to consumers.     
 
8.3.2. Cooperative mobilization of action resources between stakeholders in 
production 
 
There were three groups of mobilizations of action resources. Firstly, a cooperative mobilization 
led by the FS that created a stable but small LRA Specialty; secondly, a cooperatively mobilization 
led by the Governor’s office of Nariño that unsuccessfully intended to enlarge this LRA Specialty 
at the departmental level; thirdly, a selfishly mobilization of the Governor’s to being invested as 
the local authority in coffee public policy aiming to succeed with their LRA Specialty in Nariño.     
 
The first group of mobilizations: The FS cooperatively mobilized their AR organization and 
information to concretize the International Cooperation Public Policy of the EU, in order to 
implement the Laboratorio para la Paz methodology that transferred the AR information and 
organization to farmers, which having been beneficiated also by the AR information previously, 
                                                     
875 “Esta situación limita el radio de acción del pequeño caficultor básicamente a dos tareas: producir y entregar el 
grano a las cooperativas” (Arellano Rosero & Narváez de la Rosa, 2016, p. 23). 
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identified a commercial opportunity profiling the “exceptional coffee” taste related service, and 
created the first stable LRA Specialty with Caravela. It gave them the resource consensus to 
expand this LRA in Nariño.    
 
Indeed, at the end of the nineties in another region very hit by violence (the Magdalena basin), 
scholars showed a strong relationship between violence and poverty876 and recommended to 
prioritize the local development from the communities to enhance peace. They developed a 
methodology known as Laboratorios de Paz to produce peace through an integrated approach to 
local development877. In clear opposition to the military prioritization of the US support of the 
Plan Colombia878, the European Commission through its International Cooperation public policy 
announced a contribution of EUR 140 million to fund the spread of this initiative in Colombia 
(León, 2009, p. 100).        
 
It is possible that in 2004 the FS strategically mobilized their AR organization to obtain the AR 
information of the International Center for Tropical Agriculture 879  in order to conceptualize 
coffee not as a “productive chain” but as a “value chain”, which expand opportunities to 
producers by actively participating in the other links of the chain (Arellano Rosero & Narváez de 
la Rosa, 2016, p. 24).  
 
Then, in December 2005 the FS strategically mobilized their AR organization and information880 
to concretize the Segundo Laboratorio de Paz de la Unión Europea881  (International Cooperation 
                                                     
876 “la Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País SEAP y el Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular CINEP realizan 
un diagnóstico, en el cual observaron que existía una relación cercana entre la violencia que se daba en la región y la 
pobreza de la misma; así crearon una propuesta regional que promueve el fortalecimiento institucional a través de 
una construcción colectiva que lleva a las comunidades a impulsar el desarrollo sostenible necesario para generar 
paz” (León, 2009, p. 95) 
877 “el conjunto de procesos sociales de participación y fortalecimiento institucional que, a nivel local y regional, busca 
realizar, en medio del conflicto, transformaciones en el orden económico, social, cultural y político, para construir 
colectivamente las condiciones de una paz duradera basada en la vida con dignidad para todos los habitantes”. 
Convenio de Financiación Específica entre la Comunidad Europea y la República de Colombia, Disposiciones Técnico 
Administrativas Anexo 2, Convenio Núm. COL/B/-3100/2001/0094. Quoted by León (2009, p. 100) 
878 “En esta conferencia sucede un hecho muy importante que va a marcar el inicio de la formulación de la política 
pública de los Laboratorios de Paz, en palabras del padre De Roux: “...a nosotros no nos invitan, el gobierno no nos 
invitó entonces yo envié una carta a Londres explicando por qué el proceso del Magdalena Medio no es Plan 
Colombia, y por qué nosotros no estamos de acuerdo. Eso generó un escenario muy complicado, Pastrana (Colombian 
President) dijo en Londres que para él el mejor ejemplo de lo que era Plan Colombia era el Programa de Desarrollo y 
Paz del Magdalena Medio, Lugan de Cafot pidió la palabra y dijo: “le voy a leer lo que piensa el Programa de 
Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio”, y leyó la carta mía en público...” Francisco de Roux, quoted by León (2009, 
p. 99) 
879 Based in the Department of Valle del Cauca (Colombia) since 1967, this research center mission is to “reduce 
hunger and poverty, and improve human nutrition in the tropics through research aimed at increasing the eco-
efficiency of agriculture” at a global level. CIAT official webpage.      
880 It managed to obtain support from the Government of Nariño, the Ford Foundation, and the Local Agency for the 
Development of Nariño (Arellano Rosero & Narváez de la Rosa, 2016, p. 25). 
881 Convenio 243 Acción Social –European Union. It was signed in December 2005 for a two-year period. In 2007 the 
FS invested COP 1.021 (UDS 492 thousand) of which COP 475 million (USD 229 thousand) came from Acción 
Social/European Union (Davila, 2008, p. 18) 
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Public Policy of the EU) and produced as an output, the implementation of the “integral 
development” methodology in six northern municipalities of Nariño in order to empower 
communities with both the AR information 882  and organization. It intended to tackle down 
poverty by supporting coffee farmers upgrading in the coffee value chain.  
 
According to Davila (2008, p. 18), as a result, a partnership was consolidated in 2007 between 65 
farmers and Caravela, the first Colombian exporter of “specialty coffee” 883 . The latter, 
strategically mobilized their AR property by establishing purchases points in La Unión and 
Taminango (two municipalities near Buesaco) to stabilize the first LRA Specialty that profiled a 
small portion of the Resource coffee in Nariño in order to produce consistently the “exceptional 
coffee” taste related service. 
 
Coincidentally, in 2007 the quality component of the SP1 was developing, spreading all over 
Nariño one use of know-how during the trading process completely unknown for farmers: the 
cupping. This transference of AR information to farmers (it included the equipment needed884 
and the cascade system in which the benefited cuppers transfer the knowledge to local 
farmers885), started from 2007 to empower the FS and Caravela with the AR consensus towards 
their objective to expand the LRA Specialty in the whole department, producing both the 
“exceptional coffee” taste related service and the “poverty reduction” symbolic service.  
 
The second group of mobilizations: The group of producers that felt their demand for services 
left behind when the FNC implemented the LRA Standard-plus appeared again with the candidate 
in the electoral campaign 2008 demanded an LRA Specialty at the departmental level. Once in 
the Governors’ office, they cooperatively mobilized their AR law and consensus to concretize the 
Competitiveness Public Policy, in order to empower with the AR organization and consensus the 
Comisión Regional de Competitividad de Nariño, which decided to create a department-wide LRA 
Specialty. This commission strategically mobilized in coalition with the Government and farmers 
their AR information and organization to obtain the AR property (both a roasting facility to 
vertically integrate the value chain, and the Denomination of origin Nariño) needed to produce 
the LRA Specialty coffee, but they failed. 
 
                                                     
882 “Lo que hicimos desde la Fundación es gestionar la generación de conocimiento en los jóvenes caficultores, 
permitiéndoles el roce internacional para aprender de la calidad” Burbano (FS’s operative employee) quoted by 
Arellano Rosero and Narváez de la Rosa (2016, p. 27) 
883 Caravela was the first exporter of Colombian coffee that decided to use their infrastructures and know-how in 
the trading process to produce the “exceptional coffee” taste related service: They developed the 100% physical 
traceability in 2002 and the first vacuum packing system to export Coffee in Colombia in 2005 (Cadena, 2017, pp. 
10,13).  
884 The SPC1 equipped two coffee quality labs in Nariño, one in the north (La Unión) another in the west (Sandona) 
in 2004. (ACDI/VOCA, 2008a, p. 22).  
885 “Wbeimar Lasso Bolaños, quien luego de “educar” sus sentidos del gusto y el olfato, se categoriza como Catador 
Q y regresa a la zona a transferir el conocimiento mediante la creación de las escuelas de catación (…) A la fecha 
existen cerca de 100 escuelas de catación y algunas instituciones educativas dedicadas a la misma labor” (Arellano 
Rosero & Narváez de la Rosa, 2016, p. 27) 
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Indeed, in the midst of a political campaign to elect a new Governor of Nariño, Jorge Rebolledo886  
strategically mobilized in an iterative process, the AR political support in favor of his political chef 
Antonio Navarro to obtain a reshaped version of the AR consensus possessed by the FS, in order 
to strategically mobilize the latter to increase the former. Indeed, they participated in the 
political rallies claiming for a department-wide LRA Specialty that was blocked by the powerful 
FNC and its commercial allies, they blamed the traditional coffee business in which farmers make 
the greatest investment but receive the lower profits887. In their words, farmers made all the 
effort to profile the “exceptional service” taste related services but they received the lowest 
“monetary services”.  
 
Navarro was elected as Governor for the period 2008-2011, and Rebolledo was appointed as 
General Manager of the North region888. Once in office, they strategically mobilized their AR 
law889 to activate the Competitiveness Public Policy890 by producing an intermediary output: the 
Comisión Regional de Competitividad de Nariño (The Comisión onwards), an institution 
representative of the academia and, the private and public sector. Then, the Governor 
strategically mobilized its AR consensus to gather together all actors that were against the 
traditional coffee business (namely both LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S), including the FS, the Q-graders 
and numerous farmers and associations into the Comisión to produce another intermediary 
output: the prioritization of the coffee value chain 891  transferring both AR information and 
organization to the Comisión in order they sought the LRA Specialty Coffee without taking into 
account the FNC recommendation (or constraints), nor using FNC’s trading services 
(Cooperatives; Almacafé; FoNC; FNC’s commercial division). 
 
                                                     
886 Rebolledo, as a former President of the Comité de Nariño that was sacked in the nineties by the FNC central office, 
joined the Polo Democratico political party, a leftist opposition party to participate in the 2008 electoral contest. 
Interview with Jairo Rebolledo, Gobernación de Nariño, ibid.    
887 “Cuándo Navarro comenzó a hacer campaña andaba con un libra de café y decía “Esta libra de café vale tanto en 
el exterior (..) esto se vende en (COP 30.000 / USD 14 per pound) y a ustedes les están pagando esto (COP 2.000/ 
USD 1 per pound), les están robando!”. Interview with Rober Barco, Cooperativa de Caficultores del Occidente, ibid.    
888  Nariño was divided in four zones (north, south, west and Pacific), each one with a general manager that 
coordinated all public effort in that particular region.   
889 “El Gobierno Nacional, en coordinación con las autoridades departamentales y por recomendación de la Comisión 
Nacional de Competitividad, promoverá la creación de comisiones regionales de competitividad, cuya composición 
reflejará la adecuada participación de los principales actores sociales de la región”. Art. 9 “Comisiones Regionales de 
Competitividad”. Decreto 2828 del 23 de agosto de 2006 del Presidente de la República De Colombia “por el cual se 
organiza el Sistema Administrativo Nacional de Competitividad y se dictan otras disposiciones”.  
890 “Sistema Administrativo Nacional de Competitividad”, Documento del Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y 
Social 3439 de agosto de 2006. This public policy decentralized the decision on both the economic activities that 
would be prioritized by each Department and the strategic project needed to achieve them. The National 
Government, in the hands of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, has the competence to coordinate 
the system and support the local initiatives. 
891 “El primer ejercicio de sinergia se realiza con la cadena del café, aprovechando que en ese entonces el producto 
de nuestro departamento fue seleccionado como el mejor café de Colombia” Eduardo Vicente Menza Vallejo, 
coordinador de la Comisión Regional de Competitividad de Nariño 2010-2012. Quoted by Arellano Rosero and 
Narváez de la Rosa (2016, p. 25) 
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The Comisión considered that coffee farmers in Nariño were privileged with their environmental 
offer that allowed production of the “exceptional coffee” taste related service892. But remaining 
in the first link of the productive value chain was the cause they had not prospered with their 
extraordinary product. Farmers had to avoid selling the green bean to the traders (not only the 
FNC but also Starbucks and Caravela) and move upwards in the coffee value chain to capture the 
whole value. The strategy was to encourage associativity among farmers so the new entities 
would be able to roast, pack and commercialize directly their product to consumers in the local 
market893.  
 
To do so, through the Gobernación the Nariño, the Comisión strategically mobilized their AR 
information to obtain the AR property on the geographical reputation, by placing a demand for 
the Denomination of Origin Café de Nariño before the SIC during the second semester of 2009894. 
Their idea was to regulate the profile of the Resource through the DO specifications developed 
between them and controlled by the department government895.  
 
Farmers strategically mobilized their AR information and organization to group together in a 
private company so they could develop this business model by obtaining the AR infrastructure 
through the Comisión896. Indeed, ten associative groups representing 2.300 associates from ten 
different municipalities founded on June 2010 Alianza Café de Nariño S.A.S (Gobnariño, 2011, p. 
64). Afterward, the Comisión tried to activate the financial branch of the Competitiveness Public 
Policy to fund through Fomipyme the equipment needed by the Alianza Café for the roasting 
process897. 
 
                                                     
892  “El Gobierno Departamental buscó aprovechar la ventaja comparativa de la que goza en el café en el 
Departamento de Nariño caracterizado por una buena taya, limpia, alta acidez y cuerpo medio, cremoso y dulzor 
acaramelado” (Gobnariño, 2011, p. 64) 
893 “Se invita a los caficultores del departamento a organizarse en asociaciones de pequeños productores con el ánimo 
de que éstos, bajo su propia autonomía y contando con la asesoría del departamento, transformen o consoliden sus 
asociaciones en procesadores del café producido por sus asociados para que sea comercializado en el mercado local 
y nacional, obteniendo mejores precios por sus productos” (Gobnariño, 2011, p. 64).  
894 “Asimismo, se busca que la Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio le dé el aval de Denominación de Origen, 
para garantizar la calidad a los consumidores. Esta solicitud se hizo hace seis meses y se espera un pronunciamiento.” 
Said Antonio Navarro, the Governor in an interview for the newspaper Portafolio (2010) 
895 “vamos a crear un sello de calidad de origen que administrará la Gobernación y que identificará en sus empaques 
los mejores granos del departamento”. Antonio Navarro, Governor of Nariño. Quoted by Semana (2010) 
896  “Para la Comisión, fue impactante descubrir el talento apropiado en nuestro territorio y se convirtió en la 
oportunidad que la región necesitaba para fortalecer su producto, sobre todo en el área tecnológica, en la que 
desafortunadamente adolecemos” Eduardo Armero Martínez, Catador Q Equipo Técnico Asprounión. Quoted by 
Arellano Rosero and Narváez de la Rosa (2016, p. 31) 
897 “A finales del segundo semestre del 2010, la Comisión emprende su tarea en pleno hacia el fortalecimiento 
productivo regional, postulando tres grandes proyectos ante el Fondo Colombiano de Modernización y Desarrollo 
Tecnológico de las Micro, Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (Fomipyme). El primer proyecto, “Mejoramiento de la 
competitividad de la caficultura en el departamento de Nariño, mediante la optimización de los procesos de 
transformación el incremento de la capacidad de gestión comercial de las microempresas productoras y 
transformadoras de café de alta calidad” (Arellano Rosero & Narváez de la Rosa, 2016, p. 32)  
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Nevertheless, both strategies failed: The FNC strategically mobilized their AR personal 898 to 
concretize the rules of origin legal framework and obtain the DO Café de Nariño from the SIC in 
February 2011899. And the three projects presented to the Fomipyme were not approved900. 
 
The third group of mobilizations: It could be considered that a local coffee public policy was 
needed to grasp more resources, so the Government of Nariño selfishly mobilized both their AR 
political support and consensus to obtain the AR law. Indeed, they innovatively activate the 
Competitiveness Public Policy through an intermediate output: the ordenanza901 No. 002 del 30 
de marzo de 2011 “por medio de la cual se adopta el acuerdo de competitividad de la cadena 
productiva de café como política pública del Departamento de Nariño” approved by the Asamblea 
Departamental (Departmental council). It practically invested the Departmental Government 
with the local authority in the coffee public policy that had been uncontested in the hands of the 
FNC since the first contract was signed with the National Government eighty years before, in 
order to seek the LRA Specialty Coffee902. 
 
8.3.3. Institutional creativity to profile the “exceptional coffee” taste related 
service and “poverty reduction” symbolic service in a tiny portion of the 
Resource  
 
La Comisión worked as a deliberative scenario in which producers and stakeholders in the 
production were able to move forward the services they demanded from the resource, namely 
increasing the monetary services for the former to trigger the “poverty reduction” symbolic 
service demanded by the latter. It could have been done by both producing the “exceptional 
coffee” taste related service and upgrading in the coffee value chain to sell directly to consumers.   
 
Then, they activated this local coffee public policy through the Action Plan 2011, aiming to 
encourage a change in the uses of know-how in the planting, cultivation and post-harvesting 
processes depending on the very local particularities of the soil in the farm. According to the 
Nariño Government report (Gobnariño, 2011), they utilized a three-step process in which they 
invested COP 5,3 thousand million (USD 2.86 million): Firstly they conducted a baseline survey 
for 3.047 coffee farmers in 22 municipalities in which each plot was geo-referenced. Secondly, 
they took a sample of both coffee and soil in almost half of the surveyed farms (coffee samples 
were analyzed in the quality lab by the SENA Q-graders, and soils samples were analyzed in the 
soil lab of the Universidad de Nariño) in order to identify correlations between soils and aromatic 
                                                     
898 The Intellectual Property team that (as said in chapter 5.2, subsection closure) was recognized for its intellectual 
property strategy.   
899 Resolución No 6093 de la Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio de Colombia del 11 de febrero de 2011.   
900 “Sin embargo, pese al esfuerzo, los resultados con Fomipyme no fueron favorables.” (Arellano Rosero & Narváez 
de la Rosa, 2016, p. 32)  
901 The decisions approved by the Departmental Council are known as ordenanzas 
902 “La Gobernación de Nariño (…) consideró que se requerían adoptar estrategias técnicas y comerciales para lograr 
un proceso de comercialización directa (…) decide entonces tomar un papel activo en la formulación de alternativas 
de solución” (Gobnariño, 2011, p. 64). 
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profiles903 and the proper agronomic practices that should be implemented to enhance them. 
Thirdly they supported the creation of “Corseagrocol” a private enterprise whose mission was to 
transmit these practices to the farmers, activating the Agriculture Public Policy that transferred 
money from the Ministry of Agriculture to support the plan of rural technical assistance in the 
Department 904  that could be contracted with private entities 905 . The idea was to provide 
personalized assistance which could have implied different uses in different activities in the first 
three processes (for example a tailor-made spatial distribution of coffee trees; a specific fertilizer 
plan, or a detail fermentation process) aiming to obtain the full aromatic profile.   
 
Its main focus, though, was to encourage a different use of infrastructures and know-how in the 
trading and roasting process. It encouraged farmers, through training and workshops provided 
by the SENA, to group together in producer’s associations that could both bulk all parchment 
coffee from their members and score it in quality labs by Q graders. Then, different members of 
the Comisión (la Gobernación de Nariño, Universidad de Nariño, la Fundación Social, el SENA y la 
Cámara de Comercio de Pasto) joined efforts to build a roaster facility in the municipality of La 
Unión (Arellano Rosero & Narváez de la Rosa, 2016, p. 32), with the goal that these associations 
could use the proper s-curves in the roasting process to enhance a particular aromatic profile for 
their end-product906, its first prototype was presented in September 2011. (Prensa-FS, 2011) 
 
Finally, they wanted to change the use of the know-to-appreciate by potential consumers both 
domestic and international in the communication strategy process. At the local level, even before 
this public policy was legally approved, the Comisión wanted to shape the reputation Colombians 
had of coffee from Nariño: on February 2010, they developed the event “Café de Nariño, el mejor 
de Colombia” in Bogotá in which they presented to a select audience the reasons why this coffee 
was extraordinary. Then, they had a business roundtable for two days in which associations were 
connected with potential buyers in the Nariño’s official house in Bogotá907. At the international, 
                                                     
903 A regional consolidation was made, in which three main aromatic profiles were identified:  the three regions 
shared the orange and chocolate aroma, the citric acidity, the creamy body and the caramel-like sweetness. But they 
differ in the complexity of their profiles: for example, region two, which comprised Buesaco, had in addition, a green 
apple aroma, a malic acidity, an oily body and a sweetness remembering roasted nuts. 
904 “Para tales efectos los municipios elaborarán un plan general de la asistencia técnica directa rural que será 
prestado por las entidades prestadoras de dichos servicios, los cuales serán pagados con los recursos que por virtud 
de la Ley 60 de 1993 o aquella que la modifique o esté vigente les corresponde invertir en las actividades de desarrollo 
rural y agropecuario y las demás fuentes de financiación que se describen en la presente ley”. Numeral b, Art. 4. Ley 
607 del 3 de agosto de 2000 “Por medio de la cual se modifica la creación, funcionamiento y operación de las 
Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria, UMATA, y se reglamenta la asistencia técnica directa rural 
en consonancia con el Sistema Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología”. 
905 “Las entidades encargadas de prestar los servicios de asistencia técnica son de carácter público, mixtas, privadas, 
(…)  tendrán como objeto social la prestación de asistencia técnica directa rural” Numeral e, Art. 4. Ibíd.  
906 “Hasta ahora, la torrefacción en Nariño se ejecuta con tecnologías deficientes en control de temperatura y 
conservación de calidad del grano. El café especial requiere cuidado particular en dichos aspectos. La planta modular 
(the roaster facilities in la Unión) cuenta con mecanismos innovadores que permitirán ejecutar una tostión precisa y 
compenetrada con el grano nariñense”. Guillermo Torres Daza, director de la Fundación Social Regional Nariño. 
Quoted by Arellano Rosero and Narváez de la Rosa (2016, p. 39) 
907  ”Grupos asociativos y organizaciones cafeteras de Nariño, tendrán la oportunidad de ofertar el café del 
Departamento, durante el desarrollo del evento: “Café de Nariño, el mejor de Colombia”, que se realizará en Bogotá 
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level, as the FNC commercial division was not an option, the Comisión relied this effort in the 
Cámara de Comercio de Pasto who could activate the export promotion component of the 
Competitiveness Public Policy by Proexport: On the one hand, Proexport brought international 
experts to guided workshops in Pasto to teach producers the basics of exporting. On the other, 
it opened a window of opportunity to Alianza Café de Nariño S.A.S. to improve their product so 
it could be sold in the international markets through their commercial offices around the world.  
 
Nevertheless, the Departmental Government finished its term before this LRA could be stabilized. 
And when this administration left at the end of 2011, Allianza Café had not been able to sell as 
roasted-packaged coffee the production of the three thousand participant farmers. So, they 
could not pay higher prices and the majority of farmers continued to sell their coffee through 
both incumbents LRAs EdN and Nespresso. Just a very tiny portion of the Resource in Nariño was 
sold through this LRA Specialty as roasted-packaged coffee.     
 
8.3.4. Outcome 
 
Coffee Contests held in Colombia since 2005, showed that there was a market willing to pay 
between five and forty times the international coffee price when the present LRAs ACDI/VOCA 
N&S in the territory were paying either the standard price or a standard price plus a premium, 
which in its highest was two-thirds plus. As it happened in a context of widespread poverty in 
Nariño and Colombia, producers and stakeholders in production shared a definition of the 
problem in terms of the lower add value captured by producers that stuck them in poverty, so 
they agreed on the joint action (with their individual purposes and resources) to trigger the 
maximum value by producing the “exceptional coffee” taste related service and capture it 
through the vertical integration, namely a company owned by coffee farmers that sold directly 
to consumers.     
 
Through a series of cooperative and selfishly mobilization of action resources, this coalition 
circumvented the coffee public policy by innovatively activating the Competitiveness Public 
Policy to put in the hands of the Government of Nariño, the authority to target the small coffee 
farmers in order to make them produce the specialty coffee and capture the whole value created 
by delivering technical assistance not to fulfill any code of conduct but to enhance the aromatic 
profile of their coffee; encouraging associative enterprises and; supporting these enterprises to 
vertically integrate the whole coffee value chain (so they were able to bulk, roast, communicate 
and sell the final product to the end-consumer). 
 
                                                     
entre el 24 y 26 de febrero y que contará con la presencia de empresarios, exportadores y personalidades del Gobierno 
Nacional y Cooperación Internacional (…) El objetivo del evento (…) es el de promocionar el consumo de cafés finos 
producidos por familias cafeteras de Nariño en las zonas de occidente y norte y posicionar el producto en el mercado 
para comercializarlo sin intermediarios (…) El 25 y 26 de febrero se realizará la Rueda de Negocios, en la Casa 
Delegada de la Gobernación de Nariño.  Este será el espacio para que los empresarios y exportadores invitados caten, 
degusten y reconozcan la calidad de los cafés nariñenses y se motiven para iniciar negocios directos con las 
organizaciones nariñenses productoras de café”. (P. GobNariño, 2010)  
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The institutional creativity was trigger by the deliberative scenario produced within the Comisión 
in which producers and stakeholders in the production could agree in the uses of resource 
constituents that would be needed: Infrastructures and know-how would be used by farmers in 
the three first processes, not by following any code of conduct but the ecotope-specific practices 
recommended to maximize the probability of a high scored coffee. Infrastructures in the 
following processes must be owned by an associative enterprise of farmers, in order that they 
could use them and the know-how to produce a roast-packed coffee for the end consumer. And 
influence the use of the know-to-appreciate by consumers through investing in coffee from 
Nariño reputation.  
 
Nevertheless, the LRA Specialty got orphan once the Departmental government left. It had not 
the maturity needed to be stabilized and in the end, it just profiled a tiny portion of the Resource. 
As the LRA Specialty was dreamed (attracting enough consumers to be feasible), it would have 
de-regulated uses of Resource constituents in all activities during the first four processes 
encouraging experimentation and tailor-made interventions to increase the probability of a high-
scored coffee. Nonetheless, as only the well-developed beans have the full potential aromatic 
profile, two activities were unavoidable: picking and reselection. On the other hand, it would 
have regulated uses in all activities during the trading, roasting, and communication strategy 
processes. It decreased the extent (48% of evenly-distributed regulated uses, Annex 7). A group 
of producers and stakeholders in production aligned towards the Q system profiling institution, 
to produce the “poverty reduction” symbolic service, by profiling an “exceptional coffee” taste 
related service that would increase “monetary” services. Initially through the Comisión as a 
governance mechanism, they developed a series of outputs (Laboratorio de Paz; Action Plan 
2011; Corseagrocol's Technical assistance) that created the Alianza Café (a company owned by 
coffee farmers) which internalized the change in behavior needed to profile the Resource 
increasing coherence. Also, it would have erected the barriers of entry “product differentiation” 
at the producers’ level.    
 
8.4. Incumbent LRA Specialty, newborn LRA Nespresso, LRA Caltura, LRA 
CCEsp/Starbucks and LRA CNilson (2012-2016) 
 
During the first decade of the two-thousands, actors mobilized theirs resources of action to 
activate institutions in order to trigger production of their services, which were guaranteed in the 
their expected life span by two dynamics: 1- Land cultivated in coffee grew in parallel to the new 
demand from services, especially from the second half of the decade in which the area increased 
from 25 thousand ha in 2004 to 33 thousand ha in 2010908; 2- Farmers’ uses of Resources 
constituents encouraged by the different LRAs were complementary, in the sense that they all 
wanted to produce the full aromatic profile (then, other complementary uses would trigger the 
“exceptional coffee”, the “terroir expression” or the “clean cup” taste related service), to 
increase monetary services (other complementary uses would produce the “ethical trade” or the 
                                                     
908 Data comes from the annual report of the Comité from 2004 to 2010, known as Informe Comité Departamental 
de Cafeteros de Nariño. 
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“poverty reduction” symbolic services) while guaranteeing the “environmental responsibility” 
symbolic service.       
  
Nevertheless, these dynamics changed when a strong Niña arrived in 2008-2009 (and again in 
2011 – 2012), increasing cloud cover and precipitation while reducing solar irradiation (vital for 
productivity) in the whole country, including Nariño909. Indeed, from the 21 million kilos of coffee 
produced in Nariño in 2008, la Niña reduced it to 16 million in 2009910.     
 
On the one hand, low temperatures and high precipitation (characteristics of la Niña in 
Colombian Andes) were ideal for the sporulation of the fungus hemileia vastatrix, responsible for 
the coffee leaf rust. It affects the leaves leaving the coffee tree without the photosynthetic 
material needed to fill the beans. Farmers did not have many options: they could either accept 
yield reduction or, pay the cost of a short term using pesticides or a long term renovating with 
leaf rust-resistant varieties. The last option was preferred as they were encouraged by the LRA 
Nespresso to renovate (by concretizing two instruments of the coffee public policy described 
before: Competitividad a subsidy in cash and fertilizer for each coffee three renovated; and PSF 
a subsidized loan equivalent to 40% of the capital to renovate the crop). In a few years911, they 
managed to renovate with pest-resistant varieties like Castillo®, almost 70% of the total coffee 
zones in Nariño (FNC, 2014, p. 83). Homogenization of the coffee crops with pest-resistant 
varieties started to menace the “exceptional coffee” taste related service sought by some actors. 
 
On the other, a lower harvest meant that the stock of the Resource was not large enough to 
guarantee that all actors received their demanded services: If it was difficult for both Nespresso 
and Starbucks to access to the Resource, which monopolized purchases912, it was a real challenge 
for other actors.  
 
In the first half of the decade, the EdN bought almost the entire harvest (around 20 million kilos 
of coffee in 2005)913. It was reduced to the 60% (from the 25 million kilos produced in 2007) when 
the LRA ACDI/VOCA Nespresso started paying premiums-when-buying (Torres, 2007) and in 
combination with the Niña, their purchases started to decrease914 until the 20% of the harvest in 
2012). It became so complicated for EdN purchase’ agents to fulfill their supply commitments 
that it could have been possible they decided to buy coffee in other departments to blend it with 
                                                     
909 “Las zonas ubicadas entre Nariño y Antioquia, son las que presentan la mayor reducción en brillo solar, en todas 
las estaciones, con valores superiores al 10% (...) lo que puede significar caídas en la producción potencial del 20% en 
promedio. Sin embargo, existen zonas donde esta disminución puede alcanzar el 54,7%” (FNC, 2012a, p. 36). 
910 Informe Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño 2008 and 2009. 
911 “When we started working in Colombia in 2002, about 90% of the coffees that we purchased were 100% Caturra, 
with the rest being blends with some Colombia and Typica. Back in those days, Roya was not an issue and farmers 
really did not take that into account”. Alejandro Cadena, CEO of Caravela quoted by Sheridan (2014, p. 1). 
912 “by the time we collected baseline data in Nariño in 2012, Nespresso and Starbucks were buying more than 98 
percent of the region’s coffee” (Sheridan, 2015) 
913 Interview with Gustavo Sarasti, former technical director of EdN and currently employee at Carcafé.  
914 According to the FNC’s exporting records (FNC, 2017b)  EdN exported: 16.7 million kilos of coffee in 2007; 14 
million in 2008; 5.5 million in 2009; 5.2 million in 2010; 3 million in 2011 and 3.1 million in 2012 and 0.3 million until 
august 2013.    
297 
 
the Nariño coffee until coffee was rejected by Starbucks because it did not have the Nariño’s 
aromatic profile 915 . In any case, from the second half of 2013, EdN stopped its exporting 
activity916 and was absorbed by the local branch of the worldwide commodities trader ED&F, the 
coffee exporter Carcafé917. In the case of the LRAs ACDI/VOCA Nespresso, both the Cooperativa 
de Occidente and the Cooperativa del Norte managed to buy almost the entire coffee harvest in 
Nariño, that was delivered to Almacafé (13 million kilos of coffee was purchased (FNC, 2012c, p. 
65) from the plausible 16 million produced in 2012918). But due to the decrease in production, 
they struggled to fulfill their commitments with Nespresso in the number of kilos of coffee919.   
 
On the other hand, before 2007 some specialty roasters came to Nariño to buy isolated coffee 
lots that had won the quality contest (which could be described as a one-transaction 
relationship). When Caravela arrived thanks to the FS, they consolidated the mentioned small 
LRA Specialty in the north of Nariño with few customers: two of them could have been 
Stumptown Coffee Roasters from 2007 and PT’s coffee in 2008 (Sheridan, 2016, p. 56). But at the 
end of the decade, demand from this service boomed.  “Then something truly magical happened. 
During the 2010 Cup of Excellence competition, held in Nariño, the region produced a perfect 
coffee920” (Sheridan, 2016, p. 56). It was not only the perfect coffee produced by Jose Antonio 
Gualguan (co-founder of Asoveracruz) whose coffee was auctioned in USD 40 per pound, but also 
17 of the 21 finalists were from Nariño. Furthermore, in the 2012 version of the Cup of Excellence 
more than Nariño, it was Buesaco who came under the spotlight when three farmers were in the 
top 10, including the first position (Etelvina Diaz); the fourth position (Franco López)921 and the 
tenth position (Amelio Santacruz). Specialty roasters turned their faces to Nariño, but then, they 
realized they could not buy single lots of Nariño coffee because both LRA (LRA Nespresso and 
                                                     
915 Even though there is not any hard evidence, numerous times interviewers talked about this situation. Some even 
described the tactics used by agents to deceive EdN by filling with non-Nariño coffee the portion of the bag that was 
not reached by the sample-taken method.  
916 The lattes export reported by EdN in the export records administered by the FNC, was in august 2013 (FNC, 2017b) 
917 An example of this takeover was the environmental duties that were transfered from EdN to Carcafé. “se 
manifiesta la cesión de las obligaciones ambientales de EDNSAS(Liquidada) a CARCAFE LTDA” Antecedentes, 
Resolución No 1247 del 30 de diciembre de 2015 “Por medio de la cual se Renueva un Permiso de Emisiones 
Atmosféricas y se dictan otras disposiciones” de la Corporacion Autonoma Regional de Nariño – Corponariño. 
918 We assume similar production as the first Niña period because it is particularly difficult to find official numbers 
for this second Niña period in Nariño, even though they are available for other regions. Acknowledging the difficulties 
for fulfilling coffee deliveries, a mantle over the Nariño’s production was needed to avoid suspicious.      
919 They bought 13.2 million kilos of coffee in Nariño in 2011, from which 12.5 were delivered to Almacafé (FNC, 
2011, p. 72). It was near a third less than the 18.6 million kilos delivered by both cooperatives to Almacafé in 2010 
(FNC, 2010a, p. 92). 
920 “That experience will forever be tattooed in my memory. It was the first time I’d ever awarded a Colombian 
coffee a perfect 100-point score. It was a mind-bending, unfathomably delicious coffee (…) Several of the jury 
members gave it a perfect score, which has only happened a handful of times in over 15 years of the competition ” 
Geoff Watts, vice president for coffee at Intelligentsia Coffee, quoted by Sheridan (2016, p. 56). 
921  Mother and father in law of Nilson López, the coffee buyer of the purchase point of the Cooperativa de Occidente 
in Buesaco.   
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LRA Starbucks) bulked coffee lots from several municipalities, hindering potential treasures like 
Gualguan’s coffee and hiding agronomic practices922.  
 
At the municipal level, people started to realize that farmers that crop over the two-thousand 
m.a.s.l. had the best cupping scores in the Cup of Excellence contest. So, since 2006 coffee crops 
started to increase in altitude923 towards the páramos, the water springs of the municipality. 
During the discussion of the new development plan for the municipality, this expansion of the 
agricultural frontier was regarded as a problem for conservation of the water Resource924. So, it 
was agreed on a whole environmental chapter, “Capitulo VII Buesaco ambientalmente sostenible 
y previsivo”, in the Development Plan approved by the municipal council925 which, even though 
agriculture was targeted as responsible, focused mainly on soft general intervention to enhance 
the “environmental culture”926.    
 
So, different traders and roasters had a real threat to maintaining their access to the Resource 
that they wanted to solve profiling other symbolic and/or taste related services. A first coalition 
composed of profilers (Carcafé and Starbucks) and stakeholders in consumption intended to 
profile the Fairtrade symbolic services; a second coalition composed of profilers (Cooperatives 
and Nespresso) and stakeholders in production (FNC and the local authority) intended to profile 
the “environmental responsible” symbolic service firstly, and then, with stakeholders in 
consumption to profile the “exceptional coffee” taste related service. A third coalition composed 
of profilers (producers and specialty roasters and importers) demanded the “transparent coffee” 
symbolic service, that allows them to know precisely from which farm the coffee came from, and 
which practices had been implemented: from variety planted to post-harvesting techniques. 
 
8.4.1. Strategically-cooperative mobilization of action resources between profilers. 
 
La Niña reduced the stock of Resource coffee in Nariño (And Buesaco/Veracruz), so both LRAs 
ACDI/VOCA N&S coalitions strategically mobilized their action resources in coalition with other 
actors to enhance farmers’ loyalty to their purchasing agents in order to increase their access to 
the Resource. In both cases, the mobilization produced the contrary outcome: they lost their AR 
consensus. Farmers did not supply them but instead, they sold through other commercial 
channels. As a consequence, Asoveracruz and the local authority of Buesaco cooperatively 
mobilized their AR organization and money, to endow a recently founded producers’ association 
                                                     
922 “For years, as a coffee taster, I got used to seeing generic Nariño coffees come into our cupping room (…) I 
never knew if the sample represented one grower or 100, one community or 20. And I never knew what sort of 
quality practices, if any, were going into the coffee.” Timothy Hill, coffee quality manager at Counter Culture 
Coffee, quoted by Sheridan (2016, p. 58). 
923 Interview with Arturo Benavides, coordinator of the agriculture office (UMATA) of the Alcaldía de Buesaco.   
924 “Este capital hídrico junto con la extraordinaria condición climática, constituye la principal fortaleza ambiental 
del municipio, sin embargo, la ampliación de la frontera agrícola y la extracción de madera como combustible 
doméstico están ocasionando la transformación de la base natural que la soporta”. (CTPB, 2012) 
925 Acuerdo No 11 de mayo 31 de 2012 “por el cual se adopta el Plan de Desarrollo del Municipio de Buesaco para el 
Periodo 2012-2015. Buesaco sin Barreras” del Consejo Municipal de Buesaco. 
926 Art. 38. Programa Cultura Ambiental. En Acuerdo 11, ibid.     
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(GEB) with the AR property needed to start the physical traceability and the AR organization to 
connect with both coffee farmers in Buesaco and other actors at the departmental level, namely 
the Comisión. The latter strategically mobilized their AR law to produce the AR information and 
consensus on a new kind of LRA Specialty featured not by the vertical integration but by the 
physical traceability. 
 
The Carcafé-Starbucks coalition could have explored other than premiums-when-buying 
strategies to sustain coffee farmers’ loyalty and increase their access to the Resource927 by 
strategically mobilizing its AR organization to partner with the Catholic Relief Services and the 
Howard G. Buffet Foundation (HGBF onwards). Combining the AR consensus928 from the former 
and the AR money929 from the latter to concretize the Specialty Coffee Program and produce a 
final output known as the CRS Borderlands Coffee Project (Borderlands hereafter) from 2011 to 
2016 in order to gain access to the VSS market using the Fairtrade certification mark.   
 
This output intended to profile the “fair trade”930 symbolic services for probably both improve 
their “brand reputation” symbolic service and to reinforce the links between initially EdN and 
afterward Carcafé and, farmers: “during the project’s first year of operations in partnership with 
Starbucks Coffee Company. Borderlands’ farmers engaged in a Fair Trade Certification pilot which 
represented the first time participants ever organized to bring their coffee to market collectively” 
(HGBF, 2014, p. 47).  When Borderlands started in Nariño in March 2012 by conducting a baseline 
survey931 and then in June through the “Fairtrade for all” pilot project932 it was clearly profiling 
the Starbucks demands. But afterward in the second half of 2013, Borderlands joined the third 
coalition when an Advisory Board composed of six leading us roasters and importers933 was 
enlisted to support the Borderlands excluding Starbucks.  In an event hosted by the Gobernación 
de Nariño, this Advisory Board met two hundred farmers (from whom only three had ever met a 
                                                     
927 Farmers’ loyalty to continue selling to the LRA Starbucks was an issue foreseen by EdN since the very beginning 
of the relationship between Nespresso and the FNC. “FNC’s challenge has made Empresas’ farmer loyalty-building 
program all the more important” Jorge Enrique Vasquez, CEO of EdN quoted by (Levine, 2005, p. 8) 
928 “CRS has been working closely with the Colombian Catholic Church and local institutions since 1953 to encourage 
a culture of peace and an organized response to the internal conflict”. CRS official webpage.  
929 “To support the Borderlands Coffee Project, in December 2010, HGBF committed more than $10 million over five 
years to benefit these smallholder coffee growers in Colombia and Ecuador” (HGBF, 2012, p. 48) 
930 In 2011 Fairtrade USA broke away from Fairtrade International in order that big plantations and small farmers 
non-associated could be benefited from the Faitrade Label. By using the phrase “fair trade for all”, Fairtrade USA 
opened the doors for big buyers like Starbucks.    
931 “Beginning next month, more than 40 agronomists and community organizers will fan out across the highlands 
of Nariño, Colombia, and along the agricultural frontier in Ecuador’s northern Amazon region to collect baseline data 
from more than 1,000 smallholder farmers participating in our Borderlands Coffee Project”. (Sheridan, 2012c).  
932  “Fair Trade USA CEO Paul Rice visited CRS heaquarters in Baltimore to explain why Fair-Trade USA was splitting 
with FLO and launching its Fair Trade for All initiative.  As part of that conversation, we learned that FTUSA’s first 
pilot project with independent smallholder farmers was being planned for some of the same communities in Nariño 
where we had been planning to implement the Borderlands project.  And that we had a common partner in Empresas 
de Nariño.” (Sheridan, 2012a). “I announced here our involvement in an FT4All (Fair trade for all) innovation pilot 
with independent smallholder farmers in Nariño, Colombia” (Sheridan, 2012b) 
933  Atlas Coffee Importers; Counter Culture Coffee; Green Mountain Coffee Roasters; Intelligentsia Coffee; 
Stumptown Coffee; Sustainable Harvest Coffee Importers (Sheridan, 2013).  
300 
 
coffee buyer)  “to begin to build new trading relationships built on a mutual commitment to 
quality and value” (Sheridan, 2013). Borderlands changed to incentive the profiling of the 
“transparent coffee” symbolic service 934 , a service that was not sought by Starbucks, and 
moreover, could increase their risk to access to the Resource coffee in Nariño.  
 
The FNC-Nespresso coalition partnered with the local authority to gain access to the Resource 
needed by the former 935  by profiling the “environmental responsible” symbolic service 
demanded by the latter to strategically mobilized their AR personal936 to take advantage of the 
AR organization possessed by Asoveracruz937  (which, as said before, had practically vanished 
during the 2006-2012 period) to concretize the Proyecto de Alianzas Productivas938 from the 
Agricultural Public Policy. Their goal was to formulate projects that could produce outputs to 
influence the uses of infrastructures and know-how of producers 939 , particularly the 
“environmentally responsible” symbolic service by protecting the water940 and the soil941. The 
                                                     
934 “The main idea was to find ways to make the coffee trade more profitable and more sustainable for 
smallholder growers in Nariño, Colombia. We didn’t know exactly how we could do that until we got our boots 
dirty in the field and started to understand the region’s coffee sector better. Now it is very clear: help growers 
effectively separate their coffees for different segments of the market and help them connect with buyers in each 
of those segments.” (Stumptown, 2015) 
935 “Técnico Carlos Chimachana (FNC’s extension agent in Buesaco) dijo que la producción de café para el año 
presente estaba muy baja por eso la Federación (FNC) no le llegaría recursos por lo tanto se dificultaría para dar 
ayudas a los cafeteros” Acta 37 February/2012. “Carlos Chimachana habló sobre el programa de Café Nespresso (…) 
los que no estén se les afiliaría” Acta 38 March/2012. “Tomó la palabra el técnico, mencionó la falta de afiliación de 
algunos caficultores a Nespresso” Acta 39 April/2012.     
936 Namely the seven extension agents of the FNC and the four employees of the Umata (agricultural office of the 
municipality) 
937 “Tomó la palabra el director de la Umata mencionó que el programa se llamaba “oportunidades para el campo” 
(The proper name was Alianzas Productivas). El Gobierno (Nacional) siempre trabaja con los grupos y de todos los 
grupos el de Veracruz reúne todos los requisitos, a diferencia de los del municipio. Por eso deseaba trabajar con este 
grupo en unión con la Federación (FNC). Entre más grande el grupo, recibiría más ayudas económicas que podría 
utilizarse para fertilizar el café, arreglo de beneficiaderos, en adquirir maquinaria despulpadora”. Acta 37 
February/2012.     
938  Its objective was to strengthen a commercial alliance between small farmers and their private buyers, by 
improving the small farmers’ weaknesses identified by the alliance (Minagricultura, 2012, p. 3). 
939 “Director de la Umata (…) además animó a tener un cultivo sostenible en todo aspecto. Para ello nos mostró una 
diapositiva sobre el manejo de agua sucias con lo cual contribuir para mejorar el ecosistema”. Acta 40 May/2012. 
“Director de la Umata (...) habló sobre la necesidad de mejorar el cultivo de café en las fincas, para ello era esencial 
la certificación de la finca lo cuál mejoraba el precio del café (…) habló que para la certificación es esencial un manejo 
adecuado de basuras, un sistema de tratamiento de agua en la finca. 50 fincas para certificación”. Acta 41 June/2012. 
940 “Director de la Umata habló sobre un cultivo alternativo de guadua en la finca cafetera (…) este cultivo puede 
beneficiar o ayudar a salir o mantener el agua”. Acta 41 June/2012. “Representante de Corponariño especialista en 
cultivo de guadua mencionó sobre lo importante que es este cultivo para reforestar las fuentes de agua (..) por otro 
lado, la cantidad de hojas que caen protege el suelo (…) Director de la Umata habló sobre convenio para crear un 
vivero para sembrar árboles”. Acta 42 August/2012. 
941 “El técnico (…) felicitó a los caficultores por esfuerzo al hacer el croquis de la finca, como también complementarlo 
lo que faltaba como la cantidad de árboles de cada lote, la variedad de café, los años de producción, esto le ayudaría 
al caficultor a la hora de renovación. Hoy es muy diferente el manejo de la hierba en los cafetales, mencionó el manejo 
de una nueva herramienta para proteger el suelo: el selector de maleza con el cuál sólo se destruye la maleza que 
daña el cultivo y se deja la que protege el suelo”. Acta 39 April/2012.     
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output was not produced because the requirement942 was not fulfilled by their commercial ally, 
the Cooperativa de Occidente943. This failure disintegrated the coalition FNC-Asoveracuz-Local 
Authority.   
 
With the same goal to have access to the Resource, the FNC/Comité strategically mobilized its 
AR property944 combined with the AR organization945 of the Alliance for Coffee Excellence (ACE) 
at the international level and the AR organization Asoveracruz at the local level, in order to 
innovatively activate the Strategic Special Coffee Plan (chapter 4.2.1) and produce an output 
known as the “Cup of Excellence” in order to strengthen the LRA Nespresso. Even if this contest 
withdraws a portion of the Resource from this LRA to be profiled differently by other upper-end 
roasters, the fact that it was held once a year with the very best farmers, implied that the 
quantities removed were insignificant 946 . But by offering the possibility of selling coffee at 
incredible prices if they registered in both Cooperativa de Occidente and Cooperativa del Norte 
in Buesaco947, the FNC intended to trigger both loyalties to the LRA Nespresso and farmers’ effort 
to improve quality.   
 
But, instead of increase loyalty to the LRA Nespresso, the “Cup of Excellence” diminished it: the 
extraordinary performance of farmers in Buesaco in the Cup of Excellence 2012 (two of whom 
were part of Asoveracruz948) created the momentum for farmers in Buesaco to found the Grupo 
Empresarial Buesaco (GEB onwards)949 in order to increase their monetary services by producing 
the “exceptional coffee” taste related service and then, commercialize it in the specialty market. 
 
Due to the previous transfer of the AR information to farmers produced by the SCP1, SCP2 and 
Alianza Café SAS, it was considered that the key to the specialty business market, was the cupping 
                                                     
942 The special line of the Proyecto de Alianzas Productivas for “specialty coffee” demanded that the commercial 
allied guarantee both of a premium over the standard coffee price and a cofounding equivalent to 3% of the total 
value (Minagricultura, 2012, p. 16).     
943 “El señor presidente mencionó que hubo problemas al presentar el proyecto Alianzas principalmente con el 
Presidente de la Cooperativa de Occidente porque tenía que consignar en una cuenta (COP) 12 millones en servicios”. 
Acta 39 April/2012.      
944 As said before, coffee samples were registered in any of FNC’s purchases points in the country, and then, the 
whole coffee lots of the sectioned samples to be auctioned, were transported, threshed, exported and finally paid 
to farmers, through the FNC’s logistics entities (this cost were discounted from the final price).    
945 Their Jury for the Colombia 2017 contests, for example, was composed by seven roasters in Asia, five roasters in 
Europe, four roasters in USA, two roasters in Oceania, and four observers from the USA and UK.      
946 Two thousand kilos per farmer multiplied by a few dozens of finalists that would have never sold more than one 
hundred thousand kilos. When compared with the two hundred million kilos exported by the FNC annually, it would 
be less than 0.001 percent.     
947 “Además mencionó sobre el concurso Tasa a la Excelencia. Para participar el usuario debería concursar con 2.000 
kilos. Animó a todos los socios a que participaran en dicho concurso”. Acta 40 May/2012.     
948 “Tomó la palabra Carlos Pantoja (President of Asoveracruz) y felicitó a los dos socios que participaron en el 
concurso taza a la excelencia”. Acta 43. September/2012. Both associates Nilson López and Franco López won the 
first and the fourth position respectively.  
949 Interview with Nilson López, CEO of Café de Nilson.  
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knowledge of coffee farmers, so it was absolutely needed a quality lab950. Asoveracruz partnered 
with the local authority and cooperatively mobilized their resource AR organization and 
money951 to concretize the programa de oportunidades rurales952 from the Agricultural public 
policy and produce as an output the project to acquire a lab953 and empower the GEB with both 
the AR property 954 and organization 955. As a result, GEB joined the Comisión to represent 
Buesaco farmers (including Asoveracruz) at the departmental level956.  
 
The Comisión strategically mobilized their AR law 957  to concretize the program “Rutas 
Competitivas”, an instrument of the Competitiveness Public Policy and produce an output known 
as the Iniciativa Café Plus958: With a COP 600 million (USD 325 thousand) financial effort, an 
international consulting firm was contracted959 to support the Comisión’s effort to formulate a 
territorial strategy to enhance profitability of actors involved in Nariño’s coffee value chain 
(Innpulsa, 2014, p. 6). A six-month process divided into three phases (1- Challenges identification; 
2- Strategy formulation; 3- Launching of actions) produced the AR information once it finished in 
June 2013. 
 
8.4.2. Institutional creativity to profile the “exceptional coffee” taste related 
service and the “transparent coffee” symbolic service.  
 
It was through the Café Plus scenario that demands from profiling actors in the specialty industry 
arrived in Nariño, namely the combination of “exceptional coffee” taste related service and the 
“transparent coffee” symbolic service through two main mechanism: on the one hand, this 
                                                     
950  Asoveracruz invited another associative group that was beneficiated with a quality lab during through the 
Familias Guardabosques project: “Habló sobre la necesidad de ingresar al Grupo Empresarial (…) tomó la palabra 
Nilson López, habló sobre el laboratorio que la Fundación Social envío a la bodega de Guardabosques. Mencionó que 
esta unión con Guarda Bosques beneficiaria en gran manera al grupo con el precio del café pues permitiría vender a 
compradores de Estados Unidos directamente” Acta 44. November/2012. This effort was unsuccessful.  
951 The municipality co-funded the project with COP 10 million (USD 5.350) (Gabinete, 2015, p. 67) 
952 Its main objective was to support rural producer organizations to improve its competences in their markets 
(Minagricultura, 2013) .    
953 It costed COP 25 million (USD 13.376). Interview with Carlos Pantoja, Asoveracruz, ibid.   
954 “Por otro lado, se presentaría un proyecto para la compra de un laboratorio de café para el grupo asociativo y se 
lo ubicaría en la sede del grupo empresarial Buesaco”. Acta 46. January/2013 
955 By joining the GEB, Asoveracruz transferred its resource organization and allow them to expand in the whole 
municipality.  
956 “Tomó la palabra Nilson López mencionó la reunión en la Cámara de Comercio (namely the Comisión) con el fin 
de ayudar con recursos a grupo micro empresariales para lo cual asistiría el representante legal del grupo asociativo 
Veracruz” Acta 46 January/2013.  
957  “(…) Las comisiones regionales de competitividad formarán parte del Sistema Administrativo Nacional de 
Competitividad”. Art. 9 “Comisiones Regionales de Competitividad”. Decreto 2828 del 23 de agosto de 2006 del 
Presidente de la República De Colombia “por el cual se organiza el Sistema Administrativo Nacional de Competitividad 
y se dictan otras disposiciones”.  
958 All information from this initiative comes from the webpage https://iniciativacafeplus.wordpress.com/ they 
launched to interact with their beneficiaries.  
959 The Cluster Competitiveness Group, based on Washigton.   
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process conducted interviews with these actors in Seattle, California, and Portland960, on the 
other, it recommended that instead of vertical integration to increase monetary services (as 
previously considered) they should focus on commercialization of high score coffee961. 
 
It changed completely local actors’ perspective 962  and its recommendation was clearly 
incorporated when local actors within the Comisión agreed on an intermediary output: The Café 
plus Action Plan. It has one objective: to commercialize only coffee scored 85 or higher963, and 
two main strategies: to enhance quality and to commercialize it. The FS agreed to focus their 
efforts in the two projects oriented to produce quality: a quite ambitious program to identify the 
practices that produce consistently an 85+ SCAA score964; and to establish a research farm to test 
these practices. The Government of Nariño was to lead the commercialization strategies for 
external markets (which implied mainly funding business missions and participation in specialized 
trade fairs) while the Chamber of Commerce of Pasto would focus on the domestic market to 
trigger local demand for high-quality coffee.  And plausibly Borderlands agreed to support the 
linkages with specialty roasters965. 
 
It could be said that even though Caravela was present since 2007, a stable LRA Specialty in 
Buesaco was firmly established only after 2013. Firstly, with the launch of the GEB at the end of 
the previous year; secondly with the participation in the Café Plus initiative; thirdly with the first 
coffee negotiation between GEB and Banexport (after Caravela, the biggest exporter of Specialty 
Coffee in Colombia) in March 2013966; and fourthly with the Advisory Board of the Borderland 
Project that gave visualization towards the specialty roasters community967.    
                                                     
960 Companies interviewed by the Café Plus initiative :  Victrola Coffee Roasters; Four Barrel Coffee; Zoka Coffee 
Roasters and Tea Co; Starbucks; SCAA; Portland Roasting Coffee; Sight Glass; Sustainable Harvest; The American 
Barista & Coffee School; Fonté Coffee Roasters; Vivace espresso; Bellissimo Coffee and Ritual Coffee Roasters. 
(Caféplus, 2013a, p. 63) 
961 “En el largo plazo el café de Nariño sea considerado de alta calidad en el mercado de alta calidad por los 
consumidores expertos que están dispuestos a pagar más por su café (…) Márgenes mayores y consistentes para los 
productores de este negocio” (Caféplus, 2013b, p. 28). “Requisitos del Mercado: Calidad excelente; SCAA >85; Perfil 
en taza; Trazabilidad; Consistencia; Largo plazo (Caféplus, 2013b, p. 38). 
962 For example, the FS who had lead the process, finally understood the “specialty coffee” industry in which they 
had been working since 2005. “Se hablaba de café especial pero no había nada para validarlo. Esos recursos (Café 
plus initiative) produjeron un documento técnico sobre hacía dónde deberían orientarse los esfuerzos de Nariño. 
Aparece la Ruta! Ya hay datos!” Interview with Luz Dary Chicaiza, CEO of Café con Altura Buesaco.  
963 “se definió un objetivo estratégico particular: comercializar cafés de alta calidad con tazas de 85 puntos en adelante en la 
escala SCAA”. (Prensa-FS, 2013a) 
964 “Programa para la producción de café calidad en el departamento de Nariño. Implementación de Buenas Prácticas 
Agrícolas Específicas, enfocadas a asegurar calidad en taza requerida por los compradores del negocio de café de 
calidad (Puntaje superior a 85 en escala SCAA)” (Caféplus, 2013b, p. 50). 
965  They participated in the Café Plus initiative through Ricardo Mendoza Hurtado (who worked at the 
interinstitutional relations office of CRS). Participant’s list uploaded in the official webpage of Cafeplus. 
https://iniciativacafeplus.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/asistentes-2da-presentacion.pdf. Last visited 28-03-2018. 
966 “El día 24 de marzo llegaría el Presidente de Banexport a negociar como pagaría el kilo de café, por lo cual se 
invitó a todos los socios a asistir ese día a la negociación” Acta 45 March/2013. 
967 “In 2013, it was just 16 tiny single-farm lots and one container of coffee from a Fair-Trade Certification pilot from 
barely 100 growers.  After that, we committed to expanding the number of farmers involved in the process and 
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The Café Plus initiative consolidated the Comisión as a deliberative scenario which could 
incorporate demands from other actors than producers and stakeholders in production as in the 
incumbent LRA Specialty. Indeed, firstly through the interviews and afterwards through the 
Advisory Board of the Borderland Project, demands from traders and roasters were incorporated 
alongside with demands from a few stakeholders in consumption to profile the Resource and 
produce larger monetary services by providing both the “exceptional coffee” taste related service 
(focusing mainly on practices adapted to the environment than in varieties) and the “transparent 
coffee” taste related service (through commercialization of green coffee, not roasted coffee). 
Least notorious but uncontested were the efforts to produce also the “environmentally 
responsible” symbolic service. This initiative gave to the Comisión a strategic plan to move 
forward, but their agreed actions to build the LRA Specialty needed to be funded.  
  
In this sense, since 2012 a group of legal pieces968 allowed any local authority in Colombia access 
to the (previously restricted to oil/mineral producers regions) National Royalties fund that 
boomed thanks to the high raw material prices during the second half of the decade. It was 
expected an astonishing COP 100 million of millions (USD 55.6 billion) to fund projects during the 
following ten years 969 . As it could only be activated by territorial authorities, the Buesaco 
representatives of the Comisión composed of producers (the GEB) and stakeholders in 
production (the FS) formulated a project970 to build a community coffee processing facilities971 
in order to develop the Specialty LRA at the municipal level. In August 2013, it was presented 
before the municipal council of Buesaco in order to develop the whole set of post-harvesting 
processes to optimize the aromatic potential, reducing the environmental impact and maximizing 
income for farmers972. The idea was that farmers focused their uses of infrastructures and know-
how in the planting and cultivation processes, especially in the timely and selective picking of 
coffee cherries. Then infrastructures and know-how in the post-harvesting and trading processes 
would be carried on by the GEB in order to reduce cupping defects due to avoidable practices 
(like bean damage due to inappropriate equipment; or the full sour bean due to untimely 
                                                     
growing the volume gradually every year.  In 2014, it was 25 single-farm lots and 16 community lots from over 300 
growers” (Sheridan, 2015).   
968 Acto Legislativo 005 del 15 de julio del 2011 “por el cual se constituye el Sistema General de Regalías”; Ley 1530  
del 17 de mayo de 2012 “Por la cual se regula la organización y el funcionamiento del Sistema General de Regalías”; 
Decreto 1077 del 22 de mayo del 2012 de la Presidencia de la República ”por el cual se reglamenta parcialmente la 
Ley 1530 de 2012 en materia presupuestal y se dictan otras disposiciones”. 
969 “Hoy, el Sistema General de Regalías, que representará cerca de 100 billones de pesos en inversiones en proyectos 
de impacto regional en los próximos 10 años” (Botero López, 2012) 
970  “La propuesta fue construida colectivamente por miembros del sector caficultor, quienes, luego de varios 
encuentros, determinaron centrar los esfuerzos en el proceso del beneficio del grano”. (Prensa-FS, 2013b) 
971 “Proyecto “Aprovechamiento de la producción de café especial, mediante la instalación de una planta de beneficio 
en el municipio de Buesaco – Nariño” (…) Con un total solicitado de $546 millones de pesos (Prensa-FS, 2013b). 
972 “La experiencia de trabajo apunta a que el grano en la planta posee todas las calidades, una vez sale de ella, 
dichas calidades comienzan su deterioro, en especial en la etapa del beneficio producto de inadecuadas prácticas 
agrícolas. De ahí la importancia de la instalación de la planta de beneficio de la que habla el proyecto (…) el proyecto 
se está apuntando además a (…) infraestructura tecnológica de punta, sobreprecios apropiados en café especial, 
consolidación de las agremiaciones cafeteras, conservación del medio ambiente, entre otras bondades. (Prensa-FS, 
2013b) 
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fermentations; or contamination when drying and transport) and to reduce pollution of the water 
resource in the sense that it was much feasible to have one big water-treatment facility than 
three thousand small ones. On the other hand, the critical mass of GEB and its very near relation 
with farmers would allow them to have direct contact with both the specialty coffee farmer and 
the specialty coffee roaster, producing both the physical traceability the latter needed and the 
higher monetary services demanded by the former.     
 
This project was supported by the local authorities: both the mayor and the city council of 
Buesaco approved it to be funded by the National Royalties fund973 . 
 
8.4.3. Selfishly mobilization of action resources by stakeholders in production 
 
In Colombia, projects formulated by the Comisiones Regionales de Competitividad to be funded 
with the Royalties Fund after 2012, were a result of long negotiations between different actors 
mainly taken during the previous Departmental Governments (2008-2011). The new 
Departmental Governments (2012-2015) considered that these kinds of commitments were 
unfair with their electorate who had voted for their proposals974. So, they mobilized their AR 
political support in order that the regulatory pieces gave to them a determinant role in the final 
decision: indeed, the Law 1530/2012 and the Decreto 1077/2012 empowered the departmental 
authority with the AR law. Governors were to decide which projects in their department could 
be subject to funding, and then, to be part of a triparty decision committee that would approve 
the funds: la Secretaria de Planeación de la Gobernación has the competence to register the 
projects975 that were going to be analyzed by the decision committee OCAD - Órgano Colegiado 
de Administración y Decisión976 to be funded. It was a shot in the foot for the Competitiveness 
Public Policy because, in the end, decisions taken by the Comisiones Regionales de 
Competitividad were replaced by a one actor decision: The Governor of the Department. Only if 
the Governor agreed, action plans made by the Comisiones were going to be implemented977. 
                                                     
973  “La idea contó con el aval del Concejo Municipal y de la Alcaldía. El paso siguiente es la presentación del 
documento ante el Sistema General de Regalías a fin de obtener la financiación solicitada” (Prensa-FS, 2013b). 
974 “Sin embargo, es necesario pedirle al gobierno nacional que, en el tema de la distribución de las regalías, tales 
recursos no queden amarrados a proyectos que dejaron anteriores administraciones, permitiendo que los nuevos 
gobernantes podamos construir, replantear y decidir acerca de tales proyectos de acuerdo con nuestras 
necesidades, propuestas de gobierno y planes de desarrollo”. Said Botero López (2012), the president of the 
Federación Nacional de Departamentos during the Asamblea Extraordinaria de Gobernadores in February 2012, a 
few month earlier than the Ley 1530  del 17 de mayo de 2012 was approved.  
975 “las Secretarías de Planeación de las entidades territoriales (…) presentarán dentro de los cinco días hábiles 
siguientes a su recepción, el respectivo proyecto a la Secretaría Técnica del Órgano Colegiado de Administración y 
Decisión”. Art. 11. Decreto 1077/2012, ibid.  
976 Órgano Colegiado de Administración y Decisión Regional was composed of five Ministries, all Governors in the 
Region (Nariño belonged to the Pacific Region alongside other four Departments) and three local authorities.  
Ley 1530/2012 and Decreto 1077/2012.  
977  “Para ello, los primeros y principales insumos que se pusieron en marcha fueron los Planes Regionales de 
Competitividad. Sin embargo, algunos de los gobernadores no están abiertos a recibir opiniones sobre el destino de 
las inversiones en el departamento durante el cuatrienio de su mandato. Esta situación ha llevado a que el éxito de 
las CRC dependa, en gran medida, del compromiso e interés del gobernador de turno”. Gómez Restrepo and Mitchell 
(2016) 
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In Nariño, the Governor selfishly mobilized its AR law to create a new table to discuss a new 
action plan for the coffee issue in the Department that placed it again in the realm of the Coffee 
Public Policy lead by the FNC. Plausibly it was just a matter of ignorance of the process itself, and 
the departmental government wanted to start from zero just because they wanted to lead the 
formulation process978.  
 
8.4.4. Absence of institutional creativity 
 
But deeply involved actors in the previous exercise like the FS got frustrated and abandoned the 
collective effort, leaving the way clear for a new coalition between the CRS and the FNC to 
formulated a project that focused on production (lead by the FNC) and entrepreneurship (lead 
by the CRS)979: At the production level the FNC would concretize the PSF (chapter 4.2.2) by 
promoting renovation at high densities with pest-resistant varieties (subsidizing the planting and 
fertilizer) and improving post-harvesting (subsidizing 1.500 post-harvesting facilities); at the 
commercialization level the CRS would support farmers associations by establishing two coffee 
processing facilities in two municipalities (La Florida and Taminango), and by strengthening their 
commercial activities to sell their coffee in the specialty market. This project is known as 
“Fortalecimiento de la cadena de valor del café de alta calidad en el departamento de Nariño” 
was  funded by the National Royalties Fund with COP 13.500 million (USD 5.4 million) in 2015 
(Rodríguez-Camayo et al., 2015, p. 3) started to be implemented at the time of the fieldwork 
conducted by the author.  
 
In Nariño the deliberative scenario, produced by the Comisión to agree on how to profile the 
Resource Coffee from Nariño between the extensive group of actors who demanded different 
services, was completely erased. As a result, numerous actors that had participated in the 
Comisión felt that they were defrauded by the Government in both the national and 
departmental level. It was said to them by public officials from all levels, that regional 
competitiveness was a matter of local consensus to strategically define a common goal and to 
prioritize the most relevant actions to achieve it. But in the end, they realized that 
representatives of the national, departmental and municipal Governments in the OCAD were 
indifferent to their collective efforts980.  
 
                                                     
978 For Pedro Sanguino there was not anyone interested in destroy the previous exercise, it was just a matter that 
the Governor wanted to create their own project.  “Pero el problema es la sostenibilidad política, que los sueños de 
hoy sean lo sueños del próximo Gobierno. Cada uno va creyendo en su propia apuesta (…) los proyectos se vuelven 
muy institucionales, logrando los objetivos institucionales, pero no comunitarios”. Interview with Pedro Sanguino, 
representative of the FS in the Café Plus Initiative. 
979  “El que formuló gran parte del proyecto fue la CRS (…) La FNC en producción y el CRS en fortalecimiento 
empresarial”. Interview with Santiago Caldas, Professional in charge of coffee at the agricultural office of the 
Department of Nariño. 
980 “El problema de la sostenibilidad es social, todo lo que tiene que ver con asociatividad, se sufre de disociación: no 
hay comunión entre los actores, las apuestas no son definitivas”. Interview with Pedro Sanguino. Ibid.   
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So, a coalition of profilers (specialty coffee producers and specialty roasters) and stakeholders in 
production (FS) defined the problem as the lack of transparency in the coffee value chain that 
hindered valuable aromatic profiles for both consumers and producers. But as collective action 
was unfeasible due to the previous mobilization of action resources, the LRA Specialty coalition, 
even though sought for a common profile featured by both the “exceptional coffee” taste related 
service and the “transparent coffee” symbolic service to increase the “monetary” services, was 
divided among three LRAs led by three different specialty traders.  
 
Actors intended to profile this combination of services on the whole Resource (2.83 million kilos 
of coffee) in Buesaco in the harvest 2015/2016. But in the end, it was done only on 372 thousand 
kilos of coffee981. It meant that the 87% of the Resource, did not produce this combination of 
services, depriving the huge majority of coffee farmers in the municipality of the monetary 
services promised 982 , even though they had done the recommended practices to enhance 
quality 983 . Additionally, the “environmentally responsible” symbolic service sought by 
stakeholders in production and consumption was completely absent: Pollution in water and soil 
did not decrease984 and rivalries to access to the water increased985. 
 
• LRA Nespresso (actors’ coalitions, mobilization of AR, institutional creativity and 
outcome) 
 
As said before, the coalition FNC/Comité-Nespresso unsuccessfully tried to guarantee its access 
to the Resource by mobilizing its AR personal and property combined with the AR organization 
of Asoveracruz and the ACE by profiling firstly the “environmentally responsible” symbolic service 
and then the “exceptional coffee” taste related service. In the first case, they failed to activate 
the agricultural public policy and in the second they innovatively activated the Strategic Specialty 
                                                     
981 The number is a result of the addition of kilos sold as high-score coffee by CNilson, Caltura, and Cespeciales.  I 
mean completely because a large amount of high-score coffee was sold as standard coffee because there was not a 
demand for it. 
982 Moreover, with the promise of higher premiums-after-buying if coffee scored high (and was paid as high-score 
coffee), farmers despised the premium-when-buying of the LRA Nespresso: despite being the main buyer in Buesaco 
in 2012, the FNC through both cooperatives bought 402 thousand kilos (96% of which was through the LRA 
Nespresso), only the 14% of the harvest 2015/2016. The low proportion of coffee sold as specialty, means that, in 
the end, a high proportion of them did not receive any of the two premiums, effectively reducing their monetary 
services.  
983 For example, the 70 farmers surveyed in Veracruz implemented the labor intensive reselection process: bean by 
bean they manually discarded the beans with physical defects. 
984 At least in Veracruz from which we have data, the 100% of farmers surveyed in Veracruz did not treat water after 
fermentation (this water is so toxic, that farmers cannot pour the water into their crop because the coffee trees 
would die) and pour it into a nearby ditch; 41% instead of use the pulp as an organic fertilizer leave it as a polluting 
waste; and 63% do not implement integral practices to protect the soil. 
985 In low precipitation regions as Buesaco, access to water channels produces healthy coffee crops. During the field 
work the author observed creeks full of pipelines instead of running water, which conducted the liquid towards 
private-owned irrigation system. This reproduces a vicious circle in which the farmer with the money to pay for the 
pipe, would have a better production and quality hence would receive the high-score premiums, while depriving the 
poorer farmer of both a better production, quality and prices.  
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Coffee Plan with completely contrary-to-pretended results they lost their AR consensus. From 
being an actor to work with, in the search of solutions, they became the actor to fight: The FNC 
was responsible for impeding farmers to obtain the high prices of the high-score coffee. As a 
result, from almost monopolizing coffee purchases during the second Niña period, in 2015 they 
bought only 14% of the Buesaco coffee harvest (according to table 2 in section 3.2.2) and 35% of 
the Veracruz coffee harvest (according to table 15 in section 7.1.1). 
 
Nonetheless, as the authority in the coffee public policy, they concretize both the Specialty 
Coffee Program and the renovation program by renovating FNC-Nespresso agreement in 2012 to 
invest USD 17 million per year in premiums and both technical assistance and equipment delivery 
to fulfill the TASQ® profiling institution. Outputs that influence the use of infrastructures to 
enhance productivity through young, dense, pest-resistant coffee trees and controlled shade 
during the planting process and the use of know-how so an integrated farm management to 
enhance conservation during the cultivation and post-harvesting (delivery of equipment to 
improve the quality of coffee and to reduce pollution of the watersheds). Training that 
emphasized on the integrated farm management, shade regulation, maintenance of coverages 
and protected areas around the creeks. Nevertheless, as explained in chapter 7.2.2 in Veracruz 
neither the equipment arrived nor the personalized technical assistance. 
 
As a consequence, in 2015 the newborn LRA Nespresso downgraded two conditions of the 
incumbent LRA ACDI/VOCA Nespresso. It regulated new uses of Resource constituents in two 
activities (shade and reselection) but deregulated four in the first three processes (soil 
management; coffee borer beetle management; pest and disease management and waste 
management). It decreased the extent (85% of evenly-distributed regulated uses, Annex 7). 
Additionally, even though they maintained the same alignment and the same governance 
mechanism, once they lost their consensus their access to the Resource was seriously put in 
question reducing its capacity to influence the change in farmers’ behavior, reducing its provision 
of the demanded services decreasing the coherence. And barriers of entry remain exactly the 
same (equal closure).  
 
• LRA CCesp/Starbucks (actors’ coalitions, mobilization of AR, institutional creativity and 
outcome)   
 
This newborn LRA was led by the ancient purchase point of the EdN in Buesaco, renamed as the 
Cooperativa de Cafés Especiales de Buesaco in 2012. Plausible when losing funding when EdN 
bankrupted, the purchases were funded by 25 associates from Buesaco. They began selling 
through the LRA Standard willing to move into the mysterious specialty market 986 that was 
understood thanks to the Café Plus Initiative (in which they were participants987). In 2013, once 
the problem was defined in terms of poor taste related services due to the lack of a transparent 
                                                     
986 “Se creó porque no había líneas de comercialización (…) se identificaron los cafés especiales”. Interview with José 
Ignacio Gómez, CEO and founder of the CCespeciales.   
987  They participated in the Café Plus initiative through José Ignacio Gómez (Pastor Gómez’s son who funded 
CCespeciales). Participant’s list uploaded in the official webpage of Café plus.  
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commercial channel, a coalition between profilers (producers, CCEsp, Caravela) decided to 
strategically mobilize their CCEsp’ AR property and organization at the local level 988  and 
Caravela’s AR property and organization at the international level989 to divert the Specialty Coffee 
Program of the Coffee Public Policy through an informal coffee purchase agreement to create a 
market in which coffee was traded depending on its cupping profile: they target CCEsp 
infrastructures and know-how in the trading process to profile this combination of services: they 
made a cupping test for every coffee lot with good factor, and a full physical traceability for 
higher-than-84 coffee lots creating the newborn LRA CCEsp (Caravela would buy only coffee 
scored higher than 84).  
 
The absence of institutional creativity left behind services demanded by other actors. Even 
though all actors were interested in the full profile, especially the monetary services, only the 
17% of all coffee purchased in 2015 produced the combination “exceptional coffee” taste 
related”; “transparent coffee” symbolic service and higher “monetary” services. The 83% 
remaining990 was sold through both the LRA Standard and the LRA Starbucks (when Carcafé 
resumed the EdN operations). Hence, from the incumbent LRA Starbucks, the newborn LRA 
CCEspeciales, with the exception of the three activities during planting (variety, renovation, 
density) encouraged by the PSF-coffee public policy, de-regulated the uses of Resource 
constituents that have to be done by farmers and were encouraged by previous outputs 
(diversification; soil management, coffee borer beetle management, pest and disease 
management; waste management). Nonetheless, the better prices that a high-scored coffee 
could provide, incentivized one very labor intense activity during the post-harvesting: reselection. 
Additionally, the “transparent coffee” implied that three activities in the last four processes were 
regulated (blending; packaging and communication). In this sense, extent was reduced (60% of 
evenly-regulated uses, Annex 7). Also, CCEspeciales aligned with Caravela to profile the 
“exceptional coffee” through an informal agreement in which scored-coffee higher than 83 (using 
the Q system profiling institution) could be bought preferentially by this specialty exporter991. 
This LRA did not intend to influence farmers’ behavior, instead it focused on the sorting process, 
but in the end, just 17% of the Resource profiled the services sought for992. Hence, the coherence 
is quite low. In any case, for this small portion, it created the “product differentiation” barrier of 
entry at the producers’ level through both the origin and the exceptional aromatic profile 
increasing closure. 
 
                                                     
988 Being the local partner of EdN, they had a purchase point in the urban center of Buesaco and a long lived 
commercial relation with hundreds of coffee farmers.  
989 Caravela had the exporting facilities in Colombia, Guatemala, México and Perú. And importing facilities in USA, 
UK and Australia. They partnered with 134 roasters in 31 countries. Interview with Alejandro Cadena, CEO of 
Caravela Coffee.     
990 From 1.2 million kilos of total purchases in 2015/2016: 200 thousand kilos of coffee had not a good factor, 800 
thousand kilos had either a lower-than-84 cupping or were not sold as high-score coffee and, 200 thousand kilos 
were sold as high-score coffee. Interview with José Ignacio Gómez. CCespeciales, ibid.   
991  The remaining could be sold through other Specialty traders or roasters, or through the LRA Standard or 
Starbucks.  
992 And the remaining, if previously was increasing its coherence to profile services sought by the LRA Starbucks, 
afterwards was going on the other way down.  
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• LRA Caltura (actors’ coalitions, mobilization of AR, institutional creativity and outcome)   
 
The FS abandoned the collective action at the departmental level, and decided to focus in 
Buesaco to profile the “exception coffee” taste related service and the “transparent coffee” 
symbolic service but including higher monetary services for farmers to produce the “poverty 
reduction” symbolic service993. With extensive participation994, the FS defined the problem from 
the poor wellbeing of farmers due to the lack of a transparent commercial channel. And in the 
second semester of 2014, a coalition of producers (GEB ) and stakeholders in production (FS) 
decided to strategically mobilize their GEB’s AR organization995 with the FS’s AR money996, to 
divert the Specialty Coffee Program of the Coffee Public Policy by launching a company to create 
a market in which coffee was traded depending on its cupping profile. 
 
Indeed, instead of investing in public goods as the community coffee processing facilities (that 
fail to be funded by public authorities), the FS decided to intervene directly in the market by 
supporting with capital the trading activity997. At the beginning of 2015, the GEB was relaunched 
as a new trading company known as “Café con Altura Buesaco SAS” (Caltura) funded with capital 
from both the FS and the GEB’s associates: FS would capitalize Caltura with COP 2.5 thousand 
million (USD 1.35 million) 998 and GEB associates including Nilson López, and Asoveracruz had to 
capitalize with COP 16 million (USD 5 thousand)999 creating the newborn LRA Caltura.  
 
The Caltura developed a Café con Altura’s handbook that described the uses of Resource 
constituents needed to produce their non-negotiable profile. So, unilaterally the FS decided1000 
which uses of infrastructures and know-how should be made by farmers in the first three 
processes (planting, cultivation, post-harvesting) to increase the probability of a high-score 
coffee, particularly picking and re-selection to guarantee only perfect ripe beans in their lots. Also 
uses of infrastructures and know-how in the trading process by cupping samples of coffee from 
                                                     
993 Interview with Luz Dary Chicaiza, Caltura, ibid.  
994 “Se realizó un trabajo de 30 talleres con 1.000 caficultores en veredas y corregimientos del municipio para 
concertar la propuesta de valor y servicios que se implementan para mejorar el ingreso y calidad de vida de los 
caficultores de Buesaco”. Email received from Guillermo Torres, ibid. 
995 As a representative group of producers in Buesaco, they have strong ties with both coffee farmers at the municipal 
level and other actors at the departmental level like the Comisión.    
996 The Fundación Social is the owner the Banco Caja Social Colmena, the eight bank in Colombia by profits in 2016. 
(Dinero, 2016) 
997 “Mencionó que la directora nacional de la fundación social está completamente interesada en Buesaco 
principalmente al Grupo Empresarial, por eso manifestó el deseo de prestar un dinero a dicho grupo para la 
comercialización de café” Acta 56. September/2014. Initially they focused on coffee production to enhance its aroma 
precursors but then, they realized that to offer high-scored coffee, they have to buy it first because specialty traders 
cup samples to define the price they are willing to pay. Thus, capital was needed to buy the lots of each farmer then, 
send the samples, and wait until a specialty trader agreed to purchase. 
998 Interview with Luz Dary Chicaiza, Caltura, ibid.  
999 “El presidente (…) mencionó sobre un convenio que hará la Fundación Social con el Grupo Empresarial para crear 
una nueva empresa. Por lo tanto, cada socio del Grupo Empresarial deberá aportar COP 16 millones”. Acta 60. 
February/2015.     
1000 The technical assistance guidebook was a document produced entirely by the FS. Interview with Viviana Ramos, 
extension agent of Café con Altura Buesaco SAS. 
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participant farmers, and establishing the full physical traceability for the high-scored samples. 
Similarly to the previous LRA, only 14% of the coffee purchased produced the profile sought by 
actors (paid as a high-score full traceability coffee). The remaining was sold through the LRA 
Standard and the LRA Starbucks 1001.  
 
Inspired in the LRA Specialty, the newborn LRA Caltura deregulated all uses of Resource 
constituents during the first two processes to encourage experimentation and tailor-made 
practices depending on the environmental offer, with the sole exception of the picking (which is 
extensively detailed in the Café con Altura’s handbook). On the other hand, they focused all their 
regulations on the post-harvesting activities (hulling, fermentation, drying and reselection) to 
enhance the aromatic profile, while to guarantee the “transparent coffee”, similar to the previous 
one, three activities in the last four processes were regulated (blending; packaging and 
communication), reducing significantly the extent (52% of evenly-regulated uses, Annex 7). So, 
producers and the FS aligned to produce the poverty reduction symbolic service through higher 
monetary services due to the profiling of the “exceptional coffee” taste related service and the 
“transparent coffee” symbolic service. They founded the Café con Altura Buesaco SAS to both 
encourage, in a one-way direction, experimentation (through both technical advice on the farm 
and higher premium-when-buying) so farmers could produce high-scored coffee and, to reach 
the specialty roaster that would pay better prices. This second goal was more difficult than 
previously assumed, so only a small portion was profiled as intended, decreasing the coherence. 
Similar to the previous one, for the small portion that was actually bough, it created the “product 
differentiation” barrier of entry at the producers’ level through both the origin and the 
exceptional aromatic profile increasing closure. 
 
This hostile takeover as it was called by the President of Asoveracruz 1002  or the voluntary 
retirement as consider by the FS1003, caused that only seventeen associates transited from GEB 
to Caltura, but those without the money were forced to withdraw like Asoveracruz1004 and Nilson 
López.  
 
• LRA CNilson (actors’ coalitions, mobilization of AR, institutional creativity and outcome)   
 
                                                     
1001 From 630 thousand kilos of total purchases in 2015/2016: 540 thousand kilos had either a lower-than-84 cupping 
or were not sold as high-score coffee, and 90 thousand kilos were sold as high-score coffee. Interview with Luz Dary 
Chicaiza, Caltura, ibid. 
1002 Interview with Carlos Pantoja, Asoveracruz, ibid.  
1003 “Fueron los mismos socios los que voluntariamente y libremente decidieron retirarse de la empresa y ofrecieron 
sus acciones. En ningún momento la Fundación Social  sugirió, recomendó o intentó la adquisición de esta 
participación. La  evidencia de esta voluntad de retiro de los socios y su posterior venta se puede comprobar  en la 
correspondencia y varias comunicaciones escritas que enviaron los socios. Por el contrario y en un acto de mucha 
responsabilidad y solidaridad con los socios del proyecto,  la Fundación Social compró estas acciones a un precio justo 
y concertado con ellos”. Email received from Guillermo Torres, ibid.  
1004 “La Asamblea mencionó que no estaría en capacidad de aportar estos recursos. Por lo tanto, la Asamblea propuso 
retirarse de la asociación (GEB)”. Acta 60. February/2015.     
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As a coffee farmer, Nilson had participated in the Comisión, in the GEB/Café con Altura initiatives 
aiming to obtain higher “monetary” services by profiling both the “exceptional coffee” taste 
related service and the “transparent coffee” symbolic service. Once the former failed and the 
latter excluded him, a window of opportunity was opened with Inconexus, a nascent exporter of 
specialty coffee with whom he had sold his family’s coffee since 2011, which was looking for the 
“share value” symbolic service. They defined the problem as an unequal value creation caused 
by the lack of transparency in the commercial transaction that discourages farmers to trigger the 
full aromatic profile and obtain the most money from their crop. Hence, they consolidated a 
coalition of profilers (producers close to Nilson and Inconexus) that strategically mobilized the 
Nilson’s AR organization at the local level1005 and Inconexus’ AR organization at the international 
level1006 to divert the Specialty Coffee Program of the Coffee Public Policy by signing a formal 
contract in which Nilson will procure the amount of coffee demanded by Inconexus, through the 
farmers he knew had the practices to optimize the full aromatic potential, creating the newborn 
LRA CNilson.   
 
The absence of intuitional creativity that impede the collective action among other actors 
participant in the incumbent LRA Specialty, was not inherited by this LRA which, contrary to the 
previous cases, had a completely dynamic profile that was shaped by a closed list of participant 
actors (160 coffee farmers, Nilson, Inconexus, Royal Coffee, Specialty roasters) through both 
mechanism described previously in chapter 7: direct and frequent interaction between 
producers-Nilson and Nilson-Inconexus and, producers-roaster interaction in periodic coffee 
auctions. They agreed on the use of their infrastructures and know-how in the trading process: 
they would use Nilson’s knowledge to purchase only in farms with high-score potential and would 
pay the highest premium-when-buying in Buesaco; then samples would go to Bogotá where there 
were cupped in Inconexus’ lab; a final price would be offered back to the farmers in six days 
depending on the cupping score: 30% of coffee is bought as high-score coffee 1007  paying 
premiums-after-buying, and the remaining 70% is paid with premium-when-buying higher than 
the standard price to produce the “terroir expression”, that would be sold in Inconnexus either 
packaged (as regional, single lots or blended) or brewed in their Café Cultor coffee store.     
 
Being also inspired in the Specialty LRA, it deregulated all uses of Resource constituents during 
the first three processes to encourage experimentation to increase chances of high-scored 
coffee, with the sole exception of the picking and reselection. On the other hand, it regulated all 
activities in the last four processes (trading, roasting, communication strategy and brewing) 
decreasing extent (62% of evenly-regulated uses, Annex 7). Consequently, the mentioned actors 
sought the “shared value” symbolic service through higher monetary services due to the profiling 
                                                     
1005 As mentioned, as fiel de báscula at the purchase point of the Cooperativa de Occidente since 2000 he had the 
knowledge of who the best farmers were (in terms of potential aromatic profile) and much more important, he had 
their trust.  
1006 Inconexus is the Colombian supplier of Royal Coffee, a specialty coffee importer in the US with warehouses in 
the West (Seattle and Okland), the south (Houston) and the northeast (Madison). And a fifth one in China (Shangai). 
Royal Coffee official webpage.   
1007 From 240 thousand kilos of total purchases in 2015/2016:72 thousand kilos were sold as high-score coffee. 
Interview with Nilson López, Café de Nilson, ibid.  
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of the “exceptional coffee” taste related service and the “transparent coffee” symbolic service, 
through a purchase contract supported on a trust-based relation (Producers-Nilson-Innconexus) 
to reach high-scored coffee according to the Q System profiling institution, that is maintained 
because of the better prices all participants are receiving. It created the “product differentiation” 
barrier of entry at the producers’ level through both the origin and the exceptional aromatic 
profile increasing closure. 
 
8.5. Intermediary synthesis: Inputs to test our second hypothesis 
 
Throughout the four actors’ games in which we divided this chapter, and whose systematization 
is presented in annex 8.2. We identified ten different LRAs since the breakdown of the 
International Coffee Agreement that are presented in table 24 and whose detailed development 
is presented in Annex 9.2.   
 
Our diachronic analysis implies that we observed the change caused by the actor’s games, by 
comparing the final configuration of the LRA(s) against the initial configuration of the incumbent 
LRA. In some cases, actor’s games affected one, two or the three conditions of the incumbent 
LRA, in other cases, actor’s game produced newborn LRAs. 
 
The extent is measured in terms of the change in the percentage of regulated activities from the 
26 activities (in percentage points); the coherence in terms of a failed/successful coordination 
among profilers to provide the services sought by the LRA; and the closure in terms of the 
placement of the barriers of entry. This exercise is presented in Annex 7.2.  
      
Table 24 Variation of the LRA’s conditions explained by the three analytical dimensions in Buesaco: Source: The author. 
LRA Coalition 
Mobilization 
of AR 
Institutional 
Creativity Extent Coherence Closure 
LRA 
Standard NA NA  NA  
Baseline: 17 pp evenly 
distributed 
Baseline: Failed: two-
way coordination 
among producers  
Baseline: Barriers at the 
traders’ level 
LRA 
Standard-
plus 
PF+SHP Selfishly Absence 
Plus 14 pp evenly distributed 
(over the incumbent LRA 
Standard)  
Failed: two-way 
coordination among 
producers  
Product differentiation 
(potentially origin) 
LRA EdN PT+PR Strategically Absence 
Plus 43 pp evenly distributed 
(over the incumbent LRA 
Standard) 
Failed: one-way 
coordination among 
profilers  
Barriers at the roaster 
level 
LRA 
ACDI/VOCA 
N 
PF+PT+P
R+SHP 
Strategically / 
Cooperative Presence 
Plus 57 pp evenly distributed 
(over the incumbent LRA 
Standard-Plus)  
Successful: two-way 
coordination among 
profilers  
Barriers at the roaster 
level 
LRA 
ACDI/VOCA 
S 
PF+PT+P
R+SHC 
Strategically / 
Cooperative Presence 
Plus 28 pp evenly distributed 
(over the incumbent LRA 
EdN) 
Successful: two-way 
coordination among 
profilers  
Barriers at the roaster 
level 
LRA 
Specialty PF+SHP 
Cooperative / 
Selfishly  Presence 
Less 40 pp evenly distributed 
(over both incumbents LRA 
ACDI/VOCA N&S) 
Failed: two-way 
coordination among 
producers  
Product differentiation 
(potentially origin) 
LRA 
Nespresso 
PT+PR+S
HP Strategically Absence 
Less 3 pp evenly distributed 
(over LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S) 
Failed: one-way 
coordination among 
traders 
Barriers at the roaster 
level 
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LRA 
CCEsp/Star
bucks 
PF+PT Strategically Absence 
Less 28 pp evenly distributed 
(over both incumbents LRA 
ACDI/VOCA N&S) 
Failed: one-way 
coordination among 
traders 
Product differentiation 
(potentially origin, 
specialty) 
LRA Caltura PF+PT+SHP Strategically Absence 
Less 36 pp evenly distributed 
(over both incumbents LRA 
ACDI/VOCA N&S) 
Failed: one-way 
coordination among 
producers 
Product differentiation 
(potentially origin, 
specialty) 
LRA Cnilson PF+PT+PR Strategically Presence 
Less 26 pp evenly distributed 
(over both incumbents LRA 
ACDI/VOCA N&S) 
Successful two-way 
coordination among 
all profilers 
Product differentiation 
(origin and specialty) 
*SHP = Stakeholders in production; SHC = Stakeholders in consumption; PF = Profilers farmers; PT = Profilers traders; PR = Profilers roasters 
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Forth Part: Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
Chapter 9. Conclusions 
 
This chapter is divided into four subchapters, the first is a contextual recapitulation that leads to 
the selection of the antagonist contexts that supports the generalization of our results. The 
second test our first hypothesis and the third tests our second hypothesis. It ends with a 
discussion on the validity of our analytical framework.    
 
9.1. A contextual recapitulation  
 
Assuming that the categorization of Gereffi et al. (2005) can be considered exhaustive1008, the 
global population of LRAs developed to govern the Resource coffee in a given time and space 
could be classified either as a market, a modular or a relational type. Taking the most antagonistic 
cases in which the global demand for services landed in a small enough geographical area to be 
synchronically study, we claim that we have two extreme representative cases of the whole 
population that permit us to generalize our results: if our conditions explain the level of services 
provision in the most complex cases, it would explain the level of services provision in all other 
less complex cases.   
 
In chapter 3.2.1 we explained the logic of our selection of Colombia and the two regions. In this 
conclusive chapter, we demonstrate that the logic functioned to select Riosucio in Caldas and 
Buesaco in Nariño. Both regions have an inverse historical tendency1009 explained by the local 
features of two property rights institutions: the Resguardos Indígenas in Caldas and the 
Haciendas in Nariño that explained the divergent implementation of the Colombian coffee public 
policy, which sparked a global demand for services. A divergence that results on two completely 
opposed types of governance: modular in Riosucio and relational in Buesaco, which informs our 
criteria to select the most antagonist cases.  
 
9.1.1. Market and modular value chains in Riosucio (Caldas)  
 
In Riosucio, the Resguardos played a major role in the shaping of the coffee Resource by being 
instrumental for concretizing the Coffee Public Policy: firstly, when the priest as co-authorities 
                                                     
1008 In chapter 3.2.1 we explained that the capabilities in the supply-base have no other variation than high in the 
coffee industry, so we excluded both the captive and hierarchical modes of governance.  
1009 During the twentieth century coffee expanded in the main coffee regions in Colombia like Caldas while remained 
a marginal crop in Nariño, but liberalization of international coffee markets and deregularization of agriculture in 
Colombia since the nineties inverted the tendency: while coffee culture declined in the regions featured by 
commercial coffee farming, in the peripheral coffee lands featured by the family farming it increased. Caldas reduced 
from 91 thousand ha cultivated in coffee in 1997 to 74 thousand ha in 2014 whereas Nariño increased from 20 
thousand ha in 1997 to 39 thousand in 2014. Data from 1997 comes from the Censo Cafetero 1997, data from 2014 
comes from the SICA/FNC.  
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encouraged coffee farming to “civilize” indigenes. Then, by the land grabbing following their 
disintegration to consolidate the commercial coffee farming sought by the FNC. Finally, the 
reestablishment of the Resguardos attracted stakeholders in consumption that fueled an 
innovative concretization of the coffee public policy. 
 
The Convenio Max Havelaar that focused on the family farmers to support their indigenous 
organization, gave to the Cooperative a competitive advantage to concretize the Specialty Coffee 
Public Policy with others actors who wanted to access to the Resource. Eventually the commercial 
coffee farming disappeared and the family farms were attracted by the Cooperative, which was 
capable enough to canalize the demands for services sought by some profiling actors including 
international rosters (Starbucks, Nespresso, Keurig and Equal Exchange); stakeholders in 
consumption (Max Havelaar, Fairtrade Labelling Organizations, the Sustainable Agriculture 
Network and Conservation International) and stakeholders in production (FNC, local authorities, 
indigenous movements, fundanatura).   
 
As a result, the global consensus on a productive and environmentally responsible coffee growing 
landed in Riosucio alongside the European demand for coffee fair traded; the American demand 
for organic coffee culture; Canadian demand for coffee farming that respects indigenous 
communities; Swiss demand for a coffee aromatic profile featured by the winy aroma and; North 
American demand for coffee with a citric-acid aromatic profile.  Demands that encouraged actors 
to concretize the coffee public policy to change profilers’ behavior, so they would use 
constituents to profile the Resource through market and modular value chains. 
  
9.1.2. Market and relational value chains in Buesaco (Nariño)  
 
In Buesaco, due to the lack of historical evidence of coffee crop evolution in Nariño, we 
assembled secondary data to put forward our conjecture that diversified pre-capitalist haciendas 
shaped the coffee Resource by preventing the concretization of the Coffee Public Policy: Firstly, 
cultivating coffee as a marginal crop oriented towards the domestic market until the first half of 
the twentieth century. Then, in its transformative process into commercial food farms by 
displacing the ancient sharecroppers towards the agricultural frontier were coffee (and illegal 
crops) started to be the only option for smallholders that were pushed out of the fertile plateau, 
skipping the commercial coffee farm that benefited from the FNC’s coffee public policy. Finally, 
these peasants were the target group of a public policy to substitute illegal crops with “specialty” 
coffee, which eventually created a competitive spirit that limited the concretization of the coffee 
public policy.      
 
The Family farming was also encouraged to crop coffee in order to substitute illegal crops through 
public-private partnerships, which discovered an exceptional aromatic profile in Nariño that 
triggered demand for services hardly achievable by the Coffee Public Policy in place. So, 
international rosters (including Starbucks and Nespresso, and a plethora of Specialty 
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Roasters1010); stakeholders in consumption (US Agency for International Development, the Dutch 
Directorate General for International Cooperation, alongside the Specialty Coffee Association of 
America, the Alliance for Coffee Excellence) and stakeholders in production (FNC, local 
authorities, Fundación Social) independently tried to profile the Resource. 
 
As a result, the global consensus on a productive and environmentally responsible coffee growing 
landed in Buesaco through the American demand for coffee as a substitute for coca and poppy 
crops. It came alongside the Swiss and American demand for the “terroir expression”, and 
eventually a global demand for the exceptional aromatic profile developed in the highlands of 
Buesaco. Demands that encouraged actors to divert and circumvent the Specialty Coffee Public 
Policy to change profilers’ behavior, so they would use constituents to profile the Resource 
through mainly market and relational value chains. 
 
9.2. First hypothesis on the optimization of services provision 
 
We present our results in four sections: the outset that tests our first hypothesis; the evidence 
that supports it, the evidence against it and the discussion.   
 
9.2.1. Outset  
 
To test our first hypothesis, we combined the results from chapter 5.3 and chapter 7.3 that are 
presented in table 25.  
 
Table 25 Level of Services provision by LRA according to the combined variation of the three conditions in Riosucio and Buesaco: 
Source: The author. 
LRA  Extent  Coherence Closure Level of services 
R- LRA Organic High High High High 
B- LRA CNilson  High High High High 
R - LRA Nespresso  High High Low High 
R- LRA la Vereda High Low High Low  
R- LRA Fairtrade High Low Low Low  
B- LRA Nespresso High Low Low Low 
B- LRA Caltura High Low Low Low 
B- LRA 
CCEsp/Starbucks High Low Low Low 
R- LRA Starbucks Low  High Low Low  
R- LRA Standard Low Low Low Low  
B- LRA Standard Low Low Low Low 
B- LRA Discount Low Low Low Low 
 
                                                     
1010 Including remarkable firms in this business like Atlas Coffee Importers; Counter Culture Coffee; Green Mountain 
Coffee Roasters; Intelligentsia Coffee; Stumptown Coffee; Sustainable Harvest Coffee Importers. 
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Our results show that we cannot entirely accept our first hypothesis because, in addition to the 
case of an LRA with “high” in the three conditions, an LRA with low closeness also maximizes the 
level of services provision.  
 
• LRAs that are lacking high extent, high coherence and high closure cannot simultaneously 
optimize the provision of symbolic, taste related and monetary services.     
 
We first present the analysis of the 10 LRAs that fits our conjectures, and then we present the 
analysis of the two cases that provided contradictory evidence to open the discussion: a LRA 
featured by high extent, high coherence and low closure that optimize the level of services 
provision and, a LRA featured by high extent, low coherence and high closure that did not 
optimize the level of services provision.  
 
9.2.2. Evidence that supports our first hypothesis   
 
In Riosucio and Buesaco we found two “visible hand” LRAs (the cases of the LRA Organic and LRA 
CNilson). Both LRAs profiled a high level of services alongside the combined presence of the three 
conditions. Both increased monetary services for all profilers by producing symbolic (“natural” 
and “transparent coffee”)1011 and taste related services (“clean cup” and “exceptional coffee”) 
prioritizing one main profiling institution (USDA Organic and Q system). 
 
In both cases the extent was high because more than half of the uses of Resource constituents 
were evenly regulated among profilers, increasing the chances to produce the foreseeable 
services. Also, coherence was high because there was a successful two-way coordination among 
all profilers: a relatively closed group of farmers (153 and 160 respectively) were aligned 
alongside the traders (the Cooperative/Trillacoop/Expocafé and Nilson/Inconexus/Royal Coffee) 
and the roasters (Equal Exchange and Inconexus/Royal Coffee’s clients) to profile a commonly 
agreed combination of services. Coordination remained feasible due to the low transaction cost 
in both relatively small-groups, easily managed through a face-to-face interaction: both a daily-
based relation farmers-traders (Asprocafé’s promoters and Nilson) and a periodically one 
farmers-roasters (The annual visit of Equal-Exchange and the Inconexus coffee Auction). This 
interaction was strong enough to make profilers behave as expected so they hardly relied on 
other outputs steaming from the IR. Finally, closure was high because the “product 
differentiation” was built on the terroir and local practices to enhance organic farming (Riosucio) 
and the aromatic profile (Buesaco). Thus, actors erected barriers of entry at the producers’ level, 
strengthening farmers’ position to profile the Resource in their benefit.    
 
In ten LRAs featured by low closure, the low level of services is explained because either there 
was low coherence or low extent, or both conditions were low.  
 
                                                     
1011 To avoid wordiness, in parenthesis we will write as brief as possible the observations from each LRA in their order 
of appearance. So, in this case “natural” refers to the LRA organic, and “transparent” refers to the LRA CNilson.  
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The four “Ambitious” LRAs identified in both contexts (the LRA Fairtrade in Riosucio and the LRAs 
Nespresso, Caltura, CCEsp/Starbucks in Buesaco) profiled a low level of services because the high 
extent (74%; 87%; 52% and 60% of evenly regulated uses) was combined with low coherence and 
low closure. These LRAs failed to profile the demanded services (taste related services in the LRA 
Fairtrade; environmental responsibly in the LRA Nespresso; exceptional coffee in both LRAs 
Caltura and CCEsp/Starbucks).  
 
The extent was high because they all shared a profiling institution (Fairtrade certification mark; 
TASQ®; CAFÉ Practices and the Q System; Q system) that evenly regulated among profilers more 
than half of the uses of Resource constituents. Coherence was low because control goes in one 
direction, as it was expected when closure is low: when barriers of entry are erected at the trader 
and roaster level, local services are underprovided.  
  
Indeed, these four LRAs have large groups of producers (832; 2950; 1000; 2000) and traders 
(Cooperative; Cooperativas de cafeteros del Norte y del occidente/Almacafé/FNC; Cooperativa de 
Cafés Especiales; Café con Altura), in one case it included also a roaster (Nespresso). This group 
of actors is aligned through various governance mechanism (Asprocafé and its internal control 
system; the cluster FNC; commercial agreements with Caravela and Carcafé; Fundación Social’s 
extension service) that differ in their outputs production (Asprocafé that activate both the coffee 
public policy and its own social premium to produce outputs; the Cluster FNC that is supported 
in outputs that reinforced the implementation of the coffee public policy; the self-funded outputs 
produced by the FS and; the CCEspeciales that do not relied on any output).  
 
However, in all cases, coordination goes from the top to the bottom, meaning that producers 
have not a word to say on how the Resource could be profiled. The profiling institutions are 
imposed and Governance mechanisms only intended to encourage farmers to change their 
behavior, but there are hardly real chances for producers to shape this intervention. In the case 
of the LRA Fairtrade in Riosucio, the Fairtrade system in which representatives of buyers and 
producers of all over the world agree on the standard, remains so far away from the very local 
demands (e.g. taking advantage of the terroir expression of a region to trigger monetary services 
for those farmers) that in practical terms is impermeable. Similarly, this impermeability features 
the LRA Nespresso in Buesaco at the national level: the cluster FNC is built on the governance 
structure of the FNC in which representatives from Buesaco had to negotiate with 
representatives of the other 594 coffee municipalities in Colombia, their very local demands 
hardly could escalate. In the other two LRAs (Caltura and CCEsp/Starbucks) there are not any 
scenario in which producers demands are taken into account.               
 
There is one LRA “Cunning entrepreneur” identified in Riosucio (LRA Starbucks) which profiled a 
low level of services provision combining the absence of closure and extent with the presence of 
coherence. The low closure reflects the case of a foreigner profiler with the market power needed 
to profile its demanded services not matter other actors’ demands; the low extent reveals the 
very few uses that must be regulated to provide the services demanded by this actor; and the 
high coherence evidence its capacity to influence the other profilers to profile the combination 
of both symbolic (“ethically traded”) and taste related services (“terroir expression”). 
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This LRA prioritized one main profiling institution (the CAFÉ Practices) which regulated fewer than 
half of observed/regulated uses of constituents. However, uses were well coordinated in a two-
way among all profilers: a large group of 981 coffee farmers aligned alongside traders (the 
Cooperative/Trillacoop/Expocafé) and the roaster (Starbucks) through a commercial agreement 
between the Cooperative and Starbucks. This LRA had, on the one hand, a strong control 
mechanism from the top to the bottom (the triple quality, economic accountability, and external 
audit) and, on the other, a deliberative scenario with local participation to shape the final output 
through the improvement plans supported by the Starbucks Farmer Support Center.    
 
Three LRAs “Invisible hand” are identified in both contexts (LRA Standard in Riosucio and LRAs 
Standard and Discount in Buesaco), providing the lowest level of services with the combined 
absence of extent, coherence and closure. In fact, with fewer than half of observed/regulated 
uses, they failed to profile the demanded services (monetary services through “appellation Café 
de Colombia”). Even though the FNC’s governance mechanisms are well suited to coordinate in 
one-way farmers through the outputs derived from the coffee public policy, these mechanisms 
cannot align profilers at the end of the coffee value chain (roasters and consumers). The latter 
erected the barrier of entry “product differentiation” at the traders’ levels.   
 
9.2.3. Evidence that contradicts our first hypothesis  
 
However, there are two LRAs that contradict the conjecture that market power concentration in 
traders and roasters would produce fewer demanded services by locals. Indeed, on the one hand, 
the LRA Nespresso shows that if market power is on the hands of foreign actors, it does not 
necessarily mean that it cannot profile services demanded by other actors.  On the other hand, 
the LRA La Vereda shows that if market power is owned by local actors, it does not necessarily 
mean that the LRA will profile the services demanded by all the actors. 
 
The only LRA “Responsible Entrepreneur” identified in Riosucio (LRA Nespresso) profiled a high 
level of services with the combined presence of two conditions, extent and coherence, and the 
absence of the third one, closure. This LRA profiled a combination of services that enhance 
monetary services for all profilers, by producing both symbolic (environmentally responsible 
principally) and taste related services (winy). 
 
This is the LRA with the highest extent of the 12-cases sample. It prioritized one main profiling 
institution (TASQ®) whose implementation allowed us to observe that 95% of the whole set of 
uses of constituents were regulated and, were evenly distributed among profilers.   
 
It had high coherence because there was successful two-way coordination among all profilers. 
Even though this group composed of more than 700 coffee farmers hardly could be classified as 
small, they were successfully aligned alongside traders (the Cooperative/Trillacoop/Expocafé) 
and the roaster (Nespresso). The higher transaction costs of this relatively bigger group were 
overtaken through a complex public-private partnership that collectively agreed on outputs 
(mainly derived from the coffee public policy), which would be developed either individually or 
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in partnership by participant actors but coordinated by a specialized operator (cafexport) to 
influence profilers’ behavior.  
 
However, it had low closure because the barriers of entry are erected at the roaster level 
strengthening Nespresso’s position to profile the Resource in their benefit.  
 
A second contradictory case is the LRA “Naïve” identified in Riosucio (LRA La Vereda). It was 
featured by the combined presence of two conditions, extent and closure, and the absence of 
the coherence profiling a low level of services. It unsuccessfully intended the provision of two 
incompatible profiles: the “indigenous coffee” and, the combination “environmentally 
responsible” and monetary services. 
 
This LRA is the second one with the highest extent in the sample. It had 93% of evenly distributed 
observed/regulated uses, as a result, the prioritization of the Keurig’s Responsible Sourcing 
Supplier Guidelines profiling institution (fully acceptable with the Rainforest Alliance Standards). 
And it has high closure because the barriers of entry erected at the producers’ level when the 
“product differentiation” is built on the indigenous community of the Resguardo de San Lorenzo,  
 
However, coherence is low because the coordination between the larger group of approximately 
1500 coffee growers in the Resguardo de San Lorenzo was misaligned with the traders 
(cooperative; almacafé; FNC as an exporter) and the roaster (Keurig). The profile sought by the 
latter was put forward, prioritizing the implementation of the renewed SACEV agreement through 
a series of outputs produced by both the Cooperative and the Comité, at the expense of the 
profile sought by the former. In the end, the use of constituents did not profile the demanded 
services by the local community. 
 
These two cases contradict the first assumption that market power concentration in others than 
producers would lead to fewer services production and, the second assumption that this 
concentration in producers’ hands would trigger services provision. The idea behind is that 
traders and roasters are usually foreigners who are interested in others than locally demanded 
services, so if they have the market power the locally demanded services would not be provided. 
On the other way around, we assumed that if locals have the market power, they would provide 
both their demanded services as well as demanded services by foreigners in exchange for 
monetary services.   
 
But these cases prove us wrong: even though a foreigner has the market power, not only their 
demanded services are profiled but also local ones. And, even though locals have the market 
power, their demanded services are not profiled. 
 
9.2.4. Discussion    
 
These results allow us to explain the level of services provision by the combined presence of the 
extent, coherence, and closure. In the two cases (LRA Organic and LRA CNilson) what it first draws 
attention is the fact that a small group of profilers is actually profiling the highest number of 
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services demanded by the whole group of actors in both contexts. As showed, participant actors 
in both LRAs demanded a lower number of services that actually they are producing. Why are 
they doing this extra effort?  
 
This observation also questions the effect of closure on the level of services provision: the highest 
level of services provision is produced by both a low closure and a high closure LRAs. It suggests 
that market-power ownership (produced by barriers of entry) is less relevant to the final result 
than an agreement on the uses of Resource constituents to produce a well-coordinated complex 
profile.  
 
Indeed, if market power is owned by local actors, it does not necessarily mean that they will 
profile a Resource that produces the services demanded by all the actors (including roasters and 
stakeholders in consumption among others). On the other hand, if market power is on the hands 
of foreign actors, it does not necessarily mean that it is not possible to incorporate demands of 
other actors (including profilers and stakeholders in production among others). The results show 
both possibilities: barriers both at the producers (LRA La Vereda) and at the roasters level (LRA 
Starbucks; LRA CCEsp/Starbucks; LRA Nespresso in Buesaco) that did not optimize services 
provision and, barriers both at the producers (LRA Organic; LRA CNilson) and at the roasters level 
(LRA Nespresso in Riosucio) that did optimize services provision. 
 
It is relevant because it presents evidence to move forward a widely accepted explanatory 
framework developed by Benoit. Daviron and Ponte (2005) to explain the “coffee paradox”, a 
phenomenon in which the “coffee boom” in consumer countries during the nineties developed 
alongside a “coffee crisis” in producing countries. They argue that coffee paradox is caused by 
market power, which is understood “not simply on the basis of controlling market share, but also 
in relation to the ability to define the identity of a coffee – in other words the ability to set the 
language and the reference values that determine production norms and quality standards” (p. 
xvii).  
 
Our research does not contradict their main hypothesis that the paradox is explained because a 
group of profilers in consumer countries impose their demanded services on profilers in producer 
countries, but it shows evidence that there is a misfit when market power is automatically linked 
to the control of both features: market share and identity. Indeed, we have shown that there are 
cases in which a company that controls both market share and identity (in the terms of Benoit. 
Daviron and Ponte (2005)) like Nespresso creates a “coffee boom” in their consumer market 
while it does not create a “coffee crisis” in their supply market, at least neither in Riosucio nor in 
Buesaco. On the contrary, it is closer to a “coffee boom” because it doubles the monetary services 
of their suppliers when comparing with coffee producers selling to the mainstream markets.  
 
We consider that their hypothesis must be refined. Firstly, the concept of identity (as the brand 
and its associated rules) should be replaced by the concept of profile. Secondly, the control of 
market power should be detached from the automatic control on the profile.   
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First, identity is a misleading concept. It encourages researchers to look at the brand and then 
back to the uses of Resource constituents, denying the whole complexity of its implementation. 
For example, a researcher would look at the brand Nespresso, and then back towards the uses 
of constituents mandated by the TASQ®, would be blinded to observe other uses of constituents 
(like the mestizo practices) implemented because of outputs mobilized by other actors.  
 
By focusing on the brand and its associated rules, this concept captures a portion of the profile 
that forcefully is developed by the profilers who have the final transaction with consumers 
through the process of “communication strategy”. As usually coffee is profiled through a long 
value chain, the “identity” will always be in hands of the ultimate profiler. In this order of ideas, 
the paradox can only be avoided if producers internalize the whole value chain. However, we 
have shown that neither the market power concentration in one foreign profiler like Nespresso 
produces the coffee paradox, nor the market power concentration in one local profiler like the 
indigenous coffee farmers in San Lorenzo avoid the coffee paradox.  
 
What matters is not the identity and their associated rules but the profile of the Resource and 
the whole profiling process. Indeed, the “identity” is associated to a particular activity carried on 
by roasters (we refer to the actor, who can also be a farmer, that roasts coffee to produce roasted 
coffee for the end consumer) to communicate to consumers the attributes of the roasted coffee, 
as the cultivation forcefully is associated to the coffee grower. The brand is an essential part of 
the Resource as it is the coffee cherry, but does not tell the whole story. The profile of the 
Resource instead, takes into account the sum of all parts and the whole.    
 
In this sense, we can move forward the second refinement: the control over the profile. As we 
said, the roasters forcefully have control on the identity, is their job. But they can or cannot have 
control over the profile. There are cases in which the market power is used by the roaster to 
profile only their demanded services, but as we have shown, there are cases in which the market 
power is used to profile their demanded services but also the services demanded by other actors. 
Also, if producers have control over their identity, it does not mean they have control over the 
profile. Similarly to the previous cases, producers can use their market power in their solely 
benefit, or in the benefit of a wider group of actors.  
 
Hence, the coffee paradox could still be explained by market power in the case in which the actor, 
who successfully erects barriers of entry, also controls the profile.      
 
Having said that, more interesting than the actual placement of the barriers of entry in one 
particular segment of the coffee value chain, it is to know how/why actors who had successfully 
erects barriers of entry do not monopolize the profile and, decide to participate in an agreement 
on the profile that would increase both the extent and the coherence, and eventually the level 
of services provision. Indeed, these results make us question why did the LRA Nespresso, led by 
the market-powerful Nespresso, profile the services demanded by other actors? Or, on the other 
hand, why did not the indigenous community take advantage of their market power to provide 
their demanded services within the LRA La Vereda?   
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Interesting enough, these questions could not be answered by internal-to-the-actor responses 
because we have shown that the combined presence of conditions is more related to the 
synergies among actors than the participation of a particular actor. We can provide two examples 
in table 26 in which the participation of the same roaster in two different LRAs is associated with 
a different configuration.   
 
First, the case of the two LRAs Nespresso, one in Riosucio and the other in Buesaco. In both cases, 
the FNC and Nespresso are participant actors but conditions between both LRAs differ: the LRA 
Nespresso in Riosucio has high coherence whereas the LRA Nespresso in Buesaco has low 
coherence. Second, the case of the two LRAs in which Starbucks participated. The LRA 
CCEsp/Starbucks in Buesaco has high extent and low coherence whereas the LRA Starbucks in 
Riosucio has low extent and high coherence.   
 
Table 26 LRAs in both context that share the same roaster but have a different configuration. Source: the author. 
LRA  Extent  Coherence Closure 
R - LRA Nespresso  High High Low 
B- LRA Nespresso High Low Low 
B- LRA 
CCEsp/Starbucks High Low Low 
R- LRA Starbucks Low  High Low 
 
So, these questions have to be answered through the analysis of the actors’ games. In some 
games, synergies are created with the actors with market power to increase (or decrease) LRA’s 
conditions, or the other way around. Indeed, the LRAs’ configurations that we presented reflect 
the final picture of an extensive game in which different actors had mobilized their resources of 
action to activate institutions in order to influence the extent, the coherence, and the closure. 
Results in our second hypothesis would provide some answers.   
 
9.3. Second hypothesis on the “integral” LRA.  
 
We present our results in five sections: the outset that tests our second hypothesis; then, we 
look at each one of our three analytical dimensions (actors’ coalition; mobilization of action 
resources; institutional creativity) to analyze the eventual relationships between them and the 
LRA’s configuration. Each section briefly presents our results (which are more detailed in chapters 
6.5 and 8.5) and then, we open the discussion. In the end, we present our concluding remarks.     
 
9.3.1. Outset  
 
Why does an “integral” LRA reach its higher extent, coherence, and closure? We will demonstrate 
that these key elements of LRA depend on whether actors were able to overcome the 
conservative bias, in which each actor sought to develop its own provision of services, in order 
to produce not only their demanded services but the services demanded by other actors.  
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This process is composed of three analytical dimensions: a starting point depending on how 
actors defined the “real situation” incorporated into the actors’ coalition; a first “negotiation 
dilemma” to either deceive and take advantage to govern the Resource in its favor or to 
cooperate and endow the powerless to “balance” the initial discussion, incorporated into the 
mobilization of action resources; a second “negotiation dilemma” to agree on both the 
combination of services provided by the Resource and who should assume the costs and benefits 
of changing the use of constituents, incorporated into the institutional creativity.  
 
The underlying assumption is that if the real situation is shared by a specific group of actors which 
has to solve their first dilemma through a cooperative mobilization of action resources, the 
second dilemma could reach positive coordination through the institutional creativity, increasing 
the extent, the coherence, and the closure. 
 
The effect of these three analytical dimensions on the variance of the three conditions is 
developed in chapters 6 and 8, and its results are synthetically presented from an evolutionary 
perceptive in chapters 6.5 and 8.5, in which we evaluate the changes of a particular LRA according 
to the incumbent LRA from which it had its origin. We standardized those results by categorizing 
the change either as “higher” or “lower”, so they could be comparable among the whole set of 
the 17 LRAs identified in both Riosucio and Buesaco since the breakdown of the quota 
agreement. 
 
We present them in table 27 organized according to their “higher” effects on the conditions1012.  
So, the first three LRAs (MH-Riosucio, Natural-R, Organic-R) had a “higher” effect in the three 
conditions, the following five a “higher” effect in both extent and coherence (Nespresso-R; 
ACDI/VOCA N-Buesaco; ACDI/VOCA S-B; CS Standard-B; Reg/Starbucks-R), the next groups of 
LRAs on both the coherence and closure (CNilson-B), etc.  
 
Table 27 Variation of the LRA's conditions explained by the three analytical dimensions in Riosucio and Buesaco. Source: The 
author. 
LRA Coalition 
Mobilization 
of AR 
Institutional 
Creativity Extent Coherence Closure 
LRA MH-R PT+SHP+SHC Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Higher 
LRA Natural-R PF+PT+PR+SHP+SHC 
Selfishly-
Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Higher 
LRA Organic-R PF+PT+PR+SHC Strategically Presence Higher Higher Higher 
LRA Nespresso-R PT+PR+SHP+SHC Strategically Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA CR 
Standard-R 
PF+PT+PR+SHP+S
HC Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Lower 
                                                     
1012 As a reminder, the level of services provision was the dependent variable explained by the configuration of the 
LRAs. We tested this first hypothesis through a synchronic analysis using the collected qualitative/quantitative data 
in both contexts of study. Our second hypothesis does not intent to assess the level of services provision. It tries to 
test if the configuration of the LRA is explained by the actors’ games through a diachronic analysis developed mainly 
through qualitative data collected through interviews and documentary analysis, which is why in table 41 we do not 
present an additional column at the extreme right with the level of services provision. 
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LRA 
Reg/Starbucks-R PT+PR Strategically Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA ACDI/VOCA 
N-B 
PF+PT+PR+SHP+S
HC Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA ACDI/VOCA 
S-B PF+PT+PR+SHC  Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA Cnilson-B PF+PT+PR Strategically Presence Lower Higher Higher 
LRA Standard-
plus-B PF+SHP Selfishly Absence Higher Lower Higher 
LRA EdN-B PT+PR Strategically Absence Higher Lower Lower 
LRA Fairtrade-R PF+PT+SHC Selfishly Absence Lower Lower Lower 
LRA La Vereda-R SHP Selfishly Absence Lower Lower Lower 
LRA Specialty-B PF+SHP Cooperative / Selfishly  Presence Lower Lower Higher 
LRA Nespresso-B PT+PR+SHP 
Strategically 
/ 
Cooperative 
Absence Lower Lower Lower 
LRA CCEsp/ 
Starbucks-B PT+PR Strategically Absence Lower Lower Higher 
LRA Caltura-B PF+PT+SHP Strategically Absence Lower Lower Higher 
*SHP = Stakeholders in production; SHC = Stakeholders in consumption; PF = Profilers farmers; PT = Profilers traders; PR = Profilers roasters  
 
Our results show that we cannot entirely accept our second hypothesis because a cooperative 
mobilization in which institutional creativity is present, is also associated with a lower extent and 
coherence.  
 
• If actors’ coalitions do not cooperatively mobilize their resources of action to bring about 
institutional creativity, actors’ games will not produce LRAs with high extent, high 
coherence, and high closure. 
 
There is one case, the LRA MH-R in which the cooperative mobilization of resources of action and 
the presence of the institutional creativity produced high extent, high coherence, and high 
closure. Nonetheless, there are two cases, the LRA Natural-R and the LRA Organic-R in which the 
higher extent, higher coherence and higher closure were reached not only by a cooperative but 
also a selfish mobilization of resources of action, and by a strategical mobilization. Also, the LRAs 
ACDI/VOCA N&S-B and the LRA CS Standard-R produced higher extent, higher coherence but 
lower closure even though there had the cooperative mobilization and the presence of 
institutional creativity, furthermore, the case of the LRA Specialty-B also featured by the 
cooperative mobilization of Resources of action and the presence of institutional creativity 
produced a lower extent, lower coherence, and higher closure.   
 
9.3.2. The social construction of the problem shared by a coalition of actors.  
 
In the whole set of LRAs, the social construction of the problem explained the actors’ involvement 
in the problem of collective action. Furthermore, when they share a definition of a “real 
situation” in which their demanded services are at risk, they would form coalitions.   
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• Results    
 
A transversal lecture of the first analytical dimension brings about four groups of LRAs. Two 
groups in which the actors’ coalitions are associated with higher extent and coherence; one group 
associated mainly with lower extent and coherence and the last group with mixed results. In all 
the cases, there is not a clear association between actors’ coalitions and closure.  
 
The first group is composed of the LRAs (Natural-R, CS Standard-R, ACDI/VOCA N-B) in which the 
whole group of actors (Profilers – farmers, traders and roasters; and both stakeholders in 
production and consumption) participates in the coalition. These coalitions brought about 
different demand for services by including both stakeholders, which were materialized through 
regulations in the use of constituents (increasing the extent); Also, these coalitions made it 
possible to control the change in the uses as it was regulated by including the whole set of 
profilers (increasing the coherence).  
 
The second group is composed of the LRAs (Organic-R, ACDI-VOCA S-B, Nespresso-R, and MH-R) 
featured by coalitions including at least two profilers (trader and roaster1013), one stakeholder in 
consumption, and either an association of farmers or one stakeholder in production. The only 
difference with the previous one is that either the Stakeholder in production is engaged to 
escalate the local demands for services into the LRA and to incentivize the demanded change in 
behavior in farmers, or the farmers directly escalate their demands and adopted the 
compromised changes. Hence, the participation of both (farmers and stakeholders in production) 
is not crucial for increasing both the extent and coherence as long as local demands escalate.  
 
The third group is composed of the LRAs (Fairtrade-R, Caltura-B, Nespresso-B, Standard-plus-B, 
Specialty-B, La Vereda-R) in which stakeholders in consumption are absent, so it is their demand 
for services and the regulations it implies1014 (decreasing the extent). And the whole set of 
profilers is incomplete, so coordination for profiling the demanded services is extremely difficult 
(decreasing the coherence).       
 
The last group is composed of (Cnilson-B, Reg/Starbucks-R, EdN-B, CCesp/Starbucks-B) in which 
there are neither stakeholders in consumption nor in production within the coalition, but in all 
cases, the profiler roasters and traders are aligned. The evolutionary perspective1015 intrinsic to 
the 17 LRAs is particularly salient in this last group to explain the mixed results in terms of the 
extent: In all cases, the group of profilers is interested in a combination of services that results in 
an increase of the monetary services. In two cases, it implied new regulated uses over the 
incumbent LRA (The LRA Standard in Nariño in the case of the LRA EdN-B, and the LRA Standard 
                                                     
1013 In the case of the LRA MH, we conceptualized MH’s organization as its network with roasters. So, we can say 
that MH, as a stakeholder in consumption, aligned a group of roaster in this LRA.   
1014 The LRA Standard-plus is the only exception in which the extent increased, because it was developed from the 
much unregulated LRA Standard.   
1015 It means that LRA conditions are evaluated in reference to the incumbent LRA from which they were derived. 
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in Caldas in the case of the LRA Reg/Starbucks-R) and in two cases it implied less regulated uses 
over the incumbent LRA (The LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S for both LRAs Cnilson and CCesp/Starbucks).  
 
In term of coherence mixed results are also present. In this last group, the LRAs that incorporated 
the whole set of profilers (LRAs Cnilson-B and LRA Reg/Starbucks-R) increased their coordination 
to implement the regulated uses whereas the others, which includes only the trader and the 
roaster (LRAs EdN-B and CCEsp/Starbucks-B), cannot coordinate due to the high cost of 
influencing farmers. So, they had to rely on their own uses of Resource constituents to 
compensate as much as they can the unrealized practices of farmers. An interesting feature is 
that in the case of the LRA Nilson-B, farmers participate in the coalition as a small group with 
familiar ties with Nilson López (the owner of the trading company). In the case of the LRA 
Reg/Starbucks-R, farmers participate as individuals aggregated into a collective actor (the 
Cooperative). In the other two cases, EdN-B and CCEsp/Starbucks-B, farmers are just suppliers 
with just a commercial relationship with both traders (Empresas de Nariño and the Cooperativa 
de Café Especiales).   
 
• Discussion     
 
This last observation gives us a first insight into the discussion: unorganized individuals are 
powerless. Only when they come together into a collective actor that move forward their 
demanded services, they could be considered participants in a coalition. Indeed, it could be said 
that producers participate in all LRA’s coalitions because their coffee is the essence of each one 
of the LRAs, but as individuals, they do neither have the critical mass to claim the provision of 
their demanded services nor to propose regulation, less to influence the final outputs.  
 
Aggregation into a collective actor is salient: when looking at the configuration of both LRAs 
Starbucks (Reg/Starbucks in Riosucio and CCEsp/Starbucks in Buesaco showed in table 28), the 
conditions differ because, in Riosucio, farmers are aggregated in the Cooperative through which 
they can move forward their demand for services increasing the extent and the coherence. In 
Buesaco, on the other hand, farmers are unorganized suppliers that just sell their coffee but 
cannot influence the LRA, decreasing both extent and coherence. 
 
Table 28 LRAs Starbucks in both contexts with a different configuration. Source: the author. 
  
LRA Coalition 
Mobilization 
of AR 
Institutional 
Creativity Extent Coherence Closeness 
LRA Reg/Starbucks-R PT+PR Strategically Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA CCEsp/Starbucks-B PT+PR Strategically Absence Lower Lower Higher 
 
Interestingly enough, too much aggregation has a similar effect. It affects the LRA’s conditions 
because it vanishes the very local demands for services when the governance mechanisms are 
developed at different perimeters of the Resource.  
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The best example is the different configuration between the LRA Nespresso in Riosucio and the LRA 
Nespresso in Buesaco (showed in table 29), in both cases the perimeter is the area in which the 
Nespresso cluster has jurisdiction: 17 municipalities in Caldas and Antioquia equivalent to 7 thousand 
coffee farms approximately in the first case and nearly fifty in Cauca and Nariño equivalent to 30 
thousand coffee farms in the second case. 
 
However, in Riosucio the governance mechanism (Encuentro Bianual) is composed exclusively of 
collective and corporate actors that represent individuals interested on the services provided at 
the same Resource’s perimeter: coffee farmers, cooperatives, traders and roasters interested in 
the coffee produced exclusively in the seventeen municipalities in Caldas and Antioquia.  
 
In the second case, the governance mechanism (FNC-Nespresso’s quarterly meeting) is 
composed of collective1016 and corporate actors that represent individuals interested in the 
services provided at different Resource’s perimeter: namely the FNC represents five hundred 
thousand farmers interested in the Resource coffee in more than five hundred municipalities in 
Colombia, including the thirty thousand participant growers interested mainly in the coffee 
produced in the nearly fifty municipalities in Cauca and Nariño. Hence, the very local demands 
from this group of farmers that are supposed to reach the quarterly negotiation through their 
democratic procedures (elections to the municipal and departmental Comités and Congreso 
Nacional Cafetero), are completely blended with the demands from the Resource coffee at the 
Colombian level. As a result, the very local demands never reached the quarterly negotiation. 
 
Table 29 LRAs Nespresso in both contexts with a different configuration. Source: the author. 
  
LRA Coalition 
Mobilization 
of AR 
Institutional 
Creativity Extent Coherence Closeness 
LRA Nespresso-R PT+PR+SHP+SHC Strategically Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA Nespresso-B PT+PR+SHP Strategically / Cooperative Absence Lower Lower Lower 
 
Thirdly, aggregation has to be associated with the demanded services from the Resource. This is 
the most plausible answer to the question of why the indigenous community did not take 
advantage of their market power to shape the LRA La Vereda. In this case, indigenous people 
were aggregated into a collective actor that has an agenda much wider than the demanded 
services from Coffee in Riosucio. Indeed, the indigenous movement aggregated them to put 
forward their claims associated with the indigenous issue like education, culture, health, justice, 
etc. That is why they were not exclusively interested in the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service 
demanded by indigenous coffee growers in the Resguardo de San Lorenzo in Riosucio. So, in the 
end, these indigenous growers were a passive group within the LRA La Vereda’s coalition without 
any chance of influencing it.  
 
                                                     
1016 The FNC as an association according to (Scharpf, 1997, p. 57) with joint action, collective purpose, collective 
resources, and a voting decision making.  
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A lesson that we can derive from the analysis of this analytical dimension, that could encourage 
future research, is: the aggregation of individuals into collective actors, which move forward 
demanded services, is fundamental to diminish the transaction cost within a coalition so they 
could agree on joint action to manage the Resource in a clear perimeter. Nevertheless, the 
collective actor either exclusively represents individuals interested in the Resource at the same 
perimeter or it develops an internal mechanism so that affiliates, exclusively interested in that 
particular perimeter, can participate with voice and vote within the coalition.      
 
A second discussion is that the smaller and homogenous coalitions tend to be associated with 
lower coherence and lower extent, not necessarily lower closure. Indeed, if actors do not 
participate fewer services are demanded so fewer regulations are needed, or it is harder to 
provide the demanded services precisely because actors that have to change their behavior are 
not included. The LRA CNilson-B is a good example of the first one, in which the small group of 
participant actors is demanding fewer services therefore there exists fewer regulations. On the 
other extreme, the LRA Standard Plus-B which regulates a complex profile that cannot be 
produced because profilers, especially at the end of the value chain, are not incorporated.         
 
Claiming that a big and varied coalition is associated with higher extent and higher coherence 
may not sound very novel, but it goes deep into our research interest. Indeed, a large coalition 
means that somehow the zero-sum game did not exist or it was overtaken.  
 
In our research, we described different actors’ constellations: few were constellations of “pure 
coordination” like the CRIDEC-Cooperative-MH-FNC within the LRA MH in Riosucio. Some were 
constellations of “pure conflict” like the indigenous movement against the FNC/Comité within 
the LRA La Vereda in Riosucio and the group of producers against Nespresso and Starbucks within 
the LRA Specialty in Buesaco. However, actors usually faced the collective action dilemma in 
which the greatest benefit is only possible if everyone cooperates even though they benefit 
individually by deceiving.  
 
Our research provides evidence of this dilemma faced within actors’ coalitions: in some cases, 
the collective action is disintegrated breaking apart the coalition like the transition between the 
LRA Natural-R and the LRA Organic-R or the transition between the LRA Standard-B and the LRA 
Standard Plus-B. In others, collective action is rebuilt bringing together new actors to the 
coalition, like the case of the LRA CS Standard in Riosucio or the transition towards both the LRAs 
ACDI/VOCA N&S in Buesaco.  
 
We then turn the attention to the other analytical dimension of the actors’ games to explain this 
dynamic of actors’ coalitions.  
 
9.3.3. Mobilization of action resources 
 
Our conjecture is that the solution of the first negotiation dilemma (either support or not a power 
balance) creates the conditions to solve the second negotiation dilemma (agree on the profile 
and on the distribution of costs and benefits), explaining the collective action. 
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In our empirical study, the first negotiation dilemma is observed through our second analytical 
dimension, the mobilization of action resources (AR onward) for activating institutions.  
 
• Results    
 
A transversal lecture of the second analytical dimension can differentiate among LRAs grouped 
according to the three types of mobilization of action resources: cooperative; selfish and 
strategic.  
 
In the first group of six LRAs (Natural-R, MH-R, CR Standard-R, ACDI VOCA N-B, ACDI VOCA S-B, 
and Specialty-B in table 30), there was a cooperative mobilization of action resources that was 
mostly associated with higher extent and higher coherence without any apparent effect in the 
closure.  
 
In this group, with one exception (LRA Specialty-B), Stakeholders cooperatively mobilized their 
“organization” and “political support” to bring into the LRA both local and foreign demands for 
services, and other resources like information, personal, property, consensus, to endow the 
collective actors representative of the voiceless.  
 
Table 30 First group of LRAs categorized by the cooperative mobilization of action resources. Source: The author.  
LRA Coalition 
Mobilization of 
AR 
Institutional 
Creativity Extent Coherence Closure 
LRA ACDI/VOCA S-B PF+PT+PR+SHC Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA CS Standard-R PF+PT+PR+SHP+SHC Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA ACDI/VOCA N-B PF+PT+PR+SHP+SHC Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA MH-R PT+SHP+SHC Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Higher 
LRA Natural-R PF+PT+PR+SHP+SHC Cooperative / Selfishly Presence Higher Higher Higher 
LRA Specialty-B PF+SHP Cooperative / Selfishly  Presence Lower Lower Higher 
 
 
In four of the six LRAs in this group, the stakeholders in consumption (MH in two LRAs in Riosucio 
and ACDI/VOCA in two LRAs in Buesaco) cooperatively mobilized their AR organization, which 
functioned as a vector to mainly bring into the LRA foreign demands for services (by consumers, 
roasters, other stakeholders in consumption and stakeholders in production at the national and 
departmental level) and other action resources (information, personal, property, law), in order to 
endow in the action resources needed a collective actor representative of the voiceless: the 
indigenous movement with money and political support so they could effectively represent the 
interest of the indigenes (LRA MH-R); the small coffee farmers with the personal by stablishing 
Asprocafé so their interest could be put forward (LRA Natural-R); and the coffee farmers in 
Buesaco associated (like Asoveracruz) with the information so they improve their negotiation 
position with roasters (both LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S-B). In all cases, they concretized the Specialty 
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Coffee Program to develop the VSS market1017  so the whole group of profilers changed their uses 
of constituents to profile a commonly agreed combination of services, which implied additional 
regulation and stronger coordination, therefore increasing both the extent and the coherence. 
 
In the fifth case, the stakeholder in production (Alcaldía de Riosucio) cooperatively mobilized 
their AR political support, which functioned as a vector to bring into the LRA mainly local demands 
for services (indigenous and communal leaders), in order to endow with the consensus the 
FNC/Comité so their demands could be put forward. As a result, they were able to innovatively 
activate the two instruments of the coffee public policy:  the renovation and the diversification 
programs in order to incentivize farmers to profile a mestizo-type of climate-smart coffee culture, 
increasing both the extent and the coherence.  
 
In the sixth case, the LRA Specialty in Buesaco, the cooperative mobilization of the political 
support was associated with lower extent and coherence because, the small and homogeneous 
coalition of farmers and stakeholders in production agreed on reducing the regulations to trigger 
experimentation (reducing the extent) while vertically integrating in their own enterprise the 
whole set of processes from trading to roasting and brewing. In other words, they cooperatively 
mobilized their action resources within an LRA that explicitly wanted to exclude other profilers.  
Nonetheless, this enterprise failed 1018  in influencing the know-to-appreciate of enough 
consumers to produce the “exceptional coffee” taste related service and with it, the monetary 
services sought by the coalition (reducing the coherence)1019.  
 
The second group of LRAs (Natural-R, Specialty-B; Fairtrade-R, LRA Standard-plus-B, La Vereda-
R) 1020 was mostly associated with lower extent and lower coherence without any apparent effect 
in the closure. In this group, with one exception (LRA Natural-R), Stakeholders selfishly mobilized 
their “political support” and “property” to take advantage of the unbalanced power game to 
profile their demanded services at the expense of the other actors.  
 
Table 31 Second group of LRAs categorized by the selfish mobilization of action resources. Source: The author. 
LRA Coalition 
Mobilization of 
AR 
Institutional 
Creativity Extent Coherence Closure 
LRA Natural-R PF+PT+PR+SHP+SHC Cooperative / Selfishly Presence Higher Higher Higher 
LRA Specialty-B PF+SHP Cooperative / Selfishly  Presence Lower Lower Higher 
LRA Fairtrade-R PF+PT+SHC Selfishly Absence Lower Lower Lower 
                                                     
1017 In fact, the first cooperative mobilization (LRA MH) innovatively activated the coffee public policy to create the 
first “specialty” coffee market profiling the Fairtrade symbolic service.  
1018 Even though the failure was explained by the change of the departmental administration, if it had continued, it 
could not be said that it would have succeeded because the roasted packaged coffee market is a very mature industry 
with very well positioned players.  
1019 Eventually, they would realize through the Café Plus initiative that given the state of market’s maturity, it was 
smarter to include traders and roasters than exclude them to increase the higher monetary services. 
1020 As there are two LRAs (Natural-R and Specialty-B) featured by both a cooperative and a selfishly mobilization of 
action resources, we preferred to include them in both groups, so we do not lose analytical inputs.   
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LRA Standard-plus-B PF+SHP Selfishly Absence Higher Lower Higher 
LRA La Vereda-R SHP Selfishly Absence Lower Lower Lower 
 
Indeed, in three of the five LRAs in this group, the stakeholders in production selfishly mobilized 
their AR political support to take advantage of the unbalanced power game to profile their 
demanded services at the expense of the other actors: the FNC concretized the coffee public 
policy at the expense of the “terroir expression” demanded by the Comité de Nariño and the EdN 
in the LRAs Standard-Plus-B; the Indigenous Movement circumvent the coffee public policy to 
discourage the over-cultivation of coffee at the expense of the monetary services demanded by 
profilers in the LRA La Vereda-R;  and the Gobernación de Nariño circumvent the coffee public 
policy to invest itself with the authority to incentivize farmers profile the “exceptional coffee” 
taste related service at the expense of the profile demanded by the FNC/Nespresso and Starbucks 
in the LRA Specialty-B.  
 
In a fourth case, the LRA Fairtrade-R, the stakeholders in consumption selfishly mobilized their 
AR property to take advantage of the unbalanced power game to concretize the coffee public 
policy by imposing the use of the certification mark to produce the “Fairtrade coffee” symbolic 
service at the expense of the “monetary services” of the indigenous community and a portion of 
coffee growers. In all cases, by leaving behind some actors, coordination to profile the same 
combination of services was severely affected reducing coherence. In three cases the fewer 
services implied fewer regulations (only the LRA Standard-plus-B had more regulation because it 
derives from the very low regulated LRA Standard-B), reducing extent.     
 
In a fifth case, the LRA Natural, the selfishly mobilization of the organization was associated with 
higher extent and coherence that could be explained through our diachronic analysis in which, 
after the first selfishly mobilization, there were other complementary cooperative mobilizations 
in which small farmers were endowed with representation and both previously affected actors 
by the selfish mobilization, the indigenous community and the Comité/Cooperative, were 
empowered again by Asprocafé and Asproinca, so they demand for services was profiled 
including the mestizo and environmentally responsible practices (increasing the extent) and the 
coordination among actors through the interinstitutional committee (increasing the coherence).     
 
The third group of LRAs (Organic-R, Nespresso-R, Nespresso-B, EdN-B, Reg/Starbucks-R, 
CCEsp/Starbucks-B, Cnilson-B, Caltura-B), featured by the strategic mobilization of various action 
resources (organization, personal, money, property and law) associated with both “higher” (four 
cases) and “lower” (four cases) configurations. Indeed, this mobilization is the expected one 
when the power game is balanced: actors attempt to activate institutions in order to incentivize 
the production of their demanded services but they are neutral in the sense that they neither 
intend to empower other actors nor to impose their demanded service at the expense of the 
services demanded by others.  
 
Table 32 Third group of LRAs categorized by the strategic mobilization of action resources. Source: The author. 
LRA Coalition 
Mobilization of 
AR 
Institutional 
Creativity Extent Coherence Closure 
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LRA Organic-R PF+PT+PR+SHC Strategically Presence Higher Higher Higher 
LRA Nespresso-R PT+PR+SHP+SHC Strategically Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA Caltura-B PF+PT+SHP Strategically Absence Lower Lower Lower 
LRA Nespresso-B PT+PR+SHP Strategically Absence Lower Lower Lower 
LRA Cnilson-B PF+PT+PR Strategically Presence Lower Higher Higher 
LRA Reg/Starbucks-R PT+PR Strategically Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA EdN-B PT+PR Strategically Absence Higher Lower Lower 
LRA CCEsp/Starbucks-B PT+PR Strategically Absence Lower Lower Lower 
 
 
• Discussion     
 
These results support our claim that in an unbalanced-power initial state of the negotiation, the 
actors face a first negotiation dilemma: either they cooperate to balance it improving the LRA’s 
conditions or they deceive to take advantage deteriorating LRA’s conditions.  
 
Indeed, we have shown that, when actors in an LRA look for balanced-power negotiation through 
a cooperative mobilization of action resources like organization and political support, they can 
bring into the LRA foreigners (like roasters) and locals (like community leaders). By giving voice to the 
previously unheard actors, such games can enlarge the commonly agreed set of demanded 
services, increasing the extent and the coherence.  
 
On the contrary, when actors look for an unbalanced-power negotiation through a selfish 
mobilization of action resources like political support and property, they can influence profilers’ 
behavior to provide their demanded service at the expense of the services demanded by other 
actors, decreasing the extent and lower coherence.  
 
Nonetheless, an additional step can be done for squeezing learnings from the strategic 
mobilization group. We can cluster the LRAs in two sets depending on whether institutional 
creativity is present (table 33).  
 
Table 33 Third group of LRAs clustered by the presence of institutional creativity. Source: The author. 
LRA Coalition 
Mobilization of 
AR 
Institutional 
Creativity Extent Coherence Closure 
LRA Organic-R PF+PT+PR+SHC Strategically Presence Higher Higher Higher 
LRA Nespresso-R PT+PR+SHP+SHC Strategically Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA Caltura-B PF+PT+SHP Strategically Absence Lower Lower Lower 
LRA Nespresso-B PT+PR+SHP Strategically Absence Lower Lower Lower 
LRA Cnilson-B PF+PT+PR Strategically Presence Lower Higher Higher 
LRA Reg/Starbucks-R PT+PR Strategically Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA EdN-B PT+PR Strategically Absence Higher Lower Lower 
LRA CCEsp/Starbucks-B PT+PR Strategically Absence Lower Lower Lower 
 
On the one hand, we have four strategic mobilizations (LRA Organic-R, LRA Nespresso-R, LRA 
Cnilson-B, LRA Reg/Starbucks-R) associated with the presence of institutional creativity and, with 
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one exception (LRA Cnilson-B) higher extent and higher coherence. On the other hand, four 
strategic mobilizations are associated with the absence of institutional creativity (LRA 
CCEsp/Starbucks-B; LRA Caltura-B; LRA EdN-B; LRA Nespresso-B) and, with one exception (LRA 
EdN-B) lower extent and lower coherence. 
 
This observation illustrates that, in the case of a strategic mobilization, in order to trigger the 
higher extent and coherence (without a clear effect in closure), what looks relevant is the result 
of it associated with the presence of institutional creativity.  
 
This learning can be extrapolated to the actor’s games composed of various types of mobilization 
as can be shown with the example of the four-mobilization game within the LRA Natural-R: one 
strategic, one selfishly, one strategic and one cooperative. The failed first strategic mobilization 
of the indigenous movement’s consensus and the second selfishly mobilization of the MH’s 
organization weakened both the Cooperative and the indigenous movement but empowered the 
coffee farmers. The third strategic mobilization of the Comité’s personal and the Cooperative’s 
property improved their negotiating position. And finally, the cooperative mobilization of 
Asproinca and Asprocafé’s information empowered again the indigenous movement and 
attracted closer to the Comité-FNC. In the end, this set of mobilizations produced the distribution 
of the action resources needed so that all actors could put forward their demand for services. It 
is this last result in combination with the presence of institutional creativity that looks relevant 
to trigger the high extent and high coherence. 
 
Hence, the mobilization itself is no important if we do not take into account the second 
negotiation dilemma in which actors agreed on both the “production” and the “distribution”. The 
institutional creativity through which actors reach an agreement on the profile and on how to 
distribute the burden of the changes in the uses of Resource Constituents and the benefits. 
Because if it is clear that a power-unbalanced negotiation hardly would profile the services 
demanded by all interested actors, it is not straightforward that a power-balance one would do 
it.  
 
9.3.4. Institutional creativity 
 
Completely attached to the type of mobilization of action resources, institutional creativity is the 
action that transmits causal force from this power related first negotiation and the final 
production of services.  
 
We analyze the presence of institutional creativity in each LRA depending on both the procedural 
element (deliberative scenario) and the substantive element (the second negotiation dilemma), 
which is composed of both the distribution (uses of Resource constituents) and the production 
(the profile).  
 
• Results    
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A transversal lecture of this third analytical dimension can differentiate among LRAs grouped 
according to whether institutional creativity is present or is absent. 
 
In the first group of ten LRAs were institutional creativity is present (Natural-R; CS Standard-R; 
ACDI/VOCA N-B; Organic-S; ACDI/VOCA S-B; Nespresso-R;  MH-R; Reg/Starbucks-R; Cnilson-B 
Specialty-B;), deliberative scenarios among the coalition were documented and agreements were 
reached on both the distribution and the production: there was a clear decision on the 
distribution on who has to assume the costs/benefits of changing the uses of constituents (that 
would be encouraged/discouraged when shaping the outputs derived from the institutional 
regime) and a positive distribution of the added-value generated throughout the coalition; also 
there was an agreement on the expected profile  to be provided.   
 
In the second group of seven LRAs were institutional creativity is absent (Standard-plus-B; EdN-
B; Fairtrade-R; Caltura-B; Nespresso-B; La Vereda-R; CCEsp/Starbucks-B), there were no 
deliberative scenarios documented, distribution of costs and benefits favors some actors, as it is 
confirmed when services demanded by the winners were produced at the expense of those 
demanded by the losers.   
 
Table 34 LRAs categorized by the presence or absence of institutional creativity. Source: The author. 
LRA Coalition 
Mobilization of 
AR 
Institutional 
Creativity Extent Coherence Closure 
LRA Natural-R PF+PT+PR+SHP+SHC Selfishly-Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Higher 
LRA CS Standard-R PF+PT+PR+SHP+SHC Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA ACDI/VOCA N-B PF+PT+PR+SHP+SHC Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA Organic-R PF+PT+PR+SHC Strategically Presence Higher Higher Higher 
LRA ACDI/VOCA S-B PF+PT+PR+SHC Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA Nespresso-R PT+PR+SHP+SHC Strategically Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA MH-R PT+SHP+SHC Cooperative Presence Higher Higher Higher 
LRA Reg/Starbucks-R PT+PR Strategically Presence Higher Higher Lower 
LRA Cnilson-B PF+PT+PR Strategically Presence Lower Higher Higher 
LRA Specialty-B PF+SHP Cooperative / Selfishly  Presence Lower Lower Higher 
LRA Standard-plus-B PF+SHP Selfishly Absence Higher Lower Higher 
LRA EdN-B PT+PR Strategically Absence Higher Lower Lower 
LRA Fairtrade-R PF+PT+SHC Selfishly Absence Lower Lower Lower 
LRA Caltura-B PF+PT+SHP Strategically Absence Lower Lower Lower 
LRA Nespresso-B PT+PR+SHP Strategically Absence Lower Lower Lower 
LRA La Vereda-R SHP Selfishly Absence Lower Lower Lower 
LRA CCEsp/Starbucks-B PT+PR Strategically Absence Lower Lower Lower 
 
Table 34, shows that the presence of the institutional creativity is mainly associated with higher 
extent and higher coherence without any apparent effect in the closure. Indeed, in the first 
group, eight of the ten cases in which institutional creativity is present, both the extent and the 
coherence are higher with two deviant cases (LRA CNilson-B and LRA Specialty-B). In the second 
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group, the absence of institutional creativity is associated with lower coherence in all the cases 
and with lower extent in five out of seven.  
 
Furthermore, five cases (LRAs Natural-R1021; CS Standard-R; ACDI/VOCA N-B; ACDI/VOCA S-B and 
MH-R,) show a relation between the cooperative mobilization of action resources (first 
negotiation dilemma), the presence of the institutional creativity (second negotiation dilemma) 
and both higher extent and coherence (no effect on closure). Whereas three cases (LRAs 
Standard-plus-B, Fairtrade-R, La Vereda-R)  shows a relation between the selfish mobilization of 
action resources (first negotiation dilemma), the absence of the institutional creativity (second 
negotiation dilemma) and lower coherence and/or extent (no effect on closure).  
 
However, there is a deviant case (LRA Specialty) in which there is a both selfishly and cooperative 
mobilization with the presence of institutional creativity and lower extent and coherence but 
higher closure.  
 
• Discussion    
 
This exception invites us to take a closer look in the relation between the institutional creativity 
and the three conditions: extent, coherence, and closure respectively.   
 
The deliberative scenario, as a physical space that permits actors to discuss and negotiate their 
perception of both the definition of the problem and alternative solutions, is a fundamental 
element that could pave the way to agree on the uses of Resource constituents that should be 
(dis) incentivized and the outcomes to do so. That is, the activation (in the broad spectrum 
between concretization and omission) of an institution, steaming from public policies and the 
regulatory system, to motivate a change in the behavior of the target group (in terms of their use 
of Resource constituents). This activation affects the first of the conditions of the LRA in our 
conceptualization: extent.  
 
It is plausible to assume that institutional creativity, as a transmitter of demands for services 
tends to increase the extent by incorporating new uses that are added to those previously 
regulated by fewer actors. At first sight, our analysis reflects this logic given that as more actors 
are incorporated into the coalition, new demands request new regulated uses and therefore, as 
time progresses, extent increases. And the other way around, such as the case LRA CNilson-B in 
which extent is lower because the previous coalition (LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S-B), which included 
stakeholders in consumption and production, was reduced to only profilers so fewer services 
were demanded and fewer uses were regulated.  
 
A diachronic analysis of two LRAs gives us a more enriching reading. During the development of 
the LRA Natural-R, institutional creativity worked to make all the uses of the Resource 
constituents compatible with the “natural coffee” symbolic service, thus obstructing the rise of 
                                                     
1021 Even though there are both selfishly and cooperative mobilization of AR, we consider overall this LRA as a 
cooperative one.  
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regulations on uses to provide other services. In this sense, impeding a potential increase in the 
extent.  The transition once the FLO certification mark dismembered the actors’ coalition in the 
LRA Natural, showed that in order to implement different uses of Resource constituents, it was 
necessary to break the agreement (so to eliminate institutional creativity) and incentivize 
excluding uses of Resource constituents in different groups of profilers (AAA farmers, organic 
farmers, La Vereda farmers). Similarly, in the case of Buesaco, when the institutional creativity 
triggered by ACDI/VOCA agreed on a profile that enhances productivity, quality and reduces the 
environmental impact, it obstructed the enactment of regulation to provide other services like 
the “exceptional coffee” taste related service, which eventually led to its weakening. When la 
Niña put in danger the access to the Resource, the coalition melted and some groups of 
producers, among them Asoveracruz, broke away from the agreement to join other coalition that 
incentivized different uses to profile other services.  
 
We would say that these examples demonstrate the institutional complexity trap (Bolognesi et 
al., 2018) in which the demands for new services (that implies higher extent) were so incoherent 
(if implemented) that they were in some sort kept under pressure by the coalition until an 
unmanageable situation, like the external events mentioned, generated an implosion of the LRA.  
 
However, the research also has shown a case in which this complexity trap was surpassed: the 
LRA CS Standard-R. Indeed, the logic of the institutional creativity in this LRA, evolved from a 
"towards" to a "from": from an agreement to direct uses “towards” a specific profile to an 
agreement on a set of minimum uses “from” which different profiles would be produced. In the 
latter, the minimum uses produce a basic agreed profile from which, each group of actors, could 
add another layer of regulated uses that would increase the extent in a lower perimeter of the 
Resource.  
 
The particularity of the “from” logic is that the minimum uses agreed could optimize the provision 
of services up to the limit in which they begin to be incompatible, subsequent uses are 
encouraged through different LRAs to profile those incompatible services in different perimeters 
of the Resource.  
 
Contrary evidence is observed in Buesaco, in which the completely opposite phenomena 
occurred. The institutional complexity trap is repeated in a very short period because the 
demanded services (hence the regulations) are so inherently incoherent that the LRAs imploded 
one after the other.  
 
The example is LRA Specialty-B. Actors bring about the institutional creativity to shape uses of 
constituents “towards” a profile featured by the high-scored coffee, transparently traded and 
well paid. This profile as desirable as it looks is inherently incoherent because systematically 
among the whole population of farmers who implement the regulated uses, only the very top 
would produce it: if everyone could produce the high-scored and well-paid coffee, new farmers 
would be attracted until the price would equal the standard coffee.  
 
339 
 
It was a doomed promise since the beginning, an unsurprisingly, the LRA Specialty left unsatisfied 
actors behind. Like Sisyphus, actors created the new LRA CCEsp/Starbucks from the incumbent 
LRA Specialty in the exact same logic towards the doomed profiled, with the same consequence. 
A new group of unsatisfied actors was left behind and created a new LRA Caltura in the exact 
same logic (towards the doomed profiled) with the same consequence. In this last case, a group 
of unsatisfied actors was clever enough to create the new LRA CNilson only with the demanded 
quantity of coffee produced by the proven high-scored coffee farmers1022.   
  
Therefore, institutional creativity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to increase extent. 
Nevertheless, our empirical observations allow us to argue that only if all stakeholders in 
production and consumption participate in the deliberative scenario and, the institutional 
creativity prioritizes the "from" logic (minimum regulated uses), it could be necessary and 
sufficient to increase the extent before imploding due to unsurmountable incoherencies, in other 
words, overtaking the institutional complexity trap.   
 
Coherence also is associated with institutional creativity. In fact, the LRA La Vereda-R, in which 
institutional creativity was absent, there were rivalries so strong that in one coffee producer’s 
farm two actors arrived with (dis)incentives to use Resource constituents in a completely 
opposite way: the FNC to increase the production of coffee and the indigenous movement to 
eliminate the crop. Whereas in the cases in which institutional creativity is present, the 
(dis)incentives on the coffee farmer tend to be oriented in the same direction. 
 
However, the fact that institutional creativity acts on the coffee farmer does not necessarily imply 
that it acts on the other profilers: the LRA Specialty-B featured by the presence of institutional 
creativity had a low coherence because its coalition is deprived not only of both stakeholders in 
consumption and production but also other profilers. As a result, it has not only less regulated 
uses but also the fewer services it sought for, could not be properly profiled because, by excluding 
traders and roasters from the deliberative scenarios, the exceptional coffee beans lost their 
uniqueness when selling them as standard coffee. It made impossible to control the final profile 
of the Resource, especially the symbolic and taste related services dependent on the origin.  
 
Therefore, institutional creativity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to increase 
coherence. As it showed the previous case, the latter requires participation in the deliberative 
scenarios of all the profilers, regardless of their domicile. Hence, we venture to affirm that only 
if all profilers along the coffee value chain participate in the deliberative scenario, institutional 
creativity could be a necessary and sufficient condition to increase coherence. 
 
By defining uses of Resource constituents among a large group of actors, institutional creativity 
should decrease the closure and maintain the power balance. Curiously, institutional creativity is 
absent only in one of the five LRA with high closure (Standard-plus-B) but it is present in the other 
four (LRA MH-R, Organic-R, Natural-R, and CNilson-B). Interesting, in these cases, participant 
actors, including other profilers, decided to created barriers of entry at the municipal level to 
                                                     
1022 Still during the field work, farmers wanted another LRA that will provide them with the high-scored coffee profile.  
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produce the “product differentiation” that would add value for the whole group of profilers. 
Hence, institutional creativity is not a necessary or sufficient condition to decrease closure. 
However, if the coalition agrees, through deliberative scenarios, to impose barriers at the 
municipal level, institutional creativity could be a necessary and sufficient condition to increase 
closure.  
 
9.3.5. Concluding remarks    
 
Having shown that high closure is not salient to increase the level of services provision, there are 
three lessons that could be explored in further research to increase the extent and the coherence, 
so the level of services provision.   
 
Firstly, a large and heterogeneous coalition composed of the whole group of profilers and 
stakeholders in both consumption and production could increase the extent and the coherence 
by reducing the transaction costs through collective (or corporate actors) which exclusively 
represent the aggregated individuals interested on services from the Resource at the same 
perimeter.  
 
Secondly, even though the cooperative mobilization is neither necessary nor sufficient, the first 
negotiation dilemma remains salient: actors should either sought for a power-balance starting 
point through cooperative mobilizations or improve their own position through strategic 
mobilizations to create the conditions to solve the second negotiation dilemma, and eventually, 
increase the extent and the coherence.  
  
Thirdly, the presence of institutional creativity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
produce an LRA with both high extent and coherence. The institutional complexity trap would 
make it implode with the arrival of new actors and new services. Nevertheless, if the second 
negotiation dilemma is solved through the “from” logic (minimum regulated uses), it could 
overtake this trap and increases both the extent and the coherence.  
 
9.4. Usefulness of the analytical framework  
 
We finish this concluding chapter evaluating our analytical framework in regards to its usefulness 
to answer our question: How do actors negotiate an LRA that optimizes the provision of symbolic, 
sensory and monetary services from the Resource Coffee? 
 
We start recognizing that the complexity of the framework impeded a simple verification of our 
two hypotheses. However, from our epistemological perspective, it was more important to falsify 
them. And in this sense, from the operational perspective, the framework was perfectly suited.   
 
9.4.1. Epistemological perspective    
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Thus, from an epistemological perspective, we adhere to Favre (2005) philosophie de l’histoire 
presented in three thesis: “Thesis 1: the world (present and past) is integrally determined, so it 
is integrally cognizable by the science; thesis 2: that the world is determined does not mean that 
its future is predictable: the world is nonetheless contingent; thesis 3: human action cannot be 
based on the prediction of its effects, must be based on values established by reason and 
therefore generalizable” (translation by the author (pp. 31-32)).  
 
In short, past events can be explained but future events cannot be predicted because of its 
inherent contingency. Nevertheless, there is one certain future: the impossible one. So, we follow 
Favre (2005) concept of “dissymétrie structurelle between what can happen and what cannot 
happen (...) if a person hesitates to appear in a competition, the two branches of the alternative 
are dissymmetrical as to the success of the competition: if the person does not show up she will 
not succeed for sure, if she shows up, she can succeed or fail” (translation by the author (p. 200)). 
 
This analytical framework works not for identifying the mechanism that would enhance the 
sustainable management of Resources, but the mechanisms that surely cannot enhance it. And 
this last chapter has shown quite a lot of combinations that would not enhance the sustainable 
management of Resources. From small coalition that selfishly mobilized their action resources to 
coalitions that cooperatively mobilized theirs but are homogeneous enough to impede other 
actors to move forward their demanded services.   
 
Knowing that all of those combinations would not enhance the sustainable management of 
Resources, at least we know that a large and heterogeneous coalition of collective actors (which 
exclusively represent the aggregated individuals interested on services from the Resource at the 
same perimeter), which sought for a power-balance starting point through cooperative 
mobilizations to trigger institutional creativity through the “from” logic, could enhance the 
sustainable management of Resources.  
 
Providing evidence of actions that must be avoided, and opening a door for trying something 
that, even if not certain, it is possible that could work, we consider the analytical framework a 
successful tool.   
 
9.4.2. Operational perspective    
 
We come back to our operational model (figure 29) that we developed in chapter 2. Initially, we 
proposed to explain the sustainable management of the Resource by the Local Regulatory 
Arrangement (LRA) categorized through eight configurations (the combined presence/absence 
of three conditions, extent, coherence, and closure). Then, we proposed to explain the LRA 
configuration by the actors’ games, originally conceptualized as a sequence of three analytical 
dimensions: an actors’ coalition which could decide on a cooperative, strategic or selfishly 
mobilization of action resources to produce or not institutional creativity.  
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Figure 12 Operational Model. Source: the author. 
 
 
From an operational perspective, this framework is robust because it produces a convincing 
picture of the variable to explain: the level of services provided by the Resource in a given 
Resource perimeter. 
 
The heuristic technique to identify them through the purchase transaction is both feasible and 
powerful. At the beginning, we thought that some local services negatively related with coffee 
would be excluded like the water pollution that affected the local community, or the threat on 
the cultural identity of the indigenous farmers, because they were not in the interest of coffee 
buyers, but actually, they were at the heart of the transactions because they were the ones that 
inspired the profiling institutions.  
 
Still, there could be some negative services that could not be identified through the purchase 
transaction, but from my experience in the field, they are not part of the profiling institutions 
mainly because there is no critical mass. Eventually, when the critical mass is reached, the service 
would be somehow included in the implementation of the profiling institution.  
 
Even though the framework is empirically demanding to assess the observable provision of 
services by each LRA, it proved robust enough to provide a convincing picture of the level of 
services provided by each LRA.  
 
Firstly, supported mainly on quantitative data, chapters 5.1 and 7.1 statistically demonstrated 
that LRAs produce a different level of services provision. Then, supported mainly on qualitative 
data, chapters 5.2 and 5.3 demonstrate that conditions varied between LRAs.  
 
The framework has allowed us to provide enough evidence to support our initial assumption that 
when the conditions are absent, market forces would profile the Resource. If this combination of 
services is acceptable enough, actors would not interfere. But if market forces put at risk some 
valuable service for a group of actors, layers of extent, coherence and closure begin to settle to 
profile other combination of services.  
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Conditions have not equal explanatory power. It looks like if there were a hierarchy in which 
coherence is the main relevant condition, whereas extent follows and closure ends the line.  
Indeed, if the participant actors in an LRA demand a combination of services just a little bit over 
the one encouraged by market forces, which implied few regulations (low extent), coherence 
would be the only necessary condition to provide the high level of demanded services. However, 
it does not work the other way around, if coherence is low, no matter the level of the extent and 
closure, there will be a gap between the observed services and the demanded ones that forcefully 
will decrease the level of services provided.  
 
In this sense, coherence cannot be compensated by extent nor by closure. But extent and closure 
can compensate each other as long as coherence is present. The high extent can compensate the 
low closure because by codifying the agreed uses of Resource constituents it does not matter 
where the market power is actually placed. On the other hand, high closure can compensate 
extent because usually the former implies a small enough group of actors that can autonomously 
use their Resource constituents to profile the services demanded even if they are not regulated.     
 
Nevertheless, the framework could be improved by refining the variation of conditions. Our 
research design showed that the presence or absence of conditions explains the different level 
of services provision, in other words, a different configuration is associated with different results. 
But, we have also shown that results are different between LRAs with the same configuration as 
in Buesaco. Three LRAs (CCEsp/Starbucks; Caltura; Nespresso) were categorized as “ambitious” 
and, at the same time, differed in the level of services provision. The explanation is 
straightforward: the binary variation of the conditions in our research is too wide to capture the 
subtleties of the LRAs. In this example, coherence was absent in the three LRAs, but if a more 
refined technique would have been used, it could have shown a different level of the “absence” 
of coherence that could have explained the difference. It has no implication for the wider analysis 
but it could provide enriching information.    
 
Furthermore, we have demonstrated that extent, coherence, and closure were not 
spontaneously laid down but they were a result of the actors’ games. Following our 
epistemological approach, we consider that the picture composed by different LRAs, with various 
levels of services provision in a given perimeter, was determined so it can be explained. In 
chapters 6 and 8 we have traceback in a very (maybe too) detailed way the actions that 
transmitted causal force to laid down those layers: actors’ coalitions, mobilization of actions 
resources and institutional creativity.  
 
Contrary to the previous case, the diachronic approach implies a sequence in which it is irrelevant 
to evaluate the different explanatory capacity of the evaluated variables. I mean, first there is an 
actor’ coalition so actors could mobilize their resources of action, and then, they could trigger 
institutional creativity. So, if there is not any coalition, then, the other actions would not happen 
and no LRA would be produced.  
 
Indeed, we have demonstrated the existence of actors’ coalition in the decision-making process 
of each one of the LRAs identified in the field, as well as their mobilization of action resources. 
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Once these two actions were present, then institutional creativity could appear or not. For the 
third action to happen, the previous two have to happen. In this sense, all analytical dimensions 
are equally important to explain why a certain LRA is produced. 
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Chapter 10. Recommendations 
 
This final chapter is divided into three subchapters, the first one presents the key message in 
which we venture to propose the kind of negotiations that could enhance the sustainable 
management of the Resource coffee. The second one analyzes the effect of profiling institutions 
to highlight their relevance. The third one presents particular recommendations with regards to 
the sustainable management of the coffee Resource in Colombia, starting with recommendations 
at the national level and concluding with recommendations for each actor (farmers; stakeholders 
in production; other profilers, and stakeholders in consumption).    
 
10.1. Key message    
 
The general recommendation is straightforward: from this anthropocentric perspective on 
sustainability, the key to enhance the collective action is the dialogue at the appropriate 
resource-perimeter level, in which interested individuals are aggregated in collective or 
corporate actors that represent the whole set of profilers and stakeholders in production and 
consumption. If they solve the first negotiation dilemma privileging a power-balanced initial 
stage and the second negotiation dilemma through a minimum of regulated uses, they would 
trigger either a responsible entrepreneur or integral LRA, which could enhance the sustainable 
management of the Resource.   
 
In the case of Coffee, our results suggest an escalated dialogue at the various perimeters of the 
Resource. A kind of “cunning entrepreneur” regime from the whole world coffee harvest at the 
international level in which a small group of representatives of collective actors (profilers and 
stakeholders in production and consumption) exclusively interested on services at this global 
perimeter negotiates, from a power-balanced initial stage, the minimum requirements for the 
whole coffee harvest.  
 
This aggregation is one main challenge that opens the door for future research. How can be 
consolidated a group of actors large enough to represent the whole set of demanded services 
from the Resource Coffee, but at the same time, small enough to make it feasible a negotiation? 
Are countries the appropriate “collective actor” that aggregates the whole set of demanded 
services within their frontiers? Profilers should be disaggregated on the various segments of the 
coffee value chain? To which point stakeholders should be aggregated into a bigger collective 
actor?  
 
The Fairtrade System1023 explained in chapter 5.2.2 shed light on an interesting grouping that 
could be further explored: Actors are aggregated firstly because of the demanded services and 
then because of geographical proximity. Henceforth, they aggregate both producers around the 
monetary services and, other profilers and stakeholders around the Fairtrade symbolic service. 
Secondly, they aggregate at the very local perimeter (E.g. Asprocafé in Riosucio aggregates more 
                                                     
1023 The source for this paragraph is the Fairtrade official webpage: www.fairtrade.net  
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than 800 individuals) then at the regional one (E.g. Asprocafe, alongside more than 800 producers 
organizations involved in different agricultural products1024 in 24 countries in Latin-America are 
aggregated in one collective actor: the Coordinadora Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Pequeños 
Productores y Trabajadores de Comercio Justo – CLAC) and finally, at the global level (the CLAC 
alongside two other collective actors, Fairtrade Africa and the NAPP in the Asia Pacific). So, this 
aggregation allows that three collective actors could represent individuals that demand 
monetary services, namely 1.6 million agricultural producers in 75 countries. Similarly in the case 
of actors who demand the Fairtrade symbolic service. 
 
If this structure would be replicated for the whole set of services demanded by the Resource 
Coffee at the global perimeter, one collective actor could represent each demanded service. In 
this case, it could be possible to have a set of interested actors both representative and small 
enough to overcome transaction cost and substantially negotiate the minimum requirements for 
the whole coffee harvest. 
  
This will only work if this minimum profile produced by this global regime is agreed at the national 
level by a small group of representatives of collective actors exclusively interested at this 
perimeter. Such an agreement should include a power-balanced initial stage, a context-related 
extra layer of minimum uses, and the final outputs to spark the coherence needed to effectively 
bring about this global and national agreed profile.  
  
Finally, at the local level, the widest possible coalition of profilers and both stakeholders 
exclusively interested in that particular perimeter, should negotiate, again on the basis of a 
power-balanced initial stage, a third layer of context-dependent minimum uses over which the 
different actor’s coalitions could profile, at lower perimeters (a Vereda, a group of farms, etc.), 
“responsible entrepreneur” or “integral” LRAs that in sum, could profile the whole set of their 
demanded services.  
 
It is true that the more the minimum uses are regulated at different levels, the highest is the risk 
of the complexity trap that would implode the whole system. But on the other side, the “invisible 
hand” LRA is being questioned not only by coffee growers and consumers, and stakeholders in 
production and consumption but also by the companies themselves that are facing challenges in 
both their supply departments and their marketing ones: the supply of high-quality coffee and 
the positive brand reputation. Logically the free market would profile just one combination of 
services derivate from the highest efficient coffee culture. If actors feel their services provision 
threatened in the long turn, such a poorly regulated and incoherent LRA would never satisfy 
them. We have shown how another kind of LRAs with higher extent and coherence could provide 
a different combination of demanded services.    
 
In addition, the power-balanced initial stage looks like a naïve recommendation when there is a 
USD one-hundred billion industry at stake. However, we have provided evidence that when the 
                                                     
1024 Oils, nuts and seeds; Sugar and Panela; Banana; Cocoa; Coffee; Fresh Fruits; Dried Fruits; Juices and pulps; 
Honey; Wine; Quinoa; Handcrafts; Infusions, aromatic herbs and tea; Flowers; Vegetables. 
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first negotiation dilemma privileged an unbalanced power initial stage, the second negotiation 
dilemma is solved in favor of a portion of actors who would profile their demanded services, at 
the expense of the demanded services of other actors. Defining sustainability when all services 
demanded by actors from the Resource are guaranteed in their expected life span, this naïve-like 
recommendation takes its positive standing: an unbalanced power initial stage would not profile 
the whole set of services from the Resource demanded by actors.  
 
This recommendation is not a childish optimism. Remember that a small movement of people 
(Levy et al., 2015) that started the political vindication for the sustainable (in the socio-economic 
and environmental sense) symbolic service of coffee, were able to irrupt into the business-as-
usual coffee market. They mobilized their organization to empower the voiceless, echoing their 
message that business-as-usual were endangering their way of life and natural environment. And 
this message reached a population big enough1025 that companies had to change their uses of 
constituents to intend to profile these symbolic services in order to attract this population. And, 
as we have shown in our research, it sparked actors’ coalition that resulted in “responsible 
entrepreneur” and “integral” LRAs that enhance the sustainable management of coffee in the 
given perimeter. In short, enterprises which want to remain profitable, and by analogy political 
leaders to remain in power, have to follow people’s preferences. If the proportion of people that 
prioritized the communal benefit over the self-benefit continues to grow, eventually business 
and public policies would favor the kind of negotiations we have discussed to profile “responsible 
entrepreneur” or “integral” LRAs. 
 
10.2. Profiling institutions matter 
 
We have used the “lens of negotiation” to understand how actors could optimize services 
provision, one main component is the use of profiling institutions. That is why we are interested 
in using the “lens of contract” so we can improve our knowledge on the institutions by assessing 
the effect of institutions against their problem definition.  
 
The uncompetitive coffee culture in Colombia after the breakdown of the quota market (chapter 
4.2) generated a widely shared definition of the problem: the international coffee market did not 
provide enough monetary services for coffee growers causing poverty, and its associated 
problems regarding environmental degradation, weakening of social cohesion or illegal crops. In 
this sense, the whole set of profiling institutions, which were mobilized in our two contexts of 
study, had the intention to improve the monetary services received by farmers.  
 
Our research design is particularly well suited for testing the effect of institutions over the 
monetary services of coffee farmers. In other researches1026, scholars conducted this test by 
randomly selecting farmers implementing a profiling institution (e.g. farmers’ participant in the 
Nespresso AAA program) and farmers that do not in one particular region, then they repeat this 
                                                     
1025 A highly attractive 37% of consumers categorized depending on their engagement with sustainability (Bemporad 
et al., 2012).  
1026 In both chapters 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 we present them.  
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exercise in different regions to avoid local particularities that rest generalization power. 
Nevertheless, this sampling method has weaknesses. Firstly, related to the salience of the 
ecotope: soil, water, temperature, solar irradiation are conditions that explain both the 
productivity and the implementation of the profile institution; Secondly, it cannot assess 
synergies brought about by other profiling institutions affecting the same population of coffee 
farmers; Thirdly, it is poorly informed of previous dynamics that better explain the result than 
the institutions itself. 
 
In our research, we selected the two most antagonist coffee regions in which the global demand 
for services reached the smallest possible geographical area. It implied that we would be able to 
find the highest quantity of profiling institution influencing the same group of coffee growers. 
Henceforth, we obtained the data from the whole population of coffee farmers in the same 
ecotope controlling for external factors like precipitation or solar irradiation; then through the 
series of ANCOVA statistical tests, we controlled for internal factors like the number of coffee 
trees, the age, and the variety. So, we can convincingly claim that the difference in the monetary 
services received on average by coffee farmers was due to the successful implementation of a 
profiling institution.  
 
It is worthy to say a word about the data we used. In Buesaco data was obtained through the 
widely used survey method in which questions were asked to the whole population of coffee 
farmers. This method relies on farmers’ memory so whenever there is not a relationship between 
the memory and the LRA, results are considered acceptable.  
 
However, data could be closer to reality. In Riosucio, the monetary services were assessed not 
by asking the coffee farmers but by checking the purchases registered in the Cooperative at the 
identification number of each coffee farmer. The uses of Resource constituents were assessed 
by checking the farm features related to the identification number of the coffee farmers in the 
SICA database, data that is day-to-day updated and verified by the extension agents.   
 
Thanks to the hard work of employees from the Cooperative and the extension agents of the 
FNC, we worked with data on purchases and uses of Resource constituents for more than three 
thousand coffee farmers who are simultaneously affected by six profiling institutions including 
the official quality standard in Colombia (Resolución 5/2002); one private quality standards 
(SCAA’s Q system); one of the most well-known GI (Café de Colombia); five out of the seven most 
important VSS ( Fairtrade; Organic; Rainforest Alliance; C.A.F.E Practices: Nespresso AAA) and 
one UNESCO’s world heritage protection (Coffee Cultural Landscape of Colombia).   
 
As far as I know, there is not any study that had this kind of data, which on the one hand, can 
match uses of Resource constituents to the monetary services produced, and on the other, can 
have the variety of profiling institutions in the same population affected by the same external 
variables.  
 
The robustness of our data in the case of Riosucio, allow us to convincingly affirm that profiling 
institutions work for improving the monetary services of coffee farmers. Indeed, for a coffee 
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farmer in Riosucio that possessed 4,581 coffee trees, 3⁄4 parts of which were pest-resistant, with 
an average age of 8.4 years and, planted with a density equivalent of 5,120 plants per hectare, 
and sold more than half of their 2015 harvest through the LRA Standard (Resolución 5/2002 
profiling institution), obtained on average 8 legal monthly minimum wages (l.m.m.w).  
 
However, if the farmer sold through the LRA Reg/Starbucks (C.A.F.E Practices profiling institution) 
or the LRA La Vereda (Rainforest Alliance profiling institution), he obtained 11 l.m.m.w (or 26% 
higher than LRA Standard); If the farmer sold through the LRA Fairtrade (Fairtrade profiling 
institution) or the LRA Organic (Organic profiling institution), he obtained 13 l.m.m.w (or 58% 
higher than LRA Standard); and if the farmer sold through the LRA Nespresso (Nespresso AAA 
profiling institution), he obtained 17 l.m.m.w (or 98% higher than LRA Standard). 
 
These results contradict the unproven narrative that profiling institutions diminish monetary 
services received by farmers, particularly present in farmers communities (as we showed in 
chapter 8.3 and 8.4). Indeed, leaving the other factors equal, we showed that profiling 
institutions increase the monetary services. There are other factors like land concentration, cost 
of agricultural inputs (including labor cost, fertilizers, access to credit, interest rates, etc.), 
weather phenomena, heterogeneous competitiveness among coffee lands, etc., that come 
alongside the implementation of profiling institution, but specially in the case of Riosucio, if we 
control for these other factors, the profiling institutions are part of the solution. In other words, 
one mechanism for decreasing farmers income is by avoiding profiling institutions and pushing 
them to compete in the free coffee market.  
 
We do not pretend to say that profiling institutions are the panacea: between them are 
differences and other effects than monetary ones. But it is important to make a point clear for 
both farmers and consumers. Better than regarding profiling institutions as a “new form of 
colonialism”, they should be seeing as a tool of coordination that could be improved. In this 
second sense, stakeholders in both production and consumption should encourage the other 
profilers to proactively participate in the profiling institution’s improvement.   
 
This last statement introduces us to the last critic we made of mainstream research (presented 
in chapter 1.3.1 and 1.3.2) on the monetary effects of profiling institution: they are poorly 
informed of previous dynamics. Our sampling method that focused on two coffee lands by 
providing a static picture (the observable profiles produced by different LRAs), allowed us to trace 
the history back, to understand why a particular profiling institution worked very well in one 
place and not so well in another. We are not interested to make a judgment on which institution 
is better than others because our interest is on the agreement. And profiling institutions are part 
of the solution because they are an input of very complex agreements embedded in the actor’s 
games history that had been developed. We have shown that these actors’ games have changed 
not only the agreement but also the profiling institution itself. Like the special dish on a 
restaurant in which the kitchen team had refined both the main ingredient and its cooking, 
actors’ coalition had shaped both the profiling institution and its implementation to enhance the 
profile they are looking for.    
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To conclude this section, profiling institution matter and are part of the solution. Hence, farmers 
and consumers should look at them as a tool that could be improved. Of course, it only could be 
possible if stakeholders and the rest of profilers are open to its discussion.  
 
10.3. Particular recommendations   
 
We have developed general recommendations that could enhance the sustainable management 
of Resources by triggering “integral” and “responsible entrepreneurial” LRAs through 
negotiations, from a power-balanced starting point at the appropriate resource-perimeter level, 
between representatives of the whole set of actors. Even though this study shows that each 
negotiation is context-dependent on the services demanded from the Resource, there is neither 
a single solution nor a desirable profile, in this final subchapter we take a personal position to 
recommend the minimum regulated uses to profile the Resource coffee in Colombia. 
  
We consider that a coalition composed of a small group of collective actors (aggregated by the 
demanded services) representatives of the whole set of actors (profilers and stakeholders in 
production and consumption) should decide on a very few but crucial uses of constituents, which 
risk to put in danger its own stock by depleting the stock of associated Resources (like water and 
soil). They should agree to profile a basic combination of symbolic and taste related services in 
order to trigger monetary services to produce the profile sought by the ICA 2001/2007.  
 
We would like to emphasize the focus on symbolic and taste related services to trigger monetary 
services, not the other way around. The ICA (1962-1989) on quotas tried for various decades to 
shape a profile of the Resource that produces monetary services for profilers. It left behind 
services demanded by stakeholders in production and consumption, increasing the pressure until 
incoherencies made it imploded. Whereas the ICA (since 2001) on VSS, as our research has 
demonstrated, shows that when symbolic services are regulated, monetary services increased 
for the whole group of profilers, including coffee growers. However, there is an issue of 
distribution in which producers feel being the losing party.   
 
In fact, it is because of this perceived unfairness for farmers that the profile sought by the ICA on 
VSS has being questioned in Colombia, producing the implosion of some VSS-based LRAs (like the 
LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S in Buesaco) in the quest for the taste related services sought by the 
specialty coffee profile. The actors that favor the specialty profile have prioritized a competition-
based approach, which is believed to multiply monetary services by encouraging 
experimentation to produce exceptional aromatic profiles1027. However, this profile is inherently 
doomed because it encourages the change of behavior of the whole population of farmers by 
                                                     
1027 In the Specialty coffee market contest are very common. Hundreds of coffee growers deliver lots of coffee with 
excellent scores, usually only the very few at the top reach 30 times or higher prices, when the following two or 
three dozen would have prices lower than 10 times higher prices. For the rest, a high quality standard price would 
be paid. As an example the last Cup of Excellence auction in Colombia in 2017, in which, competing with coffee from 
the whole country, five farmers of Buesaco were in the top ten including the first, fourth and fifth  (ACE, 2017).  
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promising them a combination of services (including higher monetary services), knowing in 
advance that only a few farmers will profile.    
 
This scheme is based on two assumptions: first that through hard work the coffee grower can 
produce a high-scored coffee; second that high-scored coffee can effectively be sold as high-
scored coffee. Auction results and attractive anecdotes in which coffee are sold at prices tenfold 
higher are used to sustain the validity of these assumptions and to gain adherents. This 
assumption was hardly contested because farmers who tried hard (incurring in higher costs) and 
failed to produce high-scored coffee, usually blame the cupping agents and sent samples to 
independent laboratories until one gave them the reason. Likewise, the high-scored coffee lots 
that cannot be sold as high-scored coffee increased the coffee farmer's distrust towards traders. 
However, this gap is inherent to the competition-based approach which only rewards the winner 
coffee lot, no matter if the loser is also specialty coffee that scored slightly less.    
 
We consider a different approach to tackling down the distribution issues by combining both 
taste related and symbolic services originated in the territory through “integral” or “responsible 
entrepreneur” LRAs at the local perimeter. Privileging the “terroir expression” taste related 
service like the case of Nespresso in both Riosucio and Buesaco and the “exceptional coffee” 
taste related service as a collective bet, like the case of the LRA Organic in Riosucio, in which the 
whole burden of the change in uses of Resource constituents (cupping and communication 
strategy) is on the shoulders of the collective actor and its commercial partner, reducing the risk 
farmers had to face. When these services are associated with the symbolic ones, it could produce 
the product differentiation that could improve the monetary services received by farmers.    
 
Likewise, when matching taste related and symbolic services at a national/global perimeter, 
through the minimum regulated uses, it would produce a first separation between an “invisible 
hand” global regime that put in peril communities’ environment and social cohesion, and another 
“cunning entrepreneur” global regime that is encouraged by market forces to the extent they do 
not risk the provision of these services. I mean, companies can compete and be as innovative and 
efficient as possible as long as they do not put in danger the environment and the social cohesion 
of coffee communities. These minimum regulated uses would not negatively affect the economy 
if it equally affects the global population of profilers, but it would only work if it is regulated on a 
global scale1028.   
 
In the last scenario, this profile should regulate uses of infrastructures, know-how, and know-to-
appreciate that are valuable not only in the first processes of the coffee value chain but also on 
                                                     
1028 Labor legislation for example, obligate companies to compete to the extent they do not endanger the wellbeing 
of employees: “Globally an overwhelming majority of countries reviewed have established a right to a minimum 
period of annual leave in legislation (96%)” (Ghosheh, 2013, p. 16). It was possible to make companies accountable 
for their labor practices without generating a massive bankruptcy because higher labor cost due to working laws 
affected all companies in the same jurisdiction. Nevertheless there are huge imbalances among jurisdictions because 
laws are not equal (in Europe for example 94% of countries offer more than 20 days of annual leave whereas, in Asia 
and the Pacific, 54% of countries offer less than 14 days of annual leave (Ghosheh, 2013, p. 17), causing a perceived 
unfairness that sparked unilateral trade barriers.  
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the last processes, affecting farmers, traders and roasters. As an example, the organic labeling 
legislation showed that it is equally important targeting the first processes in the hands of 
profilers and the last in the hand of consumers.  
 
In this sense, we could have at least three kinds of LRAs in Colombia that could differently impact 
three groups of coffee farmers present in Colombia. A “cunning entrepreneur” LRA for 
entrepreneurial coffee farmers in the low lands, an “integral” LRA for entrepreneurial coffee 
farmers in the high lands. And a “responsible entrepreneur” LRA for family farmers.   
 
In the next sections, we will propose recommendations for the whole set of actors in regards to 
the developing of these three types of LRAs through national legislation, that from our personal 
perspective, could optimize the provision of demanded services from the Colombian coffee.  
 
10.3.1. Farmers      
 
When doing the fieldwork, an effect derived from the implementation of the coffee public policy 
that targets the small coffee grower, was that they and their families had to work more time in 
their farms: A coffee farmer with two thousand coffee trees has enough time to work both on his 
farm and as a day laborer on neighboring farms.  More than eight thousand plants are too much 
for a single farmer1029, if he does not rely on the family workforce, he would need to hire labor.  
 
The increase in the number of trees per unit of land produced by the renovation program 
(chapter 4.2.2) increased the time small coffee farmers devoted to their own farm while reducing 
the time available for working on the neighbors' farms, especially at harvest time. Consequently, 
it put upward pressure on the cost of labor and reduced the monetary services for coffee growers 
who had to pay for labor. In Riosucio for example, given the decreasing trend in coffee prices and 
the increasing trend in labor costs, the profitability of entrepreneurial coffee farming was 
seriously questioned1030.  
 
So, we can divide the Colombian coffee culture into two main groups depending on their 
dependency on labor: low dependent family farms and high dependent entrepreneurial farms. 
The second group can also be divided into two groups depending on comparative advantage: 
                                                     
1029 This number is a result of our experience during the field work. Usually the family composed of a couple and one 
or two sons can work a coffee farm with five or six thousand coffee three. Frequently, farmers said they could not 
cultivate more than that because they sons would leave and labor was scarce. Only one family farm I visited had 
eight thousand coffee threes because there were three adolescents that worked alongside their parents. Of course, 
the maximum number of coffee trees a family farm can manage, had to take into account other variables like the 
ecotope, idiosyncrasy, equipment, age, climate, etc. 
1030 In 2010, a coffee farmer received on average COP 1.1 million per coffee load (125 kg of coffee). He paid on 
average COP 20 thousand for a one-day-wage of labor; COP 300 for one kilo of coffee cherry harvested. In 2016, 
they received on average COP 800 thousand per a load of coffee, the wage for a day of labor increased to COP 30 
thousand; and one kilo of coffee cherry harvested increased to COP 500. Interview with Luis Eduardo Castro, an 
entrepreneurial coffee farmer in Riosucio and employee of the agricultural office in the Alcaldía de Riosucio.  
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farms in the low land with higher temperature and higher yield, and farms in the high lands with 
lower temperature and lower yield1031. 
 
We developed our case studies in coffee zones in which the global demand for services reaches 
the local level. It forcefully excluded the regions featured by the most competitive coffee farming 
in Colombia because the profile encouraged by market forces suit them perfectly. Alongside high 
productive farms in other countries, especially Brazil and Vietnam, they are the winners of the 
“invisible hand” LRA predominant to profile the world coffee harvest.  
 
We refer to the entrepreneurial coffee farming in the low lands. They are featured by the 
intensive coffee farming in farms with tens of hectares, cultivated with ten thousand full-sun-
grown coffee three per hectare, dependent on synthetic fertilizers and high solar irradiation to 
maximize the yield. Alongside poor working conditions for workers (which are paid on a daily 
basis without any social protection) and mechanization of the post-harvesting process (which 
takes a massive toll on water integrity), these coffee farms can internalize labor costs and 
maintain their profitability.  
   
But also, they are the target group of the “cunning entrepreneur” LRA that we discussed 
previously, which would agree on minimum regulated uses to profile the socio-environmental 
demanded services from the Resource. So, entrepreneurial coffee farmers could continue looking 
for efficiencies through innovations and experimentation to the extent they respect the 
minimums, for example conserving water and biodiversity and guaranteeing the appropriate 
working conditions for their workers.   
 
Entrepreneurial coffee farming in the high lands would also have to fulfill this “cunning 
entrepreneur LRA”. But they could also profile the “exceptional coffee” taste related service 
adding extra layers of extent, coherence, and closure to produce an “integral” LRA. Indeed, the 
specialty profile is perfectly suited for entrepreneurial coffee farming in the high land because 
the lower-temperature that reduce its productivity (and competitiveness on volume) triggers the 
aromatic precursors (and competitiveness on quality). As these farms struggle with labor cost 
that cannot be afforded through standard market prices nor VSS/GI prices, the only option they 
have to survive in the long term is by taking a risk, which they could afford, of implementing high-
cost practices to produce the exceptional aromatic profile and reach the ten-fold higher prices.   
 
However, the specialty profile is not convenient for family farming. Clearly, these farms can 
produce exceptional aromatic profiles, but they do not forcefully have to rely on labor cost and 
it is hard for them to assume the risk of implementing high-cost practices, particularly the 
liquidity costs of delivering their coffee and waiting for months (samples have to be sent to 
several clients, cupped, negotiated and finally bought) before the payment arrives. Additionally, 
it erodes social cohesion by affecting confidence among neighbor farmers and between them 
and the traders, as the case in Buesaco showed.  
                                                     
1031 The most productive farms in the low lands, between 1.200 and 1.600 m.a.s.l can produce 8.750 kg per ha 
whereas in the high lands more than 1.600 m.a.s.l. it is rare to reach more than 4.000 kg per ha.   
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Furthermore, simplistic economic reasoning would suggest that for family farming to succeed, 
the specialty profile is contrary to their interest. Indeed, if market prices remain low, it would be 
more strategic for the small coffee farms take advantage of the higher labor cost to eliminate 
their local competition: the entrepreneurial coffee farm. A family farm can internalize higher 
labor cost through family workforce and the manos cambiadas schemes, whereas several labor-
dependent entrepreneurial coffee farms (farms with more than 5ha),  which represent 4% of the 
total coffee farms and 27% of the cultivated area (FNC., 2014, p. 14), would not be able to reach 
the productivity needed to remain in the business. Eventually, the bankruptcy of entrepreneurial 
coffee farms would decrease the total amount of Colombian coffee offered to the international 
market pushing high its premium (as it happened during La Niña 1032 ), and improving the 
monetary services for family farms. It is simplistic reasoning because, in Colombia, both 
entrepreneurial and family farming have been associated for years. The latter provides labor for 
the former, in exchange family farmers receive not only cash but also the knowledge that is 
replicated in their farms, and commercial ties that eventually result in better prices for their 
harvest.  
 
We have shown that the family farms could focalize on profiling symbolic services like organic, 
Fairtrade, indigenous coffee, etc., associated to the “terroir expression” taste related service 
through “responsible entrepreneur” LRAs, which can increase their monetary services without 
increasing their cost of production. In fact, these services tend to rely on knowledge and labor: 
instead of buying fertilizer and pesticides, farmers have to understand the plants demands for 
nutrients and how to produce this nutrient using organic material; and instead of expensive 
experiments to enhance the aromatic profile farmers have to develop a well-conducted picking 
and post-harvesting processes to fulfill the maximum aromatic profile and obtain more money 
for the same quantity. Clearly, uses of constituents are regulated and coordinated, increasing the 
extent and the coherence, but reducing the closure. Indeed, high closure implies a significant and 
risky investment to influence the know-to-appreciate of consumers in order to create barriers to 
entry. Low closure, on the other hand, would imply that a collective actor, which aggregates 
family farmers, in collaboration with its commercial partner would create and maintain the 
barriers of entry to succeeding in the very competitive coffee market.  
 
In the case of Buesaco, the LRA Specialty showed the difficulties for producers (aggregated in the 
collective actor Allianza Café) to establish successful barriers of entry in the roasted coffee 
market. In the case of Riosucio the year after we did our field work, producers in the LRA Fairtrade 
(aggregated in the collective actor Asprocafé) struggled to maintain the roasted coffee brand 
Ingrumá Asprocafé, whose operational activity was subsidized by premiums from the LRA 
Organic, Fairtrade and partially Nespresso. It could be true that family farmers can earn more 
through an “integral” LRA if their collective actor succeeds in implementing the barriers of entry 
for having market success. However, it is a risky bet when they try to vertically integrate the 
whole chain as the Specialty LRA in Buesaco showed. In fact, this failure is not a surprise, 
                                                     
1032 During la Niña phenomenon in which Colombian coffee production fell by 40%, the price of Colombian coffee 
during 2009, 2010 and 2011 was 54%, 50% and 35% higher than the indicative price of the ICO (Annex 6).    
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Berdegué (2003) interviewed 1050 rural producers organization in Chile and analyzed financial 
reports of half of them. He concluded that there is not any relationship between the fact farmers 
being aggregated into a collective actor and the market success. For him, market success depends 
fundamentally on the intrinsic features of the product.  
 
However, we have shown that if the collective actor (that aggregates family farms) participates 
in an actors’ coalition alongside traders, roasters, and stakeholders, this coalition would be able 
to create and maintain barriers of entry. It is so because actors’ coalitions could increase the 
extent and the coherence to profile symbolic and taste related services linked to the territory, 
therefore generating product differentiation. This barrier of entry is created and maintained 
through the activation of institutions to incentivize the uses of constituents through outputs for 
incentivizing uses of Infrastructures and know-how by profilers (through technical assistance to 
transfer knowledge to farmers, for example), and influencing the know-to-appreciate of 
consumers (through marketing campaigns, for example). This shared effort by the whole set of 
actors in the coalitions would create higher monetary services for the whole set of profilers, 
including the family farmers.  
 
An iconic example of this “integral” LRA profiled by the whole set of actors that produces higher 
monetary services for the family farms is the LRA organic in Riosucio. This LRA profiled a 
combination of symbolic and taste related services linked to the territory: the “organic” symbolic 
service, and the “exceptional coffee” taste related service. Unusually, the “exceptional coffee” 
taste related service is a collective bet of the whole actor’s coalition, not an individual effort by 
one or a few actors. In Buesaco we showed the usual way for profiling the “exceptional coffee” 
symbolic service: farmers have to take the whole risk by assuming costly practices without any 
assurance they would succeed because a contest would reward few winner farmers. In Riosucio, 
participant farmers in the LRA organic do not have to assume any risky practices to profile the 
“exceptional coffee” because they are done by the cooperative and the roaster: Farmers deliver 
the organic coffee, the cooperative sort them depending on the cupping score, and the Roaster 
markets “los cuernos del diablo” as a special edition using the high-scored organic coffee from 
Riosucio. Thus, the highest price paid by consumers is not concentrated in a few farms, but it 
comes back as a premium-after-buying for almost half of the participant farmers in the LRA 
organic.  
 
10.3.2. Stakeholders in production  
 
Three stakeholders in production could play an important role in supporting the consolidation of 
the three previous LRAs in Colombia. We refer to the FNC as the national authority in regards to 
the coffee public policy, then the local authorities, and finally other stakeholders in production 
such as the indigenous organization in Riosucio and the Fundación Social in Buesaco.  
 
• FNC  
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The FNC has focused its energies mainly on improving the monetary services for producers, as it 
was evident in the fourth world coffee conference in Ethiopia in 2016, in which the FNC’s CEO 
claimed it was needed a dialogue among actors to improve and stabilize coffee prices1033. Also, 
in the conclusion of the first world coffee producers forum in Medellin in 2017, in which 
participants agreed to develop an action plan to face the main problem of the coffee culture: the 
low prices received by producers1034.  
 
For the FNC, the most evident solution is to claim for better prices because it is the best solution 
for all its coffee producer federates, including both hundreds of thousands of family farms and 
hundreds of entrepreneurial coffee farms in Colombia. But since the intentions for improving 
prices perceived by farmers were written down in Medellin, prices had lost one-third of its value 
as figure 13 shows.   
 
Figure 13 International coffee prices. Source: International Coffee Organization.  
 
 
However, when prices are regulated usually it will mainly benefit a group of individuals. In the 
case of coffee, price regulation does not only beneficiate producers versus other profilers and 
stakeholders, who demanded other services from the Resource. Price regulation in producer 
countries produced unequally distributed benefits between farmers as we showed in the 
historical sections in Riosucio and in Buesaco (annex 2.2 and 2.3): high coffee prices in the second 
half of the twentieth century benefited the socio-economic elite in Colombia at the expense of 
indigenous farmers, sharecroppers, and small farmers.  
 
The proven intrinsic bias in favor of one of the parts bring about by prices regulation engenders 
a pure conflict actor’s constellation that would hardly be solved. This proposal would waste 
energies that could be invested in other possible agreements, and worryingly, would be misused 
                                                     
1033 The whole presentations could be accessed in the official web page of the International Coffee Organization. 
http://www.ico.org/wconference.asp  
1034 “Trabajar de manera corresponsable con todos los agentes de la cadena global del café y con el apoyo de la OIC, 
en la elaboración de un Plan de Acción que deberá partir de la problemática que enfrentan las caficulturas de las 
diversas regiones del mundo, a saber: Bajísimos niveles del precio al productor y excesiva volatilidad, quedando la 
mayor fracción del valor de la cadena en los eslabones siguientes (…)” (FNC, 2017a, p. 32). 
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demonizing the other actors, like blaming traders and roasters of benefiting from exploiting 
farmers. Foreseeably, the negotiation would be even more difficult.   
 
We recommend that the FNC, as the coffee public policy authority in Colombia, should 
understand the sustainable management of Colombian coffee from this anthropocentric (hence 
context-dependent) perspective. So, there is not a single profile featured by monetary services 
to which the whole coffee harvest have to move “towards”. There should be several profiles built 
over a “cunning entrepreneur” LRA with few well-coordinated regulated uses. In this sense, from 
this basic LRA, “responsible entrepreneur” and “integral” LRAs should be developed and 
encouraged.   
 
In this sense, the FNC should look for a “cunning entrepreneur” regime at the global perimeter. 
They should partner with other collective actors who mainly demand monetary services for 
family farmers, like other stakeholders in production and especially stakeholders in consumption, 
so, eventually, they could attract roasters.  
 
We have shown that the best way for improving monetary services for family farmers is by 
profiling the symbolic and taste related services associated with the origin. So, we propose that 
the FNC mobilizes their international consensus to agree on a set of minimum regulated uses of 
constituents that profiles a minimum “environmental responsible” symbolic service (which would 
mainly target the infrastructures and know-how of the highly productive entrepreneurial 
farmers) and the “terroir expression” taste related service (which would target infrastructures 
and know-how of traders and roasters). It implies that all actors would use their infrastructures 
and know-how in the communication process to influence the know-to-appreciate of consumers, 
so two LRAs could clearly be distinguished: The “invisible hand” LRA that looking for efficiencies 
threats the local environment and social cohesion, and the “cunning entrepreneur” that does 
not. By creating this difference, the segmentation could encourage entrepreneurial coffee farms 
to internalize their environmental and social costs. 
 
It would be politically difficult because of the significant production of the relatively few 
entrepreneurial coffee farmers gave them an important representation at the center of the 
National Coffee Congress. But if the FNC wants to support the sustainable management of Coffee 
in Colombia, it would have to target differentially the represented coffee farms: Entrepreneurial 
coffee farming through a “cunning entrepreneur” LRA, and family farming trough “integral” and 
“responsible entrepreneur” LRAs. 
 
Regarding this second set of LRAs, the FNC has to decentralize itself so that the local offices could 
negotiate autonomously with other actors interested exclusively at the same Resource 
perimeter, for example, the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño could negotiate 
directly alongside members of the cluster Nespresso in this Department. So, these decentralized 
offices could solve the first negotiation dilemma providing a power-balance initial state so that 
they could agree on the minimum context-depended regulated uses, which should be 
encouraged through the locally shaped outputs of the coffee public policy. Over it, other actors 
should profile their LRAs providing a complementary combination of services.  
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• Local authorities  
 
The FNC is a hierarchical organization with local branches that do not have the autonomy needed 
to negotiate the profile of the Resource at the local level. That is why, in the two contexts of our 
research, the local authority has joined the actors’ coalition to support the provision of services 
demanded by some unsatisfied local coffee producers.  
 
As authorities, they can mobilize action resources to activate other than the coffee public policy 
in order to produce final outputs, which (dis) incentive a change in the use of constituents. They 
are powerful actors capable of triggering a change when opposing incumbent LRAs, either by 
affecting LRAs configuration (even to the point of implosion) or creating new ones.  
 
Clearly, like other powerful actors, they can selfishly mobilize their action Resources to take 
advantage of the power-unbalanced game to profile their demanded services at the expense of 
other actors reducing the sustainable management of the Resource. The example is the LRA 
Specialty in Buesaco, in which the Gobernación de Nariño selfishly mobilized their political 
support to circumvent the coffee public policy, in order to incentivize farmers to profile the 
“exceptional coffee” taste related service, at the expense of the profile demanded by the 
incumbent LRAs.  
 
But we showed that they also can improve the sustainable management of Resource, by 
incorporating into the incumbent LRA an extra layer of extent and coherence to profile some 
services demanded by actors that were left behind. The example is the LRA CS Standard, in which 
the Alcaldía de Riosucio cooperatively mobilized their political support to encourage the 
deliberation between indigenous leaders and the FNC/Comité, so the latter was endowed with 
the consensus needed to innovatively activate the coffee public policy through locally shaped 
final outputs, which profiled the indigenous demands for services. 
 
In this sense, we consider that local authorities have a major role to play to guarantee that LRAs 
do not leave any relevant local actor behind. If they are interested in the sustainable 
management of the Resource for gaining political recognition in the long term and not in the 
short-term victory taking a position in favor of an electoral attractive actor, they should not 
mobilize their action resources to activate institutions to provide the services demanded by this 
single actor, and furthermore, they should focus their energies in supporting the mechanism that 
we have shown to trigger the “integral” or “responsible entrepreneurial” LRA at the local 
perimeter:  
 
First by encouraging the consolidation of an actors’ coalition composed of all interested actors. 
At least, from local actors that demand services from the Resource.  
 
Secondly, by intervening in the quest for a power-balanced initial negotiation. If other powerful 
actors sought only their demanded services, the local authority should intervene cooperatively 
359 
 
mobilizing their action resources to endow (or to support the creation of) the collective actor that 
represents the voiceless individuals that cannot move forward their demanded services. 
 
Thirdly, by creating or enhancing deliberative scenarios among the actors’ coalition. Then, by 
actively participating in the negotiations to agree on the profile and the distribution of cost and 
benefits using its role as authority. Indeed, they can produce the collectively shaped outputs to 
(dis) incentivize the collectively agree uses of constituents to profile the collectively agreed 
combination of services. 
 
• Other stakeholders in production      
 
In our cases, we have two other stakeholders in production for which we consider pertinent 
proposing recommendations for enhancing the sustainable management of the Resource coffee: 
the indigenous organization in Riosucio and Fundación Social in Buesaco. 
 
For the first one, we strongly recommend making peace with the past, if the expression is 
valuable, in order to overtake the “pure conflict” actors’ constellations that were usually 
described in our research.  
 
I mean, “pure conflict constellation” is needed in the occasions in which there is no negotiation 
possible. It was the case with the indigenous organization that had to fight in the international 
arena firstly, and then in the national one for the full recognition of their rights. We consider this 
recognition by the Colombian institutions (inherited from the colonial one who imposed a heavy 
burden on indigenous population for the benefit of the Spanish elite dismembering the 
indigenous social structure and profoundly affecting indigenous population, which were 
reshaped by the Republic to eliminate any trace of the indigenous cosmovision to the benefit of 
the new Colombian elite) was not negotiable. So, the conflict was inevitable and eventually, in a 
power game that in Colombia implied the death of many indigenous leaders since the sixties, the 
recognition was agreed in the Constituent Assembly of Colombia in 1991.  
 
But in other cases, the “pure conflict constellation” is not necessary. Opposing coffee because it 
was a symbol of the Resguardos disappearance and indigenes dispossession does not 
automatically bring back the Resguardos and could deprive actual indigenes of some cash needed 
to improve their material well-being. Moreover, opposing the “foreign” just because it is contrary 
to the “native” could produce isolation that eventually would be traduced in vulnerability. In 
some cases, it looked as if the only legitimate service was the one that the indigenous 
organization was moving forward, and the rest demanded by other actors were almost harmful. 
However, we showed that when the indigenous organization embarked in other than “pure 
conflict” constellations, they were able to shape the final outputs in order to profile a 
combination of services that were not only acceptable but also beneficial for the indigenous 
population.  
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In this sense, we strongly recommend the indigenous organization to accept that they are part 
of this world of mankind. They have a lot to contribute for making it more respectful of nature 
and living beings, but it would only be possible if they engage in negotiations with an open spirit 
to take into account also the demands of other actors. The best way to profile their demanded 
services is by actively participating in a negotiation that implies taking and giving.  
 
In regards to the Fundación Social in Buesaco, we recommend them to change their value chain 
approach, which focus on upgrading their position through both vertically integrating the process 
of the coffee value chain and moving towards the more attractive specialty coffee markets, to 
the LRA approach that focus on agreements, among the whole set of actors, to profile symbolic 
and taste related services to increase the monetary ones, an eventually diminishing poverty.    
 
The FS started their quest because they considered the VSS produced insufficient monetary 
services to farmers and the specialty coffee was an attractive opportunity to reverse the situation 
and reduce poverty. I would suggest that the diagnosis maybe was not completely accurate, and 
if poverty was widespread, it was more related to the little production on the very small holdings 
in Nariño (whose ecotope is not suited for triggering productivity), than to the fact of selling 
through the VSS mechanisms (which of course was aggravated when prices sunk). But in any case, 
the failed experience with the Allianza Café (a vertically integrated producers’ association in 
Nariño) showed that producing the barriers of entry for succeeding in the market is more costly 
and risky than, an association with little capital, and especially little patience from its associates, 
can afford. And the experience with Café con Altura (a trading company in the specialty market) 
showed that there is not a relationship between a farmer that invests itself in producing a high-
scored coffee and the higher price received. Both are good experiences that shed light on the 
paths that should be discontinued.  
 
We think that the experience of the LRA Organic is a good benchmark for what the Fundación 
Social is intending to do: improving the wellbeing and the social tissue of coffee farmers. From 
our perspective, the FS has the money and the personal that is needed if three adjustments are 
made. Firstly, “Café con Altura S.A.S” should be the collective actor of the aggregated farmers, 
today it is just another trader funded with money that demands a social return. Secondly, they 
should target the symbolic services inviting actors to join their LRA like Fairtrade, Organic, 
Rainforest Alliance, etc. Thirdly, they should bet for the collective profiling of the “exceptional 
coffee” that we explained previously, in which the costs were assumed by the trader and the 
benefit shared as widely as possible. The exceptional taste related services would guarantee, 
once associated with the symbolic services, the development of barriers of entry at the municipal 
level that would increase the monetary services for the whole set of participant profilers, 
including the coffee farmers.  
 
10.3.3. Other profilers (traders and roasters)        
 
We previously discussed the evidence that suggests that market power is not forcefully associate 
with a lower level of services provision. And we also presented the inconveniences associated 
with the vertical integrations of coffee farmers association. In this order of ideas, we consider 
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traders and roasters a fundamental part of the solution to enhance the sustainable management 
of coffee. 
 
On the other hand, roasters should be interested in being part of the solution. They have played 
the capitalist game of encouraging efficiencies to reduce to the minimum the cost of production, 
while increasing to the maximum the quality, to offer in the shelves roasted packed coffee at 
prices attractive enough for consumers. If they want to offer a different product that takes care 
of the environment and communities, for example, they have to invest massively on marketing 
campaigns to create barriers of entry that distinguish them from the competition. Many 
enterprises have faded in the effort, and some survivors are despised by a progressively bigger 
population that consider they full the pockets of a few shareholders at the expense of the many 
inhabitants of this planet, in terms of environmental and social degradation.  
 
We have shown that there is an option in which the whole set of profilers improve their monetary 
services: profiling symbolic and taste related services associated with the origin.   
 
Firstly, it is needed the “cunning entrepreneur” LRA at the global level to allow consumers to 
distinguish it from the profile of the “invisible hand” LRA, which negatively affect the 
environment and communities.  
 
Participant roasters in the “invisible hand” LRA will not necessarily lose because they are offering 
their products at the lowest possible price, and their price-sensitive consumers will remain as far 
as prices remain low. But participant roasters in the “cunning entrepreneur” LRA have much to 
win. They should support this negotiation because they can embark in this quest without having 
to lose money in a costly and unsuccessful marketing campaign to influence the know-to-
appreciate: barely one of ten consumers believes in companies when they marketed their 
environmentally and socially responsible commitment (Bemporad et al., 2012, p. 16). Moreover, 
usually, roasters participate in both segments with different brands like Nestle, pushing 
economies of scale to the maximum through their Nescafé brand, and profiling the socio-
environmental services through their Nespresso brand.   
 
Secondly, following the example of the two LRAs ACDI/VOCA Nespresso and Starbucks in Nariño, 
roasters should invite other interested actors into the coalition, like stakeholders in consumption 
and production, so this coalition could cooperative mobilize their action resources to empower a 
collective actor, which aggregates the voiceless, as a trader. It would enhance the loyalty of 
farmers guaranteeing the supply of the coffee harvest from the perimeter.  
 
The LRA Nespresso in both contexts shows that it is a very smart strategy because the coalition 
will agree on a profile that suits them all (farmers, both stakeholders, and roasters). So, the whole 
set of actors would invest the action resources to produce the final outcome that would 
(dis)incentivize the uses of constituents. When roasters try to incentivize the uses without a wide 
coalition, it is so costly that it would work only for the short period in which financial resources 
are available, like the project to implement the C.A.F.E. Practices in Nariño using money from the 
Dutch cooperation.   
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Thirdly, roasters have to invest themselves and actively participate in the LRA’s negotiation at 
the appropriate perimeter with an open spirit to avoid the “pure conflict constellation”. In this 
sense, they have to move forward their demanded services but also take into account the 
services demanded by others. One interesting practice of the LRA Nespresso is the division 
between the general TASQ® that every cluster in the world have to follow, and the TASQ® local 
application. These complementary profiling institutions could profile both the basic demanded 
service by Nespresso and the other combination of services demanded by local actors.    
 
10.3.4. Stakeholders in consumption  
 
Stakeholders in consumption have two complementary roles. Firstly, they move forward their 
demand for services at the global level gaining the AR consensus to the point they create the AR 
organization. Secondly, this latter action resource is mobilized to incorporate into the LRA this 
global demand for services.   
 
The stakeholders in consumption that arrived in Riosucio and Buesaco successfully developed a 
wide enough consensus toward their demanded services in consumers’ countries that, either by 
conviction or commercial interest, traders and roasters joined the movement and decided to use 
their constituents in order to profile that service. Some of them, without being part, internalized 
the service as their own, so they could offer it to their customers. Others were so actively 
involved, that eventually became aggregated into the stakeholder in consumption producing the 
AR organization.   
 
In our research, the cooperative mobilization of the AR organization by stakeholders in 
consumption, explains four out of seven cases in which both the extent and the coherence 
increased. Indeed, this action resource is very powerful because it introduces this global demand 
for services into the LRA through the most important service demanded by profilers: the 
monetary services. In all cases, it implied empowering the collective actor representative of the 
voiceless: indigenous communities in the case of the LRA MH in Riosucio or small coffee farmers 
in the case of the two LRAs ACDI/VOCA in Buesaco. If other profilers like traders and roasters 
and, stakeholders in production were to take advantage of the commercial benefit derived from 
this AR organization, they had to listen to them and take into account their demanded services.  
 
It is a virtuous procedure at the local level, because it empowers the voiceless on the one hand, 
and encourages the powerful to listen to the previously ignored ones, through their own 
demanded monetary services.     
 
In this sense, the straightforward recommendation is that if stakeholders in consumption want 
to enhance the sustainable management of the Resource coffee, they should invest their efforts 
in increasing their AR consensus at the consumer's markets, and they should privilege investing 
this action resource in increasing the AR organization with other profilers like traders and 
roasters. Then, they should cooperatively mobilize this AR organization to empower the voiceless 
at a given perimeter and encourage powerful local actors to join the actors’ coalition. 
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Furthermore, they could trigger institutional creativity by both encouraging deliberative 
scenarios and participating in the final shaping of the outputs that would (dis)incentivize uses of 
constituents to profile the Resource.   
 
However, it has to be said that stakeholders in consumption were not exempted of the 
temptation of profiling their demanded services at the expense of the services demanded by 
other actors, diminishing the sustainable management of the Resource. The example is the LRA 
Fairtrade in which FLO selfishly mobilized their AR property to concretize the coffee public policy 
and impose the use of the certification mark at the expense of the indigenous community and a 
portion of coffee growers.  
 
We have shown the salience of the negotiation among actors exclusively interested in service 
demanded at the same Resource perimeter because each territory has its own particularities. 
The profiling institutions move forward by stakeholders in production have a similar effect if they 
are incompatible with the local demand for services and cannot be negotiated.  
 
The case of the Fairtrade LRA is interesting. The profile was negotiated at the global level 
“towards” the Fairtrade profile, sustained on very detailed regulated use in the Fairtrade profiling 
institution, which actually included uses to improve environmental and labor practices. This high 
extent regime at the global perimeter produced unsurmountable incoherencies to profile the 
serviced demanded at the local perimeter, causing the institutional complexity trap that made 
imploded the Natural LRA.  
 
Then, our recommendation for stakeholders, is that they should privilege profiling institutions at 
the global level with very few crucial regulated uses of constituents to profile their main 
demanded service and detailed governance mechanism to implement them (like mandating 
democratic and participative governance mechanism within collective actors, or commercial 
transparency between farmers, traders, and roasters). Then, they can encourage very detailed 
local adaptation of the profiling institution negotiated among the interested actors at the local 
perimeter like the “Normas y sanciones que rigen a los asociados de Asprocafé Ingruma”, and 
they could transparently present the geographical origin to their consumers.  
 
As in the case of label in the wine industry, the perimeters could start by the local group of 
profilers (As an example, the roaster can sell their coffee with the brand from the municipal level 
like Fairtrade-Riosucio) and eventually, because of the customers’ acceptation they would adapt 
to smaller units (like Fairtrade-Resguardo de San Lorenzo) or bigger one (like Fairtrade-Nariño), 
and coffee from other regions without any reputation could be sold as Fairtrade-Colombia.  
 
In this way, the stakeholders in consumption would be able to profile their demanded service, 
and at the same time, they could support the combination of symbolic and taste related service 
associated to a particular territory, that could enhance the monetary services for the whole group 
of profilers, including the farmers.   
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V. Annex 
V.1. List of activities needed to profile the Resource  
 
Table 35 List of activities needed to profile the Resource Coffee. Source: the author. 
Processes Uses Description Trade-offs 
Planting 
Diversification  Proportion of the farm that is used to crop coffee.  
Either the whole are is used to cultivate 
coffee to maximize coffee production, or 
it is used with other purposes like food 
production or natural forest protection.   
Variety  
After being planted, a coffee 
tree will be producing services 
for two or three decades. 
Variety can be selected for its 
productivity/efficiency or its TR&SS.  
Renovation of 
Coffee trees    
Depending on the Ecotopo and 
the productive system, coffee 
trees reduce both coffee 
production and quality of the 
coffee cherry in the first five to 
eight years. They are renovated 
four or five times before a new 
planting takes place.    
Younger coffee trees are more 
productive, but renovation is costly. 
Planting density  Number of coffee trees planted in one hectare.  
A higher density implies more production 
but less TR&SS because ecological 
services are reduced due to the 
monoculture and the fact that more 
fertilization is needed to feed the whole 
population. In addition, full sun coffee 
systems increase plants metabolism so 
coffee berries can ripe faster by 
consuming more energy. As a 
consequence, a higher proportion of 
sugar reserves in the coffee bean will be 
consumed by the coffee tree rather than 
by coffee consumers  
Shade 
Coffee is grown whether under 
the shade of a canopy provided 
by others species of taller trees, 
or not (fully-sun monoculture).     
The shade reduces temperature and 
enhances TR&SS by improving the 
aromatic profile, species diversity, biotic 
processes like pest control and 
pollination, and abiotic processes like soil 
nutrition and evapotranspiration (Arcila 
et al., 2007)). Nevertheless, it reduces 
productivity.   
Cultivation Soil management  
Weeds compete with coffee 
trees for space, light, water, and 
nutrients in different 
proportion depending on the 
species. But their eradication is 
costly and can produce soil 
erosion, contamination, and 
toxicity.  
Physical control on selected weeds 
increase TR&SS by improving soil 
protection and evapotranspiration, but it 
is more labor and know-how intensive 
than spraying them all with herbicides.      
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Coffee borer 
beetle 
management  
 
Pest and 
disease 
management 
 
 
Pest and diseases affect coffee 
trees health, reducing both 
qualities of the bean and 
production of the tree. Farmers 
implement actions to prevent 
and mitigate its effects.   
Pests and diseases reduce both taste 
related services and productivity: The 
antesia bug produce a potato cup (earthy 
flavor); the coffee berry borer produce 
insect damaged beans (loss of aroma, 
flavors, and acidity); coffee leaf rust 
produce a one-fifth decrease in 
production.  
Preventive measures and cultural or 
biological control enhance symbolic 
services, whereas chemical and genetic 
control (use of artificial pest-resistant 
varieties) diminish them.  
Nutrition  
The coffee tree needs three 
essential elements (C, H, O) that 
are provided by air and water. 
And thirteen others that are 
naturally provided by the soil or 
artificially through fertilization 
practices: six macronutrients 
are required in big quantities 
(N, P, K, Ca, Mg, S) and seven 
micronutrients in low quantities 
(Fe, Zn, Mn, B, Cu, Cl, Mo) 
(Arcila et al., 2007, p. 202). 
Nutrition practices based on either 
organic or synthetic fertilizers produce a 
tradeoff between taste related 
services/productivity at one hand, and 
symbolic services at the other. Some taste 
related services are diminished because 
of poor nutrition explained by the 
environment. Like withered beans (grassy 
flavor) and coated beans (greenish flavor) 
caused by lack of water. But other like 
amber beans (grassy flavor) and flaky 
beans (woody flavor) are due to avoidable 
nutritional deficiencies.  
Hedgerow  
Hedgerows are lines of trees 
from other species than coffee, 
within the coffee plantation. 
Hedgerows enhance TR&SS by stabilizing 
soil on steep slopes, protecting coffee 
trees from strong winds, protecting 
biodiversity and increasing quality by 
reducing temperature and metabolism. 
On the other hand, productivity is 
reduced.   
Picking   
Coffee cherries are picked from 
the coffee tree once they are 
ripe. In Colombia, picking is 
done by hand due to 
mountainous relief in coffee 
regions.   
 A very selective picking is crucial for 
taste-related services because only well 
ripe coffee cherries can provide the full 
aromatic profile. Under-ripe or overripe 
produce major defaults in the coffee cup, 
an immature bean the former 
(astringency) and a full black bean the 
latter (dirty flavor). As it implies several 
rounds over the same tree to select only 
the well ripe, it is labor and know-how 
intensive. On the other hand, a strip 
picking in which all beans in the branch 
are picked, reduce labor costs. 
Farm 
management 
The group of actions and 
decision to organize and 
operate the coffee farm.  
Certain practices like keeping records on 
farm management; implementing waste, 
water and biodiversity protection good 
practices; fulfilling Labor laws; and 
improving relations with the community, 
enhance symbolic services while increase 
farms costs. 
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Post-Harvesting 
Hulling   
To separate the two beans of 
the coffee cherry from the pulp 
and the skin to obtain beans 
known as wet parchment 
coffee. 
Firstly, a costly labor-intense second 
selection before hulling is the last 
opportunity to leave out under ripe or 
overripe beans. Secondly, investments in 
equipment also are necessary because 
both delays (if the equipment is not in the 
farm) produce a full sour bean (vinegar 
flavor) and poor equipment produce 
broken beans (earthy flavor).  
Fermentation   
Even though hulling is “the” 
common practice in Colombia, 
some farmers decide to dry the 
coffee cherry (without hulling) 
to have a long fermentation (a 
microbial reaction of yeast and 
bacteria to obtain energy by 
breaking down the sugars in the 
mucilage and pulp).  
For those who decide hulling, 
mucilage remains attached to 
wet parchment coffee, some 
can decide to dry the bean with 
the mucilage to have a medium 
fermentation, others decide to 
remove it through either a low 
fermentation before drying or 
using mechanical equipment 
(avoiding fermentation).  
Controlled fermentation enhances taste 
related services by modifying the 
composition of aroma precursors of a 
coffee cup  (Lee et al., 2015) but reduce 
symbolic services (water contamination) 
and productivity.  
Depending on temperature and humidity, 
a timely low-washed fermentation 
enhances terroir-driven flavors. A timely 
medium-semi-washed fermentation 
enriches sweetness and body. A timely 
high-natural fermentation develops wild 
characteristics provided by the pulp.  
On the other hand, fermentation is 
responsible for some of the major defects 
in coffee. Over fermentation and poor 
practices produce full black beans (dirty 
flavor) and full sour beans (vinegar 
flavor), under fermentation promote the 
growth of undesirable microorganism 
producing fungus damage beans (musty 
flavor). 
Drying    
Depending on the fermentation 
method, coffee cherries or wet 
parchment coffee (either with 
mucilage or without it) are 
mechanically – or sun-dried to a 
moisture content of 10-12% 
aiming to achieve microbial 
stability. So they can be 
transported and stored without 
deterioration as dry parchment 
coffee.  
Sun-dried coffee enhance symbolic 
services but reduce efficiency and could 
reduce taste related services if 
rainy/cloudy weather is experienced.  
Equipment to dry coffee allows proper 
control and can enhance taste related 
services by introducing drying curves 
under 40 ̊Celsius and resting periods. On 
the other hand, by increasing 
temperature, times and cost could be 
economized, but it risks some defaults 
like over-dried or discolored (woody 
flavor) and crystallized bean (death of the 
embryo, lack of flavor, aroma and acidity).  
Waste 
management 
The pulp after hulling and the 
water after washing fermented 
coffee are extremely pollutants 
if discharged directly to water 
sources.  
Waste management to enhance symbolic 
services is expensive in both equipment 
and labor.  
Reselection  To select only the well ripe coffee cherries  
Only well ripe coffee cherries produce the 
full aromatic profile. To enhance taste 
related services, farmers must introduce 
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this expensive labor-intensive activity. 
The tradeoff is that even the best 
selection cannot guarantee that coffee 
will be well paid.  
Trading 
Purchasing 
To classify parchment coffee. 
depending on its physical and 
sensorial characteristics 
A costly labor-intense selection of 
parchment coffee to remove foreign 
matter and unacceptable beans due to 
their physical (color, integrality) and their 
sensory features (odor and cup) and leave 
only the beans that enhance taste related 
services.  
Threshing and 
sorting 
To separate the last layer of the 
parchment coffee and obtain 
green coffee, which is then 
graded in terms of size (using 
screens of various sizes) and 
weight (using an air jet to 
separate heavy from light 
beans).  
A costly labor or capital intense selection 
of green coffee (using either labor or 
color sorting machines) to remove all 
unacceptable beans is performed to 
enhance taste related services.   
Bulking and 
export  
As a result of quality 
uncertainty, traders take 
advantage of buying numerous 
lots to bulk the amount of green 
coffee of certain quality needed 
by a particular client. Dealing 
with several clients, they 
managed to place on the 
market different qualities of 
green coffee. 
Costly investments in packing equipment 
guarantee taste related services that are 
threatened by efficiency (more quantity 
trade at the minimum cost) and its 
consequences like poor control over 
moisture and sanitation that produce 
spotted beans (medicinal flavor); mouldy 
beans (musty flavor); faded old beans 
(woody flavor); spongy beans (cereal 
flavor) and fungus damage beans (musty 
flavor).  
Symbolic services are enhanced through 
costly traceability systems that allow 
interested actors to track down the origin 
of the coffee, and transparency in both 
environmental and social practices, 
particularly prices paid.   
Roasting 
Blending   
Blending green coffee from 
different origins and different 
qualities to produce a particular 
taste related service. For 
example, a roaster blends 
coffee Geisha variety which has 
citrus tones but not body, with 
a Bourbon variety that has the 
body to produce a coffee with 
both body and citrus tones. 
Blending transparency enhance TRSS of 
coffee, because it allows consumer’ 
mental relationships between origins of 
coffees in the blend and sensory 
memories. Nevertheless, it implies a 
higher investment not only on traceability 
systems but also on coffee procurement 
because those systems are developed 
only for high quality (and more expensive) 
coffee.   
Roasting   
Aroma precursors in green 
coffee produce coffee aroma via 
a complex series of Maillard 
reactions (chemical reaction 
between amino acids and 
reducing sugars that creates 
A roaster can enhance TR&SS by using 
only high-quality coffee, even though it is 
costly and its continuous supply is 
unsecured. (As roasters need to provide a 
consistent taste related services for 
consumers, high-quality coffee can only 
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flavors) induced by heat during 
the coffee roasting. 
be considered if the quality is guaranteed 
in time).   
On the other hand, efficiency motivates 
the use of sophisticated techniques 
(some not so much like adding sugar to 
the roasting) to use the maximum 
quantity of cheap-low quality coffee with 
the minimum effect on taste related 
services.   
Finally, taste related services are 
diminished by improper roasting 
producing either under roast beans 
(unsweet peas/grain flavor) or over roast 
beans (ash and fishy flavor).  
Packaging and 
retailing  
To produce packaged coffee as 
end-products ready to be sold 
for consumers, like roasted 
coffee, soluble coffee, single-
serve coffee, coffee pods, etc. to 
sell packaged coffee to 
consumers 
Due to oxidation, roasted coffee gets 
deteriorated much faster than green 
coffee so costly packaging and retailing 
control will maintain taste related 
services.    
Communication 
Strategy Communication 
Marketing strategies or 
communication strategies to 
influence consumers’ minds 
and enhance TR&SS.  
All actors within the DCVC want to 
influence consumers’ minds in a way that 
meaning could be activated once the 
coffee is drunk. But the property over the 
instrument to share that meaning 
produce a major rivalry between actors. 
Brewing 
Grinding   
Grinding roasted coffee implies 
milling coffee beans in smaller 
pieces. To obtain the most 
flavor in a cup of coffee, the 
higher the grind the longer the 
time water should be in contact 
with the coffee.    
A tradeoff between taste related services 
could produce some incoherencies; as 
fine grind enhances body whereas coarse 
grind enhance aromatic profile, it could 
be that coffee produced to enhance 
aromatic profile ends with a very fine 
grinding, vanishing the Taste Related 
Services of that particular coffee. 
Brewing  Different brewing methods produce different cup profiles. 
As for grinding, the full potential of a 
coffee could be vanished by an improper 
brewing. But the main tradeoff is 
between TR&SS and profitability. 
Enhancing TR&SS implies investments not 
only in a high-quality coffee but in 
equipment, infrastructures, and know-
how (qualified baristas).  
  
V.2. Evolution of the Resguardos and Haciendas Regime 
 
This contextual annex acts as an extension of chapter five in the sense that tries to provide the 
historical support to understand the development of the main institutions that governed 
property rights on the productive factors for the coffee culture: land and labor.  
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This annex pretends to present a dynamic process in which changes have been progressive, more 
or less drastic but always reactive to the regime in force at the time at both, the national level 
and the local contexts of Riosucio and Buesaco. So, this annex is divided into three sections, each 
one divided into the same two historical frames.  
 
So we privileged a chronological description since the Spanish conquest of the land today known 
as Colombia. Even though coffee is post-colonial crop in Colombia, the colonial IR is crucial to 
understand the institution of the Resguardos Indígenas, as a collective property right to protect 
labor force, and its stifling regulation that produced a demographic change that attached labor 
to land through the sharecropper system that worked the Haciendas, as it would be presented in 
the first historical frame in each section. International geopolitics would empower a coffee 
farmers’ elite who, through the coffee public policy described in chapter 4, would shape the IR in 
order to disintegrate the ancient structures of Resguardos and Haciendas to encourage the 
commercial coffee farming, as would be presented in the second historical frame in each section.  
 
V.2.1. At the national level - Colombia  
• An export-oriented feudal regime to expulse people from Resguardos to attach them into 
Haciendas (1510 – 1927).    
 
The history of agriculture is a story of land and people. In today’s Colombia when the Spanish 
arrived there was plenty of both, but after several decades, hands were just not enough to 
support an efficient economic activity. According to Colmenares (1987), the conquest and 
colonization processes changed the whole indigenous word; from the food diet to the spiritual 
life; from socio-economic relations to the epidemiological profile, resulting in the annihilation of 
the 90% of natives in Colombia1035. This generalized demographic decline that put economic 
exploitation at risk, resulted in the recognition of the Resguardo as a form of communal 
ownership of the land so indigenes could produce both goods for their consumption and taxes 
for both the Habsburg Crown (that would be collected by an official known as the visitador 
according to the first Cédula Pardo in 1591 (Castillo, 2007, p. 96)) and the Encomendero. Indeed, 
for Colmenares (1987), the Spanish conquest was funded by private initiatives, so after the initial 
looting of gold and gems, they obtained both land through Mercedes de Tierras and tributes 
through the Encomienda from indigenous communities. At the beginning the later was their main 
return on investment because land was not harvested.  
 
As the population declined, Encomenderos demanded personal work to compensate for the 
decreasing of taxes. Firstly it was a few men working a few hours in their houses, then it was the 
                                                     
1035 “Al momento del arribo de los españoles, una cifra de cerca de tres millones de indígenas para el territorio de lo 
que hoy es Colombia... A finales del siglo XVI, regiones que a mediados del siglo, cuando se hicieron los primeros 
recuentos, contaban con medio millón de habitantes, como en el caso del área chibcha, ahora mostraban solamente 
la tercera parte de esa cifra. El ciclo de la pauperización demográfica alcanzó el nivel mínimo a mediados del siglo 
XVII, cuando en muchas partes apenas sobrevivía el diez por ciento de la población indígena original” (Colmenares, 
1987, p. 27).   
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whole community working on their land 1036  creating a particular socio-economic unit of 
production known as Haciendas1037. As the indigenous population continued to decrease more 
unexploited land was available to be appropriated by the Spaniards and more pressure over the 
workforce1038 which resulted in a new institution the Concertaje. This rule mandated indigenes 
to work in different Haciendas to obtain payment in order to pay their tribute, but in practice, 
the money received was never enough to cover the tax. Thus their debt increased and more work 
was demanded (Colmenares, 1987, p. 41). 
 
According to Melo (1990), the natives’ decline was not traduced in more land per indigene to 
compensate the demographic crisis of the indigenous population. But in some way, the potential 
for indigenous growth was channeled into the generation of a group of descendants, who were 
not fully indigenes, which repopulated the country at the end of the XVIII century1039. To explain 
this “some way”, Gutiérrez Ramos (2012, pp. 83-84) argued that the Bourbon Reforms1040 tried 
to transform indigenous peoples in peasant communities through two strategies: property rights 
and education. From a liberal perspective, the first would give them property over the land to 
incentivize its efforts for their individual prosperity. The second one would focus on both practical 
knowledge like agriculture and, Spanish habits and culture. By possessing land and knowledge, 
indigenes would be able to produce a profit that, in turn, would increase the market for Spanish 
exports1041.  Even though in the practice these reforms focused on tax and bureaucratic reforms 
that quadruplicated tax revenues1042 and multiplied social revolt1043. In the end, they indirectly 
sparked off the dilution of indigenous communities: trying to avoid the unpayable taxes, 
                                                     
1036 After some generations Encomenderos gained control over Cabildos; which allow them to obtain lands near their 
Encomiendas.  
1037 “Por eso en las haciendas debe verse una prolongación del dominio político urbano. No sólo tenían una función 
económica sino que, de una manera similar a las encomiendas, eran todo un complejo social y político. Estas unidades 
de producción … han sido uno de los rasgos más peculiares y permanentes de las sociedades hispanoamericanas.” 
(Colmenares, 1987, p. 39) 
1038 Even within the same family of encomenderos: Spanish succession laws allowed land distribution between 
several sons, but the Encomienda was indivisible, therefore there was a conflicting situation of new landowners 
without hands to work the land. 
1039 “Si en 1650 la población indígena apenas llegaba a los cuatrocientos mil habitantes, y la mestiza no podía superar 
los veinte mil, 130 años después sólo figuraban ciento cincuenta mil indios al lado de unos trescientos ochenta mil 
mestizos, sesenta mil esclavos negros y doscientos mil supuestos blancos.” (Melo, 1990, p. 3) 
1040 There were a set of economic and political legislation promulgated by the Spanish Crown under Bourbon kings 
that, inspired in the Illustration, could be synthetized in the idea that indigenes must be useful vassals which produce 
wealth and security to the Crown by integrating them to society, not by excluding them as it was the practice in the 
whole reign of Habsburgs (Gutiérrez Ramos, 2012, p. 84). 
1041 “Lo que importa es, que nuestros Indios tengan medio de ganar, que después por la contribución voluntaria del 
consumo y por el comercio, sacaremos de sus manos sin violencia más de la mitad de todo el fruto de su trabajo”. 
Gutiérrez Ramos (2012, p. 85) quoting Joseph del Campillo’s proposal reform “Nuevo sistema de gobierno 
económico para América” from 1743. 
1042 “Estas innovaciones produjeron un crecimiento dramático en las tasas tributarias que pesaban sobre los indios 
de la región, donde el monto de lo recaudado por la Dirección General de Tributos de Quito se incrementó de 
51.050 pesos en 1778 a 195.596 pesos en 1801, a pesar del avance de la depresión económica.” (Gutiérrez Ramos, 
2012, p. 93) 
1043 The failed Revolt of the Comuneros in 1781 against these measures is seen in Colombian history as a precursor 
to independence.   
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indigenes abandoned their communities and joined the Haciendas, in which they had to pay in 
labor, kind or cash to the owner of the land, the Hacendado, but at least enough were left to 
make ends meet. At the same time, for those staying in the Resguardo, they have to rent their 
land to whites and mestizos to pay the taxes. In both cases, communities were socially and 
ethnically reshaped.  
 
In brief, the institutional regimen during the colonization resulted in a particular pre-capitalist 
organization unit, La Hacienda, which according to Jaramillo Uribe (1987), produced for local 
markets, specifically for urban centers, gold mines and their own consumption (contrary to the 
export-oriented Plantations in the Antilles or Brazil) because of two main causes: the productive 
policies of the Spanish crown within their Empire, in which Colombia was to export only gold, and 
the non-capitalist mentality of proprietaries1044.  
 
During the civil wars for independence, Haciendas were at the heart of the conflict. A few 
survived the process perpetuating colonial structure, but many of them were unable to overcome 
several years of conflict and pillage (Tovar Pinzón, 1987, pp. 105-110). Expropriations to the 
“enemies” of the new Republic and unclaimed property created a kind of an enormous land bank 
in the hands of the State equivalent to the 80% of the total land area in Colombia1045. This land 
was used by political leaders for both increasing their political support (from peasants and 
landowners) and funding the new State. They passed laws to protect people to settle in a peasant 
economy1046 and rules for selling Colombian land bonds to finance its apparatus1047.  
 
Colonos (settlers that used to work in Haciendas) started a colonization process as a group in 
which they moved into unexploited zones, normally baldios or vacant lots, to establish towns and 
                                                     
1044 “La política española que especializó la producción de las colonias, asignando a Nueva Granada la producción 
de oro y reservando la producción de géneros agrícolas como el azúcar a Cuba y Puerto Rico, el cacao a Venezuela, 
el cuero y la carne al Río de la Plata, el trigo a Chile, la plata a México y el Perú” and “la debilidad de los capitales de 
los propietarios neogranadinos, su mentalidad rutinaria y el poco desarrollo de una actitud capitalista frente a los 
negocios.” (Jaramillo Uribe, 1987, p. 81).    
1045 “Quedaba en manos del Estado una inmensa reserva de tierras públicas, que podía abarcar más del 80% de la 
extensión territorial del país. Entre la década de 1820 y finales de siglo, los dirigentes colombianos vieron en estos 
baldíos una inmensa riqueza que podía servir para estimular el desarrollo económico del país; podían ofrecerse como 
señuelo a grupos de colonos europeos, brindarse como incentivo para la construcción de vías de comunicación y otras 
obras de progreso, entregarse a los campesinos que carecieran de tierra, o venderse para obtener recursos para el 
fisco” (Melo González, 1987, p. 150). 
1046 “En 1870 la Ley 14 reguló las asignaciones colectivas a poblaciones... señalando para ellas un tope de 12.000 
hectáreas y determinando que cada colono recibiría un lote de 32 hectáreas … La Ley 48 de 1882, trató de proteger 
aún más a los colonos, al determinar que sólo podrían ser expulsados del área que ocupaban si se demostraba un 
título previo legítimo y que, incluso en ese caso, si el colono había entrado en la tierra de buena fe, era preciso pagar 
las mejoras” (Melo González, 1987, p. 150). 
1047 “Durante el período de 1820 a 1870 se puso el acento en la utilización fiscal de los baldíos, y pronto se regularizó 
un sistema por el cual se emitían bonos territoriales que podían redimirse por baldíos… Por tanto, durante esos años 
la mayor cantidad de tierras fue adquirida por especuladores que habían acumulado títulos de baldíos” (Melo 
González, 1987, p. 152). 
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obtain property rights from the State1048. But in the end, 73% percent of the distributed-land was 
concentrated by capitalists, especially merchants who had accumulated capital in the previous 
bonanzas1049. Workforce shortage was aggravated nonetheless; it was not caused by decreases 
in population (like during the Colonial period) but because of contradictory policies that 
encouraged peasant migration while concentrating land in a few hands. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, a third of the rural population could have been smallholders whereas two-
thirds could have worked in the Haciendas in a very complex system of relationships 
characterized by commercial and workforce linkages between peasants and landowners (Melo 
González, 1987, p. 155).   
 
In any case, patriots urgently needed a source of revenue to improve the material wellbeing of 
Colombians to be able to survive as a ruling class1050. For the New Elite, the production of the 
land and its exportation was not only a matter of economic rationality but also a political one. 
They prioritized to harvest tropical products under 2.000 m.a.s.l., that could not be harvested in 
temperate zones maintaining the colonial Hacienda system (Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 
165) through public policies of transport aiming to link the regions associated with the patriotic 
effort to the oceans.  
 
Looking into the synthesis of infrastructure legislation from 1823 to 1905 made by Pérez-Mejía 
(1997, pp. 293-297), regions aligned with Patriots were benefited with the projects to be linked 
with the ports and the construction itself that enriched local elites whereas non-aligned regions 
were penalized. An example is the numerous pieces of legislation to build roads that connected 
the patriotic cities of Cali and Popayán with the Pacific Ocean 1051 . In those cases selected 
contractors were renamed Patriots (like Tomas Cipriano Mosquera who defeated in 1824 Agustin 
Agualongo’s contra insurgent army composed by indigenes from Nariño, and José Maria Obando 
who defeated the last focus of Nariño’s resistance in 1825) and the payment was with lands 
possessed by the Republic (in part as a result of confiscations) in south departments like Nariño. 
Whereas the unpatriotic region of Nariño, even though it had (still has1052) fertile low lands to 
                                                     
1048 Particularly intense in the region of Antioquia, twenty towns were founded and each one obtained between ten 
to twelve thousand hectares which in turn were redistributed among settlers in properties between 50 and 100 
hectares each (Melo González, 1987, p. 150). 
1049  “De los casi dos millones de hectáreas entregadas en el siglo XIX… el 73% de la tierra quedó en manos de 
beneficiarios de concesiones de más de 1.000 hectáreas. Los títulos de menos de 100 hectáreas representaron apenas 
el 11% de las tierras concedidas, y las repartidas en parcelas de 100 y 1.000 hectáreas el 16% del total” (Melo 
González, 1987, p. 152). 
1050 “Participar en el mercado mundial encarnaba la posibilidad efectiva de sobrevivir como clase al mando de una 
nación en el camino de la civilización” (Palacios, 2009, p. 86). 
1051 In the Colombian transport legislation from 1850 to 1870 listed by Pérez-Mejía (1997, pp. 292-297). Through the 
Ley del 1 de junio de 1850 to build a wagon road between Cali and Buenaventura (the Pacific Ocean), Vicente Borrero 
from Cali obtained 38 thousand ha in the pacific coast of Nariño, Cauca, Valle and Choco; through the Decreto del 
20 de mayo de 1851 to build a bridlepath between Popayan and the Pacific Ocean, José Maria Obando from Popayan 
obtained 32 thousand ha in the north of Nariño ; through the Decreto del 12 de abril de 1854 to build a wagon road 
between Cali and Buenaventura, Tomas Cipriano Mosquera from Popayán obtained 128 thousand ha in Cauca and 
Nariño; through the Decerto de 30 de abril de 1855 to build a bridlepath between Cali and Buenaventura, Juan 
Neponuceno Nuñez from Cali obtained 64 thousand ha in the Pacific Coast in Nariño, Valle and Choco   
1052 When writing these lines, there is 20 thousand hectares of coca cultivated in the Nariño low lands.  
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crop tropical products like tobacco, anise, rubber, tagua, among others; had a settlement over 
the coast (Tumaco1053) and its potential communication being equally defiant than any other 
route to the Pacific Ocean1054, have a few pieces of legislation to link Nariño to Popayán rather 
than to the Ocean1055. So, for these regions, Colombians from the interior replaced Spanish 
hacendados. 
 
During a period of radical liberalism (from 1863 to 1886), the focus on exportation did not mean 
production specialization; on the contrary, money flowed from activity to activity, taking 
advantage of higher prices and bonanzas. Tobacco was the first commercial product to be 
exported and it made a considerable contribution, duplicating the amount of Colombian exports 
to 10 million pesos oro in 1875 until the invention of the cigarette machine in the United States 
in 1881 that spurred its tobacco industry and plumped international prices. In Colombia, 
capitalists interchanged tobacco crops for chinchona trees. The exports of this tree’s bark, which 
was used to extract quinine for medical uses, reached its maximum in 1883 when the Dutch (after 
smuggling the seed from Andean republics) succeeded in establishing huge plantations in 
Indonesia and coffee began to be the principal source of foreign exchange.  
 
Is in this period that coffee started to be part of the exporting portfolio until it reached half of 
the total exports at the end of the nineteenth century. Consequently, demand over indigenous 
land increased and legislators, which were closely related to hacendados, started a legal fight to 
make indigenes owners of their land. Appelbaum (2007) provide convincing evidence on how 
legislators in Cauca in the second half of the XIX century used the liberal argument that individual 
property brings about progress, while heir associates were getting money from land grabbing of 
indigenous communities. In fact, the laws were delivered in such a way in which hacendados 
were able to overpass them1056. 
 
Eventually a new Conservative Government (from 1986 to 1930), inspired by the growing threat 
of Liberalism according to the Catholic Church (that was going to produce their first social 
encyclical Rerum Novarum promulgated by Pope Leon XIII on May 15, 1891) that was 
incorporated locally through the Concordat between the Vatican and the Republic of Colombia 
signed in 1887, took a half-way decision about the indigenous issue: protect them while they 
were “civilized” before giving individual ownership over their land. Indeed, la Ley 89 del 25 de 
                                                     
1053 This port was settled by the Spanish in 1610 to resupply ships traveling from Guayaquil to Panama. It enjoyed a 
brief prosperity time at the beginning of the XX century when exports of tagua nut (the vegetable ivory as it was 
known the seeds of the tagua palm tree) boomed to make buttons until it was replace by plastic ones at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.       
1054 Known as the Choco Biogeographic region, the whole Pacific Coast from Panama to Equator is a dense humid 
tropical forest.   
1055 From almost 180 pieces of legislation from 1823 to 1905, it could be counted with one hand the number of them 
that order to build projects in Nariño. There is one to build the bridge over the Juanambu River (Ley del 4 de junio 
de 1851) to improve communication between Pasto and Popayan and a few other to improve the route between 
the alluvial gold mining town of Barbacoas in the pacific plain and Tuquerres in the plateau.  
1056 An example is a Law that gave indigenes property over the land with the condition that it could not be sold in 
ten years (a period that was believed enough to trigger prosperity) but before the law passed, hacendados had 
already bought the properties1056. 
374 
 
noviembre de 1890 “por la cual se determina la manera como deben ser gobernados los salvajes 
que vayan reduciéndose a la vida civilizada” was approved. In its first article, it subordinates the 
government inside the Resguardos to the ecclesiastical authority to civilize the indigenous 
communities 1057. To this end, this Law regulates the Resguardo 1058, the government of the 
Resguardo1059 and the administration of justice1060 that would operate for a period of fifty years. 
At the end of this period, all these indigenous institutions1061 must be dismantled to integrate 
the indigenes into the Colombian society. 
 
• An agricultural regime that disintegrated Resguardos and Haciendas to consolidate 
commercial farming (1927-1990) 
 
In parallel to the evolution of the coffee regime described in chapter 4, a few words should be 
written to continue the previous narrative about the land and the people.  
 
Bejarano (1980) argued that coffee commercialization allowed capital accumulation that brought 
about the industrialization in Colombian urban areas and some sort of humble accumulation in 
the free peasant economy at the end of the twenties.  According to Kalmanovitz (1996), the pre-
capitalist Haciendas and the colonial Resguardos immobilized labor and land sparking 
contradiction with the new capitalist model that needed both, workers that can move freely from 
plantations to industries1062 and land to produce the food and raw materials demanded by urban 
activity1063.  
 
The Liberal party was against the pre-capitalist haciendas and when obtained the majorities in 
the Congress (after being minorities from the end of the nineteenth century), they approved la 
Ley 200 de diciembre 16 de 1936, sobre régimen de tierras (Land Law), which gave ownership to 
possessors who exploited the land. It was so heavily contested that liberals were divided among 
them, the moderate faction paused the reform in 1938 and afterward, approved La ley 100 del 
31 de diciembre de 1944, sobre régimen de tierras, which declared of public interest the 
sharecroppers contracts, a middle solution that maintained ownership structure in favor of 
hacendados and improved their relations with sharecroppers through a legal capitalist contract. 
                                                     
1057 “Art 1. La legislación general de la República no regirá entre los salvajes que vayan reduciéndose a la vida 
civilizada por medio de Misiones. En consecuencia, el Gobierno, de acuerdo con la Autoridad eclesiástica, determinará 
la manera como esas incipientes sociedades deban ser gobernadas” Ley 89 del 25 de noviembre de 1890 (C. d. l. R. 
d. C. CC, 1890) 
1058 Third chapter: “De los resguardos”. Ibíd.  
1059 Second chapter “Organización de los Cabildos Indígenas”. Ibíd. 
1060 Second chapter “Protectores de Indígenas”. Ibíd. 
1061 Fifth chapter “División de terrenos de resguardos”. Ibíd. 
1062 At the end of the thirties, salaries increased considerably motivated by public works. Haciendas imposed all kinds 
of restrictions to their sharecroppers to limit their mobility (by creating rigged debts that local authorities, in which 
they had huge influence, enforced by menacing jail). As independent farmers and workers were already occupied, 
the FNC solicited the government to stop public works (Kalmanovitz, 1996, p. 212) .  
1063 Hacendados did not produce neither efficiently nor sufficiently (foodstuff and raw materials to industries and 
inhabitants had to be imported for a long period), in addition they were not disposed to sell the land at any price 
because their power was sustain on it (Kalmanovitz, 1996, p. 213).    
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In parallel as the fifty years protection provided by the Ley 89/1890 had passed, hungry 
entrepreneurs mobilized this legislation before the Ministerio de Economía Nacional to dissolve 
the Resguardos (Eraso, 2002). 
 
According to Kalmanovitz (1996), local industries profited the internal market when the 
international one was closed due to the global confrontation, but when it was over, imports 
arrived again reducing the prices of manufactures. They reduced wages because their industrial 
supplies went up (as well as the cost of living) due to inefficiencies in the Haciendas, thus tension 
increased with unions.  
 
Preventive action (known as “la política de la violencia) of the new conservator government (that 
took advantage of liberals division to won the election in 1946) to contain radical factions from 
both, workers and peasant, included illegalization of syndicates; expropriation of electoral 
certificates from liberal citizens and the recruitment of bandits to harass liberal towns and to 
force liberals to vote for the Conservative party. Liberals opposed firstly through democratic 
means like manifestations1064, but after the murder of their leader1065, the civil war busted out 
producing between 200-300 thousand deaths in one decade and displacement of 2 million people 
(nearly one-fifth of the almost 11 million Colombians in that period (Rueda Bedoya, 2000, p. 4)) 
 
For Kalmanovitz (1996) the violence, not the reforms, was responsible for the dissolution of the 
ancient system by unchaining land and labor. The land changed hands because violence 
decreased land prices and aggressive entrepreneurs (including armed leaders, peasants, and 
agrarian bourgeoisie) took advantage of the situation and offered any money to hacendados, 
which aligned to the opposite party in the regional power, had no other option than to sell.  Also 
some hacendados “well aligned” would prefer little money than a devastated land. Labor also 
got mobility because the personal links between hacendados and sharecroppers were completely 
destroyed, peasants fled their land to settle in cities or in other rural areas with no more than 
their workforce to survive, decreasing both urban and rural wages.  
 
An undemocratic peace process between the two parties 1066  included a land reform to 
redistribute land between dispossessed peasants, through collective land to peasant 
cooperatives, by creating the Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria - INCORA through the 
Ley 135 del 13 de diciembre de 1961. According to Velásquez Torres (2013), this Land Law 135/61 
never came into practice because it vaguely defined “unexploited land” as a condition for 
expropriation, making it inapplicable due to the strong opposition of landowners. Hence a liberal 
President encouraged dispossessed peasants to organize themselves to advocate for applicable 
land reform and created la Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (ANUC onwards) through 
                                                     
1064 One iconic manifestation of one hundred thousand citizens in Bogotá (that had four hundred thousand) was “la 
marcha del silencio” led by Jorge Eliecer Gaitan on the 7th of February 1948, in which all marched in silence to 
mourning the victims of the bandits recruited by the police of the conservative party..     
1065 Jorge Eliecer Gaitan was murdered two months afterwards, on the 9th of April 1948 
1066 Known as the national front. The Liberal and the Conservative Party decided to end the conflict by intercalating 
the power, starting with liberals, each party was going to govern alternatively for one period during four terms (from 
1958 to 1974 in which bureaucracy would be divided by half for both parties). 
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the decreto 755 del 2 de Mayo de 1.9671067 which allowed the political support to make the 
corrections through a new Law Land a couple of years after. Indeed, the ley 1 del 26 de enero de 
1968 provided applicable instruments to expropriate the properties that were being exploited 
under the lease and sharecropping. Nevertheless, it opened a door that was used by organized 
peasants to invade properties and make government paid the indemnification for the 
nonconsensual expropriation  
 
According to Kalmanovitz (1996), this threat to the landowners, led them to negotiate with the 
new conservative President an agreement known as the “Pacto de Chicoral” with both the Liberal 
and Conservative Parties to redirect agricultural policy from land redistribution through two 
strategies: colonization of the agricultural frontier for dispossessed peasants, and intensification 
and economic development for agro-entrepreneurs. Two pieces of legislation were agreed: the 
Ley 4 del 29 de marzo de 1973 that dispels the phantom of expropriation and allows the landlord 
to use force to suppress peasant appropriation attempt. The ley 5 del 29 de marzo de 1973 that 
completely vanished land democratization laying down the legislative framework for 
incentivizing commercial farming. Then a new agricultural public policy was launched known as 
Plan de Desarrollo Rural Integrado that focused in farms with more than 3 hectares and the land 
titling to dispossessed peasants of vacant lots at the end of the agricultural frontier: inaccessible 
jungles and forest that make incredibly uncompetitive legal harvests welcoming the much more 
profitable illegal crops.  
 
V.2.2. At the local level: Caldas - Riosucio 
 
This contextual it describes the effects of the evolving IR in Riosucio. In this case, the Resguardo 
as a colonial institution featured by the collective ownership and self-governance is the main 
institution that shapes the Resource coffee in Riosucio.   
 
It is divided into two sections. In the first one, we briefly describe the effects of the colonial IR 
that creates the Resguardos in Riosucio, but we focus in the post-colonial institutions that trying 
to protect them in order to dissolve them later, brought about the coffee farming in Riosucio. In 
the second one, we focus on the indigenous narrative, in the sense that the IR created by a coffee-
related elite encouraged the commercial coffee farming at the expense of the indigenous culture. 
Even if in reality it was different, this narrative is crucial to understand the perceived threat to 
the services provided by the Resource in Riosucio that would contextualize the second part.  
 
• Resguardos and Haciendas in Riosucio (1510 – 1927): The Coffee to civilize the savages 
 
Riosucio is a coffee land since the late nineteenth century. References to coffee began to be 
reported in Riosucio by public officials since 1890 according to Appelbaum (2007, p. 181). 
However its consolidation is notorious a few decades later: according to the Coffee Census 
                                                     
1067 “Durante la inauguración de la ANUC el Presidente Liberal Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) dijo no habrá 
reforma agraria si el campesinado, sus organizaciones y asociaciones de usuarios no la imponen. Sin la presión 
campesina organizada no habrá reforma agraria" (Pardo, 2008)  
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conducted in 1932, Riosucio had 3,492 farms which cultivate 1,747 hectares in coffee (FNC, 1933, 
p. 129). Enough coffee crops to be placed in the middle among the municipalities of Caldas, which 
in turn was the first Department in Colombia in the total coffee area.  
 
Vallecilla Gordillo (2001) said that the consolidation of the crop in this region was the result of 
the acceptable conditions of transport and communications infrastructure, and the international 
commercial relations produced by gold-silver mining in the area known as the Alto Occidente (the 
northwestern region of Caldas that in addition to Riosucio, includes the municipalities of 
Quinchía, Supía, and Marmato). Gordillo developed this influential study on coffee and 
development in Caldas using his economist glasses. For our study, we consider that his hypothesis 
could be enriched using an institutional lens that allows us to dig into one particular institution: 
Los Resguardos Indígenas in Riosucio (Resguardos hereafter).     
 
In this section we will defend the claim that in addition to the previous two conditions, the 
Resguardos in Riosucio that during the XVII and XVIII centuries protected the access to labor and 
supplied food and tools for the mines in this region, were important to explain not only the 
expansion of the coffee crop in the region but also the shape of the local narrative. 
 
Indeed, Castillo (2007) argues that once the process of Spanish Conquest of the territories that 
are now Riosucio in 1539 was completed, two authorizations were given for the mining activity: 
the Real de Minas de Quiebralomo and the Real de Minas de la Montaña. To supply them with 
labor, the indigenous people of the region were gathered in an agricultural village known as 
Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria de la Montaña so they would be evangelized while working in 
these mines. In 1627 the Resguardo de la Montaña was founded with the inhabitants of the 
agricultural village, and in the same year, the Resguardo de San Lorenzo was founded with natives 
brought from other territories. In 1722 the Resguardo de Cañamomo-Lomoprieta was created 
with indigenous people coming from both local and foreign zones. 
 
Resguardos survived the Colonial period because they sustained the mining activity. Once the 
Republic arrived, a slow process of foreign appropriation of their land took place before la Ley 89 
del 25 de noviembre de 1890 was approved to protect their integrality. Corrales-Roa (2011) 
argued that land in higher zones of the Resguardos for dairy farming and lower zones for beef-
cattle farming, additionally to divers polygons for mines were granted to foreigners (non-
indigenes) as a reward for the services to the Republic, or appropriated by them. As coffee was 
not yet a valuable commodity, the Resguardos keep the “unprofitable” remaining land in an 
altitudinal fringe (1200 - 2000 m.a.s.l.) that happens to be the one in which coffee thrives.  
 
Once the Ley 89-1890 passed, the shared temporal authority between the Colombian 
government and the Catholic Church, gave the authority to priest to influence the indigenes’ use 
rights over the communally owned land to cultivate coffee, so they could become modern 
Colombians through the generation of income to afford goods and services that would change 
their savage behavior according to interviews conducted by the sociologist Ángela María Gómez 
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in 1991 with the eldest (indigenes who lived during the first decades of the 20th century)1068. 
Coffee provided the cash needed to buy in the markets the food that was previously produced in 
collective higher/lower lands of the Resguardo1069. 
 
So the merchant was the link between the cultivation and the civilization of indigenous 
communities, in fact, Appelbaum (2007, p. 284) argues that the priest José Gonzalo Uribe 
assigned to the parish of San Lorenzo, with authority over the Resguardo de San Lorenzo, invited 
the merchant Santiago González to Riosucio during the first decades of the 20th century. 
 
Merchants take advantage of this almost patriotic mission1070 to increase their market power and 
reduce profit margins for the coffee grower. Palacios (2009, p. 393) uncovered an illicit pact in 
the Plaza de Medellín, which was the intermediary destination of coffee from Riosucio, among 
Antioquia merchants (who managed to trade 65% of the total coffee exported from this Plaza in 
1913) to pushed the purchase price down through a combination of price agreements; monopoly 
over the threshing facilities; monopoly over the bags to pack coffee; and commercial strategies 
to influence transport cost in their benefit1071.  
 
These merchants had accumulated the capital needed to settle in New York as importers and 
traders in the twenties  (Palacios, 2009, p. 396; Ukers, 1922, p. 340). They offered to roasters a 
portfolio of aromatic profiles dependent on the region and its physical classification (grain size 
and a certain number of defective beans in a sample). The Colombian bean was described as “is 
rich and mild in the cup. The fancy grades compare favorably with the world's best growths. They 
produce one-quarter more liquor of given strength than Santos coffees and possess much finer 
flavor and aroma” (Ukers, 1922, p. 363). And the bean Medellín ( coffee exported from this Plaza 
including coffee from Riosucio) was featured as “best of Colombians; fine flavor and body”(Ukers, 
1922, p. 363).  
 
While merchants were succeeding, indigenous coffee farming was featured by smallholdings and 
little cash: from the 41 municipalities in Caldas in the mentioned Coffee Census of 1932, only 
                                                     
1068  One of the eldest remembered “el café llegó, después vino un padre Uribe y les dijo que sembraran café, se 
confesaban, la penitencia era que sembraran café porque más tarde la daría para mantenerse” (Appelbaum, 2007, 
p. 283).   
1069 Corrales-Roa (2011) citing interviews with the eldest indigenes (Franco, 2004)  in which they remembered the 
first half of the 20th century “Todo se sembraba en pedacitos dentro del monte. En la montaña había guamos, 
higuerones y mestizos cedros, tambor, guadua y cañabrava. No tenían ganado, pero sí gallinas y marranos… los 
marranos, las bestias y el ganado eran tenidos libremente en un criadero, en tierra de comunidad. Los cultivos eran 
retirados hacia las laderas y los planes más abajo… En Cañamomo lo más plano estaba sembrado con caña… tenían 
corrales de plátano, maíz y fríjol… tenía un cosechadero en mata de guineo en la tierra caliente, pero los ricos se 
adueñaron, los ricos largaron animales y la gente le perdió el deseo cosechar por allá” (Corrales-Roa, 2011, p. 165) 
1070 This perception is still widespread in rural areas in Colombia. When we interviewed an entrepreneurial coffee 
farmer in October 2015, he claimed that the Government should pay him for providing employment.    
1071  Merchants from Antioquia had “mecanismos rudimentario pero eficaces: a) Fijación del precio de compra en 
las plazas cafeteras. b) Compra y administración de trilladoras. c) Alquiler de sacos de empaque a los socios (muy 
caros y escasos por entonces). d) Diseño de tácticas comerciales para manipular los fletes terrestres (mulas)” Palacios 
(2009, p. 393). 
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Riosucio, Quinchía and Marmato had a higher number of coffee farms than fanegadas cultivated 
in coffee1072. Riosucio had farms of 0.78 fanegadas (0.5 hectares) on average, equivalent to a 
quarter of the three fanegadas (2 hectares) per farm on average in Caldas1073. Calculating 426 
kilos of coffee per farm on average in Riosucio1074 and taking as a reference the prices and costs 
of coffee production in Antioquia in 19321075 identified by Palacios (2009, p. 383). The average 
income on coffee per farm in Riosucio amounted to COP 99.4 (USD 99.4) per year or COP 8 (USD 
8) per month. It means that the coffee-related cash in one month by farms on average in Riosucio, 
was barely equivalent to the transportation cost of four bags of coffee. 
 
Hence, the Resguardo and its government were instrumental to expand coffee culture in 
Riosucio, which thanks to infrastructures and networking was attractive to merchants who were 
successful in trading coffee. For indigenous farmers, coffee was a cash crop cultivated among 
other staple crops which provided a little cash, the amount of which is going to be crucial in the 
construction of the local narrative that will be developed in the third section.     
 
• Commercial farming in Riosucio (1927-1990): Coffee to deprive the Indigenes 
 
Five years after the foundation of the FNC in 1927, the Comité Departamental de Caldas, had 
registered 36.5 thousand farms in the department, including the 3.5 thousand of them in 
Riosucio. And it was organized with a chief and four extension agents to transfer the available 
technology to improve coffee farmers’ production. It is plausible to assume that only a small 
percentage benefited from the service. 
 
With the increase in revenues from coffee, according to Caicedo (2011, p. 21), the Resguardos 
were attacked for their resistance to allow indigenous to take advantage over their property 
rights on the land. He quoted the Congressman Guillermo Valencia during the discussions of the 
Ley 19 del 23 de septiembre de 1927 “sobre división de resguardos indígenas” (Resguardos 
dissolution) demanding a liberation quest for both indigenes victims of a slaving regime and 
neighboring white colonizers1076, not without showing his more material interests when arguing 
                                                     
1072 A fanegada is a measure of land equivalent to 6,400 square meters, or 0.64 hectares whose Arab origin goes 
back to what a pair of oxen was capable of plowing in a single day. 
1073 It was far from the averages of four fanegadas per farm in Manizales, Chinchiná and Pereira and very far from 
the seven fanegadas per farm in Armenia and Palestina. 
1074 Using the same data from the 1932 Census (FNC, 1933, p. 121). Given the 2 million coffee trees in the 2730 
fanegadas reported in Riosucio, there were on average 743 coffee trees per fanegada. Given the 60 million kilos of 
coffee produced by 82 million of coffee trees Caldas, there was an average production of 734 grams of coffee per 
tree on in Caldas. Hence, in Riosucio, on average, each farm could have had 580 plants of coffea arabica Typica which 
multiplied for the 734 grams could have produced 426 kilos of coffee.  
1075 (the cost of a bag of coffee (we assume 60k) was COP 14 (USD 14)  and the cost of transportation per bag of COP 
1.92 (USD 1.92)) 
1076 “esta obra de liberación ofrece un doble aspecto: el de provecho para los indígenas, victimas involuntarias de un 
régimen sediciente protector, y de emancipación para los desdichados blancos que han tenido la desventura y mal 
acierto de levantar vivienda, cerca de tan agresivos y desapacibles propietarios” Guillermo Valencia quoted by 
Caicedo (2011, p. 21) 
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indigenes had the best lands in the Andes1077. For Appelbaum (2007) the discourse that blamed 
the collective ownership of being responsible for poverty in the indigenous community was, in 
fact, a cunning strategy to individualize ownership so land grabbing could be legal.  
  
The Law 19/1927 in its first article transferred the competence for dissolving the Resguardos from 
the judges according to the Law 89/18901078  to the central government1079. According to Caicedo 
(2011, pp. 22-24) Jorge Gartner de la Cuesta, Minister of the National Economy and native from 
Riosucio, used this legal basis to, initially, issue the Decreto 2454 del 27 de diciembre de 1939, by 
which it was decided to dissolve the Resguardo Indígena de San Lorenzo and distribute the land 
in small plots among its inhabitants.  Given that the Law 19/1927 ordered a distribution in equal 
aliquots, considered an impossible task due to the complexity of a collective territory with 
multiple rights of use over forests, pastures and crops, they decided to declare its inexistence. 
Indeed, Gartner himself as Minister of Government issued the Decreto-ley 1421 del 18 de julio de 
1940 with the objective of giving to the Ministry of National Economy the competence to declare 
the (in)existence of a Resguardo. Based on this, the Ministry of National Economy declared the 
San Lorenzo Indigenous Reservation non-existent through the Resolución 1 del 20 de mayo de 
1943. 
 
According to Appelbaum (2007), the weakening of the Resguardos in Riosucio because of both 
its dissolution as in the case of el Resguardo de San Lorenzo and for colonization in the case of el 
Resguardo de la Montaña and el Resguardo de Cañamomo-Lomaprieta, opened the door for a 
process of dispossession that is anchored in the collective memory of the indigenous movement: 
The narrative claims that once Resguardos lost their force, the indigenes owners of a small piece 
of land, were encouraged to take credit for planting coffee and buying merchandise that, given 
an insufficient income when selling the product, had to be paid with his plot of land. In the already 
mentioned interviews of Gómez (1991) some eldest described their memories linking Santiago 
González, a merchant of coffee with the dispossession1080, which was going to be escalated 
afterward. Indeed, as described in annex 2, the period known as La Violencia from the forties to 
the sixties erased the ancient structures of both the Resguardos and Haciendas to make way for 
commercial farming.  
 
                                                     
1077 “La República se sorprenderá cuándo sepa de qué es dueña en las mejores tierras del macizo andino, sobre todo 
en la Cordillera Central” Guillermo Valencia quoted by Caicedo (2011, p. 21) 
1078 “Para efectuar la división de los terrenos de que aquí se trata (…) que se solicite ante el juez del Circuito por todos 
los miembros del Cabildo (...) y tenga el apoyo o voluntad de la mayoría absoluta de los indígenas” Art. 30 de la Ley 
89 de 1890. 
1079 “la división de terrenos de resguardos de indígenas se efectuará por comisiones especiales a cargo de la Nación” 
Art. 1 Ley 19 de 1927. 
1080  “estableció un tren de mulas entre Medellín y San Lorenzo (...) Compraba café a bajos precios, vendía mercancías 
y, luego de la partición del resguardo, daba crédito a los nuevos propietarios de las tierras indígenas. Junto con sus 
hermanos y otros comerciantes e inversionistas de Riosucio y Antioquia obtuvo derechos de tierra en San Lorenzo 
comprando títulos, redimiendo hipotecas y embargando cosechas. (Otra indígena recordaba) los primeros en llegar 
fueron los González, cogían un pobre y por unas arrobas de café les quitaban las tierras; en ese tiempo les prestaban 
con que hacer una rocería, una siembra… así les quitaban las tierras.”” (Appelbaum, 2007, p. 284).   
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It is plausible that the 4,346 hectares planted in coffee in Riosucio in 19701081 (two times the 1932 
area), was featured by a few large coffee farms and great atomization of small smallholdings1082. 
As it happened in other Colombian regions, entrepreneurial coffee farming could have started to 
be dominant in the zone and the various instruments of the coffee public policy reached the 
larger-than-10-ha coffee farms. Indeed, according to (Asprocafé, 2007), the Jefe de Fomento 
Cooperativo del Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas encouraged the leaders of a small 
cooperative in a village near Riosucio that wanted to establish themselves as Cooperativa de 
Caficultores, to associate with coffee farmers in the municipalities of Riosucio, Supía, Quinchía 
and Marmato. Indeed, in June 1963, 255 coffee growers met at the purchase point of the FNC in 
Riosucio and contributed the $ 13,500 that made possible the constitution of the Cooperative. 
The FNC played a major role contributing with the 49% of the capital subscribed and making the 
whole paperwork to obtain the legal personality through resolución Nº 0019 del 28 de Septiembre 
de 1963 de la Superintendencia Nacional de Cooperativas. The cooperative initiated its purchases 
on March 4, 1964, as the Cooperativa de Caficultores del Alto Occidente (La Cooperative 
onwards). During the eighties, La Cooperativa was already buying 70% of the coffee produced in 
the municipality (Calvo & Dorado, 2010, p. 42)  
 
The indigenous narrative claims that without Resguardos the indigenous culture vanished 
through miscegenation and mixed marriages1083 but mainly because of impoverishment1084 that 
produced emigration: people form Riosucio in productive age remained most of the year outside 
their municipality, men as jornaleros or recolectores (people who sell their workforce to 
commercial farms in exchange of a payment either on a daily basis or by kilos harvested) 
throughout the country, and women as domestic employees in the houses of the capital cities 
(Appelbaum, 2003, p. 199). The narrative from people in the urban area of Riosucio, following 
Benítez (1984), was that a new race of mestizos people was created in this municipality. There 
were neither indigenes nor white people, but just one mestizo race. An understandable narrative 
in times in which violence had declined and the first round of (unsuccessful) processes of peace 
with guerrillas had started.   
 
                                                     
1081 Fuente: SICA/Censo cafetero 1970 
1082 In the fieldwork the interviewees remembered some few large commercial coffee farms. In a few cases they had 
a family inheritance (after being divided among two/three generations) from those large farms, in several other 
interviewees used to work in those farms. The interviewees remembered indigenes owners of large farms (not only 
mestizos or white people), an observation that would support the hypothesis that the dispossession was the result 
of an accumulation of land regardless of whether the owner was white, mestizo or indigene.  
1083 “una de estas normas (del Resguardo) consistía en prohibir el matrimonio entre una indígena y un mestizo, si una 
mujer deseaba iniciar una relación de pareja con una persona externa a la comunidad debía renunciar a sus derechos 
de propiedad de la tierra. Esto se hacía con el fin de evitar que los mestizos se apropiaran de porciones del territorio 
indígena” (González Henao, 2013, p. 139).  
1084“Ver familias que no tenían nada que comer y niños por ahí tirados en el piso, eso era lo que más me mortificaba 
a mí. Ver a las señoras que salían y a los hombres que se tenían que quedar en la casa cuidando los niños, pasando 
como mi Dios les ayudara, y las señoras se iban a ganar el jornal con su fuerza en la finca de los terratenientes, les 
pagaban treinta pesos y con ese sueldo sacaban las familias adelante.” Otilia Aricapa León interviewed in Riosucio 
by González Henao (2013, p. 144) 
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The fact is that in the late sixties peasants from Riosucio (not indigenes) joined the organization 
of landless peasants that would result in the already mentioned ANUC (annex 2). For Caicedo 
(2011) it was this association that provides the scenario to create the indigenous movement1085. 
Indeed, within the ANUC a group of indigenous people from Cauca1086 was involved in a legal-
political struggle to recover the indigenous lands by demanding instruments to implement the 
“indigenous and tribal population” Convention 107 signed the 26th of June, 1957 of the 
International Labour Organization, which established the right of ownership over the traditional 
lands of the indigenes1087 and which was part of the Colombian legal system once was approved 
the Ley 19 de 1958 “sobre fomento agropecuario de las parcialidades indígenas”.  
 
According to (Appelbaum, 2007), this message to recuperate ancestral land was disseminated 
throughout the territory through the ANUC, and some populations in which there was no 
consensus on their current status as indigenous as Riosucio, enrolled in the struggle because it 
could better suit their interest for land than the one as peasants. A decade after, the Organización 
Nacional Indígena de Colombia (ONIC) held its first Congreso Nacional Indígena in 1982. One 
thousand and a half delegates from indigenous peoples throughout the country adopted the 
principles of Unity, Land, Culture, and Autonomy and prioritized actions to incorporate them into 
the governmental agenda. One of them was Silvio Tapasco, a Riosuceño who joined the ANUC in 
the 1970s as a landless peasant until he was elected as an indigenous representative of the 
Executive Committee of the ANUC in 1981 (Dajer, 1981, p. 75).  According to Lopera-Mesa (2010), 
Tapasco began a crusade to recover the identity of the Embera people in Caldas by reviving the 
Cabildos (the authority of a Resguardo) of the legally existent but practically vanished Resguardos 
de Cañamomo-Lomaprieta and el Resguardo de la Montaña and the legally inexistent Resguardo 
de San Lorenzo during the eighties. Moreover, he led indigenous peoples of the department to 
be organized into the Consejo Regional Indígena de Caldas (CRIDEC onwards) in 1985 with the 
aim of gaining critical mass to support the demands of its members and share experiences and 
specialized advice to increase the probability of success1088. Over time, through a very difficult 
path to convince the population of their indigenous origins1089, people began to identify with the 
Cabildos and their institutions.  
 
Once the Decreto 2001 de 1988 passed to regulate the INCORA’s titling process of collective lands 
to the Resguardos (not only to the Cooperatives of peasants) land started to be recovered. 
Followed by a national consensus that recognized the ONIC's proposals as its own: Colombia as 
a multi-ethnic and pluricultural nation, which was written down in the Constitución Política de 
                                                     
1085 “En medio de este movimiento agrario, un sector rural hasta ese momento invisible toma conciencia de sí mismo 
y empieza un proceso propio y diferenciado de organización. Son los indígenas de Colombia” (Caicedo, 2011, p. 29). 
1086 El Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca – CRIC was founded in 1971. 
1087 “The right of ownership, collective or individual, of the members of the populations concerned over the lands 
which these populations traditionally occupy shall be recognised”. Art. 11 Convention 107/1957 
1088 “Cuando iniciamos la reconstrucción de Bonafont como parcialidad (el primer paso para el reconocimiento del 
Resguardo es la parcialidad), tuvimos asesoría del CRIDEC” Interview with the indigenous leader Martha Lucía 
Gapacha quoted by González Henao (2013, p. 146). 
1089 “Desde entonces los Cabildos comienzan un proceso muy difícil de convencimiento casa por casa para reconstruir 
la parcialidad; pero había pasado una generación y las familias se mostraban reticentes a volver a identificarse como 
indígenas, por lo que los líderes debieron aguantar reclamos e insultos”(CRIDEC, 2012, p. 48) 
383 
 
Colombia of 1991 and that recognized the Resguardo as a Territorial Entity1090. The Riosuceños 
began to feel again indigenous1091. Partly thanks to the fact that the renewed legal protection 
allowed indigenes to unearth the benefits of existing laws such as the exemption from both 
military service and land taxes and, to produce new benefits with the new post-constitution 
legislative package such as a special health social security regime for the indigenous, exclusive 
quotas in public universities, subsidized public services, among others. The Cabildos strategically 
used these benefits to convince owners of land titles located in their area of influence (unrelated 
to their indigenous heritage) to give them to the Cabildo in exchange for a right of use on the 
same land, and of course, be registered as indigenous to access to these benefits.  
 
V.2.3. At the local level: Nariño - Buesaco  
 
This contextual it describes the effects of the evolving IR in Buesaco. In this case, the Hacienda as 
a colonial institution featured by the sharecropper system and political exclusion is the main 
institution, from a negative point of view, that shaped the Resource coffee in Buesaco. 
 
It is divided into two sections. In the first one, we focus on the change produced by both the 
colonial and republican IR from a thriving indigenous community to an impoverished Haciendas. 
In the second one, we conjecture that the IR created by a coffee-related elite did not encourage 
the commercial coffee farming but indirectly, sparked violence that disintegrated the Haciendas 
and encouraged both non-coffee commercial farming in the best land and, small coffee (and 
illegal crops) farming for the displaced peasants at the agricultural frontier.  
 
• Resguardos and haciendas in Nariño (1510 – 1927): From the indigenous 
microverticalidad system to the peripheral republican granary 
 
Before the Spanish Conquest of today’s Nariño, Uribe Alarcón (1986) using archaeological 
evidence, claim that indigenous population neither lived in autarky nor in a market-based 
economy. Two main indigenous groups applied an economic system called microverticalidad in 
which they were self-sufficient and at the same time, they were supplied by neighbor 
communities in different altitudinal zones1092: The Quillacingas that cultivated maize, cotton, 
coca, chili, peanut, fique1093, indigo, yucca and salt on the northern part of the plateau and its 
inter-Andean valleys between 1.000 m.a.s.l and 2.000 m.a.s.l., and the more numerous, and 
                                                     
1090 La Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991 reconoce la diversidad étnica (art. 7), su protección (art. 8, 10, 68, 
70,72), su derecho al territorio (art. 63), la jurisdicción propia (art.246), al gobierno según sus usos y costumbres (art. 
330), a la participación en los ingresos de la nación (art. 357) y a la “conformación de entidades territoriales indígenas 
(…) los resguardos son propiedad colectiva y no enajenable” Art. 329 de la Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991.   
1091 “Mientras que en el censo de 1993, el 41% de los 43.511 habitantes de Riosucio se identificó como indígena, en 
2005 el porcentaje aumentó al 75.4% de una población total de 54.537 personas” (Lopera-Mesa, 2010, p. 71) 
1092  “No existen comunidades andinas económicamente autosuficientes, sino más bien, regiones económicas 
conformadas por comunidades que se autoabastecen y son abastecidas por otras” Definition proposed by Oberem 
(1974) cited by (Uribe Alarcón, 1986, p. 39). 
1093 “A though natural fibre made from the leaves of furcraea andina, similar to hemp” Collins English Dictionary. It 
was used to as an input to craft articles, from tissues and espadrilles to ropes and kitchen tools.  
384 
 
Quechua speakers, the Pastos, which harvested tubers like potatoes, mashua, ullucos, oxalis, 
quinoa and maize in the southern biggest portion of the plateau above 2.700 m.a.s.l. They traded 
both through the mindalaes (or indigenous merchants) and permanent colonies on other tribes 
in the West (the Pacific plains), East (the Amazon forest) and South (Equator). 
 
Cerón Solarte and Ramos (1997, p. 90) using colonial documents, said that the Spanish took 
advantage of this well-organized society to establish its regional center: a high population 
density; a high potential tributes; ideal conditions for agricultural development of European crops 
like wheat, barley and pasture for cattle; nearby alluvial gold mining (in both the Pacific and 
Amazon) and its geographical position, equidistant to the northern Popayán and the southern 
Quito in the path Cartagena-Lima, was well enough to settle and so they founded Pasto in 1537. 
In 1559 it was recorded that 23.734 tributaries (this amount of tributaries could have meant 100 
thousand indigenes1094) organized in 66 communities (each one governed by one Cacique in a 
non-saleable communal land that was going to be known as Resguardo) had to pay 17 thousand 
tissues and 55 tons of wheat, maize, barley and kidney beans as a tribute1095 to 28 Spanish 
Encomenderos1096 Even though that Tunja and Santa Fe in the Cundiboyacense plateau had more 
tributaries than Pasto (52.647; 36.552 and 23.734 respectively), on average Encomiendas were 
more attractive in the later (721; 664 and 844 respectively).  
 
Pasto was center of a greedy Spanish elite that enriched themselves through excessive vassalage 
that changed the whole indigenous word resulting in the annihilation of the 90% of natives in 
Colombia (Colmenares, 1987, p. 27). In fact, Pastos and Quillancingas were reduced in this same 
proportion: only 2.741 tributaries (equivalent to probably 10 thousand indigenes1097) were listed 
by Spanish officials in 1691 (Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 109). The population decrease 
caused a spatial repopulation in which authorities aggregated neighboring communities in a 
single Resguardo and take advantage to grab the land indigenes left behind to auction it to 
Landowners. Bolaños Martinez (2015) provide evidence that, in this context, the Resguardo of 
Buesaco was founded in 1677 by the Corregidor of Pasto with the assistance of the local most 
important Cacique. They regrouped1098 native survivors that were sparsely distributed near the 
chosen new settlement at the north edge of the Plateau, just above the only passage over the 
                                                     
1094 (Gutiérrez Ramos, 2012, p. 74) 
1095 “tasados en diez y siete mil y cuatrocientos cincuenta mantas y novecientos y ochenta y siete hanegas de trigo 
y maíz y cebada y frijoles, sembrado y beneficiando y cogido” (Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 94) 
1096 As a reward for their services, the Spanish Crown conferred to Conquistadores the right to demand tribute to 
the indigenous population. This institution called Encomienda gives the name of Encomendero to the owner of one. 
It was restricted to collect taxes in gold or goods, so it did not mean control over land, work or other resources. The 
Spanish Crown, trying to avoid a feudal system in America, obliged Spaniards to live in urban centers separated from 
natives and instructed the Cabildo and its Corregidor (authority of those urban centers) to distribute the land, work 
and other resources (using other institutions) excluding the land of indigenous communities (from where the taxes 
were obtained) between the newcomers.  
1097 (Gutiérrez Ramos, 2012, p. 74) 
1098  Using a mixture of measures: After ordering authorities to burn indigenous homes, they mandated 
Encomenderos not to collect the tribute for one year and penalized with 200 lashes and the cut of the hair to any 
indigene that in one year had not built their homes in the new Buesaco (Bolaños Martinez, 2015, p. 82) 
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Juanambú River that communicates, by land, the Audiencia of Santa Fe with the Viceroyalty of 
Peru.  
 
In the rest of the second half of the XVII Century, the mismanaged Imperial Spanish Crown 
suffocated its colonies with an unpayable tax burden to fight Europeans wars and fed its 
malfunctioning bureaucratic apparatus. After snatch everything from cows to clothes, Caciques 
were jailed because its communities were not able to pay1099, Encomenderos were imprisoned 
for evading tax and even Corregidores (the local authority) were penalized with prison for 
incompetence in collecting taxes (Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 111).  
 
In a few generations, the community was ruined. The microverticalidad system described above 
that provided supplies to cover needs was replaced by an extractive system that was not able to 
cover them, nor even to the Spanish population. The local elite was so impoverished that their 
unattractive Encomiendas1100 had to be returned to the crown or to elites in Popayán and Quito 
(Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 113) and their commercial activity were ruined off1101. The 
ancient communication between indigenous nations was broken because natives were also 
annihilated in the Pacific plain, the Amazon forest, and the Equator. The route to Popayán was 
infested with bandits, mainly slaves which, after fleeing from gold mines and sugar cane 
plantations in Cauca, made a living stealing travelers (Uribe, 1995, p. 66).  
 
Cerón Solarte and Ramos (1997) depicted Pasto as a poor and ruinous village at the end of the 
XVIII century, but they also affirmed: “there is abundant food that makes life cheap, but there 
are not the benefits of the commercial development”1102. One can assume that isolation was bad 
business for colonialist that used to live in Pasto, but it might be not the case for natives mainly 
living in rural areas. If there were not any profitable economic activity, businessmen would have 
been attracted by other regions, letting the diminished indigenous population recover. The 
                                                     
1099 "Los indios han quedado destruidos y perdidos de 30 años a esta parte. Si algo se recoge es de fuerza de las 
diligencias que en ellos se pone en ropa pastusa, bestias, mulares, caballos y cabezas de ganado que les quedan a los 
indios (…).Hay pobreza y acabamiento en esta tierra y no valen las ordenanzas y no se puede cobrar siquiera en las 
dichas ropas. Aunque se prenden en las cárceles a los indios, gobernadores y mandones, no se saca ningún fruto. 
Están presos por dos o tres años y se les suelta para no dejarlos morir en la cárcel” (Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 
112)     
1100 "Esta ciudad está muy pobre y los deudores tanto que no se les da nada que los ejecuten y tengan presos en la 
cárcel de esta dicha ciudad como lo están el Corregidor Rodrigo Muñoz de Ayala y Diego de Benavides. No hay de 
que echarles mano para ejecutar sus bienes y aunque tengan haciendas no hay quienes las compren por la pobreza 
de esta tierra. No valen diligencias para negociar ni cobrar alcabalas, ni para mi sustento y gastos (Cerón Solarte & 
Ramos, 1997, p. 113)     
1101 “"si era verdad que los vecinos estaban pobres, sus casas caídas y haciendas arruinadas, por la cantidad de censos 
que no alcanzaban a mantener sus familias y han cerrado sus tiendas de comercio. Que si desde 1696 cayó el tizón 
del frío hasta la fecha...; sí las harinas no tenían ningún mercado... ” (Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 116). 
1102 “hay alimento abundante que hace la vida barata, pero no se cuenta con los beneficios del desarrollo comercial” 
(Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 121). 
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increase in land conflicts1103  that has to be solved mainly through justice1104 and in some cases 
through violence, depicts a more nuanced situation.  
 
On the one hand, not only this impoverish elite remained, but also they changed their desire for 
Encomiendas towards an appetite for land for their Haciendas. On the other hand, its power in 
relation to indigenous communities diminished. Gutiérrez Ramos (2012, pp. 129-138) provide 
evidence on how indigenes took advantage to protect their lands by creating “foundational titles” 
on their lands 1105: they brought about property rights by legalizing their possession before 
colonial authorities. As a consequence, they created a symbolic vector towards its identity, a 
symbolic frontier between the indigenes and Spanish “republics” that was the medullar spine of 
their economic activity by annually redistributing arable land between community members. 
That is why they fought successfully in the courts of the Audiencia in Quito for its defense against 
Spanish or mestizos “invasions”. As a result, Indigenous communities felt the Spanish Crown and 
their officials were protecting them against the more menacing local rivals1106. 
 
During the XVIII century, the local population (indigenous, whites, mestizos and slaves) 
recovered. Gutiérrez Ramos (2012, pp. 113-114) using information from the Governor of Popayán 
in 1797 (to which today’s Nariño was part), claim that almost 30 thousand people were living in 
the district of the Cabildo de Pasto (divided in two provincias: Pasto with 12.461 (To the north, 
ancient territory of Quillacingas) and Los Pastos with 17.887 (to the south, ancient territory of 
the Pastos). Luna Zarama (2014, p. 191) using different primary and secondary sources showed 
that the composition changed at the expense of indigenes: slightly more than half of the 
23.3401107 inhabitants of la provincial de Pasto were indigenes in 1809, an acceptable recovery 
when comparing with the 21.964 dwellers in Bogotá at the end of the year 18001108. 
 
The demographic change evolved in parallel with an economic transformation. From the 
extractive economy that characterized the first period, an apparent autarky sustained in a 
growing population gave way to rural-urban trade in agricultural products like wheat and cattle, 
                                                     
1103 There were seven revolts in different towns in Nariño between 1781 and 1803 mainly against the new taxes on 
local trade. Their resolution, by hanging indigenes elites that were part of revolts, worked also as a mechanism to 
vanish ethnic memory. 
1104 “A lo largo de los siglos XVII Y XVIII el recurso de los indios ante la audiencia aumentó considerablemente y con 
frecuencia lograron que los fallos fuesen a su favor. El motivo principal de sus demandas siguió siendo la protección 
de sus tierras y cultivos (…)” (Gutiérrez Ramos, 2012, pp. 78-79) 
1105 See “Tabla 8, títulos primordiales de algunos resguardos de Pasto, siglos XVII x XVIII” (Gutiérrez Ramos, 2012, p. 
133) 
1106 “La conclusión salta a la vista: en la región de Pasto mal podría decirse que el rey y sus funcionarios hubiesen 
actuado en los años previos a la Independencia como un elemento disolvente o amenazante de las condiciones 
materiales de existencia de las comunidades y pueblos de campesinos indios encarnadas en los resguardos. Más 
bien, estos se erigieron como sus protectores frente a las invasiones y agresiones de sus vecinos.” (Gutiérrez Ramos, 
2012, pp. 134-135) 
1107 “2.600 Nobles (both legal and blood nobility); 7.700 Montañeses (descendants of Spanish and indigenes); 12.300 
Indios (indigenes); 740 pardos y otros (Africans slaves and its descendants with indigenes)”. (Luna Zarama, 2014, p. 
191) 
1108 Padrón General de 1800, Instituto de Estudios Urbanos en www.institutodeestuiosurganos.info. Last visited 10-
23-2017.    
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for milled grain and leather products or services like construction or entertainment among 
others, described by Luna Zarama (2014)1109 with a humble trading of its surplus grain with 
Popayán and cattle with Quito.  
 
This isolation could have played a major role during the independence wars. For Gutiérrez Ramos 
(2012, pp. 158-164) being aligned with the Crown interest and against revolutionaries, could have 
been a strategy to gain prevalence at the expense of the rebellious Quito and Popayán1110. In 
addition to the, already mentioned, effective protection of communal lands and the fact that 
royal authorities reduced and afterward eliminated the tax burden. It was not surprising that 
Pastusos had preferred this Statu Quo under the Spanish Rule that bet for the Patriots (rebels in 
favor of the independence from the Spanish Crown). 
 
As it happened, they lost the bet and the Province of Pasto was placed on the wrong side of 
history. They suffered the ravages of the war of independence as it was in other regions, but 
whereas the latter benefited from land retribution and public investments once the war was 
over, Nariño’s provinces suffered punishments and Patriots confiscated their money and 
properties1111.  This region was dispossessed from the position that it should have obtained in 
the early republic because of its demographics. Instead of trying to insert itself in the liberal 
economy as the efforts of others regions in Colombia, Nariño was pushed towards the periphery 
of the new nation, playing the role of supplying raw materials needed by those export-oriented 
regions. So wheat and maize were cultivated in Haciendas in both the plateau and the valleys of 
the Andes in Nariño and then milled in Pasto to be transported to Popayán and from there, to 
other parts of the country1112. Also, livestock was getting attractive: mules for transport, cattle 
for food and leather for saddleries and crafts (Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 174).  
 
• Commercial farming in Nariño (1927-1990): The FNC must be present in Nariño… even if 
there is not coffee  
 
                                                     
1109 “En Pasto los sectores populares estuvieron constituidos por las agrupaciones de capa media, denominados 
plebeyos: artesanos (plateros, albañiles, alarifes), pulperos, tenderos, truqueros e indios, es decir, aquellos que con 
su fuerza de trabajo convertían a la ciudad en un espacio dinámico, tangible e inquietante”. (Luna Zarama, 2014, p. 
207)  
1110 “al salir de los conflictos, a costa de nuestra sangre, se nos hacían promesas magníficas de poner en esta 
ciudad la Capital del Gobierno, el Obispado, la Real Casa de Moneda y otras” (Gutiérrez Ramos, 2012, p. 161) 
1111 “Boves en noviembre de 1822 recolecta 11.400 pesos que impone como contribución a unos pocos ricos que no 
acolitan sus aventuras, so pena de ser acusados de traición al rey y embargados sus bienes. En enero de 1823 Bolívar 
y Salom basados en los decretos sobre la expropiación de bienes" que dicta el congreso de Cúcuta en 1821, confiscan 
grandes haciendas a propietarios de Pasto y del sur que han apoyado el levantamiento de A. Agualongo y se han 
declarado fieles al rey. Impone además como sanción a la ciudad 30.000 pesos y obliga a reunir más de mil reses y 
trescientos caballos para llevarlos a Quito. Se añaden otras contribuciones individuales y 13.700 pesos recolectados 
únicamente entre doce ciudadanos” (Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 164) 
1112 As an example of this dynamic activity, a traveler arriving in Pasto from Popayán in 1830 quoted by Cerón Solarte 
and Ramos (1997, p. 169) said that they lost one hour waiting for a convoy of mules transporting wheat and maize 
floor to pass.  
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In this context, coffee landed in the south at the end of the nineteenth century1113. Nariño was 
both, a peripheral region feebly linked with national markets through inadequate roads 1114 
(relatively to other regions) supplying wheat and cattle mainly produced by (foreign-owned) 
haciendas. And an isolated region with little competition, in which indigenes in their tight 
Resguardos and mestizos in the smallholdings managed to make ends meet in the local economy, 
producing staple food to exchange against artisanal products and services1115.   
 
These two features: poor infrastructure and smallholdings are blamed responsible for the slow 
development of coffee culture in Nariño compared with other regions1116, as it can be inferred 
from the very little work about this issue1117.      
 
In the first case, Rodríguez Guerrero (1961) blamed infrastructures the responsible for this 
unequal development1118. Cerón Solarte and Ramos (1997); (FNC, 1933, p. 152) claim that it was 
a consequence of local politics, more interested in preserving privileges produced by the Statuo 
                                                     
1113 A register of 277 bags of coffee exported from Nariño in October in 1893 is the oldest evidence of this activity 
presented by Rodríguez Guerrero (1961, p. 303) 
1114 40 days took the travel from Pasto to Bogotá in a mule. It was so dangerous that many travelers left behind their 
testament. “De Pasto a Bogotá se emplean 40 días a lomo de mula y exponiéndose a muchos peligros, al punto que 
algunos viajeros dejan hecho su testamento por temor a morir en el viaje” (Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 236). 
1115 In Pasto, in 1906 there were 6 mills, 30 bakeries, 20 blacksmiths, 20 carpentry, 25 saddleries, 36 shoes stores, 25 
tailors, among others. Showing that it has a dynamic local market that dressed, fits and feed by itself. “El número 
tan elevado de carpinterías; panaderías, sastrerías, zapaterías, talabarterías, etc., reafirma la continuidad de las 
descripciones del siglo pasado, cuando se dice que Pasto se viste, calza y alimenta sola” (Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 
1997, p. 241) 
1116 Nariño’s coffee culture expanded in the first three decades of the twentieth century planting five million coffee 
trees in 3,5 thousand hectares (FNC, 1933, p. 139) in Nariño’s central region near Pasto, the capital city and exporting 
through its port in the Pacific Ocean, Tumaco, 8 thousand coffee bags in 1932 (FNC, 1933, p. 119). In that time, 
Buesaco had 130 thousand coffee trees cultivated in 43 ha in 40 farms, more than half cultivated in one farm while 
36 farms had less than 5 thousand coffee threes (FNC, 1933, pp. 139-140) and produced 450 coffee bags per year 
(Rodríguez Guerrero, 1961, p. 307). However it was far behind other Colombian departments which started roughly 
at the same time, Caldas for example exported 960 thousand coffee bags produced in 79 thousand hectares 
cultivated in coffee, and Antioquia exported 550 thousand produced in 64 thousand hectares (FNC, 1933, p. 119). 
1117 The author spent several days in both the Biblioteca del Banco de la República en Pasto, and the Biblioteca de la 
Academia Nariñense de Historia en la Universidad de Nariño and it could be said that the evolution of coffee in 
Nariño in the twentieth century has been poorly studied. The invisibility of the coffee crop is so notorious, than even 
in 2007 in which coffee in Nariño had almost 30 thousand ha, a study of the economy in Nariño produced by el Banco 
de la República did not mention coffee in its chapter about agriculture in Nariño!  (Viloria De la Hoz, 2007)    
1118 In fact, in 1932, whereas the 454 kilometers that separated Manizales (Capital city of Caldas) from Buenaventura 
(main port on the Colombian Pacific coast) where linked by a railway, the 301 kilometers that separated Pasto 
(Capital city of Nariño) from Tumaco (Main port on the South Colombian Pacific coast) had to be transited using all 
manner of conveyances including trucks for the first 142 km, mules for 50 km, trains for 92 km, and little boats for 
the last 17 km. Not only means of transport like mules are extremely uncompetitive in big numbers (two coffee bags 
per mule against a few hundred of coffee bags by wagon), but also each change implied loading-unloading costs. It 
is not surprising that, for a ton of coffee, freight rates Pasto-Tumaco where 5 times higher than Tumaco-London 
($32.79 pesos versus $6 pesos), making coffee from Nariño one of the most expensive to export in Colombia 
(Rodríguez Guerrero, 1961, p. 304).   
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Quo than in inserting Nariño into the world economy1119 whereas Zarama Rincón (2016) argued 
that local politicians did their work to link Nariño with both, the country and the world1120 but 
there were national and international constraints that created obstacles and opportunities. 
Eventually, Pasto was linked by train (at least one/third) to the Pacific Ocean in 19301121 and by 
a roadway with the interior of Colombia a few years after1122. 
 
In the second case, Eraso (2002) argued that thanks to the Ley 89/1890, eighty-eight Resguardos 
with a total area of 69 thousand ha1123 had survived from land grabbing (from the 3.2 million 
hectares total extension of the department1124). But, with the roadway built in 1932, staple crops 
for national consumption was seen as a great opportunity in the fertile lands of Nariño. Wright 
(1922, p. 26) calculated roughly 400 thousand hectares cultivated in 1922. Cerón Solarte and 
Ramos (1997, p. 212) said that at the end of the thirties, there were crops of potatoes (8.214 ha), 
maize (7.690 ha), barley (420 ha), beans (85ha) and especially wheat (6.670 ha) 1125, in addition 
                                                     
1119 The Amazon Rubber Boom that enriched Manaus in Brazil and Iquitos in Peru, triggered Colombian Congress to 
pass the Ley 65 del 6 de noviembre de 1912 to build a Railway from Tumaco, passing through Pasto, to the eastern 
amazon forest in Putumayo, and then, potential oil exploitation sparked the  the Ley 110 de 27 de diciembre de 1922 
adding to the previous trace another line to connect the Equator border with Popayán through Pasto, but local 
politicians were too busy discussing the alcohol monopoly to mobilized the political support needed in the 
subsequent phases to make it real“Es irónico observar que mientras otras regiones del país discuten su inserción en 
el mercado mundial y nacional, en Pasto el centro de la polémica se desarrolla alrededor del monopolio de 
aguardiente, única fuente importante como recurso del erario público” Cerón Solarte and Ramos (1997, p. 244) 
1120 Julian Buchelli, the first Governor of Nariño (In 1904 Nariño became a Department with its capital in Pasto), who 
founded the University of Nariño in 1904 and its faculty of Engineering, signed in 1920 the first contract to elaborate 
the technical studies needed for a Railway that connected in the axis west-east Tumaco with Pasto, and in the axis 
South-North Ipiales (in the very border with Equator) – Pasto – Popayan. He was so committed that he even said 
that Nariño should paid for it if the central government was not able (Zarama Rincón, 2016, p. 93). 
1121 For example, the First World War made impossible implementing the Ley 65/1912, which had passed with the 
money needed to build the railway, and the illusion to build all the lines proposed by the Ley 110/1922 evanished 
with the Great Depression in 1929 that closed funding sources. In the end, and as a result of a compensation paid 
by the United States Government for its instigator role in the independence of Panama, of the three hundred 
kilometers railway between Tumaco and Pasto, only the first one hundred segment between Tumaco and El Diviso 
(in the Pacific Plain) was opened to traffic in 1930 reducing travel time from one week to two days and, cost and 
discomfort when voyaging. 
1122 Rubber ambition, Peruvian politics, and discontents about a previous border treaty with Colombia turned out in 
a Peruvian civilian takeover in 1932 of two Colombia towns (Leticia and Tarrapaca) in the Amazon basin, which 
infuriated Colombians, especially because there was not a single way to reach those villages from Colombian 
territory (when eventually troops arrived three month afterwards, they had travelled from the Caribbean coast to 
the mouth of the Amazon in Brazil, and then, navigated all the way upstream to Leticia). As the only feasible way to 
reach the Amazon by land was through Pasto, the central government realized they need a passable roadway that 
communicates this city with the rest of the country (Álvarez Hoyos, 2012, p. 210). 
1123 29 Resguardos Quillacingas with 39.313ha; 57 Resguardos Pastos with 28.833ha; 2 otros Resguardos with 889ha. 
(Eraso, 2002, p. 261) 
1124 Nariño had 30.220 square kilometers (equivalent to 3,2 million hectares) as it was rapport in 1922 (Wright, 1922, 
p. 26). It would be continue like that until 1991 in which the Department of Putumayo was created.  
1125 They did not mention the 3.500ha cultivated in coffee that were reported in the Censo Cafetero in 1932 (FNC, 
1933) 
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to the plausibly 200 thousand hectares dedicated to cattle1126. 189 trucks affiliated to a dozen 
companies stationed in Pasto in 1940 connect this production with national markets (Cerón 
Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 212) 
      
As the fifty years protection provided by the Ley 89/1890 had passed, hungry entrepreneurs 
mobilized the element of the legislation before the Ministerio de Economía Nacional to dissolve 
the Resguardos, mainly those from the Quillacingas to the north of the plateau (Eraso, 2002). As 
their protected lands had been dismembered before, when the Resguardos were dissolved, the 
land distributed within the community was insufficient for a family to survive1127. The case in 
Buesaco was not so extreme, in 1950 the Resguardo de Buesaco had 3 thousand hectares and its 
population was 780 indigenes (Gutiérrez Ramos, 2012, p. 131), so if divided equally each one 
could have obtained 3.8 hectares. Bolaños Martinez (2015) by contrasting the number of electors 
and its names in the archives claims that its dissolution in 1950 happened in parallel of the 
weakening of the indigenous movement. He argued that mestizos penetrated this governance 
mechanism and implanted the idea of progress through capitalism that made strong roots over 
the antiquated communal system1128.  
 
This particular land tenure is blamed responsible for the slow development of coffee culture in 
the south. One article about the history of Coffee in Nariño published in the very influential La 
Revista Cafetera (FNC, 1958), highlighted that the partitions of the Resguardos resulted in such 
smallholdings that it was common to see a family of 7 members with ownership of one-eighth of 
a hectare. Indeed, Nariño was featured by the minifundio1129: In the Census of 1932 (FNC, 1933, 
p. 140), the 3.811 farms in Nariño listed, 3.681 (96.6%) had less than 5 thousand coffee trees. A 
small number of coffee trees that reflected the small plot of land they possessed. If we divided 
the 3.517 hectares cultivated in coffee in Nariño, on average each farm had 0.92 hectares, it was 
lower than the average of 2.23 ha per farm in Antioquia or 1.95 ha in Caldas.  
 
                                                     
1126 In the Railway rapport in 1920, the contractor said that in the municipality of Pasto in 1920 (the only one with 
disaggregated data) there were less than 2 thousand hectares of crops and 15 thousand hectares of pastures (Wright, 
1922, p. 30). I used this relation 1 – 8 to generalize to the whole department.     
1127 Eraso (2002, p. 262) quoting Fals Borda, say that this distribution produced on average smallholdings of 0.5 to 3 
hectares per family, triggering conflicts between the members of the same community: The 84 hectares of the 
Resguardo de Jongovito were distribuited between one hundred families; the 70 hectares of the Resguardo de 
Obonuco were distribuited between 200 families; and when the Resguardo de Anganoy was dissolved, land was so 
scarce that families received between 500 and 700 square meters. 
1128 In 1945 there were 163 indigenes that voted for the Cabildo (indigenous authority) whereas 89 (some of whom, 
after reviewing other sources, had been part of the military forces of Colombia – to which indigenes were dispensed) 
elected the last Cabildo of Buesaco in 1950. (Bolaños Martinez, 2015, pp. 200-201) 
1129 M. Arango (1977) highlighted that coffee dissemination in the first decades of the twentieth century happened 
in Colombia thanks to smallholdings (a farm managed by the owner and his family, in which coffee as a cash crop 
was integrated with staple crops), but when dividing such farms in two categories: minifundios below 5.000 coffee 
trees and propiedad parcelaria between 5.000 and 20.000 coffee trees, he affirmed that the first ones must be 
accompanied with complementary income off-farm, mainly selling workforce. 
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If we take another regard, by looking at the causal mechanism that is considered key to 
understand why coffee prospered (so its absence in Nariño can explain its slow development), 
we can add a third condition. The commercial capital (Bejarano, 1980, p. 124).  
 
Because of Nariño’s pro-crown position during the independence wars, it is plausible to assume 
that vacant lots were used more to pay for public services than to distribute between 
independent peasants (as shown before, Nariño was particularly subject of this kind of 
concessions for funding infrastructures projects to link the Cauca Valley with the Pacific ocean). 
Clearly land did not go to the Resguardos, which when dissolved left behind indigenes without 
enough land to make a living. So, it did not have that peasant army that harvested the Andes in 
Antioquia. On the other hand, because of its similitudes with the plateau Cundiboyacense (in 
which Tunja and Santa Fe were settled) both over the 2.500 m.a.s.l., populated by numerous 
indigenes before the Spanish Conquest and with the same agricultural crops, it is plausible to 
assume the same pre-capitalist relation between haciendas and their sharecroppers, therefore 
the absence of commercial capital accumulation (and its derived product, the merchant-
hacendado).  
 
In the end, due to infrastructures and land tenure possibly featured by a few enormous Haciendas 
and numerous minifundios linked by pre-capitalist relation, that made impossible commercial 
capital accumulation, it is plausible to assume that the best option for Nariños’ hacendados was 
to supply the domestic demand for grains, potatoes and cattle and, as a second alternative, to 
supply the international demand for coffee. Therefore, a marginal 0.5% participation in the 
Colombian coffee harvest of 1932 was produced in Nariño (FNC, 1933, p. 116). It reinforced its 
isolation in a country increasingly dependent on coffee exports.  
 
However, the FNC needed to project the idea that they represented all Colombian coffee farmers, 
including those in Nariño, to obtain a nationwide political influence. In the Colombian collective 
memory, the FNC was founded by delegados to the II Congreso Cafetero in 1927 from the 
fourteen departments in which coffee was harvested1130. Saether (1999) checked the list of the 
33 attendants to this Congress and traced the background of each of them. From the 25 he 
actually was able to trace, 16 were either from Antioquia or have strong ties with this department 
but 11 of them were “representatives” of other regions. For example, the two delegates from 
Nariño, Alejandro Munera was a congressman from Medellín, and José Luis López was a 
merchant from Medellín  (Saether, 1999, p. 148). It was predictable that the decision-making 
process was institutionalized in a way in which the biggest producers would maintain political 
power by conditioning the number of delegates to the Congreso Cafetero to the number of coffee 
bags exported by the Department the previous year1131.  So, in the IX Congreso Cafetero in 1938, 
                                                     
1130 Nariño, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Huila, Tolima, Cundinamarca, Boyacá, Santander del Sur, Santander del Norte, 
Magdalena, Bolívar, Choco, Antioquia y Caldas. On that time, covering the whole Colombian Andes (were coffea 
arabica grows), or in other words, all the Colombian coffee harvest. 
1131 “Los departamentos que exporten hasta 25.000 sacos, tendrán derecho a un Delegado; de 25.001 a 250.000 dos 
Delegados; de 250.001 a 600.000 tres Delegados; de 600.001 a 1.000.000 cuatro Delegados, y de 1.000.000 en 
adelante, cinco Delegados. Por ningún motivo los Departamentos podrán tener más de cinco Delegados en el 
Congreso”. Art. 3, Capítulo II, Estatutos de la Federación Nacional de Cafeteros del 14 de diciembre de 1930.   
392 
 
there were 30 delegates from ten Departments, 11 from Antioquia and Caldas, and no one from 
Nariño (Bates, 1998, p. 59).    
 
In spite of its little influence, Nariño was part of the FNC and its coffee farmers received its 
support. For example, it was voted in the IV Congreso Nacional Cafetero “to request the national 
government to pay special attention to the construction of the Pasto-Popayán roadway”1132 in 
1930, because Nariño was “in very favorable conditions for the intensification of coffee 
culture”1133.  And then, when the road was built, they decided to celebrate in Pasto the VI 
Congreso Cafetero that started in June 1934. At the local level, they were proactive when they 
founded the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño in 1928 (the third one to be 
established).  
 
Using data from the Census in 1932, in which Nariño exported 8 thousand coffee bags and 
produced 18 thousand and, data from the FNC presented by Rodríguez Guerrero (1961, p. 310), 
coffee culture augmented significantly, it almost tripled to produce 48 thousand coffee bags1134 
in 1948. But, even though it increased faster than the average in Colombia, it represented less 
than one percent of all coffee produced in the country at that time. In the case of Buesaco, coffee 
culture doubled in fifteen years to produce 950 coffee bags in 1948 (450 coffee bags exported 
and 500 locally consumed (Rodríguez Guerrero, 1961, p. 309)) placing it in the middle between 
the 31 municipalities that were producing coffee in Nariño.  
 
We believe that the coffee crop in Nariño was featured rather by the precapitalist hacienda 
system (in which one hacendado use their sharecroppers to diversify by cultivating different 
products) than by the dynamic relation between capitalist haciendas and an independent 
peasant economy. Three pieces of evidence allow us to believe that: Firstly, a national agricultural 
sample conducted by the statistical body of the Colombian government (DANE, 1954), claimed 
that there was 39.887 ha that had at least a few coffee trees, including 5.207 ha cultivated only 
in coffee1135. Secondly, two of the three members of the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de 
Nariño in 1930, Medardo Bucheli y Rafael Eraso Navarrete (FNC, 1931, p. 775) had won several 
awards for agricultural products like wheat, maize, barley and cattle (none one because of their 
                                                     
1132 Resolución número 5 del IV Congreso Nacional de Cafeteros del 13 de diciembre de 1930.  
1133 Ibid.  
1134 Rodríguez Guerrero (1961, p. 310) showed a contradiction between figures because the Ministry of Agriculture 
claimed less than 15 thousand coffee bags produced in Nariño in 1948. Nevertheless if we assume that the figure of 
8,2 million coffee trees provided by the Comité de Cafeteros de Nariño was true (and actually it is highly possible 
that crops had been increased from 5 million to 8 million in Nariño because of good prices of coffee, as it was in the 
rest of Colombia) and we use the figure of 1.470 hectares cultivated in coffee provided by the Ministry of Agricuture, 
we have to say that there was 5.585 coffee tree per hectare. That figure is unrealistic taking into account that on 
those days they cultivated coffea typica that, as they leave it untouched for decades, it reached 3 meters high and 
width, with that density it would have been impossible to enter to the field to harvest the coffee cherries. So, we 
feel more comfortable with the data provided by the FNC (registered by its personal in Nariño and discriminated by 
municipality), that implies a completely acceptable figure that each coffee tree produced 330 grams of beans.        
1135 “en la muestra nacional se tomaron todos los cultivos de café, por pequeños que éstos fueran (es decir unas 
pocas matas se tomaron como cultivo intercalado) sin tener en cuenta si era cafetal o no”. (DANE, 1954, p. 37) 
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coffee) in an agricultural fair in 19191136. A third one was productivity: as the main economic 
rationality of haciendas was to reduce the risk, not only by crops diversification but also placing 
all the risk in hand of the sharecroppers1137, there were not technical advances once the crop 
was established. The production increase was explained by adding land or labor, not productivity. 
In Nariño it looked that productivity remained with small changes: from the 314 kg of coffee/ha 
that could be calculated from the Census 1932, productivity decreased to 250 kg/ha in 1955 to 
return again towards 350 kg/ha in 1970 (Vallecilla Gordillo, 2001, p. 176).  
 
Assuming that Nariño was characterized by the pre-capitalist hacienda, according to Kalmanovitz 
(1996) this structures disintegrated by the violence during the forties and fifties to consolidate 
commercial farming afterward (annex 2).  
 
In Nariño neither the violence nor the commercial farming was so intense in comparison with 
other regions, but both were present producing migration and land concentration. Gómez Zea 
(2014) described episodes of harassment by bandits affiliated to the conservative police and the 
dispossession that followed 1138 . Cerón Solarte and Ramos (1997, p. 53) highlighted the 
commercial farming by comparing the $3.067 that cost on average a hectare in Nariño 1944 when 
the violence started with the $40.096 that cost in 1962 when it was over. As it happened in other 
regions, 107.888 people from the 705.611 reported in Nariño in the National Census of 1964 
(DANE, 1964), migrated to other departments, in addition, to internal migration towards the 
main urban centers like Pasto and Ipiales that reduced the rural population proportion in the 
department from 77% in 1938 to 61% in 1980 (Cerón Solarte & Ramos, 1997, p. 247).  
 
Industrialization and urbanization boomed demand for agricultural products produced on the 
highlands of Nariño, increasing attractiveness for that kind of commercial crops, and the surface 
devoted to them 1139 . These pieces of evidence, allow us to consider that the precapitalist 
                                                     
1136 They won awards because of their wheat, maize, barley and cattle, (none one because of their coffee) “Medalla 
de plata y diploma de primera clase para las seis muestras de trigos distintos que se producen en Funes, presentadas 
por el señor Medardo Bucheli A (…) Mención honorífica para las muestras de maíz blanco, amarillo y maicena de la 
Sección de Funes, presentadas por el señor Medardo Bucheli A (…) Medalla de plata y diploma de primera clase para 
la cebada pelada de la Sección de Funes, presentada por el señor Medardo Bucheli A. (..) Medalla de plata y diploma 
de primera clase para el toro negro de raza Holstein, importado del Ecuador y presentado por el señor Medardo 
Bucheli A (…) Mención honorífica para (…) Un grupo de ganado de raza Holstein, Normanda y Durham, presentado 
por el señor Medardo Bucheli A.” (Nariño, 1919, pp. 33-35). “Medalla de plata y diploma de primera clase para el 
grupo de toros, raza Holstein, presentado por el seJ10r Rafael Eraso Navarrete”(Nariño, 1919, p. 35) 
1137 Sharecroppers had to cultivated with their own resources and their production would be sell by the Hacienda, 
giving back a 50% profit to the sharecropper once land and capital cost were subtracted. (Bejarano, 1980, p. 129) 
1138 Gómez Zea (2014) following the story of Abel Sena, a Policeman during the “politica de la violencia” in Nariño 
and Valle del Cauca, interviewed some nariñenses elders who had memories from that period. Mariela Toro 
remembered that his father, a Liberal, was expulsed from his land in 1947. And Otoniel Vega that his family was 
harassed by people with machetes because of their liberal affiliation, and some of them were banished (Gómez Zea, 
2014, p. 31).  
1139 From those areas mentioned by Cerón Solarte and Ramos (1997, p. 212) at the end of the thirties, projections 
from the Segundo Censo Nacional Agropecuario (DANE, 1974, pp. 437-443) estimated a significantly expansion in 
1972: The area had multiplied for all major crops in that period: potatoes (from 8.214 ha to 26.000 ha), maize (from 
7.690 ha to 48.000 ha), barley (from 420 ha to 10.000 ha), beans (from 85 ha to 6.000 ha) and wheat (from 6.670 ha 
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haciendas transformed into capitalist farms specialized in the national urban market (especially 
when the Panamericana replaced in 1975, through another route, the ancient road to the north 
and linked quicker and safer Pasto with Popayán). By buying (or stripping) the fertile and arable 
land from the plateau and the valleys in Nariño, agro-entrepreneurs pushed towards the 
agricultural frontier 1140  the dispossessed peasants 1141  (those who did not emigrate to other 
departments). They were pressed towards the edge of the plateau, to the East – the Pacific plain 
and its impenetrable rainforests; to the west - The Amazonian jungle; to the north - the steep 
slopes that descend rapidly from the 2.500 m.a.s.l. to 1.000 m.a.s.l. 
 
Our conjecture is that coffee culture in Nariño migrated from the precapitalist coffee hacendado 
towards the pushed coffee peasant, skipping the commercial coffee farm that characterized 
coffee farming in other regions during the quota regime.   
 
In our regard, it is plausible that the new entrepreneurial landowners decided to specialize its 
culture to local markets because, either it was profitable in a context of high devaluation and 
high tariffs to protect local production, or it was politically motivated because the Colombian 
coffee quota was taken by more powerful regions1142: Using data produced by the Colombian 
statistical office – DANE, from almost 40 thousand hectares with some coffee reported in Nariño 
in the muestra agropecuaria nacional 1954  (DANE, 1954, p. 18) the area decreased to 11.330 ha 
in the muestra agropecuaria nacional 1968 (DANE, 1974, p. 403). Using the data from the FNC, 
from 17 thousand hectares in coffee reported by a coffee census conducted by the FNC in 
19701143, it decreased to 13 thousand hectares one decade afterward when a new coffee census 
was conducted by the FNC in 19801144.   
 
On the other hand, we suspect that coffee started to be cropped at the agricultural frontier 
featured by worst land but near major roads. Indeed, coffee is known because it is not very 
                                                     
to 35.000 ha). As it was reported a total livestock of 383 thousand cattle, the pasture land should have doubled from 
the 200 thousand hectares to more than 400 thousand because the ratio has always been less than one head per 
hectare. Cerón Solarte and Ramos (1997, p. 51), comparing data from the National Agricultural Census in 1960 and 
in 1970, showed a change in land structure reducing both the average size (-3.2%) and the number of farms (-1.8) 
with less than 5 hectares, while increasing both the average size (60%) and the number of farms (44%) with more 
than 50 hectares. 
1140 Land titling by The Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCORA) was not sustained on expropriations (of 
unexploited fertile land) but on vacancy lots that should look attractive to motivate migration. That is why “Por 
razones estratégicas INCORA y la clase política encargada de resolver el conflicto, hacen percibir las selvas pluviales 
como "espacios vacíos" que pueden albergar población con la garantía de adquirir tierra suficiente” (Cerón Solarte 
& Ramos, 1997, p. 51) 
1141 Almost 3 hundred thousand hectares of vacant lots were given to peasants in Nariño from 1960 to 2012. “Con 
respecto a los campesinos, entre 1960 y 2012 se les titularon 281.696 hectáreas de predios baldíos” (Conpes, 2014, 
p. 6)  
1142 The boom of coffee prices in 1975-77 (a devastating frost that hit Brazil in July 1975 (not only affected that 
harvest but also two thirds of the two following ones killing the coffee trees in the main regions) doubled prices in 
1976 and 1977) that must have made coffee a very profitable business did not increase the number of hectares 
cultivated in coffee in Nariño.  
1143 SICA/FNC. “Censo Cafetero”. 1970. 
1144 SICA/FNC. “Censo Cafetero”. 1980. 
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demanding, is easy to crop and to maintain, it grows very well with other crops and it would be 
bought because of the purchase guarantee described before. It could have been the case of 
Buesaco, which had jurisdiction at the very edge of the plateau, including highlands at more than 
3 thousand m.a.s.l. and all the way down the slopes until its base at one thousand m.a.s.l. (a 
gorge known as “El Cañon del Juanambu”)1145. On the canyon, Buesaco has the fertile volcanic 
soils and good road connection with Pasto and Popayan, but the steep slopes and the lack of 
water made it unattractive for entrepreneurs, so it was an “agricultural frontier” that was 
reachable for the dispossessed peasants. From the 43ha reported in the coffee census in 1932, 
Buesaco had multiplied for four times its coffee area to reach 189 ha in 19701146, and more than 
tripled it in one decade to 689 ha 1147 in 1980 to become one the main coffee producer in 
Nariño1148. 
 
At the beginning of the nineties, Nariño had enjoyed an acceptable growth explained by the 
commercial policy known as sustitución de importaciones 1149 . In Colombia it was not only 
oriented to protect the industry (as it was the case in other Latinamerican countries) but also the 
agriculture (by both high tariffs and creating the IDEMA to regulate the local agricultural 
market1150), at the expense of the industry which had to pay more for their agricultural supplies  
and resources that would be better allocated in other activities (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003, p. 
16). Nevertheless, a new institutional framework founded with the new Constitution in 1991, 
came alongside a new commercial policy inspired in trade liberalization that reduced tariffs and 
eliminated public intervention in agricultural markets1151. As a consequence, artificial profitability 
vanished and resources moved towards markets were signaling at least, some return on 
investment. As a result, land use started to change1152 and coffee started its ascending trend: 27 
                                                     
1145 The total area of 62 thousand ha is divided in three main tropical climates: Temperate climate from 1.000 to 
2.000 m.a.s.l. accounts for 21% of the total area. Cold climate from 2.000 to 3.000 m.a.s.l. accounts for 57% and very 
cold climate over 3.000 m.a.s.l accounts for 22%. Alcaldía de Buesaco. Official Webpage.   
1146 SICA/FNC. “Censo Cafetero”. 1970. 
1147 SICA/FNC. “Censo Cafetero”. 1980. 
1148 In a press report in February 1983 quoted by Bolaños Martinez (2015, p. 213) it was highlighted that Buesaco 
escalated to the third position of coffee production in the department with 13 thousand coffee bags from the 238 
thousand produced in Nariño in the coffee year 1980-1981 (less than 3% of the 8 million coffee bags exported in 
Colombia in the same period).  
1149 Its signals artificially increased both agricultural profitability and land value. “Las señales dadas por la 
protección del modelo corporativo conservador tienden un manto que aumenta artificialmente tanto la renta del 
suelo como las utilidades de los empresarios agrícolas” (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003, p. 21)). 
1150 To promote agricultural production, El instituto de Mercadeo Agropecuario – IDEMA was created through el 
decreto-ley 133 de 26 de enero de 1976. Its main function was to regulate the internal market (purchasing, selling, 
storage, import-export any agricultural product (at exception of coffee). It monopolized foodstuff imports to resell 
them locally at higher prices, which in turn gave IDEMA a profit that was used to guarantee a minimum price for 
local products  
1151 In that year tariffs for all main crops in Nariño were as follows: barley 15.47, maize 30, wheat 47.14 and milk 
42.14. But in 1992 they were reduced: maize 19.73, wheat 15.53 and milk 23.91. And in 1996: barley 3.33, maize 
3.50, wheat 2.08 and milk 15.96. (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003, p. 24)). In addition by eliminating imports monopoly 
in the hand of the IDEMA, this institution was not able to sustain a minimum price and had to be liquidated (Mendoza 
Villalobos, 1999, p. 143) 
1152 Comparing the previous figures from 1972 with those from la Secretaría Departamental de Agricultura de Nariño 
at mid-nineties (Nariño, 1996), it was notorious the changing trend.  Whereas cereals and livestock started to 
396 
 
thousand hectares crop in coffee were reported alongside other more profitable agricultural 
products 1153. Legal ones reported in that document like kidney beans, peas, sugar cane and 
banana, palm oil and cacao mainly in the Pacific plain. And illegal ones that started to be noticed: 
coca in the eastern and western edge of the plateau, and poppy on the highest lands like 
Buesaco1154 (1.700 – 3.000 m.a.s.l.)1155. In Buesaco, at the beginning of the nineties, the steep 
canyon was cultivated in coffee by a peasant economy whereas the more soft highlands had 
other crops. Coffee was a complimentary cash crop for farmers accounting for roughly one-tenth 
of the 10.420ha devoted to agricultural products in the municipality: kidney beans, peas, maize, 
wheat and barley in addition to 32.420ha in pasture lands (Burbano & Patiño, 1992, pp. 162-165). 
But after the liberalization, cereals crops started to decline to leave room to the more profitable 
crops: The Censo Cafetero in 1997 reported 1.346 ha cultivated in coffee (doubling the 689 ha 
reported in 1980).  
 
Nevertheless, the change in land use was more abandonment of unprofitable crops than an 
entrepreneurial opportunity. Coffee, for example, suffered from an all-time low price after one 
decade of a free global market. In Nariño the only profitable crops were the illegals ones, in 
Buesaco illegal poppy crops started to be a menace because more than half of the area had the 
proper condition (climate, soils, isolation) for its culture (UNODC, 2005).  
 
V.3. Support for the “closed lists of services” table in both context 
V.3.1. Both contexts 
 
The LRA Discount concretized the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC in its negative form. I.e. the 
Resource coffee that has not the minimum qualities to produce the services sought by this 
institution is going to join this LRA. If it was useless it would be thrown away, but it is not the 
case: These beans that are both under/overripe, badly developed, or have a higher proportion of 
defects (pasilla) will produce an unpleasant almost undrinkable beverage, that roasters can 
overcome by over-roasting (higher temperature or/and more time in the roasting machine) the 
                                                     
decrease: maize (from 48.000 ha to 32.768 ha), wheat (from 35.000 ha to 30.015), and livestock (from 383.000 to 
338.486 cattle) 
1153 Figures from the FNC differed, but the trend was similar. The Censo Cafetero in 1997, reported 20.489 hectares 
cultivated in coffee in Nariño (from the 13.000 ha reported in the previous Censo Cafetero in 1980). Trend that got 
even more notorious in 2004, in which a report from the Central Bank  documented only 15.224 ha cultivated in 
maize and 12.451 ha in wheat (Viloria De la Hoz, 2007, p. 49). The lower land (1.800-2.300 m.a.s.l) that these crops 
left was conquered by coffee (which had increased to 25 thousand hectares in 2005 (FNC, 2004, p. 69)) and the 
higher land (2600 – 3.400 m.a.s.l.) by potatoes (12.672 ha (Viloria De la Hoz, 2007, p. 49)) whereas overall it was 
replaced by unproductive pastures: there were  350 thousand cattle in 500 thousand hectares (Viloria De la Hoz, 
2007, p. 45).  
1154 Quoting a local newspaper of the 24th of September 1983, Bolaños Martinez (2015, p. 214) showed coca crops 
existence since the eighties in Buesaco. “La policía descubrió un plantío de coca en la vereda Ijagui, municipio de 
Buesaco. Las matas de coca 2.200 en total” 
1155 “La llamada flor maldita, o amapola, se está dando silvestre en las montañas de Nariño (…) Estadísticamente, 
siete mil hectáreas cultivadas de amapola han sido descubiertas y se cree que muchas más son explotadas en 
asociación de los grupos de narcoguerrilleros que operan en esta sección del país”. El Tiempo, “Nariño: inundado de 
flor maldita”. 27th of April 1992.   
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coffee in order to eliminate all unpleasant (and if any pleasant) aromatic profile. As a result, a 
taste related service known as baked coffee is produced, an uninteresting, flat and oaty as it is 
commonly described. This coffee will be sold to be blended (or not) with coffee of different 
qualities to a certain point in which the beverage would not reject by a commercially attractive 
group of consumers, which are demanding mainly the energy dose symbolic service: a sensation 
of readiness or activeness to start any daily life activity. This service that is prompted by caffeine, 
is not less shaped by companies’ advertisement since coffee was packed and commoditized in 
the second half of the nineteenth century1156. Monetary services depend on the price published 
by the FNC for Standard Coffee minus the discount for quality. In general, it can be expected 
lower monetary services for coffee producers because this kind of lower quality does not mean 
higher quantity or lower cost in general (labor cost for picking untimely or timely coffee beans 
are exactly the same, but in the first case the ratio income/labor cost is lower).         
  
The LRA Standard concretized the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC in its positive form. Minimum 
acceptable tolerance that would guarantee a consistent taste related services known as a clean 
cup in which different aromas than the ones expected from a typical well-developed bean in 
Colombia, must be absent. Indeed, as caffeine produces a bitter taste that is unpleasant, its 
concentration of 1.5% in a Coffea Arabica could be hidden behind other aromatic precursors in a 
well-ripe and well-processed bean. So, taking into account soils and climate in Colombia, the FNC 
had encouraged some agronomic practices from the second half of the twentieth century to 
guarantee a coffee described as “mild, of a clean cup, with a medium to high acidity and body, 
and a pronounced and complete aroma”1157. This coffee produced in Colombia Coffee Lands1158 
can be exported invested by the IGP Café de Colombia 1159 , transmitting to consumers the 
symbolic service of reputation of the appellation that was shaped firstly by roasters at the 
beginning of the past century1160, and since 1960 by a well-known marketing campaign, heavily 
funded by the FNC, featured by the iconic character of Juan Valdez and its mule Conchita 
(Fernández et al., 2007). The basis of this LRA are the monetary services for producers by 
increasing productivity as it was widely described since the foundation of the FNC in 1927. These 
                                                     
1156 “Prior to the sixties (he refers to 1860), coffee was not generally sold roasted nor ground, ready for the coffee 
pot. Except in the big cities, most housewives bought their coffee green, and roasted it in their kitchen stoves as 
needed… the plan of selling roasted coffee in little paper bags like peanuts” was launched in 1873 and then Ariosa 
packaged coffee became the first successful national brand of packaged coffee in US (Ukers, 1922, p. 523). 
1157 Art. 31 del título III del Reglamento de Uso de uso de la Indicación Geográfica Protegida Café de Colombia (F. N. 
d. C. FNC, 2010). 
1158 “latitud norte 1° a 11°15´, longitud oeste de 72° a 78° y altitud de 400 a 2.500 metros sobre el nivel del mar 
(M.S.N.M.)” Art. 29, ibid. (F. N. d. C. FNC, 2010). 
1159 It applied for coffee produced in Colombia that fullfill the mínimum quality requirments. “que cumple con los 
requisitos de calidad del café de exportación establecidos por el Comité Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia” Art. 29 
del título III del Reglamento de Uso de uso de la Indicación Geográfica Protegida Café de Colombia (F. N. d. C. FNC, 
2010). 
1160 An example of the well reputation of Colombian coffee was the higher prices paid in 1922 for a blend with more 
coffee from Bogotá that other with less. “The prime requisite for success in any package coffee is the composition 
of the blend  (…) In March, 1922, (…) a blend of Bogota and Bourbon Santos (…) was being sold at retail in New York, 
at the same period for the same price (42 cents). Simultaneously, in the retail stores of a well-known chain system, 
a bulk blend composed of sixty percent Bourbon Santos and forty percent Bogota was to be had loose for 29 cents” 
(Ukers, 1922, p. 409).  
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ones are dependent on the price fixed by the FNC, which in turn, as it was said before, is 
established from a calculus obtained from the international coffee price, the premium from 
Colombia coffee, the exchange rate, and FNC’s trading expenses. In the context chapter, it was 
shown that monetary services are not only relevant for profiling actors but for the government 
itself, whose monetary policy and access to exchange currency was dependent on coffee exports. 
Later on, it was relevant for political stability and poverty reduction.    
 
V.3.2. Riosucio 
 
The LRA Regional/Starbucks is built on the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC, but it also can concretize 
the CAFE Practices 1161 . The higher demands in terms of tolerance allow to maximize the 
organoleptic potential, but unlike an expression of the exclusive terroir of a territory, it is an 
aromatic profile identifiable in different batches of coffee coming from different terroir, namely 
the citric acid aroma, an intense and pleasant flavor that gives life to the coffee with a retronasal 
sensation of ripe citrus aromas such as orange or lemon and the clean cup. Both of them are 
demanded by Starbucks in Riosucio. Also, it produces a bundled of symbolic services:  Given the 
lower tolerance of defects, the coffee sold as Regional reflects the typical coffee from Caldas 
coffee (although there is no legal protection to appeal it). Also, because of the CAFE Practices 
program was developed in collaboration with the non-profit group Conservation International, it 
tries to coordinate the whole chain by enforcing as a prerequisite for suppliers product quality 
and economic accountability (traceability) and then evaluating its social and environmental 
impact aiming to produce two complementary symbolic services: ethically traded and 
environmentally responsible in order to enhance its brand reputation as a “responsible 
company”1162. Indeed, five aromatic profiles are sought by Starbucks in their supplier regions, 
three of them in Colombia: high citric acidity; herbal, and a clean cup1163, from which two in 
Riosucio. Similarly than the previous LRA by increasing monetary services received by coffee 
producers thanks to the implementation of the CAFÉ Practices program, which could increase 
productivity (because they are paying a very similar price for a Regional coffee as the price paid 
by the FNC). 
 
The LRA Fairtrade concretized both the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC and the Normas Asprocafé. It 
highlights the demand for the clean cup taste related service by accepting 6.33% of grains with 
defects. As Normas de Asprocafé is the local application of the “standards for small producer 
organization” developed by FLOCERT to evaluate verifiable control points in the Fairtrade 
certification process1164, it evidences the demand for the Fairtrade symbolic service: a more 
balanced distribution of income within the coffee value chain by using certification as an 
instrument to compensate power in favor of producers. The monetary services are expected to 
be higher than the standard LRA because they paid COP$ 120 (USD 0.05) additionally per kilo 
                                                     
1161 Starbucks Coffee Company & SCS Gobal Services, C.A.F.E. Practices Smallholder Scorecard. Its 3.4 version January 
2016 can be consulted in https://www.scsglobalservices.com/starbucks-cafe-practices. Last visited 01-27-2017. 
1162 Starbucks’ official webpage.  
1163 Interview with Valentina Duque, ex-employee of the quality team of Starbucks in Colombia.   
1164 To consult this standard and the additional criteria for those that produce coffee see Fairtrade official webpage. 
https://www.fairtrade.net/standards/our-standards/small-producer-standards.html.  
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during for the whole harvest 2015, and an additional re-settlement that was later paid as a social 
premium of COP 150 (USD 0.06) per kilo1165. 
 
The LRA Organic concretized the previous two profiling institutions, and two additional, the USDA 
Organic that highlights consumer concerns about food products that, given the use of synthetic 
pesticides, antibiotics, or other toxic products, could potentially put health at risk. And the Q 
system of the SCAA. It implies that coffee samples that meet the standards for green, roasted 
and cup quality are   “among the highest quality in the world”1166. Thus, this LRA highlights two 
types of taste-related services demanded which are materialized at the time of purchase through 
the selection in two stages: First, a sample of coffee that accepts a maximum of 6.33% the grains 
with defects would produce a clean cup by which most of the organic coffee is procured. A 
percentage of this coffee (which in 2015 was closer to 70%) is tasted in the laboratory according 
to the SCAA protocols and classified into four groups according to the score: less than 83 (almost 
55% of the total reflects the average cup of Colombian coffee that is considered between 80-82); 
equal to 83; equal to 84; equal to or greater than 85. These lots that were paid with additional 
premiums are used to produce the exceptional coffee taste related service that reflects the 
demand for an unusual and exclusive coffee1167. By activating the Fairtrade and the USDA organic, 
these actors claim both the fairtrade symbolic service and the natural coffee symbolic service 
that involves a coffee produced avoiding prohibited products. The monetary services offered by 
this LRA included an additional premium when buying of COP 560 (USD 0.24) per kilo and several 
additional re-assessments that were subsequently paid: The first is the social premium (SP) of 
Fairtrade of COP 150 (USD 0.06) per kilo; the second is the Small Producers Symbol premium 
(SPP)  for the commitment to acquire coffee for a minimum of USD 1.60 per pound and that, in 
addition, if organic it is added 40 cents, the sum of both they denominate the organic premium 
(SO) that equaled approximately COP 1300 (USD 0.55) per kilo1168; the third is the organic plus 
premium (SOP) awarded to coffee with higher than 83 cupping score: 45% of the total provision 
obtained between 83-85 cupping score with SOP between $ 800 and $ 1500 per kilo1169 (For 
simplifying the analysis we calculate the SOP as an average of COP 517 (USD 0.22) per kilo). 
 
                                                     
1165 The fair trade premium of 20 cents per pound of coffee exported totaled 491 million pesos in 2015 (Informe de 
administración y gestión 2015, presentada a la XIII Asamblea General de Delegados de la Asociación de pequeños 
productores de café ingruma. Págs. 9). The investment of the social premium is decided in the asamblea general de 
delegados de Asprocafé, who in 2015 decided to distribute a portion of these resources as a social bonus of COP $ 
150 (USD 0.06) for associates of Asprocafé that do not sell through the LRA Nespresso and COP $ 75 (USD 0.03) for 
associates of Asprocafé that sell trhough the LRA Nespresso.  
1166 The Coffee Institute, “Q grader, the Q coffee system”. Official webpage.  
1167 Equal Exchange presented in the spring season 2015 "Los Cuernos del Diablo" for which “(they) we recommend 
brewing Los Cuernos up on a Chemex to highlight the sweetness and bright acidity  (Exchange, 2015) 
1168 The SPP premium plus the SO totaled 349 million pesos in 2015, equivalent to $ 2,600 pesos per kilo of coffee 
sold as excelso (Informe de administración y gestión 2015, presentada a la XIII Asamblea General de Delegados de la 
Asociación de pequeños productores de café ingruma. Págs. 9). COP 1,000 (USD 0.42) per kilo were paid after buying 
during the first five months and COP 1,500 (USD 0.64) per kilo during the following seven months of the year 
according to an interview with the coordinator of the Internal Control System of Asprocafé. 
1169Informe de administración y gestión 2015, presentada a la XIII Asamblea General de Delegados de la Asociación 
de pequeños productores de café ingruma. Págs. 9-16.   
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The LRA La Vereda / Rainforest Alliance accepts up to 4.5% of grains with defects, thus it reflects 
the demands for a terroir expression taste related service derived from: cultivation practices, soil 
characteristics and the particular mountain-valley winds system which stabilizes the temperature 
in relatively high altitude for growing coffee, to produce a coffee with “intense fragrance and 
floral notes, distinctive fruity and citric overtones”(Keurig, 2017c). Also through the SACEV 
agreement, it is highlighted the demand for the indigenous coffee symbolic service that Keurig 
describes as “La Vereda coffee and taste the love, care and passion that can only come from the 
Embera-Chami tribe of San Lorenzo” (Keurig, 2017c). In addition, currently, some farms are 
certified (or in the process) in the Rainforest Alliance VSS, thus showing the demands for the 
environmentally responsible symbolic service. The monetary services offered by this LRA 
included a premium when buying of COP 360 (USD 0.15) per kilo. 
 
The LRA Nespresso is built over the minimum tolerances of the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC but 
only for those coffee farmers in the Nespresso’s list selected mainly for being located in an 
altitudinal fringe above 1.500 m.a.s.l. because the probability is higher for finding the winy taste 
related service, an aromatic profile similar to that of the fermented grape that tends to develop 
after the grain is mature and begins its over-ripening process. So, in a two-step process, they 
accept a maximum of 4.5% of grains with defects, and then they cup the lots to select those with 
the vinous profile. This selection is due to the concretization of the AAA Program which is 
sustained on the Tool for the Assessment of Sustainable Quality – TASQ1170, a methodology 
developed in collaboration with the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) that aims to maximize 
productivity in the coffee farm while guaranteeing ecosystems and biodiversity protection and, 
natural resources conservation. They seek two complementary symbolic services: shared value 
and environmentally responsible because by “creating greater value for both society and the 
environment” 1171 , they enhance their brand reputation in order to attract aspirational 
consumers, Nespresso’s target group1172. That is why they sought for higher monetary services 
for producers, which expect a higher yield as a result of the TASQ implementation. In addition, 
they paid a premium when buying of COP$ 560 (USD$ 0.24) per kilo and an additional SP premium 
after buying of COP 75 (USD 0.03) per kilo for the 387 coffee growers associated also with 
Asprocafé. Additionally, the one certificated in the Rainforest Alliance VSS received an additional 
premium when buying of COP 125 (USD 0.05) per kilo. (To simplify we distribute among the total 
of the coffee purchased by the LRA Nespresso the 30% that was paid with the Rainforest Alliance 
premium so an average COP 40 (USD 0.02) per kilo for the total purchases). 
 
V.3.3. Buesaco  
 
The LRA Nespresso is built over the minimum tolerances of the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC but 
only for those coffee farmers in the Nespresso’s list selected mainly for being located in an 
                                                     
1170 There are both, a Generic TASQ and local version known as TASQ “Módulo Colombia”. For both of them, we have 
the version 1009 of 2009. 
1171 Nespresso’s official webpage.  
1172 “We want to be the kind of Company you admire, the Company of choice for discerning coffee drinkers and 
talented people who share our goal of being the highest quality and most sustainable coffee brand. How should we 
leverage our sustainability commitments to be your company of choice?” (Nespresso. et al., 2017) 
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altitudinal fringe with the help of the Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño. These 
minimum tolerances on high altitude coffee in Buesaco allows Nespresso to gather a coffee bean 
that potentially would produce their demanded taste related service: citric acid aroma and sweet 
flavor1173. This selection is due to the concretization of the AAA Program which is sustained on 
the Tool for the Assessment of Sustainable Quality – TASQ1174, a methodology developed in 
collaboration with the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) that aims to maximize productivity 
in the coffee farm while guaranteeing ecosystems and biodiversity protection and, natural 
resources conservation. They seek two complementary symbolic services: shared value and 
environmentally responsible because by “creating greater value for both society and the 
environment” 1175 , they enhance their brand reputation in order to attract aspirational 
consumers, Nespresso’s target group1176. That is why they sought for higher monetary services 
for producers, which expect a higher yield as a result of the TASQ implementation. In addition, 
they paid an additionally COP$ 420 (USD$ 0.18) per kilo during the harvest 2015/2016 over the 
minimum price offered by the FNC for a factor 93.  
 
The LRA CCEsp/Starbucks is built on the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC, but it also can concretize the 
“Coffee and Farmer Equity Practices” (CAFE Practices hereafter)1177, which is restricted to the 
geographical area in which its Census-2004 was conducted encouraging the terroir expression 
taste related service. This area covers the whole municipality of Buesaco, including the citric acid 
aroma of high altitude farms and the clean cup of the low altitude ones that are demanded by 
the main client of Nariño’s coffee, Starbucks. Indeed, five aromatic profiles are sought by 
Starbucks in their supplier regions, three of them in Colombia: high citric acidity; herbal, and a 
clean cup1178, from which two from Nariño. In addition, the CAFE Practices program which was 
developed in collaboration with the non-profit group Conservation International, tries to 
coordinate the whole chain by enforcing as a prerequisite for suppliers product quality and 
economic accountability (traceability) and then evaluating its social and environmental impact 
aiming to produce two complementary symbolic services: ethically traded and environmentally 
responsible in order to enhance its brand reputation as a “responsible company”1179. Similarly 
than the previous LRA by increasing monetary services received by coffee producers thanks to 
the implementation of the CAFÉ Practices program, which could increase productivity (because 
they are paying a very similar price for a factor 93 than the price paid by the FNC). 
 
In this LRA there is a third selling option through Caravela as Specialty Coffee, it concretized the 
Q system of the Specialty Coffee Association of America. It implies that coffee samples that meet 
                                                     
1173 Interview with Hernando Delgado, executive director of the Comité departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño.  
1174 There are both, a Generic TASQ and local version known as TASQ “Módulo Colombia”. For both of them, we have 
the version 1009 of 2009. 
1175 Nespresso’s official webpage.  
1176 “We want to be the kind of Company you admire, the Company of choice for discerning coffee drinkers and 
talented people who share our goal of being the highest quality and most sustainable coffee brand. How should we 
leverage our sustainability commitments to be your company of choice?” (Nespresso. et al., 2017) 
1177 Starbucks Coffee Company & SCS Gobal Services, C.A.F.E. Practices Smallholder Scorecard. Its 3.4 version January 
2016 can be consulted in https://www.scsglobalservices.com/starbucks-cafe-practices. Last visited 01-27-2017. 
1178 Interview with Valentina Duque, ex-employee of the quality team of Starbucks in Colombia.   
1179 Starbucks’ official webpage.  
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the standards for green, roasted and cup quality are   “among the highest quality in the 
world”1180. As a wide range or aromatic profiles can be produced, we propose to categorize them 
all as an exceptional coffee taste related service. By activating this institution, passionate coffee 
farmers1181 are selected to join a coffee value chain that fosters “economic empowerment by 
promoting quality coffee and rewarding farmers for it”1182. A model offered to satisfy consumers 
that wanted more connection with the producers whose coffee they were drinking 1183 , a 
symbolic service we call transparent coffee. As a result, it is expected higher monetary services 
than the ones offered by the LRA Standard that increase alongside quality in the coffee cup. In 
fact, firstly the farmer will receive the price depending on the factor, but then, a cupping test will 
be conducted and depending on the score, it will be offered. Only when the coffee is bought (and 
paid) as Specialty, the trader will give additional value for kilo to the farmer that in Veracruz was 
a range between COP$ 500-1000 (USD$ 0.17 - 0.33) per kilo.  
 
The LRA CAltura concretized both, the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC and the Q System of the SCAA, 
producing both the terroir expression and the exceptional coffee taste related services. This LRA 
was developed and funded by the Fundación Social to contribute to tackling down the structural 
causes of poverty1184, so, in addition to the transparent coffee that is sough through the direct 
trade value chain, a poverty reduction symbolic service is also demanded. Monetary services are 
expected to be higher than the standard LRA because they paid COP$ 100 (USD$ 0.03) in addition 
per kilo during for the whole harvest 2015/2016, and a reassessment for the specialty coffee in a 
range between COP$ 500-1600 (USD$ 0.17 - 0.53) per kilo.   
 
Similar to the previous two, the LRA CNilson concretized both the Resolución 5/2002 del CNC and 
the Q System of the SCAA, producing the terroir expression and the exceptional coffee taste 
related services. In the same line, they implement a direct-trade purchase model aiming to 
produce transparent coffee.  As the LRA CAltura, the direct trade is a mean, in the case to 
produce the symbolic service shared value: “to create significant and measurable value alongside 
with the communities that converge with the business”1185. Monetary services are expected to 
be higher than the standard LRA because they paid COP$ 200 (USD$ 0.07) in addition per kilo 
during for the whole harvest 2015/2016, and a reassessment for the specialty coffee in a range 
between COP$ 2000-7500 (USD$ 0.67 - 2.50) per kilo.   
 
It must be clarified that in the last three cases, monetary services are not dependent on 
productivity but on the production of the exceptional coffee taste related service. So, we will 
distinguish between the two groups. The first group refers exclusively to uses oriented to increase 
productivity, the second group refers to uses to trigger the “exceptional coffee taste related 
service”. In any case, when we measure the “monetary services” at the end of this section, we 
                                                     
1180 The Coffee Institute, “Q grader, the Q coffee system”. Official webpage.  
1181 Interview with Alejandro Cadena, founder and CEO of Caravela. 
1182 Caravela, “impact report”. 2016.  
1183 Caravela, official webpage.  
1184  "Contribuir a superar las causas estructurales de la Pobreza para construir una sociedad justa, solidaria, 
productiva y en paz". Fundación Social. Official webpage.   
1185 InConexus’ official webpage.   
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refer to the income of the coffee farmer that are the result of all uses including those oriented 
towards the productivity and/or those oriented towards the production of the “exceptional 
coffee” service.  
 
V.4. Support for the “regulated uses” table in both context 
V.4.1. Both contexts 
• Monetary services production  
 
As defined in this document, monetary services are the result of multiplying the number of kilos 
of coffee produced by the price per kilo.  
 
Implementation projects conducted by actors aiming to concretize the first five profiling 
institutions (Resolución 5/2002 del CNC; the IGP Café de Colombia; DO Café de Nariño; the AAA 
Program; the CAFE Practices) focus mainly on the first part of the equation, increasing quantities, 
whereas the last one, the Q system focus on obtaining better prices. Indeed, in the first case, the 
key question is how can be closed the gap between the potential production in a piece of land 
and the actual yield? The answer will be oriented towards scientifically proven uses of resource 
constituents that increase productivity. Whereas in the second, the key question is how can be 
closed the gap between the most complex and extraordinaire aromatic profile that will be well 
paid on the markets, and the actual aromatic profile produced? As prices are associated with 
scarcity, the answer will be oriented towards unusual agricultural practices dissociated from the 
standard ones, in several cases costly/risky enough to maintain the exclusivity.  
 
For the first group of profiling institutions, infrastructures and know how must be used to 
maximize productivity, i.e. increasing the kilos of coffee with the less use of factors of production, 
mainly land.   
 
Infrastructures are affected in the five activities of the planting process: Diversification must be 
eliminated because to maximize coffee production all the land, water, solar irradiation, and 
fertilizers must be used exclusively by coffee trees; Variety planted must be selected from 
varieties featured by high yield and pest resistant, as the variety Castillo®1186 produced through 
artificial selection by CENICAFÉ; Renovation of Coffee trees in order to maximize production and 
stabilize income in time: cultivation is planned in accordance with rains, and pruning is done to 
the 20% - 15% of the coffee trees each 5-7 years once the main harvest is over to maintain young 
and productive coffee trees; Planting density or the number of coffee tree per unity of land must 
be as high as climate and soils allow: due to competence between coffee trees for light, water 
and nutrients, the higher the number of them, the lower the individual production. The optimal 
number is the one that maximizes production per unit of land (under the best conditions this 
number is around 9.500 coffee tree per hectare) 1187; Shade must be controlled (because is 
                                                     
1186 “Las investigaciones de la última década han permitido la selección de nuevas progenies de porte bajo con 
resistencia a la roya y con mejores características de tamaño de grano y productividad. La mezcla de estas progenies 
es lo que hoy se denomina como Variedad Castillo®.”(Arcila et al., 2007, p. 73) 
1187 “Las investigaciones han demostrado que en cafetales a plena exposición solar y bajo condiciones ambientales y 
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beneficial in hot and dry climates, and soils with low moisture retention and low fertility) or 
eliminated because solar irradiation, as the main input for photosynthesis for transforming 
inorganic matter into coffee cherries, is the determinant factor of productivity1188. 
 
Know how is affected in five activities in the cultivation process: Soil management must focus on 
soil conservation at the lower cost: By controlling the size of noble weeds (that protect and 
nurture the soil) with cultural methods like machete and scythe1189, and eliminating the other 
weeds, which compete for water, light and nutrients with the coffee tree, using effective 
synthetic weed killers; Pest and disease management must prioritize prevention like the planting 
of pest resistant varieties to avoid the coffee leaf rust or implement the RERE to control the coffee 
borer beetle1190. If prevention was not enough, an early detection is a must, as it is the pertinence 
and precision in the use of pesticides and other agrochemicals; Nutrition must be conducted 
under a compensation approach in which nutrients demanded by the plant that are not produced 
naturally (demands identified by soil or leaves analysis), must be added in exacts doses when the 
plant demands it and the weather permits (too little water won’t allow filtration and too much 
will drain it further down where roots cannot reach them) in order to maximize production and 
avoid any lost; Picking  must be done on time when coffee cherries are completely ripe, on the 
one hand, to reduce penalization and obtain the full price, on the other, as they are full-grown 
they are heavier and valuable. So, after registering flowering the picking of coffee cherries is 
scheduled for the 240th day afterward; Farm management must be conducted as an enterprise, 
registering all inputs (costs) and outputs (income) on a daily basis.  
 
For the second group (the Q System), monetary services are derived from the taste related 
services. So, it will be developed in the section devoted to this kind of services.   
 
• Symbolic services production 
 
Energy dose: consumption of any kind of coffee will produce a sensation of being ready and 
active because of caffeine. So, if the final beverage was produced using coffee, no matter the 
profile of the Resource, this service will be produced. From a negative concretization of 
institutions, the Resource that is profiled to not produce the other services is by default producing 
the energy dose. In this order of ideas, the know-how is affected in the three activities in the 
trading process; Purchasing with a discount coffee that has a factor higher than 94 and bulking it 
separately; Threshing and sorting the residual coffee when a 70 kilos bag of Excelso is produced. 
                                                     
manejo agronómico adecuados, la densidad de siembra óptima tanto para la variedad Caturra como la Castillo® está 
alrededor de 9.500 plantas por hectárea.” (Arcila et al., 2007, p. 136) 
1188 “Diferentes investigaciones en Colombia y otros países cafeteros sugieren que el sombrío presenta una serie de 
ventajas principalmente en climas cálidos y secos, y en suelos con baja retención de humedad y baja fertilidad. (Pero) 
registra desventajas asociadas especialmente con la restricción de la incidencia de la radiación solar que es el 
principal factor determinante de la productividad” (Arcila et al., 2007, p. 171) 
1189 Its complete elimination is extremely costly in terms of both products and labor (Arcila et al., 2007, p. 123) 
1190 Recolección- Repase after picking up all the harvest, a new tour to pick up the coffee beans leave behind in both 
the branches and the soil to avoid the coffee borer beetle (as it was said before it thrives inside overripe fruits that 
fell down).  
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In addition, Know-to-appreciate is affected in one activity during the roasting process and the 
communication strategy: Packaging and the communication strategy enhance this quality 
associating it to breakfast time or to mental demanding activities.    
 
Reputation of the appellation Café Colombia: This service is produced when the origin, is 
associated with positive sensations that enhance its attractiveness to consumers. A positive 
expectation on an aromatic profile due to soils, climate and agronomic practices, embedded in 
an imaginary landscape, people and culture. The process to “encapsulate” (using the terminology 
of Acampora and Fonte (2009)) this meaning into the product is both developed autonomously 
by the successive commercial transaction throughout long periods of time and direct intervention 
of interested actors. In the case of Café de Colombia it is a result of more the second process, by 
encouraging some agronomic practices; investing in a more attractive image and legally 
protecting it 1191 . So all the infrastructures, the know-how, and the know-to-appreciate are 
affected to eliminate the gap between the promised value and the produced one and to enhance 
its transmission power of positive feelings.       
 
Infrastructures are affected in one activity in the planting process: Variety must absolutely be 
one variety of the species Coffea arabica1192, to guarantee that both the coffee farmer and their 
coffee crop must be registered in the Coffee information System - SICA1193. Know-how is affected 
in one activity in the cultivation process: Picking of ripe cherries to fulfill the promised aromatic 
profile1194.  
 
Infrastructures and know-how are affected in three activities in the post-harvesting process: 
Hulling must be done the same day in which coffee cherries were picked to interrupt the long 
fermentation1195; Fermentation must be a short one1196, for a few hours (depending on weather 
conditions) the sweet mucilage (a last layer irremovable using the hulling machine) will be 
naturally detached (fermentation takes place during this time) until it is washed and then 
completely removed using water to clean the bean and lay it down to dry; Drying using either 
sun-exposure or heating machines to reduce bean moisture until a range between 10% - 12% 1197. 
                                                     
1191 In Colombia, this protection is regulated through the Título XII de la Decisión 486 de la Comunidad Andina: 
producers can obtain the registro administrativo as a prerequisite to constitute the property right over the 
geographical indication before the Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio de Colombia - SIC. The FNC, requested 
this registro administrativo to obtain the Denomination of Origin Café de Colombia. It was granted through the 
Resolución No. 4819 in March 2005. Afterwards, they requested legal protection for Café de Colombia in Europe 
using their legal framework, the Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92, granted two years after through the 
Commission regulation (EC) No 1050/2007 of 12 September 2007. This document registered Café de Colombia as a 
Protected Geographical Indication 
1192 Art. 32 “especies y variedades” del título III del Reglamento de Uso de uso de la Indicación Geográfica Protegida 
Café de Colombia (F. N. d. C. FNC, 2010). 
1193 Art. 34 “zona de producción” y 39 “SICA – registro de plantaciones o unidades de producción”, ibid.  
1194 Numeral 2-a, Art. 35 “practicas de producción”, ibid. 
1195 Known as natural coffee, pulp is not removed and the coffee cherries are laid down on patios for a few weeks 
until is completely dry. As the fermentation takes so long, the fruity flavor of the pulp is predominant in the cup.  
1196 Numeral 2-b, Art. 35 “practicas de producción”, ibid. 
1197 Numeral 1, Art. 33 “características”, ibid.   
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Also in three activities in the trading process: Purchasing using recommended methods to buy 
(as buying depending on the factor, the number of kilos needed to produce a 70 kilos bag of 
Excelso coffee) in order to sort the coffee that fulfills quality requirements to start a trazabilidad 
documental 1198  of a coffee lot; Threshing and sorting only can be done in threshing mills 
authorized by the FNC because of their proven capability to sort and manage differently, 
Colombian Excelso from other origin  and quality coffee1199, they must maintain the trazabilidad 
documental and fulfill requirements of the sanitary authority1200; Bulking and export must be 
proven through the trazabilidad documental of a particular lot that guarantees its origin and 
quality1201.  
 
Know-how and Know-to-appreciate are affected in two activities in the roasting process: Blending 
or not Colombian coffee with other origins, if the roaster wants to produce this service, it has to 
register both the company and all the marks that are going to use the brand1202. If blended, it can 
inform that Colombia Coffee is used only if all origins are informed in the exact same way, without 
highlight anyone and without using any authorized Colombian Coffee seals1203. If it is not blended 
Packaging could include the words “Café de Colombia” or “IGP Café de Colombia” and the 
European Union seal for IGP according to the Commission Regulation CE 628/2008 of the 2nd 
July 20081204.  
 
Know-to-appreciate is affected in the only activity of the communication strategy process: 
Communication must be done to enhance the romantic image of the small Colombian coffee 
farmer (sustained on the Iconic Juan Valdez, an antioqueño coffee farmer dressed as it was in the 
first half of the twentieth century) and its effort to produce a soft-clean cup coffee (Fernández et 
al., 2007). 
 
Brand reputation: Similar to the appellations, this service triggers sensations associated to the 
brand, which are triggered by the perceived effect of the brand on consumers, farmers, and their 
community, the environment among others. Positive ones that are reinforced and negative ones 
that are fought back by the owners of the property rights on the brand. Essentially by encouraging 
symbolic and taste related services (next paragraphs) and attaching them to the brand. In this 
regard, the Know-to-appreciate is affected in the activity of communication strategy that is 
different for each company, and we are going to develop further in the section devoted to 
closure.    
 
                                                     
1198 A coffee bought from a farmer A is registered (kilos per farmer/farm) and it is added to a lot composed of 
previous registered coffee from other farmers. So, when the coffee lot (and its documentation) reach the threshing 
mill, coffee from farmer B cannot be individualized but it can be known that it is part of that lot.    
1199 Art. 36 “trilla y acondicionamiento del café verde”, ibid.   
1200 Art. 47 “derechos y obligaciones específicas de los trilladores de Café de Colombia”, ibid. 
1201 Art. 45 “derechos en la presentación y publicidad de los productos” ibid. 
1202 Numeral c-d, Art. 38 “inscripciones y registros ante la FNC”; Art. 41 “registro de las empresas y/o plantas 
procesadoras de café industrializado” and Art. 42 “registro de marcas autorizadas para incluir la IGP”. Ibid. 
1203 Art. 37.4 “Mezclas”, ibid. 
1204 Art. 48 “Derechos y obligaciones específicas de las Empresas procesadoras de café industrializado”. ibid 
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Environmentally responsible: A neutral or a positive relationship between the coffee crop and 
its ecosystem generates this service. I.e. agronomic practices that produce the human demanded 
coffee bean without putting in peril the biodiversity and natural resources. We will use the SAN 
Standard for Sustainable Agriculture (SAN, 2017) as the profiling institution to produce this 
service1205 because, with the exception of water treatment, it goes further than both the AAA 
Program and the CAFE Practices profiling institution. In this regards, Infrastructures and Know-
how are used to both increase productivity (an income) in the already cultivated area in order to 
avoid crop expansion to natural forest, and to tackle down pollution in order to neutralize 
damaging effects on natural resources, and Know-to-appreciate are used to accept the idea that 
it is compatible to produce more coffee and to protect the environment at the same time.  
 
Infrastructures are used in three activities in the planting and one in the cultivation process: 
Diversification could decrease because the farmer must refrain himself to plant all farm area to 
conserve natural ecosystems1206, has to eliminate crops to establish ecological corridors1207 and 
to protect aquatic ecosystems1208; Variety cannot include genetically modified organism1209 and 
it must be prioritized pest-resistant varieties that diminish the use of pesticides1210; Shade that 
must include a minimum percentage of canopy within the crop, with a minimum number of 
different species of trees per ha1211; Hedge rowing must be implemented between crop areas in 
which agrochemicals are used and, natural ecosystems and human activity1212. 
 
Know how is affected in five activities in the cultivation and one activity in the post-harvesting 
processes: Soil management must control weeds, minimizing herbicide, to cover the soil and 
diminish both erosion and evapotranspiration, planting nitrogen-fixing ground covers, and 
nurture the soil using also compost1213; Nutrition must be based on the assessment of crop needs 
(through regular monitoring) and fertilization is precise in terms of dosage and time to minimize 
loss and avoid eutrophication1214; Pest management must be done through an Integrated Pest 
Management that prioritizes prevention over mitigation, and if there is no other option, only 
pesticides authorized are applied as it is permitted1215; Picking must be done timely to maximize 
income; Farm management must take advantage of managerial techniques to maximize income 
                                                     
1205 SAN was absorbed by Rainforest Alliance in 2017, which in turn helped to put in place the AAA Program. On the 
other hand, Conservation International which worked in the CAFÉ Practices is allied with SAN and RF in the Tropical 
Forest Alliance 2020. TFA Official webpage https://www.tfa2020.org/en/about-tfa/partners/ . Last visited 11-29-
2017. 
1206 Critical Criteria 2.2, Sustainable Agriculture Network Standard. July 2017.   
1207 Continuous improvement criteria 2.13, ibid.   
1208 Continuous improvement criteria 2.5, 2.7 y 2.8, ibid. 
1209 Critical Criteria 3.6, ibid.  
1210 Critical Criteria 3.3, ibid. 
1211 Continuous improvement criteria 2.5, 2.6 and 2.9, ibid.   
1212 Continuous improvement criteria 3.27 and 3.28, ibid.   
1213 Continuous improvement criteria 3.8, 3.10 and 3.27, ibid.   
1214 Continuous improvement criteria 3.11, 3.12 y 3.14, ibid.   
1215 Critical Criteria 3.3 and 3.4; Continuous improvement criteria 3.23, 3.24, 3.25, 3.26, 3.27, 3.29, 3.30, 3.31, 3.32, 
3.33, 3.34 and 3.36 ibid.   
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while minimizing costs like planning the activities in the farm1216 and accounting records1217; 
Waste management implies keeping records of all waste flows and producing implementation 
plans for each one. Waste is separated: organic waste is composted1218, recyclable waste is 
recycled and the other waste is properly disposed without posing risk to people and the 
ecosystem1219. Wastewater from processing operations must be treated before being discharged 
into aquatic ecosystems1220. Water is a big issue in coffee, so both the AAA program and the CAFE 
Practices go further than the SAN Standard. In the first case, it allows a maximum of 30 liters of 
water for each kilo of dry parchment coffee 1221  (but encourages a 10 liters threshold) and 
demands fulfilling local legislation 1222. In Colombia, it allows wastewater disposal through a 
“permiso de vertimiento”1223 that is conditioned to the water quality in terms maximum values 
permit of BOD (biochemical oxygen demand) and COD(Chemical oxygen demand) depending on 
the activity1224  and the payment of tax known as “tasa restributiva”1225. For the coffee post-
harvesting process, these maximum values are 400 mg/L for BOD and 650 mg/L for COD1226. CAFE 
Practices is more permissive with maximum values at 1.000 mg/L for BOD and 1.500 mg/LO2 for 
COD1227.  
 
Infrastructures and Know-how are affected in the three activities in the trading process and two 
in the roasting process: Purchasing, Threshing and sorting, Bulking and export, Blending and 
Roasting must be done through a Chain of Custody Management System that guarantee both, 
the integrality of the product (by control procedures 1228, trained personnel 1229 and internal 
inspections1230) and its traceability from the certified farms (by any system that can identify 
certified products1231 and its transactions1232 from each segment of the value chain from the farm 
to the customer1233 including the “trazabilidad documental”). 
 
                                                     
1216 For example to take advantage of the weather and avoid unforeseen costs, nurseries must begin eight months 
before the rainy season, so when coffee trees are planted in the field, they will have the water they need for its 
development. If planted during the dry season, several trees won’t survive and not only the money invested will be 
lost, but also the farmer has to uproot the dying tree assuming extra costs.     
1217 Critical criteria 1.2, and Continuous improvement criteria 1.7, 1.8, 1.9 y 1.10, ibid. 
1218 Continuous improvement criteria 3.40, ibid. 
1219 Continuous improvement criteria 3.20, 3.21, 3.22, 3.37, 3.38, 3.39, 3.41, ibid. 
1220 Critical criteria 3.1, 3.2, ibid.  
1221 Criteria 9a. Herramienta TASQ Módulo Colombia. Versión 1009 del 2009. 
1222 Criteria 9e. Ibid.  
1223 Decreto 3030 de 2010 del Ministerio de Ambiente, Vivienda y Desarrollo Territorial.  
1224 Resolución 631 del 17 de marzo de 2015 del Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible 
1225 Decreto 2667 del 21 de diciembre del 2012 del Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible. 
1226 Art. 9. Resolución 631 del 17 de marzo de 2015 del Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible. 
1227 Criteria WC2. CAFÉ Practices Smallholder Scorecard. Version 3.4. January 2016.   
1228 Criteria 1.1, Chain of Custody Standard, Version 3. July 2015.  
1229 Criteria 1.2. Ibid.  
1230 Criteria 1.4. Ibid. 
1231 Criteria 2.2 Ibid. 
1232 Criteria 2.3 Ibid. 
1233 Criteria 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 Ibid. 
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In addition, Know-to-appreciate is affected in one activity during the roasting process and the 
communication strategy: Packaging and the communication strategy only can include the 
Rainforest Alliance trademark by signing a license agreement directly with the Rainforest 
Alliance1234  and only in those products that it can be proved that meet the minimum percentage 
of certified content1235.  
 
Ethically traded: This service is produced when the price received by farmers for a pound of dry 
parchment coffee, is close enough to the international price to consider that merchants are 
charging market prices for their services. Know-how is affected in the three activities in the 
trading process: Purchasing, Threshing and sorting, Bulking and export, must be done through 
a system to track the movement of CAFÉ practices coffee from initial purchase through point of 
export1236, that can also demonstrate the price paid to the coffee farmer (each producer must 
receive a receipt for coffee purchased1237) for all producers participating in the CAFÉ Practices 
program (an annually updated list of them is mandatory1238). Know-to-appreciate is affected in 
the one activity in the communication strategy: the communication strategy revealed prices paid 
“We paid an average of $1.47 per pound (0.5 kilograms) for green coffee in the 2009 financial 
year”1239 and how they control it reached farmers: “Suppliers must submit evidence of payments 
made throughout the coffee supply chain to demonstrate how much of the price Starbucks pays 
for green (unroasted) coffee gets to the farmer”1240.  
 
Shared value: This service is produced when coffee production triggers positive value for coffee 
communities at the lower cost for the environment: By increasing the income, the measures to 
diminish environmental damaged can be funded. It goes further than the ethically traded coffee 
in a sense in which not only market price is paid, but also farmers are benefited by other kinds of 
investments that help them increase their income while reducing environmental damage 
(Nespresso. et al., 2017, p. 26). In general terms Infrastructures and Know-how are affected as it 
was described for the processes of planting, cultivation, and post-harvesting to produce the 
service “environmentally responsible”, but this service is developed, no when the farmer 
implements changes by himself, but when it is helped both financially and technically by other 
actors along the coffee value chain. As a consequence, Know-how is affected in the three 
activities in the trading process. Purchasing, Threshing and sorting, Bulking and export not only 
to guarantee the integrity of the product and traceability to the farm level as the 
“environmentally responsible” service but also to invest directly in the farm through collaborative 
schemes that do not modify ownership. From the share value perspective, this is neither 
                                                     
1234 Criteria 3.1 Ibid. 
1235 Criteria 3.3 Ibid. 
1236 Zero tolerance Criteria PS-MT 1.1 CAFÉ Practices Smallholder Scorecard. Version 3.4. January 2016.   
1237 Zero tolerance Criteria PS-MT 1.3 CAFÉ Practices Smallholder Scorecard. Version 3.4. January 2016.   
1238 Zero tolerance Criteria PS-MT 1.2 CAFÉ Practices Smallholder Scorecard. Version 3.4. January 2016.   
1239 Starbucks “Responsibly Grown Coffee”. Official webpage. http://en.starbucks.ch/responsibility/sourcing/coffee. 
Last visited. 12-01-2017. In perspective this price was very close to the international price for mild Arabica coffee. It 
was much higher than the “ICO composite indicator” that on average in 2009 (USD$ 1.15), slightly higher than “other 
milds” (USD$ 1.77) but lower than the “Colombian milds” (USD$ 1.77). Source. International Coffee Organization. 
“Indicator prices”. Official webpage.  
1240 Ibid.  
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philanthropy nor social responsibility is an investment to increase the value of the final product 
(M. Porter, 2011) if it is well communicated. Indeed, Know-to-appreciate is affected in the one 
activity in the communication strategy: the communication strategy that has to leverage the 
collaborative schemes to create value associated with the final product.   
 
• Taste-related services production  
 
Clean cup: Described as mild coffee, with a medium to high acidity and body, and a pronounced 
and complete aroma1241 this is the taste related service that goes together with the “reputation 
of the appellation Café de Colombia” symbolic service. So, in addition to uses described in that 
section, Know-how is affected in two activities in the trading process: Threshing and sorting, 
Bulking and export have to include an aleatory cupping test of representative samples from each 
lot of coffee to confirm the absence of defects and inconsistencies1242. Nevertheless, there is a 
difference in the use of Know-to-appreciate with the symbolic service: whereas to use the legend 
“Café de Colombia” the roaster has to agree to certain conditions mentioned, the use of this taste 
related service does not have any restriction and Roasters can use it (the taste related service of 
the Colombian coffee) to produce whatever profile they desire, either to improve a poor quality 
coffee, or to reduce the final price of an exotic blend1243.       
 
Exceptional coffee: This taste related service is by definition a rare and fortunately combination 
of soils, climate, and culture that develop the aromatic precursor inside the coffee bean that, 
once roasted and brewed, would spark an aromatic profile that would score high on the SCAA 
cupping test. It is not produced by following regulates uses on a particular institution, but on 
unconventional practices (from the ones to produce standard coffee) that have worked before 
to achieve high SCAA scores. So, more than the scientific approach followed by the previous LRAs 
in which a certain set of practices will produce an anticipated combination of services, this LRA is 
based on a probability approach in which a particular practice would increase the probability to 
obtain high SCAA scores1244.  
 
Infrastructures are affected in all activities in the planting process1245: Diversification with other 
crops and different plant species triggers a complex ecosystem with several microorganisms that 
could affect the final beverage by enriching the soils or during the fermentation process. Variety 
planted must avoid the pest-resistant ones (highly recommended on the other LRAs) because 
this resistance was obtained through artificial selection of one natural hybridization between two 
                                                     
1241 “suave, de taza limpia, con acidez y cuerpo medio/alto, aroma pronunciado y completo”. Art. 31 “Definición” del 
título III del Reglamento de Uso de uso de la Indicación Geográfica Protegida Café de Colombia (F. N. d. C. FNC, 2010). 
1242 E.g. phenolic flavor cause by contamination with chemical products; earthy flavor caused by dirty storage 
facilities or over-fermentation for defective beans unidentified during purchasing.   
1243 In any case, the higher the demand for Colombian coffee (either with or without the IGP), the higher the 
differential (price differential between Colombian Coffee and the market price for Arabica coffee), increasing the 
income for coffee producers.      
1244 Interviews with differeent  
1245  These paragraphs use information collected from interviews with people involved in the Specialty coffee 
business.  
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coffee species: arabica (Coffea arabica) and robusta (Coffea canephora), the hybrid of Timor. For 
some1246 it can be perceived in the cupping test that not only the pest-resistant genes were 
transmitted, but also some unpleasant aromatic traits of the robusta1247; Renovation of Coffee 
trees must be lengthening because older trees produce fewer grains but individually more 
complex in terms of aromatic precursors1248, nevertheless it is not a widespread practices; in 
similar terms Planting density should be low enough to diminish the competence between trees 
and allow each one to fulfill the aromatic potential of each of its beans but it is not wide use; 
Shade must provide the cover needed to diminish crops temperature and therefore its 
metabolism to enrich the coffee bean. 
 
Infrastructures and Know-how1249 are not particularly different in the cultivation process1250 with 
the exception of picking, which goes further than the repeated recommendation of harvesting 
ripe beans: on the one hand this selective picking must be incentivized with premiums to 
gatherers1251, on the other, bags must be marked to start the traceability from the various coffee 
crops in one farm1252 (because farms, small ones included, usually have different crops of coffee 
trees in terms of variety, age and altitude). But both resource constituents are particularly 
regulated in four activities in the post-harvesting process; Hulling must be done maximum 6 
hours after the picking (as fermentation takes longer, at least two fermentation tanks are 
needed)1253, and only ripe cherries must be use (before hulling, other material than the ripe 
cherries must be separated using firstly flotation (increasing the demand for water) and then for 
the slightly unripe beans, hand selection1254. After each hulling the machine must be completely 
cleaned1255 and a calibration must be done ideally each two weeks or at least 3 times during the 
harvest (once in a month)1256. Finally an evaluation of the good condition of the machine must 
                                                     
1246 Interview with Alejandro Cadena, CEO and founder of Caravela.  
1247 Even though a blind test between Caturra (arabica 100%) and Castillo (pest resistant) conducted in 2014-2015 
with well-known cuppers in the Specialty coffee business, concluded they were not statistical differences between 
SCAA cupping scores between both varieties. Sheridan, M. 2015. “More precision on Castillo v Caturra”. CRS 
Coffelands Blog. Baltimore. MD. In interview with Alejandro Cadena, the results only reflects that standard practices 
for both Castillo and Caturra will produce a similar SCAA score. For him, if specialty practices are applied for both, 
the results would show a wide gap in favor of Caturra.   
1248 Interview with Juan Carlos Caicedo, one of the first professional cuppers in Nariño certified by the Q system. It 
has to be said that there is not clear evidence to sustain this claim.   
1249 For this paragraph we describe the regulated uses written down in the Café con Altura’s handbook for technical 
assistance in specialty coffee: Café con Altura, “Cosecha y beneficio del café especial,” 2014.    
1250 Even though during the cultivation there is not any particular recommendation, it can be considered that a health 
coffee crop that profit from eco-systemic services minimizing the use of chemicals (even though non-pest resistant 
varieties demands the use of toxic pesticides) could increase the probability of a high SCAA score. So, it could be 
much closer to the uses described to produce the “environmentally responsible” than the ones to produce the 
“appellation of the reputation” symbolic service.   
1251 Recommendation 3-16 in Café con Altura, “Cosecha y beneficio del café especial,” 2014.    
1252 Recommendation 3-17. Ibid.  
1253 Recommendation 4-6. Ibid. 
1254 Recommendation 4-2. Ibid. 
1255 Recommendation 4-10. Ibid. 
1256 Recommendation 4-9. Ibid. 
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be done regularly1257; Fermentation are not restricted to the short one, but it is recommended 
that before experiment with naturals (long fermentation in which the coffee cherries are drying 
directly after picking) or honeys (medium fermentation in which coffee cherries are drying after 
hulled) the sale is guaranteed (usually to high end domestic markets). For the short one, as said 
before, it must be at least two fermentation tanks to avoid blending coffee from different hulling 
times 1258 , wood or corrosive metal is forbidden 1259 , water quality and availability must be 
checked in advance1260 and it must be stopped only when the mucilage slips off the coffee 
bean1261. When it is ready, the fermentation tank must be filled with water until all the mass is 
covered and, using a paddle, it must be shaken strongly to completely remove the mucilage1262, 
then all floating material must be hand removed1263 just before drain all water (and the highly 
polluting mucilage dissolved in it). This process must be repeated four times to assure coffee 
would not be dried with any remaining mucilage material1264; Drying must start immediately 
after drying (maximum 3 hours after1265, avoiding contact with earth1266 (plastic or impermeable 
tissues is not sufficient1267) in concrete or wood structures isolated from polluting agents1268 (like 
animals or smoke) and protected from rain1269 (to avoid rewet that cause fungi proliferation) with 
at least one square meter space for each 12.5 kilos of coffee1270. Inside the facility, temperature 
must never overcome 45 degrees Celsius, so a thermometer is indispensable1271 and currents of 
air must be controlled1272. Coffee must be spread without overpassing a 3cm - 5cm of thickness 
depending on the facility1273. During the first two days must be softly removed1274 on an hourly 
basis, afterwards, three or four times daily using a plastic rake1275. And evaluation known as 
graviment1276 must be used to identify the proper time to stop the drying, when the bean has 
reach a moisture level between 10-11.5%1277. Once dried, coffee must be packed in clean bags1278 
                                                     
1257 A random sample of one liter of coffee hull must be taken, if there are more than 8 beans milled or dented, the 
machine must be checked.  
1258 Recommendation 5-3. Ibid. 
1259 Recommendation 5-1. Ibid. 
1260 Recommendation 5-2. Ibid. 
1261 Recommendation 5-4. Ibid. 
1262 Recommendation 6-2. Ibid. 
1263 Recommendation 6-4. Ibid. 
1264 Recommendation 6-1. Ibid. 
1265 Recommendation 7-10. Ibid. 
1266 Recommendation 7-1. Ibid. 
1267 Recommendation 7-2. Ibid. 
1268 Recommendation 7-3. Ibid. 
1269 Recommendation 7-4. Ibid. 
1270 Recommendation 7-6. Ibid. 
1271 Recommendation 7-7. Ibid. 
1272 Recommendation 7-8. Ibid. 
1273 Recommendation 7-11 and 7-12. Ibid. 
1274 Recommendation 7-14. Ibid. 
1275 Recommendation 7-13. Ibid. 
1276 A sample of 200 grams is set aside in a basket that is dry alongside the whole lot. Two times a day the basket is 
weighted. When it has fallen to 104-105 grams it is properly dry.     
1277 Recommendation 7-23. Ibid. 
1278 Recommendation 8-4. Ibid. 
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and stored separately different lots of coffee1279 (to continuing the traceability to the crop level) 
in isolated facilities1280 separated from floors1281 and walls1282, controlling at least once in a 
week1283 for maximum three months1284; Reselection implies a labor intensive activity in which 
each bag of parchment coffee will be slowly emptied with a small basket, in which all defective 
beans are discarded manually and the remaining will be packed in the bags that are going to be 
sold as specialty coffee.           
 
In the same way, Infrastructures and Know-how are affected in the three activities of the trading 
process: Purchasing must continue the trazabilidad documental by farm and crop (or just by farm 
if there is just one lot) adding the cupping score, so traders must have the information of each 
producer and its coffee farm; the labs and qualified cupping professionals in the Q System; and 
the space and logistics needed to separate lots and carry on the traceability process; Threshing 
and sorting implies the milling in facilities that clean the tubes after each lot of coffee is milled, 
(so remaining grains of previous mills are not mixed with the lot being milled) and packed it in 
special bags that isolate moisture and oxygen from coffee to maintain its aromatic profile; 
Bulking and export must be done in such a way that coffee arrive at the roaster facilities without 
losing its aromatic profile and traceability. Also, they are affected in the tree activities of the 
roasting process and the communication strategy (and when sold directly to the consumer in the 
brewing process): Blending and roasting (and grinding and brewing) is done tailor-made to 
enhance uniqueness and memorability of the experience. Exceptional coffee usually does not 
blend and S-curves are adapted specifically to the features of that particular coffee and the style 
of the roaster, but also it could be blended with other either exceptional or high-quality coffee 
and roasted to enhance the final aromatic profile the roaster is looking for. Packaging is done to 
avoid any risk on the aromatic profile, using material that allows gases expulsion (once roasted, 
coffee emits CO2 for a few weeks) while preventing the entry of oxygen. 
 
Know-to-appreciate is affected in one activity during the roasting process and on in the 
communication strategy: Packaging and the communication strategy prioritize the aesthetic 
pleasure of drinking that particular beverage, describing in detail perception of aromas in the 
nose, flavor, textures, and feeling in the mouth, retronasal olfaction, aftertaste, etc., aiming to 
enhance the drinking experience. The experience that is magnified by adding a story that usually 
merges both the farmer and the roaster experience, highlighting their uniqueness practices that 
give the exceptional taste related service that consumers are experiencing.  
 
V.4.2. Riosucio 
 
                                                     
1279 Recommendation 8-7. Ibid. 
1280 Recommendation 8-1. Ibid. 
1281 Recommendation 8-5. Ibid. 
1282 Recommendation 8-6. Ibid. 
1283 Recommendation 8-9. Ibid 
1284 Recommendation 8-4. Ibid. 
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• Symbolic services production 
 
Typical coffee: The service is provided by the relationship between the coffee and the 
department of origin, hence there are two differences with the previous “Reputation of the 
appellation Café Colombia” service. The first is that uses of infrastructures and know-how during 
the planting and cultivation must be localized within the departmental territorial district. The 
second is that uses of know-how in the first activity of the trading process: the purchase that 
requires more strict tolerances in terms of qualities to bring coffee closer to the expression of 
the territory (4.5% of broca and pasilla instead of 6.5%). 
 
Natural coffee: The natural coffee service requires a system of agricultural production1285 that 
transforms abiotic components (CO2, water, energy, minerals) through biotic components (the 
coffee tree) into coffee cherries as if it was an autonomous dynamic ecosystem that provides 
with the nutrients needed to feed the plants and the protection against pests and diseases. By 
removing the coffee cherries (to sell in the market) this autonomy of the system is altered, so it 
must be compensated by the farmer by restoring the balance with animal or vegetable fertilizers 
produced on the farm. Consequently, infrastructures and know-how should be used in such a way 
that the diversity of plant and animal species in the crop is increased to optimize the interactions 
between organisms and the environment, and the know-to-appreciate should be used in such a 
way that message can be transmitted. 
 
Infrastructures are affected in three activities of the planting and one in the cultivation processes:  
diversification implies using the land for other (than coffee) agricultural activities1286; Density 
implies leaving space for other vegetal species 1287 ; Shade implies the planting and the 
maintenance of trees that provide cover to the crop 1288; Hedge rowing must be implemented at 
the boundaries of the crop to contain chemical agents used by neighbors 1289.  
 
Know how should be used to restore balance so it is affected in one activity in the post-harvesting 
and four activities during the cultivation process: Waste management involves recycling all 
organic waste to produce biomass, including the pulp of coffee or other fruits, domestic waste 
and water resulting from the washing of coffee and/or stables and pigsties1290; Nutrition involves 
preparing fertilizers with recycled biomass1291 to compensate for the elements demanded by the 
                                                     
1285 We use Arcila et al. (2007, p. 18) definition of a system of agricultural production. 
1286 Numeral 2.15 sobre las condiciones ambientales de las “Normas y sanciones que rigen a los asociados de 
Asprocafé Ingruma” desarrollado por la acción de mejoramiento del tercer tema del cuatro resumen de los criterios 
de mercado justo FLO del mismo texto.   
1287 Numeral 2.01, ibid. 
1288 Numeral 2.13, ibid.   
1289 Numeral 2.13, ibid.   
1290 Numeral 2.04, ibid.   
1291 Numeral 2.19, ibid.   
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coffee plant 1292  that the soil does not contribute naturally 1293 ; Soil management implies 
maintaining weed coverings that, when pruned periodically, contribute with organic matter and 
nitrogen to the soil while avoiding erosion by runoff1294; Pest control implies carrying out cultural 
practices to avoid the use of pesticides, insecticides, fungicides and herbicides (even though 
some products are authorized under certain conditions)1295. 
 
Infrastructures and Know-how are affected in the three activities in the trading process: 
Purchasing starts with the documentary traceability for each lot of coffee cultivated under the 
conditions previously described; threshing and sorting should be done carefully to guarantee its 
integrality, meaning for example that the whole equipment has to be cleaned before/after each 
coffee lot is threshed; bulking and export must continue with the traceability using the logistic 
services exclusively for this type of coffee, sacrificing available space in warehouses or containers.  
 
Know-to-appreciate is affected in two activities, one in the roasting, the other in the 
communication strategy: packaging and distribution requires the incorporation of the "organic" 
seal under pre-established conditions; communication strategy implies to convince consumers 
of the positive relation between all activities performed by the profilers and the health of the 
people, the environment and the communities. In this way, the private investment increases not 
only the value of the private asset (the brand coffee) but also collective assets (the organic coffee 
stamp). 
 
Indigenous coffee: This service originates in the positive influence of the coffee production 
system in the "buen vivir" of the indigenous communities1296. That is, the cultivation of coffee 
improves material well-being without affecting the indigenous world view (avoids cultural 
homogenization), nor its relations within the community (avoids income inequality) nor its 
relationship with mother earth (avoids environmental degradation). At the same time, it 
reinforces indigenous institutions such as collective lands and self-government and places value 
on the historical memory, language and identity of the indigenous people (Del Popolo, Jaspers, 
& CEPAL, 2014, pp. 33-34). Consequently, infrastructures and know-how should be used 
prioritizing ancestral techniques and indigenous cosmovision. 
 
                                                     
1292 The coffee plant needs three essential elements (C, H, and O) that are provided by air and water. And thirteen 
others that are naturally provided by the soil or artificially provided by man through fertilization. There are six 
macronutrients required in abundant quantities (N, P, K, Ca, Mg, S) and seven micronutrients in low quantities (Fe, 
Zn, Mn, B, Cu, Cl, Mo) (Arcila et al., 2007, p. 202). 
1293 Given the need to transform coffee cherries into sufficient income for the wellbeing of the household, the 
definition of the “autonomous system” is flexible and it allows the entry of external components like “authorized” 
fertilizers that the coffee grower can acquire in the market.  
1294 Numeral 2.13, ibid.   
1295 Numeral 2.03, ibid.   
1296 Uses are regulated by informal institutions transmitted orally, consequently this section is carried out based on 
field interviews, in particular with member of the Cabildo of the Resguardo de San Lorenzo, and other entities that 
support the indigenous organization such as Asprocafé and Asproinca (Association of indigenous and peasant 
producers of Riosucio). 
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Infrastructures are affected in four activities of the planting: Diversification of the farm is a vector 
of identity and autonomy: the land has to be used to produce food consumed by their 
ancestors1297 such as corn, beans, and cassava, reducing indigenes dependence on coffee and 
therefore the vulnerability to its monoculture, which in periods of low prices or poor harvests 
had produced dispossession and malnutrition; Planted variety is a vector of the indigenous 
worldview that admires, respects and submits to the wisdom of nature, for which it rejects 
"human arrogance" when wanting to adapt it for its own benefit. It implies a complete abstention 
to the planting of genetically modified varieties and to a lesser extent, those products of artificial 
selection; Renovation implies selecting the seed, carrying out the storage and planting in the field 
according to the phases of the moon and the lunar calendar and not intervening in the natural 
cycle of the tree, that is, not renovating by pruning once the cycle of greater productivity has 
elapsed; Shade implies the maintenance of covers, but more than the protection and nutrition 
of the soil and the crop, it reflects the respect for the trees, the older brothers in the indigenous 
discourse. 
 
Know-how is affected in four activities during cultivation and one during the post-harvesting: Soil 
management; Nutrition; Pest control; Picking and waste management that given the scarcity of 
traditional techniques (because coffee was a relatively recent or an invasive crop for indigenous 
discourse) implies limiting the use of chemical products that "poison" the soil, water and living 
beings.  
 
Infrastructures and Know-how are affected in the three activities in the trading process similarly 
to the natural coffee symbolic services. However, in the activities of the roasting processes and 
the communication strategy, the uses are not regulated allowing the other profiling actors to 
invest in their own assets (in particular the brands) without necessarily contributing to the 
collective asset (coffee's reputation) indigenous of Riosucio. 
 
Fairtrade coffee: This service originates in the redistribution of power within the coffee value 
chain in favor of coffee communities so they could earn higher participation in the monetary 
services. By strengthening associative skills among producers and regulating their business 
practices with the other profilers, the producers’ organization could increase its capacity to 
capture greater value and provide greater benefits to its members. Consequently, the Resources 
constitutive of the association and of the other profilers must be used to increase the welfare of 
the coffee-growing communities. 
 
Infrastructures and Know-how are affected in the three activities of trading and one of the 
roasting: Purchasing must be carried on by a producers’ organization, meaning that the 
infrastructures must belong to an association own by producers1298. The know-how implies both 
the correct documentation1299, selection and treatment of the product to separate it from other 
                                                     
1297 The actions of past generations legitimize the actions of the present generations in the indigenous discourse. 
1298 Numeral 1 General Requirements, Fairtrade Standard for Small Producer Organizations. Version 1.5, 2011.  
1299 Numeral 2.12 ; 2.1.3 ; 2.1.4 ; 2.1.5 ; 2.1.6 ; 2.1.7. Ibid.  
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grains1300 and, democratic and participative governance1301 with identified members, own rules, 
control mechanisms1302 and executive organs with the ability to influence their partners1303. This 
governance produces the service through the effort for its partners to improve environmental 
practices1304 (in particular in terms of integrated pest and weed management that protects and 
nourishes the soil and the protection of water and biodiversity which in the case of Riosucio is 
the already mentioned profiling institution Normas Aprocafé) and labor practices1305 that protect 
the environment and the family members from risky activities such as the application of 
agrochemicals1306. 
 
Other profilers also have to use their infrastructures and know how in four activities during the 
trading and one during the roasting: Threshing; Sorting; Bulking; Export and Blending have to 
guarantee both a documentary traceability (records of volumes purchased, processed and sold 
as fair trade by producer) and physical traceability (differentiated logistic treatment by type of 
coffee). Additionally, they have to follow rules of business behavior1307 among participants in the 
Fairtrade coffee value chain.   
 
Know-to-appreciate affects two activities, one in roasting and the other in the communication 
strategy: packaging and distribution requires the use of the FairTrade seal under a contract with 
Fairtrade International (after the Flocert certification)1308; Communication strategy transmits the 
message of a solidarity trade that limits the abuse of the weakest links in the chain, increasing 
the attractiveness of the private asset (the coffee brand) at the same time as the collective asset 
(the FairTrade seal). 
 
• Taste-related services production  
 
Terroir expression: It is the taste related service resulting from the production of the “typical 
coffee” symbolic service but further narrowing the jurisdiction to territories not necessarily 
limited by departmental administrative borders, but a territory whose soil and climate conditions 
allow to produce a coffee with similar organoleptic characteristics. In consequence, 
infrastructures and know-how within that territory should be used to highlight these 
characteristics. As the case of “clean cup” taste related service, during the cupping of 
                                                     
1300 Numeral 2.1. Traceability 
1301 Numeral 4.2 Democracy, participation and Transparency. 
1302 Numeral 3.1.5. Ibid. 
1303 Numeral 3.1.4. Ibid. 
1304 Numeral 4.1 Development potential 
1305 Numeral 3.3 Labour conditions 
1306 Numeral 3.2 Environmental Development 
1307Including the contractual documentation to impose clauses that minimize the risks for the producer according to 
the type of contract; the definition of minimum prices, premiums and periodicity of payments that make it 
impossible to deceive the producer through the accounting language; the provision of supply plans from the buyers 
and, to the extent possible, direct financing (or through third parties) to the producer organization for the purchase 
of the harvest from its members; and fair commercial practices of the buyers that strengthen the capacities of the 
producing organization. Fairtrade trader Standard. Version 1.4, 2015. 
1308 Numeral 1.1 Fairtrade trader Standard. Version 1.4, 2015. 
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representative samples, batches with defects are eliminated, but in addition, the cupping also 
allows the elimination of batches that do not have the organoleptic characteristics of this terroir. 
   
Citric acid aroma: It is the sensory service resulting from the production of the sensory service 
expression of the terroir in the Resguardo de San Lorenzo and eventually in other high-altitude 
farms in Riosucio. Therefore all the uses described for producing the “terroir expression” are 
promoted but once the sampling of representative samples has been carried out, all the lots that 
do not show citric acidity are eliminated. 
 
Winy: It is the sensory service resulting from the adequate benefit of ripe cherries and even little 
overruns collected in the high levels of the municipality of Riosucio profiled by the AAA Program. 
Thus, Infrastructures and Know-how are affected in one activity in the planting process, one 
activity in the cultivation process, and the four activities in the post harvesting process: Planted 
variety must prioritize Castillo® variety whose beans, after ripe, remains attached to the 
branches a little longer allowing an extra development of aroma precursors 1309 ; Farm 
management implies that all equipment (hulling machine, fermentation tank) and places 
(including drying and storage surfaces) must be completely clean from beans or other rare 
material before its utilization1310, and all supplies like fertilizers, agrochemicals, or tillage tools 
must be properly stored separated from coffee beans1311; Picking must be done so selectively 
that neither ripe beans should remain in the tree nor unripe beans in the collection hoppers1312; 
Hulling must be done as quickly as possible1313 in good condition machines1314 (desirable two-
times a day, at midday to hull coffee picked during morning, and at dusk for the afternoon one); 
Fermentation must be a short one: it must start immediately after the hulling1315 and it must 
finish by washing the coffee precisely1316 when the mucilage naturally slide off the bean (avoiding 
mechanical methods)1317 depending on the temperature, microbial flora, ripeness, etc., with 
                                                     
1309  This “late harvest” is encouraged by Alexis Rodriguez, Green Coffee Quality and Development Manager at 
Nestlé Nespresso SA, because “harvesting the crop a few weeks later than usual at a specific point in time, allowed 
specific aromas to develop, creating a unique coffee taste”. Nespresso “Naora: the fruit of a long-term collaboration 
in Colombia between coffee farmers and Nespresso”. Nespresso official webpage. On the other hand, in interviews 
with coffee farmers, are beans are firmly attached, for them is more difficult when picking.   
1310 Criteria 8c, herramienta TASQ Módulo Colombia. Versión 1009 del 2009. 
1311 Criteria 7c. Ibid.  
1312 Criteria 1a and 1b. Ibid. 
1313 Criteria 1c. Ibid. 
1314 Criteria 2ª, 2b and 2c. Ibid.  
1315 Criteria 3c and 3d. Ibid. It implies that coffee that was hulled in different times cannot be fermented together, 
because as fermentation started differently, once finish, necessarily, some beans are going to be either over or under 
fermented.  
1316 Criteria 3b. Ibid. They are some tools like the Fermaestro® produced by CENICAFÉ that tell coffee growers the 
precise moment, but actually experimented growers know the proper time just by touch. The issue is not to know 
the proper time but to be present when it is ready (from eight to twelve hours after the hulling).  
1317 “Nespresso recomienda procesar 100% del café por el método de fermentación natural. Excepcionalmente un 
10% de la producción del sub-cluster podrá ser realizado utilizando desmucilaginadores mecánicos, siempre y cuando 
el perfil de taza no sea alterado.” TASQ Módulo Colombia. Versión 1009 del 2009. Pag. 6. 
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clean water1318; Drying must start immediately after washing1319 and mostly under the sun1320 
until it reaches a 10-12% moisture, in permitted surfaces like concrete floor, wooden floor and 
raised beds1321 (to avoid earth and asphalt contact that can cause cancer1322) with enough space 
to evenly spread coffee on the surface1323  without overpassing a 5cm of thickness1324. Once 
dried, coffee must be stored avoiding any contact with walls, floor, and roof.1325 
 
Know how is affected in the three activities in the trading process1326: Purchasing must start the 
trazabilidad documental by separating coffee bought from farmers included in the AAA Program 
lists and storage it avoiding any contact with the surrounding surfaces, chemicals or any other 
agent that could alter the cupping profile. Threshing and sorting imply the verification through 
cupping test of randomly selected samples, and the continuation of the trazabilidad documental 
on the 70 kilos of Excelso coffee bags produced; Bulking and export must be done in such a way 
that coffee arrives at the roaster facilities without losing its aromatic profile. Also it is affected in 
the tree activities of the roasting process and the communication strategy: Blending due to the 
high volumes demanded by roaster’s clients, the Roaster cannot depend on one origin, it has to 
maintain a stable and consistent supply of coffee from diverse regions to reproduce a blend with 
the same potential aromatic precursor; Roasting must guarantee consistency in the final product 
by standardizing S-curves through specialized software in their high-tech roasting facilities; 
Packaging is done to avoid any risk on the aromatic profile and control at maximum 
characteristics of the final beverage1327. Know-to-appreciate is affected in one activity during the 
roasting process and on in the communication strategy: Packaging and the communication 
strategy focus on enhancing the aromatic profile by signaling the unique portfolio of supplier 
regions without going too far in losing brand attractiveness in favor of region reputation1328.  
                                                     
1318 Criteria 9b. Ibid.  
1319 Criteria 4a. Ibid. 
1320 Nespresso recommends 100% solar dying but allows at maximum of 40% mechanical drying if meteorological 
conditions are adverse (e.g. rainy season), but it is hardly the case in Buesaco in which harvesting happens to be 
during the dry season. Criteria 4c. Ibíd. 
1321 “Patio de concreto, piso de madera o tamiz en camas suspendidas”. Criterio 5c. Ibíd.  
1322  “Nespresso considera que el café pergamino secado en contacto directo con la tierra puede traer 
contaminaciones por hongos que pueden conllevar a la producción de toxinas carcinogénicas (OTA). De igual forma 
el café pergamino secado en contacto directo con el asfalto puede traer contaminaciones por hidrocarburos que 
pueden causar desarrollo de cáncer”. TASQ Módulo Colombia. Versión 1009 del 2009. Pág. 7.   
1323 12.5 kilos of parchment coffee per square meter. Criteria 5e. Ibíd. 
1324 Criteria 5f. Ibid.  
1325 Criteria 7a and 7b. Ibid. 
1326 Interview with Felipe Jaramillo, logistics director of the FNC (which bulks and exports coffee for Nespresso).  
1327 For example, Nespresso uses controversial aluminum capsules that are recyclable but depending on the 
costumer could end in the garbage. Nevertheless, “Nespresso chose aluminum as the best material to protect the 
aroma and flavor profiles of its quality coffees. Aluminum provides perfect protection from oxygen, light and 
moisture.”. (Nespresso, INCAE, & CIMS, 2015, p. 21)  
1328 Regional single origin capsules, in which the name of the region and the country is presented alone without any 
joined bra, are offered as “limited edition” for a few months (Colombia Aguadas; Ethiopia Yirgacheffe). The pure 
origin capsules that are permantenly offered displays the name of the country after the Nespresso brand: Indriya 
from India, Rosabaya de Colombia, Dulsão do Brasil; Bukeela ka Ethiopia. Nespresso. Official Webpage. Last visited. 
12-06-2017.    
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V.4.3. Buesaco 
 
• Symbolic services production 
 
Reputation of the appellation Café Nariño: Like the previous one, this service triggers images, 
memories, and sensations encapsulated in the coffee due to its origin, which in this case is the 
department of Nariño in Colombia. The reputation developed through commercial 
transactions 1329  was protected by the FNC in 2011 1330 : In practice a coffee that fulfills the 
conditions of the IGP Café de Colombia and was produced in the department of Nariño1331. 
Indeed, infrastructures and know-how must be used exactly as said previously in all the activities 
mentioned, the exception is that coffee must be harvesting in this department1332. Know-to-
appreciate is affected in two activities in the roasting and one in the communication strategy 
processes: Blending with coffee from another region that Nariño is forbidden1333. Packaging can 
use the DO Nariño seals only when 100% of the coffee comes from Nariño. Communication is 
done to enhance the geographical features of being cultivated on the Andes at the equatorial 
line, which allows coffee crops at 2.300 m.a.s.l. In addition to climate and soils, it focuses on 
terroir characteristics that are responsible for this reputation1334.   
 
Transparent coffee: This service is produced when consumers can clearly identify the farmer 
whose coffee they are drinking, thus a wide range of pieces of information become available 
depending on what it is prioritized by the actors: from the variety that was cropped to the 
education of farmers’ sons1335. By revealing the farmer’s identity, consumers’ anxiety caused by 
incertitude decreases, especially the one related to farmers’ wellbeing. To produce this service, 
it is not important how farmers are using their resource constituents as long as they are 
producing exceptional taste related services (next section) and mainly how the other actors are 
behaving to guarantee transparency. In this order of ideas, Infrastructures and Know-how are 
affected in the three activities in the trading process. Purchasing, Threshing and sorting, Bulking 
                                                     
1329  As an example, Howard Schultz, CEO of Starbucks, said in an interview that Coffee from Nariño was the 
Colombian Coffee he prefers. Caracol Radio. 
http://caracol.com.co/programa/2014/07/17/audios/1405576620_325399.html, 17th of July 2014. Last visited 11-
29-2017. In Colombia it was registered in different blogs and local media as if he had said that “Nariño produce el 
mejor café del mundo”.     
1330 Through the Resolución 06093 de 11 de febrero de 2011 by the SIC, the FNC obtained the property rights over 
the denomination of origin Café de Nariño.  
1331 “El CAFÉ DE NARIÑO es un producto que cumple con los requisitos y definición de la Denominación de Origen 
Protegida CAFÉ DE COLOMBIA y es además el producto concreto protegido por la Denominación de Origen Protegida 
CAFÉ DE NARIÑO” Art. 1.3 “definiciones” del Reglamento de Uso de uso de la Indicación Geográfica Protegida Café 
de Nariño (F. N. d. C. FNC, 2012) 
1332 Art. 11.3 “mezclas”. Ibid.  
1333 Art. 8 “zona de producción”. Ibid.  
1334  FNC, “Nariño denominación de origen”. Official webpage 
http://narino.cafedecolombia.com/es/narino/marcas_de_cafe_de_narino/. Last visited 12-04-2017.  
1335 Interviews with Raphael Studer, Cofounder and, finance and sales director of Algrano. A platform that meets 
transparently farmers with roasters.  
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and export have to be able to guaranteeing product integrity and traceability for nanolots (from 
3 to 10 bags) and microlots (from 10 to 65 bags), a hardly profitable activity when dealing with 
huge quantities because storage space is sacrificed (mainstream traders need every inch of space 
bulking coffee bags in towers that reach the ceiling), so companies tend to specialize in this 
business model adding value through the exceptional coffee taste related services1336 (following 
section). Know-to-appreciate is affected in the one activity in the communication strategy: the 
communication strategy enhances this trust feeling by sharing stories of the coffee farmers in 
which they describe their hard work to produce an extraordinary product and how being part of 
this transparent value chain had increased wellbeing for their families and their communities.  
 
Poverty reduction: This service is produced when a community has improved their wellbeing, 
mainly by increasing their income and their purchase power. Coffee could have a positive impact 
in Veracruz due to land features (soil and climate) and ownership (mainly smallholdings), if it is 
individually produced prioritizing taste related services and it is associatively commercialized 
desirably until the final consumer1337. So, Infrastructures and Know-how must be affected in 
throughout all processes (from planting to roasting and brewing) to produce the “exceptional 
coffee” taste related services (following section) and the Know-to-appreciate must be affected in 
the communication strategy process to produce the “reputation of the appellation Café Nariño” 
symbolic service. From purchasing onwards, it should desirably be vertically integrated by a 
company owned by coffee producers to capture the maximum percentage of money paid by 
consumers.   
 
• Taste-related services production  
 
Baked Coffee: This is the taste related service when the “energy dose” symbolic service is sought 
for. It is both a flavor and a financial equilibrium in which roasters try to optimize the use of poor 
quality (and cheapest coffee) with good quality to enhance flavor as much as they can until a 
drinkable beverage is offered. So, Know-how is affected in the trading process to select poor 
quality coffee that cannot be exported (so must be sold to domestic markets). Then both resource 
constituents are affected in two in the Roasting process: Blending with the less possible higher 
qualities (more expensive) coffee to maintain low final prices; Roasting using a S-Curve1338 short 
in time and high in temperature, which will both neutralize unpleasant (also pleasant) flavors 
from defect beans and reduce energy costs in larger volumes. Lyophilization is highly convenient 
to hinder these unpleasant flavors1339. Know-to-appreciate is affected in one activity during the 
                                                     
1336 Interview with Steven Martinez, barista from Inconexus.  
1337 Interview with Guillermo Torres, Director Regional Nariño de la Fundación Social  
1338 When measuring the roaster machine temperature on the Y-axis, and time in the X-axis, it graphs and S because 
it starts at the top (high temperature) and goes down once the coffee grain is introduced into the machine, it goes 
up slowly for few minutes until the first crack in which it stabilized for a few seconds before you open it to discharge 
the roasted coffee.   
1339 A process in which coffee is firstly brewed and frozen, then, through a lyophilization procedure in which water 
pass from the solid phase to the gas one without passing through the liquid phase, it leaves behind a mass of 
dehydrated coffee that is cut in little pieces and packaged to be sold as soluble coffee. It allows the addition of other 
flavors (e.g. vanilla extract, and so on) that makes easier for the roaster to hinder the poor quality of coffee.  
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roasting process and the communication strategy: Packaging and the communication strategy 
are oriented to attach symbolic services (like the energy dose and brand reputation) to the taste 
related one.   
 
Terroir expression: This is the taste related service of the clean cup in Nariño, which due to its 
particularities of climate, soil and culture produce a coffee, which aromatic profile is described 
as high acidity, medium bodied, sweet notes, and a clean, mild cup with a very pronounced 
aroma1340. In practice, resource constituents are used similarly than the clean cup, including the 
cupping test in traders’ facilities, with one main difference: jurisdiction is restricted to the 
administrative borders of the department of Nariño.   
   
Sweet flavor and citric acid aroma: This is the taste related service of the coffee highlands of 
Buesaco (above 1.700 m.a.s.l.) when the AAA Program profiles the resource. Thus, Infrastructures 
and Know-how are affected in one activity in the planting process, one activity in the cultivation 
process, and the four activities in the post harvesting process: Planted variety must prioritize 
Castillo® variety whose beans, after ripe, remains attached to the branches a little longer allowing 
an extra development of aroma precursors1341; Farm management implies that all equipment 
(hulling machine, fermentation tank) and places (including drying and storage surfaces) must be 
completely clean from beans or other rare material before its utilization1342, and all supplies like 
fertilizers, agrochemicals, or tillage tools must be properly stored separated from coffee 
beans1343; Picking must be done so selectively that neither ripe beans should remain in the tree 
nor unripe beans in the collection hoppers1344; Hulling must be done as quickly as possible1345 in 
good condition machines1346 (desirable two-times a day, at midday to hull coffee picked during 
morning, and at dusk for the afternoon one); Fermentation must be a short one: it must start 
immediately after the hulling1347 and it must finish by washing the coffee precisely1348 when the 
                                                     
1340 “de alta acidez, cuerpo medio, notas dulces, limpio, suave y aroma muy pronunciado” Art.3.1 “Alcance de la 
autorización de uso de la Denominación de origen Café de Nariño” del Reglamento de Uso de uso de la Indicación 
Geográfica Protegida Café de Nariño (F. N. d. C. FNC, 2012) 
1341  This “late harvest” is encouraged by Alexis Rodriguez, Green Coffee Quality and Development Manager at 
Nestlé Nespresso SA, because “harvesting the crop a few weeks later than usual at a specific point in time, allowed 
specific aromas to develop, creating a unique coffee taste”. Nespresso “Naora: the fruit of a long-term collaboration 
in Colombia between coffee farmers and Nespresso”. Nespresso official webpage. On the other hand, in interviews 
with coffee farmers, are beans are firmly attached, for them is more difficult when picking.   
1342 Criteria 8c, herramienta TASQ Módulo Colombia. Versión 1009 del 2009. 
1343 Criteria 7c. Ibid.  
1344 Criteria 1a and 1b. Ibid. 
1345 Criteria 1c. Ibid. 
1346 Criteria 2ª, 2b and 2c. Ibid.  
1347 Criteria 3c and 3d. Ibid. It implies that coffee that was hulled in different times cannot be fermented together, 
because as fermentation started differently, once finish, necessarily, some beans are going to be either over or under 
fermented.  
1348 Criteria 3b. Ibid. They are some tools like the Fermaestro® produced by CENICAFÉ that tell coffee growers the 
precise moment, but actually experimented growers know the proper time just by touch. The issue is not to know 
the proper time but to be present when it is ready (from eight to twelve hours after the hulling).  
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mucilage naturally slide off the bean (avoiding mechanical methods) 1349  depending on the 
temperature, microbial flora, ripeness, etc., with clean water1350; Drying must start immediately 
after washing1351 and mostly under the sun1352 until it reaches a 10-12% moisture, in permitted 
surfaces like concrete floor, wooden floor and raised beds1353 (to avoid earth and asphalt contact 
that can cause cancer1354) with enough space to evenly spread coffee on the surface1355  without 
overpassing a 5cm of thickness1356. Once dried, coffee must be stored avoiding any contact with 
walls, floor, and roof.1357 
 
Know how is affected in the three activities in the trading process1358: Purchasing must start the 
trazabilidad documental by separating coffee bought from farmers included in the AAA Program 
lists and storage it avoiding any contact with the surrounding surfaces, chemicals or any other 
agent that could alter the cupping profile. Threshing and sorting imply the verification through 
cupping test of randomly selected samples, and the continuation of the trazabilidad documental 
on the 70 kilos of Excelso coffee bags produced; Bulking and export must be done in such a way 
that coffee arrives at the roaster facilities without losing its aromatic profile. Also it is affected in 
the tree activities of the roasting process and the communication strategy: Blending due to the 
high volumes demanded by roaster’s clients, the Roaster cannot depend on one origin, it has to 
maintain a stable and consistent supply of coffee from diverse regions to reproduce a blend with 
the same potential aromatic precursor; Roasting must guarantee consistency in the final product 
by standardizing S-curves through specialized software in their high-tech roasting facilities; 
Packaging is done to avoid any risk on the aromatic profile and control at maximum 
characteristics of the final beverage1359. Know-to-appreciate is affected in one activity during the 
roasting process and on in the communication strategy: Packaging and the communication 
                                                     
1349 “Nespresso recomienda procesar 100% del café por el método de fermentación natural. Excepcionalmente un 
10% de la producción del sub-cluster podrá ser realizado utilizando desmucilaginadores mecánicos, siempre y cuando 
el perfil de taza no sea alterado.” TASQ Módulo Colombia. Versión 1009 del 2009. Pag. 6. 
1350 Criteria 9b. Ibid.  
1351 Criteria 4a. Ibid. 
1352 Nespresso recommends 100% solar dying but allows at maximum of 40% mechanical drying if meteorological 
conditions are adverse (e.g. rainy season), but it is hardly the case in Buesaco in which harvesting happens to be 
during the dry season. Criteria 4c. Ibíd. 
1353 “Patio de concreto, piso de madera o tamiz en camas suspendidas”. Criterio 5c. Ibíd.  
1354  “Nespresso considera que el café pergamino secado en contacto directo con la tierra puede traer 
contaminaciones por hongos que pueden conllevar a la producción de toxinas carcinogénicas (OTA). De igual forma 
el café pergamino secado en contacto directo con el asfalto puede traer contaminaciones por hidrocarburos que 
pueden causar desarrollo de cáncer”. TASQ Módulo Colombia. Versión 1009 del 2009. Pág. 7.   
1355 12.5 kilos of parchment coffee per square meter. Criteria 5e. Ibíd. 
1356 Criteria 5f. Ibid.  
1357 Criteria 7a and 7b. Ibid. 
1358 Interview with Felipe Jaramillo, logistics director of the FNC (which bulks and exports coffee for Nespresso).  
1359 For example, Nespresso uses controversial aluminum capsules that are recyclable but depending on the 
costumer could end in the garbage. Nevertheless, “Nespresso chose aluminum as the best material to protect the 
aroma and flavor profiles of its quality coffees. Aluminum provides perfect protection from oxygen, light and 
moisture.”. (Nespresso et al., 2015, p. 21)  
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strategy focus on enhancing the aromatic profile by signaling the unique portfolio of supplier 
regions without going too far in losing brand attractiveness in favor of region reputation1360.   
 
V.4.4. In short: Regulated uses in Riosucio and Buesaco 
 
                                                     
1360 Regional single origin capsules, in which the name of the region and the country is presented alone without any 
joined bra, are offered as “limited edition” for a few months (Colombia Aguadas; Ethiopia Yirgacheffe). The pure 
origin capsules that are permantenly offered displays the name of the country after the Nespresso brand: Indriya 
from India, Rosabaya de Colombia, Dulsão do Brasil; Bukeela ka Ethiopia. Nespresso. Official Webpage. Last visited. 
12-06-2017.    
425 
 
• Riosucio 
 
Table 36 Synthesis of the uses regulated to produce the seventeen demanded services in Riosucio in 2015. Source: the author. 
Proc
esse
s 
Uses Monetary  
Ener
gy 
dose 
Appelatio
n Café de 
Colombia 
Typical 
coffee 
Brand 
reputa
tion 
Enviro
nment
ally 
respon
sible 
Ethical
ly 
traded 
Shared 
value 
Natural 
Coffee 
Indigeno
us coffee 
Fairtrade 
coffee 
Clean 
cup 
Terroir 
express
ion 
Citric 
acid  Winy 
Excepti
onal 
coffee 
Plan
ting 
Divers
ificati
on  
Monocultu
re N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Special
ization  N/A 
Specializ
ation  
Diversifi
cation 
Diversific
ation 
Diversifica
tion N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Diversifi
cation 
Variet
y  
High yield 
and pest 
resistant 
N/A Coffea arabica 
Coffea 
arabic
a 
N/A 
Pest 
resista
nt 
N/A Pest resistant NA 
Tradition
al and 
exotic 
varieties 
NA Coffea arabica 
Coffea 
arabica 
Coffea 
arabica 
Coffea 
arabica 
variety 
Castillo
®  
Traditio
nal and 
exotic 
varietie
s 
Renov
ation 
of 
Coffee 
trees    
Younger 
coffee 
trees 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA NA 
Older 
coffee 
trees 
NA N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Older 
coffee 
trees 
Planti
ng 
densit
y  
Higher 
density N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA 
Lower 
density N/A 
Lower 
density N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Lower 
density 
Shade Less canopy N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Minim
um 
shade 
N/A Minimum shade 
More 
canopy 
More 
canopy 
More 
canopy N/A N/A N/A N/A 
More 
canopy 
Culti
vati
on 
Soil 
mana
geme
nt  
Integrated 
plan  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Integra
ted 
plan  
N/A Integrated plan  
Integrat
ed plan  
No 
chemicals  
Integrated 
plan  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pest 
and 
diseas
e 
mana
geme
nt 
Integrated 
plan  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Integra
ted 
plan  
N/A Integrated plan  
Integrat
ed plan  
No 
chemicals  
Integrated 
plan  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Nutriti
on  
Exact 
compensat
ion 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Based 
on 
crop 
needs 
N/A 
Based 
on crop 
needs 
Organic  No chemicals  
Based on 
crop 
needs 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
426 
 
Hedge
row  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Betwe
en 
crops 
and 
natural 
ecosys
tems 
N/A 
Betwee
n crops 
and 
natural 
ecosyste
ms 
Betwee
n crops 
and 
natural 
ecosyste
ms 
N/A 
Between 
crops and 
natural 
ecosyste
ms 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pickin
g   Timely  N/A 
Ripe 
cherries 
Ripe 
cherrie
s 
N/A Timely  N/A Timely  Ripe cherries 
Ripe 
cherries 
Ripe 
cherries 
Ripe 
cherrie
s 
Ripe 
cherrie
s 
Ripe 
cherrie
s 
Ripe 
cherrie
s 
Ripe 
cherries 
Farm 
mana
geme
nt 
Planning  N/A N/A N/A N/A Planning N/A Planning Planning N/A Planning N/A N/A N/A 
Plannin
g, 
includi
ng 
hygieni
c 
proced
ures 
Plannin
g, 
includin
g 
hygienic 
procedu
res 
Post
-
Harv
esti
ng 
Hullin
g   N/A N/A 
Immediat
ely  
Immed
iately  N/A N/A N/A N/A NA NA NA 
Immedi
ately  
Immedi
ately  
Immedi
ately  
Immedi
ately  
Immedi
ately  
Ferme
ntatio
n   
N/A N/A Short  Short  N/A N/A N/A N/A Short  NA NA Short  Short  Short  Short  
Short-
medium
-long 
but 
ferment
ation 
has to 
be 
mastere
d.  
Drying    N/A N/A 
No matter 
how has 
to reach 
10-12% 
No 
matter 
how 
has to 
reach 
10-
12% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
No 
matter 
how has 
to reach 
10-12% 
NA NA 
No 
matter 
how 
has to 
reach 
10-12% 
No 
matter 
how 
has to 
reach 
10-12% 
No 
matter 
how 
has to 
reach 
10-12% 
Sundry 
until 
10-12% 
Controll
ed 
sundry 
until 10-
12% 
Waste 
mana
geme
nt 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Integra
ted 
plan  
N/A Integrated plan  
Integrat
ed plan  
No 
chemicals 
waste 
Integrated 
plan  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Resele
ction  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA NA NA N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Discard 
manuall
y all 
defectiv
e beans 
427 
 
Trad
ing 
Purch
asing N/A 
Quali
ty 
sorti
ng 
inferi
or to 
the 
mini
mum 
dema
nded 
by 
the 
Res 
02/0
5 
Quality 
sorting by 
Res 02/05 
and 
document
ary 
traceabilit
y per lot 
Quality 
sorting 
by Res 
02/05 
and 
docum
entary 
tracea
bility 
per lot 
N/A 
Quality 
sorting 
by Res 
02/05 
and 
docum
entary 
tracea
bility 
per 
certifie
d  farm 
Tracki
ng of 
purcha
se 
record
s 
Quality 
sorting 
by Res 
02/05 
and 
docume
ntary 
traceabil
ity per 
certified  
farm 
Quality 
sorting 
by Res 
02/05 
and 
docume
ntary 
traceabil
ity per 
certified  
farm 
Quality 
sorting by 
Res 
02/05; 
document
ary 
traceabilit
y per lot. 
Quality 
sorting by 
Res 
02/05; 
document
ary 
traceabilit
y per lot. 
Quality 
sorting 
by Res 
02/05; 
docum
entary 
traceab
ility per 
lot. 
Quality 
sorting 
by Res 
02/05; 
docum
entary 
traceab
ility per 
lot. 
Quality 
sorting 
by Res 
02/05; 
docum
entary 
traceab
ility per 
lot. 
Quality 
sorting 
by Res 
02/05; 
docum
entary 
traceab
ility per 
farm. 
Physical 
traceabi
lity and 
cupping 
taste 
per 
farm 
Thres
hing 
and 
sortin
g 
N/A 
Low 
qualit
y 
coffe
e 
bags 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags - 
document
ary 
traceabilit
y 
Excels
o 
quality 
coffee 
bags - 
docum
entary 
tracea
bility 
N/A 
Excels
o 
quality 
coffee 
bags - 
Docum
entary 
tracea
bility 
per 
certifie
d  farm 
Tracki
ng of 
purcha
se 
record
s 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags - 
Docume
ntary 
traceabil
ity per 
certified  
farm 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags - 
Docume
ntary 
traceabil
ity per 
certified  
farm 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags; 
document
ary 
traceabilit
y; 
aleatory 
cupping 
test. 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags; 
document
ary 
traceabilit
y; aleatory 
cupping 
test. 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags; 
docum
entary 
traceab
ility; 
aleator
y 
cupping 
test. 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags; 
docum
entary 
traceab
ility; 
aleator
y 
cupping 
test. 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags; 
docum
entary 
traceab
ility; 
aleator
y 
cupping 
test. 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags; 
docum
entary 
traceab
ility; 
cuppin
g test 
per 
lots. 
Milling 
small 
lots to 
be 
packed 
in 
special 
coffee 
bags 
that 
maintai
n the 
aromati
c 
profile. 
Bulkin
g and 
export  
N/A N/A 
Documen
tary 
traceabilit
y 
Docum
entary 
tracea
bility 
N/A 
Docum
entary 
tracea
bility 
per 
certifie
d  farm 
Tracki
ng of 
purcha
se 
record
s 
Docume
ntary 
traceabil
ity per 
certified  
farm 
Docume
ntary 
traceabil
ity per 
certified  
farm 
Documen
tary 
traceabilit
y; 
aleatory 
cupping 
test. 
Document
ary 
traceabilit
y; aleatory 
cupping 
test. 
Docum
entary 
traceab
ility; 
aleator
y 
cupping 
test. 
Docum
entary 
traceab
ility; 
aleator
y 
cupping 
test. 
Docum
entary 
traceab
ility; 
aleator
y 
cupping 
test. 
Docum
entary 
traceab
ility; 
cuppin
g test 
per 
lots. 
Physical 
traceabi
lity 
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Roas
ting 
Blendi
ng   N/A N/A 
Must 
contain 
Colombia
n coffee 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
100% 
organic 
coffee 
N/A 
100% 
Fairtrade 
coffee 
N/A N/A N/A 
Strategi
cally to 
maintai
n the 
profile 
withou
t losing 
control 
at the 
expens
e of 
provide
rs 
Tailor-
made 
by the 
roaster 
(either 
blended 
or not) 
Roasti
ng   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Standar
dized S-
curves 
S-curves 
adapted 
specific
ally to 
the 
coffee  
Packa
ging 
and 
retaili
ng  
N/A 
High 
inves
tmen
t in 
the 
priva
te 
pack 
Could use 
the IGP 
"Café de 
Colombia
" 
N/A N/A 
Could 
use 
the 
trade
mark 
"Rainf
orest 
Allianc
e" 
N/A 
Could 
use the 
tradema
rk 
"Rainfor
est 
Alliance
" 
Could 
use the 
organic 
label 
N/A 
Could use 
the 
Fairtrade 
label 
N/A N/A N/A 
Maintai
n 
control 
of the 
final 
aromat
ic 
profile 
Maintai
n the 
aromati
c profile 
Com
mun
icati
on 
Stra
tegy 
Comm
unicat
ion 
N/A 
Priva
te 
inves
tmen
t in 
priva
te 
bran
ds 
Collective 
investme
nt in the 
appellatio
n to add 
value to 
private 
brands  
Collect
ive 
invest
ment 
in the 
appell
ation 
to add 
value 
to 
private 
brands  
Private 
invest
ment 
over 
the 
private 
brand 
Private 
invest
ment 
in the 
private 
RA 
trade
mark 
to add 
value 
to 
private 
brands
.  
Price 
paid 
on 
averag
e to 
produc
ers can 
be 
reveal 
Private 
investm
ent to 
commu
nicate 
the 
"shared 
value 
commit
ment"  
to add 
value to 
private 
brands.  
Private 
investm
ent in 
the 
collectiv
e mark, 
adding 
value to 
both 
private 
and 
collectiv
e 
brands.  
Private 
investme
nt over 
the 
private 
brand 
Private 
investmen
t in the 
collective 
mark, 
adding 
value to 
both 
private 
and 
collective 
brands.  
Collecti
ve 
investm
ent in 
the 
reputat
ion of 
the 
"clean 
cup". 
Collecti
ve 
investm
ent in 
the 
reputat
ion of 
the 
"Café 
from 
Caldas"
. 
Collecti
ve 
investm
ent in 
the 
reputat
ion of 
the 
"Café 
La 
Vereda
". 
Private 
invest
ment in 
the 
private 
brand 
linking 
it to the 
region 
reputat
ion. 
Private 
investm
ent in 
the 
private 
brand 
linking it 
to the 
aromati
c 
profile. 
Bre
win
g 
Grindi
ng   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Brewi
ng  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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• Buesaco  
 
Table 37 Synthesis of the uses regulated to produce the fifteen demanded services in Veracruz in 2015/2016. Source: the author. 
Processe
s Uses 
Moneta
ry  
Energ
y dose 
Appella
tion 
Café de 
Colomb
ia 
Appella
tion 
Café de 
Nariño 
Brand 
reput
ation 
Environm
entally 
responsib
le 
Ethicall
y 
traded 
Shared 
value 
Transpa
rent 
coffee 
Poverty 
reductio
n 
Baked 
coffee 
Clean 
cup 
Terroir 
express
ion 
Sweet 
flavor 
and 
citric 
acid 
aroma 
Excepti
onal 
coffee 
Planting 
Diversific
ation  
Monocu
lture N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Specializa
tion  N/A 
Speciali
zation  
Diversifi
cation 
Diversifi
cation N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Diversifi
cation 
Variety  
High 
yield 
and pest 
resistan
t 
N/A Coffea arabica 
Coffea 
arabica N/A 
Pest 
resistant N/A 
Pest 
resistan
t 
Traditio
nal and 
exotic 
varieties 
Traditio
nal and 
exotic 
varieties 
N/A Coffea arabica 
Coffea 
arabica 
Coffea 
arabica 
variety 
Castillo
®  
Traditio
nal and 
exotic 
varieties 
Renovati
on of 
Coffee 
trees    
Younger 
coffee 
trees 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Planting 
density  
Higher 
density N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Shade Less canopy N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Minimum 
shade N/A 
Minimu
m shade 
More 
canopy 
More 
canopy N/A N/A N/A N/A 
More 
canopy 
Cultivati
on 
Soil 
manage
ment  
Integrat
ed plan  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Integrate
d plan  N/A 
Integrat
ed plan  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pest and 
disease 
manage
ment 
Integrat
ed plan  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Integrate
d plan  N/A 
Integrat
ed plan  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Nutrition  
Exact 
compen
sation 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Based on 
crop 
needs 
N/A 
Based 
on crop 
needs 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hedge 
rowing  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Between 
crops and 
natural 
ecosyste
ms 
N/A 
Betwee
n crops 
and 
natural 
ecosyst
ems 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Picking   Timely  N/A Ripe cherries 
Ripe 
cherries N/A Timely  N/A Timely  
Ripe 
cherries 
Ripe 
cherries N/A 
Ripe 
cherries 
Ripe 
cherries 
Ripe 
cherries 
Ripe 
cherries 
Farm 
manage
ment 
Plannin
g  N/A N/A N/A N/A Planning N/A 
Plannin
g 
Plannin
g, 
includin
g 
hygienic 
procedu
res 
Plannin
g, 
includin
g 
hygienic 
procedu
res 
N/A N/A N/A 
Plannin
g, 
includin
g 
hygieni
c 
proced
ures 
Plannin
g, 
includin
g 
hygienic 
procedu
res 
Post-
Harvesti
ng 
Hulling   N/A N/A Immediately  
Immedi
ately  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Immedi
ately  
Immedi
ately  N/A 
Immedi
ately  
Immedi
ately  
Immedi
ately  
Immedi
ately  
Ferment
ation   N/A N/A Short  Short  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Short-
medium
-long 
but 
ferment
ation 
has to 
be 
mastere
d.  
Short-
medium
-long 
but 
ferment
ation 
has to 
be 
mastere
d.  
N/A Short  Short  Short  
Short-
medium
-long 
but 
ferment
ation 
has to 
be 
mastere
d.  
Drying    N/A N/A 
No 
matter 
how 
has to 
reach 
10-12% 
No 
matter 
how 
has to 
reach 
10-12% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Controll
ed 
sundry 
until 10-
12% 
Controll
ed 
sundry 
until 10-
12% 
N/A 
No 
matter 
how 
has to 
reach 
10-12% 
No 
matter 
how 
has to 
reach 
10-12% 
Sundry 
until 
10-12% 
Controll
ed 
sundry 
until 10-
12% 
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Waste 
manage
ment 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Integrated plan  N/A 
Integrat
ed plan  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Reselecti
on  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Discard 
manuall
y all 
defectiv
e beans 
Discard 
manuall
y all 
defectiv
e beans 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Discard 
manuall
y all 
defectiv
e beans 
Trading 
Purchasi
ng N/A 
Qualit
y 
sortin
g 
inferio
r to 
the 
minim
um 
dema
nded 
by the 
Res 
02/05 
Quality 
sorted 
by Res 
02/05 
and 
docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity per 
lot 
Quality 
sorted 
by Res 
02/05 
and 
docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity per 
lot 
N/A 
Quality 
sorted by 
Res 02/05 
and 
documen
tary 
traceabilit
y per 
certified  
farm 
Quality 
sorted 
by Res 
02/0. 
Trackin
g of 
purchas
e 
records 
Quality 
sorted 
by Res 
02/05 
and 
docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity per 
certified  
farm 
Quality 
sorting 
by 
cupping 
test. 
Physical 
traceabi
lity per 
farm 
Quality 
sorted 
by 
cupping 
test 
conduct
ed by 
the 
associati
on of 
coffee 
farmers 
N/A 
Quality 
sorted 
by Res 
02/05; 
docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity per 
lot. 
Quality 
sorted 
by Res 
02/05; 
docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity per 
lot. 
Quality 
sorted 
by Res 
02/05; 
docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity per 
farm. 
Quality 
sorted 
by 
cupping 
test. 
Physical 
traceabi
lity. 
Threshin
g and 
sorting 
N/A 
Low 
qualit
y 
coffee 
bags 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags - 
docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags - 
docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity 
N/A 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags - 
Documen
tary 
traceabilit
y per 
certified  
farm 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags. 
Trackin
g of 
purchas
e 
records 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags - 
Docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity per 
certified  
farm 
Specialt
y 
quality. 
Physical 
traceabi
lity per 
farm 
Specialt
y quality 
milled in 
behalf 
of the 
associati
on of 
coffee 
farmers 
N/A 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags; 
docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity; 
aleator
y 
cupping 
test. 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags; 
docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity; 
aleator
y 
cupping 
test. 
Excelso 
quality 
coffee 
bags; 
docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity; 
cupping 
test per 
lots. 
Specialt
y quality 
milled in 
small 
lots to 
be 
packed 
in 
special 
coffee 
bags 
that 
maintai
n the 
aromati
c 
profile. 
Bulking 
and 
export  
N/A N/A 
Docum
entary 
traceabi
lity 
Docum
entary 
traceabi
lity 
N/A 
Documen
tary 
traceabilit
y per 
certified  
farm 
Docum
entary 
traceabi
lity. 
Trackin
g of 
purchas
Docume
ntary 
traceabi
lity per 
certified  
farm 
Physical 
traceabi
lity per 
farm 
Physical 
traceabi
lity per 
farm. 
Exporte
d by the 
associati
N/A 
Docum
entary 
traceabi
lity; 
aleator
y 
Docum
entary 
traceabi
lity; 
aleator
y 
Docum
entary 
traceabi
lity; 
cupping 
test per 
lots. 
Physical 
traceabi
lity 
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e 
records 
on of 
coffee 
farmers 
cupping 
test. 
cupping 
test. 
Roasting 
Blending   N/A N/A 
Must 
contain 
Colomb
ian 
coffee 
100% 
Café de 
Nariño 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Diminis
h at 
maxim
um raw 
materi
al costs 
N/A 
100% 
Café de 
Nariño 
Strategi
cally to 
maintai
n the 
profile 
without 
losing 
control 
at the 
expens
e of 
provide
rs 
Tailor-
made by 
the 
roaster 
(either 
blended 
or not) 
Roasting   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Roasted 
by the 
associati
on of 
coffee 
farmers 
A short 
time/hi
gh-
temper
ature S-
Curve.  
N/A N/A 
Standar
dized S-
curves 
S-curves 
adapted 
specific
ally to 
the 
coffee  
Packagin
g and 
retailing  
N/A 
High 
invest
ment 
in the 
privat
e pack 
Could 
use the 
IGP 
"Café 
de 
Colomb
ia" 
Could 
use the 
IGP 
"Café 
de 
Nariño" 
N/A 
Could use 
the 
trademar
k 
"Rainfore
st 
Alliance" 
N/A 
Could 
use the 
tradem
ark 
"Rainfor
est 
Alliance
" 
N/A 
Packed 
by the 
associati
on of 
coffee 
farmers 
N/A N/A N/A 
Maintai
n 
control 
of the 
final 
aromati
c profile 
Maintai
n the 
aromati
c profile 
Commun
ication 
Strategy 
Commun
ication N/A 
Privat
e 
invest
ment 
in 
privat
e 
brand
s 
Collecti
ve 
investm
ent in 
the 
appellat
ion to 
add 
value to 
private 
brands  
Collecti
ve 
investm
ent in 
the 
appellat
ion to 
add 
value to 
private 
brands  
Privat
e 
invest
ment 
over 
the 
privat
e 
brand 
Private 
investme
nt in the 
private 
RA 
trademar
k to add 
value to 
private 
brands.  
Price 
paid on 
average 
to 
produc
ers can 
be 
reveal 
Private 
investm
ent to 
commu
nicate 
the 
"shared 
value 
commit
ment” 
to add 
value to 
private 
brands.  
Private 
investm
ent in 
the 
image of 
the 
coffee 
househ
old to 
add 
value to 
the 
private 
brand.  
Collectiv
e 
investm
ent in 
the 
appellat
ion.  
Private 
invest
ment 
over 
the 
private 
brand 
Collecti
ve 
investm
ent in 
the 
reputati
on of 
the 
"clean 
cup". 
Collecti
ve 
investm
ent in 
the 
reputati
on of 
the 
"Nariño 
terroir". 
Private 
investm
ent in 
the 
private 
brand 
linking 
it to the 
region 
reputati
on. 
Private 
investm
ent in 
the 
private 
brand 
linking it 
to the 
aromati
c 
profile. 
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Brewing 
Grinding   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Brewing  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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V.5. Statistical annex  
V.5.1. Riosucio 
 
Diversification 
 
1- Coffee area/total area 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Especialización   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected 
Model 
4.440a 9 .493 8.266 .000 .024 74.396 1.000 
Intercept 19.324 1 19.324 323.777 .000 .096 323.777 1.000 
Resistencia .039 1 .039 .648 .421 .000 .648 .127 
Edad 1.317 1 1.317 22.065 .000 .007 22.065 .997 
NDENSIDAD2 .016 1 .016 .262 .609 .000 .262 .080 
NPLANTAS .127 1 .127 2.126 .145 .001 2.126 .308 
ARL 1.647 5 .329 5.520 .000 .009 27.602 .992 
Error 181.796 3046 .060      
Total 1771.142 3056       
Corrected Total 186.236 3055       
a. R Squared = .024 (Adjusted R Squared = .021) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Especialización   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
0 .698a .008 .683 .714 
1 .694a .016 .662 .725 
3 .741a .019 .705 .778 
4 .755a .009 .738 .772 
5 .718a .009 .700 .737 
6 .713a .020 .673 .753 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: 
Resistencia = 1.29, Edad = 8.39, NDENSIDAD2 = 5120.68, NPLANTAS = 
4581.14. 
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Variety  
1- Pest-resistant coffee trees planted / total coffee trees planted in the farm.  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Resistencia   
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected 
Model 
156.594a 8 19.574 252.147 .000 .398 2017.179 1.000 
Intercept 80.297 1 80.297 1034.349 .000 .253 1034.349 1.000 
Edad 109.073 1 109.073 1405.040 .000 .316 1405.040 1.000 
NDENSIDAD2 2.431 1 2.431 31.317 .000 .010 31.317 1.000 
NPLANTAS .029 1 .029 .376 .540 .000 .376 .094 
ARL 6.347 5 1.269 16.352 .000 .026 81.760 1.000 
Error 236.539 3047 .078      
Total 5493.268 3056       
Corrected 
Total 
393.132 3055       
a. R Squared = .398 (Adjusted R Squared = .397) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Resistencia   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
0 1.242a .009 1.225 1.259 
1 1.268a .018 1.232 1.303 
3 1.245a .021 1.204 1.287 
4 1.353a .010 1.334 1.373 
5 1.309a .011 1.288 1.330 
6 1.322a .023 1.276 1.367 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: 
Edad = 8.39, NDENSIDAD2 = 5120.68, NPLANTAS = 4581.14. 
 
Renovation 
 
1- Average age of the coffee crop.  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Edad   
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Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected 
Model 
54978.615a 8 6872.327 315.006 .000 .453 2520.051 1.000 
Intercept 1073.454 1 1073.454 49.204 .000 .016 49.204 1.000 
NDENSIDAD2 5118.979 1 5118.979 234.638 .000 .072 234.638 1.000 
NPLANTAS 900.969 1 900.969 41.298 .000 .013 41.298 1.000 
Resistencia 30653.000 1 30653.000 1405.040 .000 .316 1405.040 1.000 
ARL 2159.245 5 431.849 19.795 .000 .031 98.973 1.000 
Error 66474.778 3047 21.816      
Total 336589.054 3056       
Corrected Total 121453.393 3055       
a. R Squared = .453 (Adjusted R Squared = .451) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Edad   
ARL Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
0 9.287a .147 8.999 9.574 
1 9.158a .303 8.564 9.752 
3 8.910a .357 8.209 9.611 
4 7.744a .169 7.413 8.074 
5 7.312a .179 6.962 7.663 
6 8.892a .386 8.135 9.649 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the 
following values: NDENSIDAD2 = 5120.68, NPLANTAS = 
4581.14, Resistencia = 1.29. 
 
Density 
 
1- Average density of the coffee crop.  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   NDENSIDAD2   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partia
l Eta 
Squar
ed 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
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Corrected Model 446167395.100a 8 55770924.380 90.837 .000 .193 726.695 1.000 
Intercept 5875486574.000 1 5875486574.000 9569.698 .000 .758 9569.698 1.000 
Resistencia 19227354.860 1 19227354.860 31.317 .000 .010 31.317 1.000 
Edad 144060371.100 1 144060371.100 234.638 .000 .072 234.638 1.000 
NPLANTAS 12507609.210 1 12507609.210 20.372 .000 .007 20.372 .995 
ARL 36641059.880 5 7328211.976 11.936 .000 .019 59.679 1.000 
Error 1870759923.000 3047 613967.812      
Total 82449544000.000 3056       
Corrected Total 2316927318.000 3055       
a. R Squared = .193 (Adjusted R Squared = .190) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
 
 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   NDENSIDAD2   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
0 5155.345a 24.745 5106.826 5203.864 
1 5040.711a 50.851 4941.005 5140.417 
3 5157.734a 59.985 5040.119 5275.348 
4 5255.532a 28.232 5200.177 5310.887 
5 4957.289a 30.045 4898.378 5016.199 
6 5025.154a 64.785 4898.128 5152.181 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: Resistencia = 1.29, Edad = 8.39, NPLANTAS = 4581.14. 
 
 
Shade 
 
1- Average shade of the coffee crop.  
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   LUMINOSIDCat%   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
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Corrected 
Model 
301.752a 10 30.175 152.270 .000 .333 1522.697 1.000 
Intercept 86.276 1 86.276 435.365 .000 .125 435.365 1.000 
Resistencia 1.716 1 1.716 8.662 .003 .003 8.662 .837 
Edad 94.067 1 94.067 474.678 .000 .135 474.678 1.000 
NPLANTAS 4.628 1 4.628 23.351 .000 .008 23.351 .998 
NDENSIDAD2 9.613 1 9.613 48.507 .000 .016 48.507 1.000 
ASNM 15.671 1 15.671 79.078 .000 .025 79.078 1.000 
ARL 15.387 5 3.077 15.529 .000 .025 77.644 1.000 
Error 603.425 3045 .198      
Total 7839.278 3056       
Corrected Total 905.177 3055       
a. R Squared = .333 (Adjusted R Squared = .331) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   LUMINOSIDCat%   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
0 1.445a .015 1.415 1.474 
1 1.520a .029 1.463 1.576 
3 1.511a .034 1.444 1.578 
4 1.519a .017 1.486 1.551 
5 1.516a .017 1.482 1.551 
6 1.793a .037 1.721 1.865 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: 
Resistencia = 1.29, Edad = 8.39, NPLANTAS = 4581.14, NDENSIDAD2 = 
5120.68, ASNM = 1677.77. 
V.5.2. Buesaco  
 
Diversification 
 
2- Coffee area/total area 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   %Especi   
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Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .777a 6 .130 1.563 .173 .130 
Intercept 15.741 1 15.741 189.917 .000 .751 
NplantasPro .014 1 .014 .169 .682 .003 
ARL .761 5 .152 1.835 .119 .127 
Error 5.222 63 .083    
Total 33.367 70     
Corrected Total 5.999 69     
a. R Squared = .130 (Adjusted R Squared = .047) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   %Especi   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .459a .093 .274 .644 
2 .468a .098 .273 .663 
3 .728a .078 .572 .883 
4 .690a .068 .554 .825 
5 .560a .109 .343 .778 
6 .704a .084 .536 .871 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
1- Percentage of the household income derived from coffee 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   %Ingresocafé   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .328a 6 .055 1.151 .344 .099 
Intercept 10.877 1 10.877 229.110 .000 .784 
NplantasPro .005 1 .005 .107 .745 .002 
ARL .321 5 .064 1.353 .254 .097 
Error 2.991 63 .047    
Total 19.688 70     
Corrected Total 3.319 69     
a. R Squared = .099 (Adjusted R Squared = .013) 
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Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   %Ingresocafé   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .486a .070 .346 .626 
2 .540a .074 .392 .688 
3 .485a .059 .367 .602 
4 .384a .051 .281 .486 
5 .601a .082 .437 .766 
6 .519a .063 .393 .646 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Variety 
 
2- Pest-resistant coffee trees planted / total coffee trees planted in the farm.  
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   %resistencia   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .476a 6 .079 .743 .617 .066 
Intercept 27.005 1 27.005 252.782 .000 .800 
NplantasPro .004 1 .004 .035 .852 .001 
ARL .432 5 .086 .809 .548 .060 
Error 6.730 63 .107    
Total 51.893 70     
Corrected Total 7.206 69     
a. R Squared = .066 (Adjusted R Squared = -.023) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   %resistencia   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .839a .105 .629 1.049 
2 .959a .111 .738 1.181 
3 .803a .088 .627 .980 
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4 .790a .077 .636 .944 
5 .644a .124 .396 .891 
6 .744a .095 .555 .934 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Renovation 
 
2- Average age of the coffee crop.  
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   %edad   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 34.101a 6 5.683 1.183 .327 .101 
Intercept 791.616 1 791.616 164.707 .000 .723 
NplantasPro 3.060 1 3.060 .637 .428 .010 
ARL 28.344 5 5.669 1.179 .329 .086 
Error 302.791 63 4.806    
Total 1768.339 70     
Corrected Total 336.892 69     
a. R Squared = .101 (Adjusted R Squared = .016) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   %edad   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 4.286a .705 2.878 5.695 
2 4.714a .743 3.229 6.199 
3 5.532a .592 4.349 6.715 
4 3.808a .517 2.775 4.841 
5 3.865a .830 2.207 5.523 
6 4.850a .638 3.576 6.125 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Density 
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2- Average density of the coffee crop.  
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Densidad   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 10663565.140a 6 1777260.857 1.711 .133 .140 
Intercept 1695150122.00
0 
1 1695150122.00
0 
1632.173 .000 .963 
NplantasPro 459843.058 1 459843.058 .443 .508 .007 
ARL 9402620.906 5 1880524.181 1.811 .124 .126 
Error 65430834.830 63 1038584.680    
Total 2862989105.00
0 
70     
Corrected Total 76094399.970 69     
a. R Squared = .140 (Adjusted R Squared = .058) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Densidad   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 6008.830a 327.633 5354.108 6663.553 
2 7108.787a 345.447 6418.466 7799.108 
3 6103.178a 275.093 5553.449 6652.907 
4 6431.633a 240.221 5951.590 6911.676 
5 5769.025a 385.641 4998.383 6539.666 
6 6334.763a 296.426 5742.403 6927.122 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Shade 
 
2- Average shade of the coffee crop.  
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   %Sombrio   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
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Corrected Model .690a 6 .115 1.777 .118 .145 
Intercept 29.576 1 29.576 456.871 .000 .879 
NplantasPro .417 1 .417 6.443 .014 .093 
ARL .250 5 .050 .772 .573 .058 
Error 4.078 63 .065    
Total 47.952 70     
Corrected Total 4.769 69     
a. R Squared = .145 (Adjusted R Squared = .063) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   %Sombrio   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .851a .082 .687 1.014 
2 .738a .086 .566 .910 
3 .865a .069 .728 1.002 
4 .751a .060 .631 .871 
5 .680a .096 .488 .873 
6 .786a .074 .638 .934 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Weed/soil management 
 
1- Percentage of respondents who are using integrated soil management.   
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   SuelosDuo   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 1.961a 6 .327 1.432 .217 .120 
Intercept 6.290 1 6.290 27.555 .000 .304 
NplantasPro .039 1 .039 .172 .679 .003 
ARL 1.899 5 .380 1.663 .157 .117 
Error 14.382 63 .228    
Total 26.000 70     
Corrected Total 16.343 69     
a. R Squared = .120 (Adjusted R Squared = .036) 
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Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   SuelosDuo   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .311a .154 .005 .618 
2 .346a .162 .022 .669 
3 .350a .129 .092 .607 
4 .333a .113 .108 .558 
5 .854a .181 .492 1.215 
6 .243a .139 -.035 .521 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Pest and disease management 
 
1- Percentage of respondents who are implementing the RERE (A cultural practice to 
control the coffee borer beetle).    
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Brocaduo   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .375a 6 .063 1.159 .339 .099 
Intercept .150 1 .150 2.790 .100 .042 
NplantasPro .005 1 .005 .097 .757 .002 
ARL .375 5 .075 1.390 .240 .099 
Error 3.396 63 .054    
Total 4.000 70     
Corrected Total 3.771 69     
a. R Squared = .099 (Adjusted R Squared = .014) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Brocaduo   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .204a .075 .055 .353 
2 .004a .079 -.153 .162 
3 -.003a .063 -.128 .123 
4 .055a .055 -.054 .165 
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5 .142a .088 -.034 .317 
6 -.003a .068 -.138 .132 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
2- Percentage of respondents who are using pesticides (for controlling pest and diseases).    
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   PlagyEnfe   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 1.902a 6 .317 1.560 .174 .129 
Intercept 5.131 1 5.131 25.255 .000 .286 
NplantasPro .258 1 .258 1.270 .264 .020 
ARL 1.876 5 .375 1.846 .117 .128 
Error 12.798 63 .203    
Total 21.000 70     
Corrected Total 14.700 69     
a. R Squared = .129 (Adjusted R Squared = .046) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   PlagyEnfe   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .171a .145 -.119 .460 
2 -.031a .153 -.337 .274 
3 .376a .122 .133 .620 
4 .279a .106 .067 .491 
5 .581a .171 .240 .922 
6 .435a .131 .173 .697 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Nutrition  
 
1- Doses of fertilizer per coffee tree  
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Gramospalo   
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Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 10650.146a 6 1775.024 .186 .980 .017 
Intercept 484319.540 1 484319.540 50.816 .000 .446 
NplantasPro 625.224 1 625.224 .066 .799 .001 
ARL 10542.612 5 2108.522 .221 .952 .017 
Error 600445.697 63 9530.884    
Total 1423477.000 70     
Corrected Total 611095.843 69     
a. R Squared = .017 (Adjusted R Squared = -.076) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Gramospalo   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 122.948a 31.386 60.229 185.668 
2 119.539a 33.092 53.409 185.669 
3 96.195a 26.353 43.534 148.857 
4 94.657a 23.012 48.671 140.644 
5 104.256a 36.943 30.431 178.080 
6 121.275a 28.396 64.530 178.021 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
2- Percentage of respondents who are using the pulp as organic fertilizer 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Reutilización   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .743a 6 .124 .480 .821 .044 
Intercept 12.598 1 12.598 48.861 .000 .437 
NplantasPro .289 1 .289 1.121 .294 .017 
ARL .323 5 .065 .251 .938 .019 
Error 16.243 63 .258    
Total 41.000 70     
Corrected Total 16.986 69     
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a. R Squared = .044 (Adjusted R Squared = -.047) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Reutilización   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .531a .163 .205 .857 
2 .589a .172 .245 .933 
3 .622a .137 .349 .896 
4 .499a .120 .259 .738 
5 .704a .192 .320 1.088 
6 .648a .148 .352 .943 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Picking  
 
1- Percentage of respondents who are manually selecting defective beans before hulling 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Recolección   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .324a 6 .054 .312 .928 .029 
Intercept 1.314 1 1.314 7.609 .008 .108 
NplantasPro .073 1 .073 .421 .519 .007 
ARL .305 5 .061 .353 .879 .027 
Error 10.876 63 .173    
Total 14.000 70     
Corrected Total 11.200 69     
a. R Squared = .029 (Adjusted R Squared = -.064) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Recolección   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .216a .134 -.051 .483 
2 .350a .141 .068 .631 
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3 .133a .112 -.091 .357 
4 .222a .098 .026 .417 
5 .138a .157 -.176 .452 
6 .157a .121 -.084 .399 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Farm management 
 
1- Percentage of respondents who are using accounting records 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Registros   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 2.120a 6 .353 2.629 .024 .200 
Intercept .527 1 .527 3.924 .052 .059 
NplantasPro .165 1 .165 1.227 .272 .019 
ARL 1.964 5 .393 2.923 .020 .188 
Error 8.466 63 .134    
Total 13.000 70     
Corrected Total 10.586 69     
a. R Squared = .200 (Adjusted R Squared = .124) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Registros   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .024a .118 -.212 .259 
2 .247a .124 -.001 .496 
3 .127a .099 -.070 .325 
4 .443a .086 .271 .616 
5 -.007a .139 -.285 .270 
6 .069a .107 -.144 .282 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Hulling 
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1- Percentage of respondents who have appropriate equipment  
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Despupadoraduo   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 2.370a 6 .395 2.495 .031 .192 
Intercept 21.326 1 21.326 134.720 .000 .681 
NplantasPro .301 1 .301 1.901 .173 .029 
ARL 1.650 5 .330 2.085 .079 .142 
Error 9.973 63 .158    
Total 54.000 70     
Corrected Total 12.343 69     
a. R Squared = .192 (Adjusted R Squared = .115) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Despupadoraduo   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .532a .128 .276 .787 
2 .589a .135 .320 .859 
3 .693a .107 .479 .908 
4 .887a .094 .700 1.075 
5 .990a .151 .689 1.291 
6 .897a .116 .666 1.128 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Fermentation 
 
1- Percentage of respondents who have the appropriate equipment  
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Fermentaciónduo   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 3.742a 6 .624 3.358 .006 .242 
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Intercept 14.422 1 14.422 77.651 .000 .552 
NplantasPro .663 1 .663 3.571 .063 .054 
ARL 2.380 5 .476 2.562 .036 .169 
Error 11.701 63 .186    
Total 47.000 70     
Corrected Total 15.443 69     
a. R Squared = .242 (Adjusted R Squared = .170) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Fermentaciónduo   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .447a .139 .170 .724 
2 .383a .146 .092 .675 
3 .612a .116 .380 .844 
4 .831a .102 .628 1.034 
5 .985a .163 .659 1.311 
6 .721a .125 .470 .971 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Drying 
 
1- Percentage of respondents who have appropriate equipment  
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Secadoduo   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 1.656a 6 .276 1.206 .315 .103 
Intercept 13.721 1 13.721 59.966 .000 .488 
NplantasPro .628 1 .628 2.744 .103 .042 
ARL .640 5 .128 .560 .731 .043 
Error 14.416 63 .229    
Total 45.000 70     
Corrected Total 16.071 69     
a. R Squared = .103 (Adjusted R Squared = .018) 
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Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Secadoduo   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .546a .154 .239 .853 
2 .493a .162 .169 .817 
3 .613a .129 .355 .871 
4 .665a .113 .439 .890 
5 .843a .181 .481 1.204 
6 .722a .139 .444 1.000 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
Waste management 
 
1- Percentage of respondents who have compost equipment  
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Pulpaduo   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .938a 6 .156 .630 .706 .057 
Intercept 14.318 1 14.318 57.646 .000 .478 
NplantasPro .245 1 .245 .988 .324 .015 
ARL .598 5 .120 .482 .789 .037 
Error 15.647 63 .248    
Total 43.000 70     
Corrected Total 16.586 69     
a. R Squared = .057 (Adjusted R Squared = -.033) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   Pulpaduo   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .529a .160 .209 .849 
2 .697a .169 .360 1.035 
3 .624a .135 .355 .893 
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4 .499a .117 .264 .733 
5 .705a .189 .328 1.082 
6 .732a .145 .443 1.022 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
 
 Reselection  
 
1- Percentage of respondents who reselected during the previous harvest  
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   ReselecciónDuo   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .511a 6 .085 1.078 .385 .093 
Intercept 33.174 1 33.174 420.107 .000 .870 
NplantasPro .026 1 .026 .329 .568 .005 
ARL .414 5 .083 1.050 .397 .077 
Error 4.975 63 .079    
Total 64.000 70     
Corrected Total 5.486 69     
a. R Squared = .093 (Adjusted R Squared = .007) 
 
Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   ReselecciónDuo   
ARL Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 .809a .090 .629 .990 
2 .788a .095 .597 .978 
3 .922a .076 .771 1.074 
4 1.000a .066 .867 1.132 
5 .997a .106 .785 1.210 
6 .911a .082 .748 1.074 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following 
values: NplantasPro = 6251.00. 
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V.6. Coffee indicator prices 
 
Figure 14 Coffee Indicator prices. Source: International Coffee Organization, 2017. 
 
 
Prices paid to growers in exporting countries 
 
Colombian milds: Colombia; Kenya (until 2004); Tanzania (until 2008).  
 
Other Milds: Bolivia, Burundi, Cameroon, Dem. Rep. Of Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Venezuela, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
Brazilian Naturals: Angola, Brazil, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam. 
Robustas: Angola, Benin, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Dem. Rep. of 
Congo, Rep. of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Uganda, Vietnam. 
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V.7. Extent, Coherence and Closure evaluation  
 
V.7.1. Riosucio 
 
Table 38 Conditions’ evaluation for each LRA in Riosucio from 1990 until 2015. Source: the author. 
Extent1361 
Uses LRA 
Standard 
LRA MH LRA Natural LRA 
Fairtrade 
LRA 
Organic 
LRA 
La 
Vere
da 
LRA 
Nespresso 
LRA 
Standa
rd 
LRA 
Reg/Sta
rbucks 
LRA CS-
La 
Vereda 
LRA CS 
Fairtrade 
LRA CS 
Organic 
LRA CS 
Nespres
so 
Synthesi
s 
Concentrat
ion 
17% 22% 47% 34% 47% 69% 30% 62% 62% 38% 48% 48% 40% 
Regulated
/observed 
uses 
17% 36% 69% 57% 69% 43% 80% 37% 37% 93% 74% 83% 95% 
Regulated 
uses 
4.5 9.4 18.0 14.9 18.0 11.2 20.9 9.7 9.7 24.2 19.2 21.5 24.7 
Planting Diversifica
tion 
 
1 1 
 
1 1 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Variety 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Renovatio
n of Coffee 
trees 
  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Planting 
density 
       
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Shade 
  
1 
 
1 1 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cultivati
on 
Soil 
managem
ent 
  
1 
 
1 1 
   
1 1 1 1 
Coffee 
borer 
beetle 
managem
ent 
         
1 1 1 1 
                                                     
1361 Each activity observed/regulated is coded as 1, in all other cases it is coded as 0. 
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Pest and 
disease 
managem
ent 
         
1 1 1 1 
Nutrition 
 
1 1 
 
1 1 1 
    
1 1 
Hedgerowi
ng 
  
1 
 
1 
      
1 
 
Picking 
  
1 1 1 1 1 
  
1 1 1 1 
Farm 
managem
ent 
      
1 
  
1 1 1 1 
Post-
Harvesti
ng 
Hulling 
  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Fermentati
on 
  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Drying 
  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Waste 
managem
ent 
  
1 1 1 1 1 
  
1 1 1 1 
Reselectio
n 
             
Trading Purchasing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Threshing 
and 
sorting 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bulking 
and export 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Roastin
g 
Blending 
  
1 1 1 
 
1 
  
1 1 1 1 
Roasting 
      
1 
  
1 
 
1 1 
Packaging 
and 
retailing 
  
1 1 1 
 
1 
  
1 1 1 1 
Commu
nication 
Strategy 
Communic
ation 
 
1 1 1 1 
 
1 
  
1 1 1 1 
Brewing Grinding 
      
1 
  
1 
  
1 
Brewing 
      
1 
  
1 
  
1 
Coherence 
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LRA 
Standard 
LRA MH LRA Natural LRA 
Fairtrade 
LRA 
Organic 
LRA 
La 
Vere
da 
LRA 
Nespresso 
LRA CS 
Standa
rd 
LRA 
Reg/Sta
rbucks 
LRA CS-
La 
Vereda 
LRA CS 
Fairtrade 
LRA CS 
Organic 
LRA CS 
Nespres
so 
Services Appellatio
n Café de 
Colombia; 
Monetary 
services 
Fairtrade + 
indigenous  + 
monetary 
services 
Natural = 
indigenous+ 
Fairtrade + 
Environmen
tally 
Responsible 
+ clean cup 
+ citric acid; 
monetary 
services 
Fairtrade 
symbolic 
service. 
Natural 
coffee 
symbolic 
service 
Indig
enou
s 
coffe
e; 
citric 
acid; 
mone
tary 
servic
es 
Environm
entally 
responsibl
e + winy; 
and 
monetary 
services 
 
Environ
mentally 
responsi
ble; 
ethical 
traded 
and 
terroir 
expressi
on. 
indigeno
us 
coffee + 
environ
mentally 
responsi
ble and 
the citric 
acid, 
monetar
y 
services 
Fairtrade 
symbolic 
service. 
Natural 
coffee 
symbolic 
service; 
Exception
al coffee 
environ
mentally 
responsi
ble + 
winy; 
and 
monetar
y 
services 
Aligned actors Producers 
and the 
FNC 
CRIDEC (SHP); 
Cooperative 
(PT); FNC 
(SHP) and MH 
(SHC)  
Asprocafé 
(PF), 
Indigenous 
Movement 
(SHP), 
FNC/Comité 
(SHP), 
Cooperative 
(PT), Equal 
Exchange 
(PT) and 
MH (SHC) 
Asprocafé 
(PF), 
Cooperati
ve (PT) 
and MH 
(SHC) 
Asprocafé 
(PF), 
Cooperati
ve (PT), 
MH 
(SHC),  
and Equal 
Exchange 
(PR) 
FNC 
(SHP) 
Cooperati
ve (PT), 
FNC/Comi
té (SHP), 
Nespresso 
(PR); 
Technoser
ve and 
Fundanat
ura (SHC) 
Local 
author
ity 
(SHP) 
FNC 
(SHP). 
All 
other 
actors. 
Coopera
tive (PT) 
Starbuck
s (PR) 
FNC/Co
mité 
(SHP); 
coopera
tive 
(PT); 
Keurig 
(PR). 
Asprocafé 
(PF), 
Cooperati
ve (PT) 
and MH 
(SHC) 
Asprocafé 
(PF), 
Cooperati
ve (PT), 
MH 
(SHC),  
and Equal 
Exchange 
(PR) 
Coopera
tive (PT), 
FNC/Co
mité 
(SHP), 
Nespres
so (PR); 
SAN 
(SHC) 
Profiling institution Minimum 
quality 
regulation
s 
Minimum 
quality 
regulations 
Organic 
certification 
Fairtrade 
certificati
on 
Organic 
certificati
on 
NA TASQ® / 
Rainforest 
Alliance 
Minim
um 
quality 
regulat
ions 
CAFE 
Practice
s 
RSSG/ 
Rainfore
st 
Alliance 
Fairtrade 
certificati
on; 
Normas 
asprocafé 
Organic 
certificati
on; 
Normas 
asprocafé 
TASQ® / 
Rainfore
st 
Alliance 
Governance 
mechanism 
FNC/Comi
té/Coffee 
farmers 
cooperativ
es/ 
Extension 
service 
Convenio 
MH/Junta 
Administrador
a/Promoters 
Asprocafé/I
nternal 
Control 
System/SAC
EV/Comité 
asesor 
CLV/Escuela 
y Café 
Asprocafé
/Internal 
Control 
System 
Asprocafé
/Internal 
Control 
System/Al
liance 
Asprocafé
-Equal 
Fract
ured 
SACE
V 
Clúster 
Expocafé/
AAA 
Program/
Premiums 
Mesas 
de 
Concer
tación 
Commer
cial 
agreeme
nt 
conditio
ning 
quality; 
economi
c 
account
ability 
and 
external 
audit 
SACEV Asprocafé
/Internal 
Control 
System 
Asprocafé
/Internal 
Control 
System/Al
liance 
Asprocafé
-Equal 
Clúster 
Expocaf
é/AAA 
Program 
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Output Coffee 
public 
policy 
Loans and 
assistance to 
Associative 
groups 
Asprocafé 
outputs; 
Sacev 
outputs 
shaped by 
the Inter-
institutional 
committee 
Subsidies 
for 
renovatio
n and 
equipmen
t with the 
Fairtrade 
Social 
premium 
Subsidies 
for 
diversifica
tion, soil 
managem
ent; and 
organic 
farming 
through 
both 
premiums 
and the 
Small 
Farmer 
Fund 
NA "Impleme
ntación 
AAA" 
project 
PSF - 
PMC 
PSF - 
PMC; 
Improve
ment 
plans 
PSF - 
PMC; 
Alianzas 
producti
vas and 
Procom
pite 
PSF - PMC PSF - 
PMC; 
Cooperati
on in 
quality 
project. 
PSF - 
PMC; 
"Arbol 
de vida, 
fertilizac
ión, 
Rainfore
st 
Alliance 
certifica
ción" 
projects; 
and the 
SCP field 
level 
project. 
Closure 
 
LRA 
Standard 
LRA MH LRA Natural LRA 
Fairtrade 
LRA 
Organic 
LRA 
La 
Vere
da 
LRA 
Nespresso 
LRA 
Standa
rd 
LRA 
Reg/Sta
rbucks 
LRA CS-
La 
Vereda 
LRA CS 
Fairtrade 
LRA CS 
Organic 
LRA CS 
Nespres
so 
Barriers of entry Product 
differentia
tion at the 
traders 
level 
Product 
differentiation 
at the 
producers 
level 
Double 
product 
differentiati
on (origin 
and 
organic) at 
the 
producers 
level 
Product 
differenti
ation at 
the 
retailing 
level 
Double 
product 
differenti
ation 
(origin 
and 
organic) 
at the 
producers 
level 
Any Product 
differentia
tion at the 
roasting 
level 
Any Product 
different
iation at 
the 
roasting 
level 
Double 
product 
different
iation 
(origin 
and 
indigeno
us 
coffee) 
at the 
produce
rs level 
Product 
differenti
ation at 
the 
retailing 
level 
Triple 
product 
differenti
ation 
(origin, 
organic, 
specialty 
coffee) at 
the 
producers 
level 
Product 
different
iation at 
the 
roasting 
level 
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V.7.2. Buesaco  
 
Table 39 Conditions’ evaluation for each LRA in Riosucio from 1990 until 2015. Source: the author. 
Extent1362  
Uses LRA Standard 
LRA 
Standard-
plus 
LRA EdN LRA ACDI/VOCA N 
LRA 
ACDI/VOC
A S 
LRA 
Specialty LRA Nespresso 
LRA 
CCEsp/Star
bucks 
LRA Caltura LRA Cnilson 
Synthesis 
Concentratio
n 17% 9% 5% 34% 34% 11% 33% 37% 27% 12% 
Regulated/ob
served uses 17% 31% 60% 88% 88% 48% 85% 60% 52% 64% 
Regulated 
uses 4.5 8.2 15.6 22.9 22.9 12.4 22.1 15.6 13.4 16.7 
Planting 
Diversificatio
n        1 1   1       
Variety  1 1 1 1 1   1 1     
Renovation of 
Coffee trees          1 1   1 1     
Planting 
density        1 1   1 1     
Shade             1       
Cultivation 
Soil 
management        1 1         1 
Coffee borer 
beetle 
management  
      1 1           
Pest and 
disease 
management 
      1 1           
Nutrition                      
Hedgerowing                      
Picking         1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                                     
1362 Each activity observed/regulated is coded as 1, in all other cases it is coded as 0. 
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Farm 
management                     
Post-
Harvesting 
Hulling         1 1   1 1 1   
Fermentation         1 1   1 1 1   
Drying          1 1   1 1 1   
Waste 
management       1 1           
Reselection            1 1 1 1 1 
Trading 
Purchasing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Threshing and 
sorting 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bulking and 
export  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Roasting 
Blending       1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Roasting       1 1 1 1 1     1 
Packaging 
and retailing      1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Communic
ation 
Strategy 
Communicati
on   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Brewing 
Grinding       1 1 1   1     1 
Brewing      1 1 1   1     1 
Coherence 
  LRA Standard 
LRA 
Standard-
plus 
LRA EdN LRA ACDI/VOCA N 
LRA 
ACDI/VOC
A S 
LRA 
Specialty LRA Nespresso 
LRA 
CCEsp/Star
bucks 
LRA Caltura LRA Cnilson 
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Services 
Appellation 
Café de 
Colombia; 
Monetary 
services 
Terroir 
expression; 
Monetary 
services 
Terroir 
expressio
n 
Drugs 
substitution = 
Terroir 
expression; 
Ethically 
traded+  
Environmentall
y responsible + 
Brand 
reputation; 
Monetary 
services 
Drugs 
substitutio
n = Terroir 
expression
; Ethically 
traded+  
Environme
ntally 
responsibl
e + Brand 
reputation; 
Monetary 
services 
Exceptional 
coffee; 
Poverty 
reduction; 
Monetary 
services 
Environmentall
y responsible + 
Brand 
reputation; 
Monetary 
services 
Exceptional 
coffee; 
Transparen
t coffee; 
Monetary 
services 
Poverty 
reduction; 
Exceptional 
coffee; 
Transparent 
coffee; 
Monetary 
services 
Shared 
value; 
Exceptional 
coffee; 
Transparent 
coffee; 
Monetary 
services 
Aligned actors Producers and the FNC 
Cooperatives 
(PT) and the 
FNC (SHP) 
EdN (PT) 
and 
Starbucks 
(PR) 
 Asoveracruz 
(PF), 
Cooperativas 
(PT), 
FNC/Comité 
(SHP), 
Nespresso (PR); 
ACDI/VOCA 
(SHC)  
Producers 
association
s (PF); EdN 
(PT) 
Starbucks 
(PR); 
ACDI/VOC
A (SHC) 
Producers 
mobilized 
through the 
political 
party (PT); 
FS (SHP); 
Gobernació
n (SHP) 
 Asoveracruz 
(PF), 
Cooperativas 
(PT), 
FNC/Comité 
(SHP), 
Nespresso (PR). 
CCEspeciale
s (PT); 
Caravela 
(PR). Also 
Carcafé 
(PT) ; 
Starbucks 
(PR). 
Asoveracruz 
(PF); Café con 
Altura (PT); FS 
(SHP). 
Nilson’s 
producers 
network 
(PF); Nilson 
(PT); 
Inconexus 
(PT); Royal 
Coffee (PT) 
Specialty 
roasters (PR) 
Profiling institution 
Minimum 
quality 
regulations 
Minimum 
quality 
regulations 
Minimum 
quality 
regulatio
ns 
TASQ® CAFE Practices Q System TASQ® Q System Q System Q System 
Governance mechanism 
FNC/Comité/
Coffee 
farmers 
cooperatives
/ Extension 
service 
FNC/Comité/
Coffee 
farmers 
cooperatives
/ Extension 
service 
Purchase 
agreeme
nt 
Clúster 
FNC/Extension 
service 
replicated by 
Asoveracruz/Pr
emiums 
Commerci
al 
agreement 
conditionin
g quality; 
economic 
accountabi
lity and 
external 
audit 
Comisión/A
lianza Café 
Clúster 
FNC/Extension 
service 
replicated by 
Asoveracruz/Pr
emiums 
Informal 
Agreement 
with 
Caravela/ 
Commercia
l 
agreement 
with 
Carcafé 
conditionin
g quality; 
economic 
accountabil
ity and 
external 
audit 
Café con 
Altura 
Buesaco 
SAS/Café con 
Altura's 
handbook/Pre
miums 
Contract 
Nilson-
Inconnexus/
Coffee 
Auction/ 
Premiums 
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Output Coffee public policy 
Specialty 
coffee 
registration 
and 
promotion 
program 
NA 
Familias en 
Acción; 
proyectos 
productivos; 
Strategic 
Specialty Coffee 
Plan; SCP 1; 
Implementation 
project; SCP 2 
DGIS' call 
of ideas; 
SCP 1; SCP 
2; SENA's 
technical 
assistance 
project. 
Laboratorio 
de Paz; 
Action Plan 
2011; 
Corseagroc
ol's 
Technical 
assistance 
PSF  
  
Extension 
service by FS NA 
Closure 
  LRA Standard 
LRA 
Standard-
plus 
LRA EdN LRA ACDI/VOCA N 
LRA 
ACDI/VOC
A S 
LRA 
Specialty LRA Nespresso 
LRA 
CCEsp/Star
bucks 
LRA Caltura LRA Cnilson 
Barriers of entry 
Product 
differentiatio
n at the 
traders level 
Product 
differentiatio
n potentially 
at the 
producers 
level 
Product 
differenti
ation  at 
the 
roaster 
level 
Product 
differentiation  
at the roaster 
level 
Product 
differentiat
ion  at the 
roaster 
level 
Product 
differentiati
on 
potentially 
at the 
producers 
level 
Product 
differentiation  
at the roaster 
level 
Product 
differentiati
on 
potentially 
at the 
producers 
level 
Product 
differentiation 
potentially at 
the producers 
level 
Product 
differentiati
on 
potentially 
at the 
producers 
level 
 
V.7.3. Synthesis of both Riosucio and Buesaco 
 
Table 40  Synthesis of conditions’ evaluation. Source: the author. 
Riosucio  
LRA Coalition 
Mobilization of 
AR 
Institutional 
Creativity Extent Coherence Closure 
LRA Standard NA NA  NA  Baseline: 17 pp evenly distributed 
Baseline: Failed: two-
way coordination among 
producers  
Baseline: Barriers at 
the traders level 
LRA MH SHP+SHC Cooperative Presence 
Plus 19 pp evenly distributed 
(over the incumbent LRA 
Standard)  
Successful two-way 
coordination among all 
profilers 
Product 
differentiation 
(origin) 
LRA Natural PT+SHP+SHC Selfishly-Cooperative Presence 
Plus 33 pp evenly distributed 
(over the incumbent LRA MH) 
Successful two-way 
coordination among all 
profilers 
Product 
differentiation (origin 
and organic) 
LRA Fairtrade FP+FT+SHC Selfishly Presence Less 12 pp evenly distributed (over the incumbent LRA Natural) 
Failed one-way 
coordination among all 
profilers 
Barriers at the 
traders level 
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LRA Organic FP+FT+FR+SHC Selfishly Presence Plus 12 pp evenly distributed (over the incumbent LRA Natural) 
Successful two-way 
coordination among all 
profilers 
Product 
differentiation (origin 
and organic) 
LRA La Vereda SHP Selfishly Absence Less 26 pp concentrated (over the incumbent LRA Natural) Failed, any coordination. Any barrier 
LRA Nespresso PT+PR+SHP+SHC Strategically Presence Plus 37 pp evenly distributed (over the incumbent LRA Natural) 
Successful two-way 
coordination among all 
profilers 
Barriers at the 
roaster level 
LRA Standard Climate Smart PT+PR+SHP+SHC Cooperative Presence 
Plus 20 pp concentrated (over the 
incumbent LRA Standard for the 
whole set of LRAs)  
Successful two-way 
coordination among all 
profilers 
Barriers at the 
traders level 
LRA Reg/Starbucks PT+PR+SHP+SHC Cooperative Presence Plus 20 pp concentrated (over the incumbent LRA Standard) 
Successful two-way 
coordination among all 
profilers 
Barriers at the 
roaster level 
Buesaco 
LRA Coalition 
Mobilization of 
AR 
Institutional 
Creativity Extent Coherence Closure 
LRA Standard NA NA  NA  Baseline: 17 pp evenly distributed 
Baseline: Failed: two-
way coordination among 
producers  
Baseline: Barriers at 
the traders level 
LRA Standard-plus PF+SHP Selfishly Absence 
Plus 14 pp evenly distributed 
(over the incumbent LRA 
Standard)  
Failed: two-way 
coordination among 
producers  
Product 
differentiation 
(potentially origin) 
LRA EdN PT+PR Strategically Absence 
Plus 43 pp evenly distributed 
(over the incumbent LRA 
Standard) 
Failed: one-way 
coordination among 
profilers  
Barriers at the 
roaster level 
LRA ACDI/VOCA N PF+PT+PR+SHP Strategically / Cooperative Presence 
Plus 57 pp evenly distributed 
(over the incumbent LRA 
Standard-Plus)  
Successful: two-way 
coordination among 
profilers  
Barriers at the 
roaster level 
LRA ACDI/VOCA S PF+PT+PR+SHC Strategically / Cooperative Presence 
Plus 28 pp evenly distributed 
(over the incumbent LRA EdN) 
Successful: two-way 
coordination among 
profilers  
Barriers at the 
roaster level 
LRA Specialty PF+SHP Cooperative / Selfishly  Presence 
Less 40 pp evenly distributed 
(over both incumbents LRA 
ACDI/VOCA N&S) 
Failed: two-way 
coordination among 
producers  
Product 
differentiation 
(potentially origin) 
LRA Nespresso PF+PT+PR+SHP Strategically / Cooperative Presence 
Less 3 pp evenly distributed (over 
LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S) 
Failed: one-way 
coordination among 
traders 
Barriers at the 
roaster level 
LRA CCEsp/Starbucks PF+PT Strategically Absence 
Less 28 pp evenly distributed 
(over both incumbents LRA 
ACDI/VOCA N&S) 
Failed: one-way 
coordination among 
traders 
Product 
differentiation 
(potentially origin, 
specialty) 
LRA Caltura PF+PT+SHP Strategically Absence 
Less 36 pp evenly 
distributed(over both incumbents 
LRA ACDI/VOCA N&S) 
Failed: one-way 
coordination among  
producers 
Product 
differentiation 
(potentially origin, 
specialty) 
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LRA Cnilson PF+PT+PR Strategically Presence 
Less 26 pp evenly distributed 
(over both incumbents LRA 
ACDI/VOCA N&S) 
Successful two-way 
coordination among all 
profilers 
Product 
differentiation (origin 
and specialty) 
*SHP = Stakeholders in production; SHC = Stakeholders in consumption; PF = Profilers farmers; PT = Profilers traders; PR = Profilers roasters 
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V.8. Supporting tables for analyzing the second hypothesis   
V.8.1. Riosucio  
• Incumbent LRA Standard; new born LRA MH (1989-1996) 
 
Table 41 Mobilization of resources of action LRA MH. Source: the author 
 
Mobilization of Action 
Resources  
Changes in the AR 
endowment   
Mobilization typology  
(Coffee growers) 
indigenes 
  Cooperative mobilization 
of the MH’s organization, 
FNC’s law and 
Cooperative’s property 
to produce money for the 
indigenous movement 
that resulted in political 
support to move forward 
their demanded services.  
SH production 
(Indigenous movement) 
AR consensus Obtained AR money and 
AR political support 
SH production 
(Asproinca) 
 
 
Cooperative AR property  
FNC  AR law  
SH Consumption (Max 
Havelaar) 
AR organization  
 
Table 42 Institutional creativity LRA MH. Source: the author  
Institutional 
Creativity 
Description 
Deliberative 
scenario  
Ad-hoc coordination mechanism at the beginning of the sequence. Formalized in the Junta 
Administradora of the Convenio since 1993. 
Uses of 
Resource 
constituents 
agreed on 
Use of infrastructures to diversify crops; know-how to fertilize coffee crops with synthetic 
fertilizers and during the whole activities of the trading process to trace the Fairtrade coffee; 
and know-to-appreciate during the communication strategy to share the meaning of the 
Fairtrade market.   
Borders  Inclusive with all indigenous (farmers) of the radius of action of the cooperative owners of 
properties up to 2ha, and traders and roasters associated to the Fairtrade movement. 
Excluding for coffee growers with higher properties. 
Profile A combined provision of the merged Fairtrade-indigenous coffee symbolic services and 
monetary services (a premium when buying and higher productivity) 
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Figure 15 Actors’ coalitions LRA MH. Source: the author 
 
 
• Incumbent LRA MH, Newborn LRA Natural (1997-2003):  
 
Table 43 Mobilization of Resources LRA Natural. Source: the author  
 
Mobilization of 
Action Resources 
Changes in the AR 
endowment  
Mobilization typology 
(Non) Indigenous small 
coffee farmers 
(Asprocafé) 
AR personal  AR 
information 
Obtained AR 
personal 
Obtained AR 
information 
Failed strategic mobilization of the 
AR consensus of the indigenous 
movement. 
 
Selfishly mobilization of the AR 
organization of MH over the 
Cooperative and the CRIDEC. 
 
Strategic mobilization of the AR 
personal of the Comité and AR 
property of the Cooperative to 
counterbalance the AR organization 
of MH and the AR personal of 
Asprocafé. 
 
Cooperative mobilization of the AR 
information of Asproinca and 
Asprocafé to endow with it both the 
indigenous movement and the 
Comité-FNC. 
SH production 
(Indigenous movement) 
 
Lost AR consensus  
Lost AR  political 
support 
Obtained AR 
information 
SH production 
(Asproinca) 
AR information 
 
Cooperative AR property  Obtained AR 
political support 
FNC - Comité AR personal Obtained AR 
information 
SH Consumption (MH) AR organization Obtained  AR law 
 
 
Table 44 Institutional Creativity LRA Natural. Source: the author.  
Institutional 
Creativity 
Description 
Deliberative 
scenario  
Inter-institutional Committee 
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Uses of Resource 
constituents agreed 
on 
Use infrastructures to establish integrated “mestizo” production systems, affecting three 
activities in the planting process (diversification, renovation, and shade); know-how to 
implement “mestizo” agroecology practices, affecting four activities in the cultivation 
process (soil management, nutrition, hedgerows, picking) and four activities in the post-
harvesting (hulling, fermentation, drying, waste management), and all activities in the 
trading and one in the roasting (blinding); know-to-appreciate through the organic 
certification and the Café la Vereda trademark, affecting two activities during roasting and 
communication strategy (packaging and communication).  
Borders  Inclusive with all (non) indigenous coffee growers located in the cooperative's radius of 
action, owners of farms up to 5 hectares, and traders and roasters that accept organic 
agriculture. Excluding for coffee growers who did not accept the organic farming; those with 
larger crops, and all other cultivating outside Riosucio.  
Profile Provision of both the merged symbolic services around “Café Natural” (namely “Fairtrade 
coffee”; “Indigenous coffee”; “Environmentally responsible”). Also the “citrus acid” and 
“clean cup” taste related services and the “monetary” services in terms of premium 
(Fairtrade premium, organic premium, and SACEV premium).  
 
Figure 16 Actors' coalitions LRA Natural. Source: the author 
 
 
 
• Incumbent LRA Natural; newborn LRA Fairtrade; LRA Organic; LRA La Vereda and 
LRA Nespresso (2004-2011)  
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Figure 17 Actors coalitions LRA Fairtrade (and LRA Organic): Source the author. 
 
 
 
Figure 18 Actor' coalitions LRA La Vereda. Source: the author 
 
 
 
Figure 19 Actors' coalitions LRA Nespresso. Source: the author 
 
 
• A newborn LRA Standard Climate-Smart shared by all the incumbent LRAs and a 
newborn LRA Starbucks (2012-2016) 
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Table 45 Mobilization of resources for the LRA CS. Source: the author 
 
Mobilization of 
Action Resources 
Changes in the AR 
endowment  
Mobilization typology 
(Non) Indigenous small 
coffee farmers 
(Asprocafé) 
  
Cooperative mobilization of the AR 
political support of the indigenous 
movement to generate deliberative 
scenarios.  
 
Cooperative mobilization of the AR 
information of the Committee to 
gain AR consensus.  
 
Strategic mobilization of the AR 
money of the indigenous movement 
and the AR of the Comité, alongside 
the AR time of both, to strengthen 
the bonds of trust. 
SH production 
(Indigenous movement) 
AR political support 
AR money 
AR time 
Obtained AR 
consensus 
 
SH production 
(Asproinca) 
  
Cooperative 
  
FNC - Comité AR information 
AR personal 
AR time 
Obtained AR 
consensus 
 
SH Consumption (MH) 
  
 
Table 46 Institutional Creativity for the LRA CS. Source: the author 
Institutional 
Creativity 
Description 
Deliberative 
scenario  
Mesas de concertación promoted by the Alcaldía 
Uses of Resource 
constituents 
agreed on 
Agreement on uses of the Resource constituents to adapt to climate change in the five 
activities of the planting process (diversification, variety, renovation, density, shade) in all 
LRAs.  
Borders  Uses of the Resource constituents inclusive to all coffee farmers in Riosucio to adapt to 
climate change. 
Uses of the Resource constituents exclusively for the participants in each LRA. 
Profile Each LRA profiles the Resources to produce a combination of services, but all are built on a 
profile adapted to climate change. 
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Figure 20 Actors’ coalition for the LRA CS. Source: the author 
 
 
 
V.8.2. Buesaco 
 
• Incumbent LRA Standard, newborn LRA EdN (1989-2000) 
 
 
Table 47 Mobilization of RA LRA Standard plus and LRA EdN. Source: The Author. 
 
Mobilization  RA exchange Type of mobilization  
FNC AR organization 
AR personal  
Lost AR law 
Maintained AR 
political support 
Obtained AR 
information  
The FNC strategically mobilized their 
AR personal, to produce the AR 
information and maintain the AR 
political support, which was selfishly 
mobilized to neutralize the Comité’s 
mobilization of the AR information. 
 
Starbucks strategically mobilized the 
AR law and Information to obtain 
the AR consensus.   
Starbucks AR law  
 
Starbucks / SCCAA AR information Obtained AR 
consensus  
Comité de Nariño AR information Failed to obtain AR 
consensus 
 
Table 48 Institutional Creativity LRA EdN. Source: The Author. 
Institutional 
Creativity  
Description 
Deliberative 
Scenario 
There was not a deliberative scenario  
Uses of 
Resource 
constituents 
agreed  
There was not any collective agreement on the uses of Resource Constituents. Starbucks 
contractually demanded EdN changes in the use of infrastructures and know-how 
throughout all activities in the trading process to implement the documentary traceability, 
and internally assume the use of know-to-appreciate in the communication strategy 
process. 
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Borders It affected exclusively traders belonging to each LRA.   
Profile  It sought to provide a combination of the “terroir expression” and the “clean cup” taste 
related services; the “brand reputation” and the “appellation Café de Colombia” symbolic 
services. It did not change the monetary services received by farmers.  
 
Figure 21 Actors' coalitions LRA EdN. Source: the author 
 
  
• Newborn LRA ACDI/VOCA Nespresso and Starbucks (2001-2007) 
 
Table 49 Mobilization of AR LRA ACDI/VOCA N&S. Source: The Author. 
First group Mobilization  RA exchange Type of mobilization  
FNC - Comité de 
Nariño 
- Corponariño 
AR personal  
AR law  
Obtained AR 
money  
The FNC/Comité strategically mobilized in coalition 
with Corponariño their AR personal, law to obtain 
the AR money from USAID and fund their own 
operations to profile the Resource.  
 
Starbucks/EdN strategically mobilized in coalition 
with Conservation International and the OIM their 
AR money, consensus, infrastructure, and 
organization to obtain the AR consensus around the 
symbolic services provided by the LRA Starbucks. 
 
Asoveracruz obtain the AR organization    
Starbucks – 
Conservation 
International – 
EdN - OIM 
AR money 
AR consensus 
AR property 
AR organization 
Obtained AR 
consensus 
Asoveracruz 
 
Obtained AR 
organization 
Second group Mobilization  RA exchange Type of mobilization  
ACDI/VOCA AR organization  Obtained AR 
money  
The ACDI/VOCA cooperatively mobilized their AR 
organization to encourage mobilization of the AR 
information and personal from both the FNC and 
the SCAA, to profile the Resource as demanded by 
specialty markets.  
FNC AR information 
AR personal  
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SCAA AR information 
 
 
Asoveracruz among other farmers’ associations 
strategically mobilized its AR organization to 
facilitate the implementation and obtained the AR 
information. 
 
Asoveracruz strategically mobilized the AR 
information to produce the profile sought by 
Starbucks and Nespresso.  
Starbucks and 
Nespresso 
 
Obtained AR 
organization 
Farmers in 
Nariño 
(including 
Asoveracruz) 
AR organization Obtained AR 
information  
 
Table 50 Institutional creativity ACDI/VOCA N&S. Source: The Author 
Institutional 
Creativity  
Description 
Deliberative 
Scenario 
Indirect deliberative scenario 
Uses of 
Resource 
constituents 
agreed  
Uses of infrastructures and know-how in the planting (diversification and renovation with 
pest-resistant varieties); cultivation (integral pest and soil management avoiding chemicals 
when possible and picking); post-harvesting (proper equipment in the whole activities); and 
the whole activities during the trading, roasting, and brewing. Use of know-how during the 
communication strategy to enhance brand reputation.  
Borders Inclusively for all farmers in Nariño and participant traders and roasters (Starbucks and 
Nespresso).  
Profile  It sought to provide a combination of the “terroir expression” taste related services; the 
“environmentally responsible” and the “ethical traded” symbolic services; in order to 
increase the monetary services for farmers and produce the “drug substitution” symbolic 
service.   
 
Figure 22 Actors' coalition LRA ACDI/VOCA N&S. Source: the author 
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• Newborn LRA Specialty (2008-2011)  
 
Table 51 Mobilization of AR LRA Specialty. Source: The Author. 
 
Mobilization  RA exchange Type of mobilization  
FS AR organization 
AR information 
 
The FS cooperatively mobilized their AR 
organization and information to transfer the 
AR information and organization to farmers. 
They mobilized it in coalition with the AR 
infrastructure of Caravela and produced the 
AR Consensus around the need for an LRA 
Specialty Coffee. 
 
The Government of Nariño cooperatively 
mobilized their AR law and consensus to 
empower with the AR organization and 
consensus the Comisión to produce the LRA 
Specialty Coffee avoiding the FNC, but it 
failed. 
 
The Government of Nariño selfishly 
mobilized their AR political support and 
consensus to obtain the AR law and be 
invested as the coffee public policy local 
authority.   
Caravela AR property 
 
Farmers  
 
Obtained AR 
information 
Obtained AR 
organization 
Government of Nariño AR political 
support 
AR consensus 
AR law  
Obtained AR 
consensus  
Obtained AR 
political support 
Comisión  AR organization 
AR information 
Obtained AR 
organization 
Obtained AR 
consensus 
FNC AR personal  Lost AR political 
support  
Obtained AR 
property 
 
Table 52 Institutional Creativity LRA Specialty. Source: The Author. 
Institutional 
Creativity  
Description 
Deliberative 
Scenario 
The Comisión Regional de Competitividad 
Uses of 
Resource 
constituents 
agreed  
Uses of infrastructures and know-how in the planting, cultivation and post-harvesting 
(depending on the environmental offer to enhance the aromatic profile); trading and 
roasting (through associative enterprises that enhance the aromatic profile depending on 
the coffee lot); and know-to-appreciate in the Communication Strategy (enhancing Nariño 
reputation as the best of Colombia). 
Borders Inclusively for all farmers in Nariño.  
Profile  To profile the “exceptional coffee” taste related service, vertically integrated into a company 
own by small farmers, to allow them to capture the whole value and produce the “poverty 
reduction” symbolic service.   
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Figure 23 Actors’ coalitions LRA Specialty. Source: The Author. 
 
 
• Incumbent LRA Specialty, newborn LRA Nespresso, LRA CAltura, LRA 
CCEsp/Starbucks and LRA CNilson (2012-2016) 
 
Table 53 Mobilization of RA Incumbent LRA Specialty. Source: The Author. 
First Group Mobilization  RA exchange Type of mobilization  
FNC - AFC AR property  
AR organization 
Lost AR 
consensus 
Starbucks strategically mobilized in coalition with the 
CRS and HGBF their AR organization, consensus and 
money. Also, the FNC strategically mobilized in 
coalition with Alliance For Coffee their AR property 
and organization. In both cases to produce the AR 
consensus (to access to the resource), but instead, in 
both cases, they lost it.  
 
Asoveracruz cooperatively mobilized in coalition with 
the local authority their AR organization and money, 
to empower with the AR property and organization 
the GEB, so it became part of the Comisión.   
 
The Comisión strategically mobilized its AR law to 
produce the AR information.   
Asoveracruz – 
Local Authority 
- GEB 
AR organization 
AR money 
Obtain AR 
organization 
and property 
Comisión AR law Obtain AR 
information  
Starbucks – 
CRS – HGBF   
AR organization 
AR consensus 
AR money 
Lost AR 
consensus 
 
Table 54 Mobilization of AR LRA Specialty. Source: The Author. 
 
Mobilization  RA exchange Type of mobilization  
Government 
of Nariño 
RA political 
support 
RA law 
Obtained RA law The Governors strategically mobilized their political 
support to obtain the RA law. The Government of 
Nariño selfishly mobilized their RA law to disband the 
action plan previously agreed. 
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Table 55 Institutional creativity LRA Specialty. Source: The author. 
Institutional 
Creativity  
Description 
Deliberative 
Scenario 
There was not a deliberative scenario  
Uses of 
Resource 
constituents 
agreed  
There was not any collective agreement on the uses of Resource Constituents, but individual 
ones affecting the use of infrastructures, know-how and know-to-appreciate: planting (non-
pest resistant varieties when commercial opportunities available); cultivation (practices to 
enhance aromatic profile); post-harvesting (picking and re-selection to guarantee a well-ripe 
bean); trading (cupping and physical traceability); roasting (tailor-made S-curves); 
communication (highlight both the unique aromatic profile and the farmer’ story).    
Borders It affected all farmers in Buesaco indistinctively, but exclusively traders in each LRA.  
Profile  It provided the “exceptional coffee” taste related service, the “transparent coffee” symbolic 
service and monetary services for profiling actors (some farmers, traders, roasters). But it did 
not provide monetary services for the majority of farmers, and the “environmentally 
responsible” symbolic services for stakeholders in production and consumption.     
 
Figure 24 Actor's coalition LRA Nespresso. Source: the author. 
 
 
Figure 25 Actor's coalition LRA CCEsp/Starbucks. Source: the author. 
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Figure 26 Actor's coalition LRA Caltura. Source: the author. 
 
 
Figure 27  Actor's coalition LRA CNilson. Source: the author. 
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V.9. Evaluation of LRAs according to each analytical dimension 
 
V.9.1. Riosucio  
 
The following paragraphs would expand table 20 by synthetically describing the evaluation of 
each LRA according to each analytical dimension.  
 
We start with the “coalition”, namely the group of actors that participate in the coalition which 
bring about the LRA. Then we describe the “mobilization of action resources” by each LRA (even 
though in each LRA there could be found different types of mobilization that are fully detailed 
throughout this chapter we classified the LRAs according to the most salient mobilization). 
Finally, we analyze the presence of institutional creativity in each LRA depending on both the 
procedural element (deliberative scenario) and the substantive element (the second 
negotiation dilemma), which is composed of both the distribution (uses of Resource 
constituents) and the production (the profile).  
 
1. Coalitions:  
o LRA MH: Trader (The Cooperative), stakeholders in production (the CRIDEC and the FNC), 
stakeholders in consumption (MH). 
o LRA Natural: Farmers, trader, and roaster (Asprocafé, the Cooperative and Equal 
Exchange), stakeholders in production (the Indigenous Movement and the FNC/Comité), 
and stakeholders in consumption (MH).  
o LRA Fairtrade: Farmers, trader (Asprocafé and the Cooperative), and stakeholders in 
consumption (MH). 
o LRA Organic: Farmers, trader, and roaster (Asprocafé, the Cooperative and Equal 
Exchange) and stakeholders in consumption (MH). 
o LRA La Vereda: Stakeholders in production (the FNC). 
o LRA Nespresso: Trader and roaster (the Cooperative and Nespresso), stakeholders in 
production (the FNC/Comité) and stakeholders in consumption (Technoserve and 
Fundanatura) 
o LRA CS Standard: Farmers, trader, and roasters (Asprocafé, the Cooperative and Equal 
Exchange/Nespresso/Keurig/Starbucks), stakeholders in production (the local authority 
and the FNC/Comité), and stakeholders in consumption (MH). 
o LRA Regional/Starbucks: Trader and roaster (the Cooperative and Starbucks) 
 
2. Mobilization of action resources  
o Cooperative mobilization of action resources to empower other actors with the objective 
that they can put forward their demand for services. 
 LRA MH: The MH’s organization, FNC’s law, and Cooperative’s property were 
mobilized to endow the indigenous movement with the AR money, that resulted in 
political support, so they could consolidate an organization capable of exercising their 
constitutional right to cultural diversity. It balanced the power game so the indigenous 
movement could move forward their demand for services alongside the MH, the FNC 
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and the Cooperative. Thus, they innovatively activated the coffee public policy to 
incentivize indigenous (coffee farmers) traders and roasters to profile both the 
“Fairtrade” and “indigenous coffee” symbolic services in order to produce “monetary 
services”.  
 LRA Natural: MH mobilized their organization selfishly over the Cooperative and the 
indigenous movement to trigger their demands for the “Natural coffee” symbolic 
service, but at the same time, it increased the endowment of personal and 
information of the (not) indigenous coffee farmers so that they were, through the 
collective actor Asprocafé, able to put forward their demands, balancing the power 
game when including this previously unheard group into the actors’ coalition. Then, 
Asprocafé supported by Asproinca, mobilized their information to endow both the 
FNC and the Indigenous movement with information, balancing the power game in 
the sense that the different actors converged around the same assumptions, from 
which their demanded services would be provided. As a result, they concretized the 
Specialty coffee registration and promotion program of the coffee public policy to 
incentivize (non) indigenous coffee farmers profiled the “natural coffee” and both, 
the “environmentally responsible” symbolic service and the “citric acidity” taste 
related service demanded by the FNC, and the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service 
(defined in terms of the rescue of ancestral practices) demanded by the indigenous 
movement.  
 LRA CS Standard: The indigenous movement’s political support was mobilized to 
generate deliberative scenarios that endowed the FNC-Comité with the consensus, 
balancing the power game so that the latter, who had been previously excluded, was 
able to move forward their demand for a Climate Smart coffee culture. Hence, the 
whole set of actors agree on innovatively activating the two instruments of the coffee 
public policy:  the renovation and the diversification programs in order to incentivize 
farmers to profile a combination of “environmentally responsible” and “indigenous 
coffee” symbolic services; “clean cup” taste related service to guarantee stable 
“monetary” services, as a base from which the other LRAs would profile their own 
demanded services.  
o Strategic mobilization of action resources to profile the demanded services.  
 LRA Organic: Equal Exchange’s organization was mobilized to concretize the specialty 
coffee program of the coffee public policy to incentivize farmers to profile their 
“natural coffee” symbolic service.   
 LRA Nespresso: The Cooperative’s personal and the Nespresso’s money were 
mobilized to concretize the specialty coffee program of the coffee public policy to 
incentivize farmers to produce both the “winy” taste related service and “monetary” 
services. 
 LRA Reg/Starbucks: The Cooperative’s personal was mobilized to concretize the 
specialty coffee program of the coffee public policy to incentivize Starbucks to the 
produce the “monetary” services (in terms of volume for the cooperative).  
o Selfishly mobilization of action resources to produce the services demanded by the 
powerful actor. 
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 LRA Fairtrade: FLO’s property was mobilized to concretize the specialty coffee 
program of the coffee public policy by making Asprocafé fulfill the requirement to 
have the use right of the certification mark to produce the “Fairtrade coffee” symbolic 
service. It implied the formalization of Asprocafé and the traceability of coffee that 
excluded the indigenous community and a portion of coffee growers, therefore 
diminishing provision of their “indigenous coffee” symbolic service and “monetary 
services”.     
 LRA La Vereda: Indigenous movement’s consensus initially and, political support and 
law afterward, were mobilized to circumvent the coffee public policy by innovatively 
activating both the education and the cultural public policies to influence the behavior 
of the indigenous farmers and discourage the over-cultivation of coffee, clearly at the 
expense of the services demanded by the Cooperative and the Comité/FNC.   
 
3. Institutional creativity  
o Deliberative scenario: In six of the eight LRAs, different scenarios (formal and informal) 
are documented. In the remaining six, it is not possible to document the existence of a 
deliberative scenario in which the whole set of LRA’s participant actors are present. 
 LRA MH: an ad-hoc coordination mechanism between contractually obligated actors 
produces the deliberation scenario that eventually became formalized as the Junta de 
Administración del Convenio among the whole set of actors interested in the 
Resource in that given time and space.   
 LRA Natural: the need to coordinate actions to both avoid foreseeable rivalries and to 
achieve economies of scale, informally produced the Comité Interinstitucional as a 
deliberative scenario among the whole set of actors interested in the Resource in that 
given time and space  
 LRA Organic: In order to follow the implementation of the organic project funded by 
the “small farmers fund”, an informal deliberative scenario known as “the annual visit 
of Equal Exchange” provide the space in which the coalition meet (Asprocafé, the 
Cooperativa, Equal).   
 LRA Nespresso: Once the commercial agreements that featured the first project to 
start the implementation of the Nespresso AAA program lead by technoserve evolved 
towards the complex Expocafé cluster, the deliberative scenario Encuentro bianual 
del Clúster Expocafé was developed in which the coalition shape the final outputs.    
 LRA Reg/Starbucks: This young LRA has not produced any output, but we consider that 
the meeting between the Cooperative (not only as a trader but as a representative of 
farmers) and the Starbucks’s Farmer Support Center in Manizales to produce the 
“improvement plans”, is clearly a deliberative scenario to shape this final output 
according to the interest of the coalition.   
 LRA CS Standard: the participation policy implemented by the new municipal 
administration produced a series of formal consultation tables that opened a 
deliberative scenario among the whole set of actors interested in the Resource in that 
given time and space. 
o Uses of Resource constituents: In the six LRAs in which there were deliberative scenarios, 
the agreements in the inclusive use of Resource constituents over the entire group of 
479 
 
profilers were documented and, the distribution of both the effort of the change and the 
benefit. In the remaining two LRAs there was not an agreement between all participant 
profilers on the distribution of costs and benefits, producing winners and losers.  
 LRA MH: it was agreed to innovatively activate the coffee public policy by shaping the 
final outputs of the Convenio MH, the loans and technical assistance to groups of 
farmers, to encourage inclusive uses on indigenous (coffee farmers) apparently 
contradictory: on the one hand, to encourage diversification and, on the other, to 
encourage synthetic fertilization; and exclusively uses on traders and roasters 
associated to the Fairtrade movement to communicate the meaning of the Fairtrade 
market to produce an add value that would be irrigated throughout the group of 
profilers. 
 LRA Natural: it was agreed to concretize the “specialty coffee registration and 
promotion program” and shape the final outputs of Asprocafé and the SACEV 
agreement to incentivize inclusive uses on the (non) indigenous coffee growers 
compatible with the “mestizo” production systems, merging “scientific” and 
“indigenous practices” to shape the agro-ecologic productive system in the planting 
and cultivation (renovation; shade; soil management, hedgerowing, and picking); in 
the post-harvesting process (four activities hulling, fermentation, drying and waste 
management); and exclusively uses on roasters in the roasting process (blending and 
packaging) to communicate the meaning of the organic market to produce an add 
value that would be irrigated throughout the group of profilers.   
 LRA Organic: It was agreed to concretize the “specialty coffee program” through the 
“small farmer fund” output that incentivize the same uses than the LRA natural but 
exclusively on the members of Asprocafé’s organic group, the Cooperative/Expocafé 
and Equal Exchange to produce an add value that would be irrigated throughout this 
group of profilers.  
 LRA Nespresso: It was agreed to concretize the “specialty coffee program” through 
the “implementation AAA project ” output that encouraged exclusive uses on coffee 
growers (owners of higher-than-0.5-ha farms in the target zone) to fulfill the TASQ® 
during the cultivation (farm management), and traders and roasters in the remaining 
activities of the commercialization, roasting, communication strategy and brewing 
processes to produce an add value that would be irrigated throughout AAA farmers, 
the Cooperative/Expocafé and Nespresso. 
 LRA Reg/Starbucks: It was agreed to concretize the “specialty coffee program” by 
verifying farmers in the CAFÉ Practices profiling institution to encourage exclusive 
uses on the trading process for the Cooperative in order to produce an added value 
for the Cooperative, an indirectly to its associated farmers. 
 LRA CS Standard: it was agreed to innovatively activate the two instruments of the 
coffee public policy:  the renovation and the diversification programs by shaping their 
outputs (the PSF and the PMC ) to encourage inclusive uses on farmers compatible 
with adaptation to climate change respectful of the indigenous culture in the five 
activities of the planting process (diversification, variety, renovation, density, shade), 
as a baseline over which, actors encouraged others excluding uses to the group of 
delimited actors participating in each LRA. More than pretending to add value (that 
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was also the case by producing the environmental responsible symbolic service), it 
sought to stabilize the “value flow” for the whole group of actors, so reducing their 
vulnerability to climate shocks.  
 LRA Fairtrade: Asprocafé concretized the specialty coffee program once the FLO 
organization demanded a change of the use of Resource constituents on farmers 
(establish in the FLO certification trademark), who had to assume the cost even 
though the benefit was blurring due to the increase of Fairtrade certified coffee 
worldwide that diminished the portion being sold as Fairtrade. 
 LRA La Vereda: The non-agreement result was that the indigenous organization to 
circumvent the coffee public policy by innovatively activating both the education and 
the cultural public policies to counterbalance its activation by the FNC, so in the end, 
both actors demanded antagonist uses of Resource constituents to farmers that 
impeded provision of the demanded services (any added value to be distributed).  
o Profile: In the six LRAS in which both the deliberative scenario was fulfilled and the 
agreement on inclusive use of Resource constituents was documented, the Resource was 
profiled so it could produce the services demanded by participant actors. In the remaining 
two, the LRAs produced an unstable profile insofar as the provision of one actor implied 
depriving another. 
 LRA MH: The merged services demanded by stakeholders in production (“indigenous 
coffee” symbolic service), stakeholders in consumption (“Fairtrade coffee” symbolic 
service) and profilers-farmers (monetary services) were produced. 
 LRA Natural: All actors converged around the “natural coffee” symbolic service which, 
as it was outlined, also produced the services demanded by stakeholders in 
production (“indigenous coffee” symbolic service), stakeholders in consumption 
(“Fairtrade coffee” and “environmentally responsible coffee” symbolic services) and 
profilers who, to increase monetary services, produced the “clean cup” and “citrus 
acidity” taste related services. 
 LRA Organic: The coalition agreed to profile the services demanded by the 
stakeholders in consumption (“natural coffee”) and profiler-farmers (“monetary 
services”). 
 LRA Nespresso: The coalition agreed to profile the demanded services of profilers 
farmers (“monetary services”) by producing services demanded by stakeholders in 
consumption (the “environmentally responsible” symbolic services) and profilers-
rosters (“winy” taste related service and “brand reputation” symbolic service). 
 LRA Reg/Starbucks: The coalition agreed on a profile featured by the services 
demanded by a stakeholders in consumption (“ethical traded” and “environmentally 
responsible” symbolic services), the profiler-roaster (the “terroir expression” taste 
related services and the “brand reputation” symbolic service) and the profiler-trader 
(monetary services) that reach profilers-farmers, as shareholders of the Cooperative, 
through either dividends or services.   
 LRA CS Standard: All actors converge around a minimum profile adapted to climate 
change whose service is to guarantee over time a combination of demanded services 
by profilers (“monetary” services); stakeholders in consumption (the 
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“environmentally responsible”) and stakeholders in production (the “indigenous 
coffee” symbolic services; and the “clean cup” taste related service). 
 LRA Fairtrade: The “fair trade” sought by this LRA was produced at the expense of the 
“monetary services” sought by some producers and the “indigenous coffee” sought 
by the indigenous movement.        
 LRA La Vereda: If the “monetary” services had been produced, it would have been at 
the expense of the “indigenous coffee” symbolic service, and on the other way round.  
 
V.9.2. Buesaco 
   
The following paragraphs would expand table 39 by synthetically describing the evaluation of 
each LRA according to each analytical dimension.  
 
We start with the “coalition”, namely the group of actors that participate in the coalition which 
bring about the LRA. Then we describe the “mobilization of action resources” by each LRA (even 
though in each LRA there could be found different types of mobilization that are fully detailed 
throughout this chapter we classified the LRAs according to the most salient mobilization). 
Finally, we analyze the presence of institutional creativity in each LRA depending on both the 
procedural element (deliberative scenario) and the substantive element (the second negotiation 
dilemma), which is composed of both the distribution (uses of Resource constituents) and the 
production (the profile).  
 
1. Coalitions:  
o LRA Standard plus: Trader (The Cooperative), stakeholders in production (the FNC). 
o LRA EdN: Trader and roaster (EdN and Starbucks). 
o LRA ACDI/VOCA N: Farmers, traders, and roaster (Asoveracruz, Cooperativa del Norte and 
Cooperativa del Occidente, Nespresso), stakeholders in production (the FNC/Comité) and 
stakeholders in consumption (ACDI/VOCA) 
o LRA ACDI/VOCA S: Farmers, traders, and roaster (Producers associations, EdN, Starbucks) 
and stakeholders in consumption (ACDI/VOCA) 
o LRA Specialty: Farmers (Producers mobilized through the political party), stakeholders in 
production (FS and Gobernación de Nariño). 
o LRA Nespresso: Traders and roaster (Cooperativa del Norte and Cooperativa del 
Occidente, Nespresso), stakeholders in production (the FNC/Comité). 
o LRA CCEsp/Starbucks: Traders and roasters (Producers associations, Cooperativa de Cafés 
Especiales; Caravela and Carcafé, Starbucks). 
o LRA Caltura: Farmers and traders (Asoveracruz, Café con Altura), stakeholders in 
production (FS). 
o LRA CNilson: Farmers, traders, and roaster (Nilson’s producers network, Nilson (local 
trader), Inconexus (exporter), Royal Coffee (importer), Specialty roasters) 
 
2. Mobilization of action resources 
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o Cooperative mobilization of action resources to empower other actors with the objective 
that they can put forward their demand for services. 
 LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S: organization of the ACDI/VOCA’s and, personal and 
information of both the FNC and the SCAA were mobilized to empower coffee growers 
with information so they would be able to understand the potential services their 
coffee could produce, balancing the power game in the sense that farmers improved 
their negotiating position to move forward their demanded services. Hence, they 
concretized the specialty coffee program of the coffee public policy in order to profile 
the services demanded by the roasters Nespresso and Starbucks to provide the 
“monetary” services. 
o Strategic mobilization of action resources to profile the demanded services.  
 LRA EdN: Starbucks’s law was mobilized to concretize the civil code to incentivize 
Empresas de Nariño to produce the “terroir expression” taste related service.   
 LRA Nespresso: FNC’s personal and property was unsuccessfully mobilized to activate 
the agricultural public policy and innovatively activated the Strategic Specialty Coffee 
Plan to provide both “environmentally responsible” symbolic service and “exceptional 
coffee” taste related service in order to gain access to the Resource.    
 LRA CCEsp/Starbucks: property and organization of both the CCEsp and Caravela were 
mobilized to divert the specialty coffee program of the coffee public policy to 
incentivize roasters produce the “exceptional coffee” and the “monetary” services.  
 LRA Caltura: FS’s money and GEB’s organization were mobilized to divert the specialty 
coffee program of the coffee public policy to incentivize farmers and roasters produce 
the “exceptional coffee” and the “monetary” services. 
 LRA CNilson: organization of both Nilson and Inconexus were mobilized to divert the 
specialty coffee program of the coffee public policy to incentivize farmers and roasters 
produce the “exceptional coffee” and the “monetary” services.  
o Selfishly mobilization of action resources to produce the services demanded by the 
powerful actor. 
 LRA Standard-plus: The FNC’s information and political support were mobilized to 
concretize the Specialty coffee registration and promotion program of the coffee 
public policy to incentivize traders profiled the “terroir expression” demanded by the 
FNC at the expense of the “terroir expression” demanded by the Comité de Nariño 
and the EdN.   
 LRA Specialty: The Governor of Nariño’s political support and consensus initially, and 
law afterward, were mobilized to circumvent the coffee public policy by innovatively 
activating the Competitiveness Public Policy to put in the hands of the Government of 
Nariño the authority to incentivize farmers profile the “exceptional coffee” taste 
related service at the expense of the profile demanded by the FNC/Nespresso and 
Starbucks. 
 
3. Institutional creativity  
o Deliberative scenario: In four of the eight LRAs, different scenarios (formal and informal) 
are documented. In the remaining four, it is not possible to document the existence of a 
deliberative scenario in which the whole set of LRA’s participant actors are present. 
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 LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S: An indirect deliberative scenario was developed through the 
“value chain approach” strategy of ACDI/VOCA that put together farmers (through 
their supported by ACDI/VOCA aggregation into collective actors) with the traders and 
both roasters Nespresso and Starbucks to shape the different outputs produced by 
both LRAs.     
 LRA Specialty: La Comisión Regional de Competitividad resultant of the activation of 
the competitiveness public policy worked as a deliberative scenario in which the 
coalition could shape the final outputs.  
 LRA CNilson: Being a small group of participant actors, both the frequent direct 
bilateral interaction between profilers and the periodical multilateral interaction 
among all of them during the coffee auctions, created the deliberative scenario 
needed to shape the final outputs by the coalition.      
o Uses of Resource constituents: In the four LRAs in which there were deliberative 
scenarios, the agreements in the inclusive use of Resource constituents over the entire 
group of profilers were documented and, the distribution of both the effort of the change 
and the benefit. In the remaining five LRAs there was not an agreement between all 
participant profilers on the distribution of costs and benefits, producing winners and 
losers.   
 LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S: It was agreed to concretize the “specialty coffee program” 
through three complementary outputs (DGIS' call of ideas; SCP 1; SCP 2; SENA's 
technical assistance project) to encourage inclusive uses on coffee farmers to enhance 
productivity, quality and good environmental responsible practices during the 
planting (diversification and renovation), cultivation (soil management; coffee borer 
beetle management, pest and disease management and picking), and post-harvesting 
(hulling; fermentation; drying; waste management), and exclusively on traders (EdN 
and FNC) and roasters (Nespresso and Starbucks) the whole set of activities during the 
last four processes to produce an add value that would be irrigated throughout the 
group of profilers. 
 LRA Specialty: It was agreed to circumvented the coffee public policy by innovatively 
activating the Competitiveness Public Policy through the output “Action Plan 2011”, 
aiming to encourage inclusive uses on coffee farmers to enhance the aromatic profile 
during planting, cultivation, and post-harvesting (depending on the environmental 
offer to enhance the aromatic profile); and exclusively on Alianza Café SAS during 
trading and roasting (enhance the aromatic profile depending on the coffee lot); and 
communication Strategy (enhancing Nariño reputation as the best of Colombia), to 
produce an added value that would be captured by producers (owners of Alianza Café 
SAS).  
 LRA CNilson: It was agreed to divert the Specialty Coffee Program of the Coffee Public 
Policy through a formal contract to encourage, via prices, exclusive uses on 160 coffee 
farmers to trigger experimentation to increase chances of high-scored coffee during 
the cultivation and post-harvesting (picking and reselection), and exclusive uses on 
CNilson, Inconexus, Royal Coffee and Roasters on all activities during the last four 
processes (trading, roasting, communication strategy and brewing) to produce an add 
value that would be irrigated throughout the group of profilers. 
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 LRA Standard-plus: The FNC innovatively activated the coffee public policy to produce 
the intermediary output “Specialty Coffee Registration and Promotion Program” that 
targeted their supply network of traders so it assumed the change of the use Resource 
constituents during the trading and communication strategy to add value through an 
exceptional aromatic profile in order to increase their commercial benefit, for a group 
of producers, at the expense of farmers in Nariño.  
 LRA EdN: Non-activating the “Specialty Coffee Registration and Promotion Program”, 
Starbucks contracted with EdN the change of the use Resource constituents during 
the trading and assumed the change during the last three processes (roasting, 
communication strategy and brewing) to add value using the “terroir expression” of 
Nariño coffee to increase their commercial benefit. Farmers in Nariño did not receive 
any portion of the added value created.    
 LRA Nespresso: the FNC and Nespresso concretized both the Specialty Coffee Program 
and the renovation program to encourage inclusive uses of on coffee farmers to 
enhance productivity, quality and environmentally responsible practices. 
Nevertheless, the loss of consensus impeded proper implementation.   
 LRA CCEsp/Starbucks: Carvela alongside CCEspeciales diverted the Specialty Coffee 
Program of the Coffee Public Policy through an informal coffee purchase agreement 
to assume the change of the use Resource constituents during the trading to sort out 
the high-scored coffee from standard one and encourage through promised higher 
prices, farmers’ change in two labor-intensive activities (picking and reselection). Both 
traders increased their potential benefit assuring a larger supply of high-scored coffee 
while leaving on farmers’ hands the risk of paying the labor cost without any benefit 
if their coffee is not sold as high-scored coffee.   
 LRA Caltura: Similarly, the FS and the GEB diverted the Specialty Coffee Program of 
the Coffee Public Policy by launching a company that assumed the change of the use 
Resource constituents during the trading to sort out the high-scored coffee from 
standard one and encouraged through promised higher prices, farmers’ change in two 
labor-intensive activities (picking and reselection). Nonetheless, without any 
experience with Specialty roasters, they barely sold high-scored coffee leaving 
farmers with the cost without any benefit.   
o Profile: In the four LRAS in which both the deliberative scenario was fulfilled and the 
agreement on inclusive use of Resource constituents was documented, the Resource was 
profiled so it could produce the services demanded by participant actors. In the remaining 
five, the LRAs produced an unstable profile insofar as the provision of one actor implied 
depriving another. 
 LRAs ACDI/VOCA N&S: All actors agreed to profile the “drug substitution” symbolic 
service demanded by some stakeholders in consumption and production by profiling 
the “environmental responsible” and the “ethical traded” demanded by other 
stakeholders in consumption and the “terroir expression” taste related service 
demanded by consumers to enhance the “brand reputation” symbolic service 
demanded by profiling-roasters; and monetary services for profiling farmers. 
 LRA Specialty: The coalition agreed to profile the “exceptional coffee” taste related 
service for consumers, through a vertically integrated company owned by profilers-
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farmers so they capture the whole portion of monetary services and produce the 
“poverty reduction” symbolic service sought by stakeholders in production.   
 LRA CNilson: The coalition agreed to profile the “shared value” symbolic service 
sought by the profiler-trader through higher monetary services for profilers-farmers 
due to the profiling of the “exceptional coffee” taste related service and the 
“transparent coffee” symbolic services for profilers-roasters.  
 LRA Standard-plus: The “terroir expression” sought by this LRA was produced at the 
expense of the “monetary services” sought by producers.  
 LRA EdN: The “terroir expression” sought by this LRA was produced at the expense of 
the “monetary services” sought by producers.   
 LRA Nespresso: The “environmentally responsible” and the “shared value” symbolic 
services demanded by stakeholders in consumption was not produced, even though 
the “brand reputation” symbolic service demanded by profiler-roasters and monetary 
services for profilers (including participant farmers) were produced.  
 LRA CCEsp/Starbucks: The combination of the “exceptional coffee” taste related”; 
“transparent coffee” symbolic service and higher “monetary” services were produced 
at the expense of these services for 83% of the Resource.   
 LRA Caltura: The combination of the “exceptional coffee” taste related”; “transparent 
coffee” symbolic service and higher “monetary” services were produced at the 
expense of these services for 86% of the Resource.    
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